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Preface 
Arctic Development: In Theory & In Practice 
 
Tero Vauraste, CEO Arctia Ltd. and Chairman, Arctic Economic Council 
 
 
Mapping of the Arctic Sea started during the 15th century, as did efforts to trace various Arctic 
sea routes. A Finnish-born polar explorer, Adolf Nordenskiold, was the first to navigate the 
Northern Sea Route in 1878, successfully sailing from Norway through to the Pacific. 
Nordenskiold was made a baron but the Arctic was not ready for travel, trade and development. 
Livelihoods remained based upon traditional fishing and hunting. 
Climate change impact in the Arctic area is very significant as the temperatures in the Arctic rise 
two to three times faster than the rest of the world. This is mostly due to human activity outside 
the Arctic. 
The World Economic Forum has estimated that the Arctic investment potential is around one 
trillion USD. Approximately 20% of this investment opportunity lies in the Barents Euroarctic 
Area. 
The energy sector is still considered to hold the greatest potential, but it’s not just about 
hydrocarbons. The Arctic holds vast potential in renewables, including wind, hydro, geothermal, 
and solar. In the European Arctic, around half of the estimated economic potential is in the energy 
sector, divided 50/50 into hydrocarbons and renewables. Infrastructural potential is significant, 
too.  
There are very big differences in productivity and significance of the Arctic areas in different 
countries. On one hand, the Russian Arctic provides more than 15% of the country’s GDP, and 
Lapland’s productivity in Finland is at a nationally high level. But in other areas the Arctic is still 
very poorly developed with weak or practically non-existing infrastructure. Unemployment rates 
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are higher and social problems more severe compared to the “Non-Arctic” areas of those 
countries. 
For the Arctic’s trillion-dollar potential to be realized, international financial value chains are a 
must. The cash is not going to come from Arctic taxpayers’ pockets. 
Several years ago, the Arctic Council Task Force recommended the establishment of the Arctic 
Economic Council and envisioned a “Pan-Arctic Free Trade Zone.” Indeed, establishing strong 
market connections and ensuring market access within the region has become very important. As 
the international community works on outlining a model for Arctic development, this is more 
timely than ever; protectionism endangers sustainable development of the Arctic by inhibiting free 
exchange of the best-available technologies and services.  
Free trade is not a threat to sovereignty, but protectionism is a threat to sustainability. Fortunately, 
there are exceptions to the trend – the  EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) and the EU-Japan Free Trade Agreements are important steps in this 
development. 
The European Union launched its Arctic Policy in Winter 2016. There are three main areas in the 
policy: Climate Change and Safeguarding the Arctic Environment; Sustainable Development in 
and around the Arctic; and International Cooperation on Arctic Issues.  
China similarly published its Arctic Policy Winter 2018 acknowledging the following goals: to 
understand, protect, develop and participate in the governance of the Arctic, safeguard the 
common interests of all countries and the international community, and promote sustainable 
development of the Arctic. 
Both policies acknowledge the importance of international co-operation in decision making. This 
has become more and more important due to the recent unfortunate developments in international 
trade of new tariffs and other barriers. 
The EU Arctic Policy notes that: 
The European part of the Arctic also has significant potential to support growth in the rest of 
Europe. However, as the EU does not currently have a complete north-south traffic connection, 
it could explore the merits of strengthening links to the Arctic through trans-European networks, 
for example from Finland to Norway, providing access to the Arctic Ocean. 
Investment and business potential lie in the Arctic, at least theoretically. In practical terms there 
are many barriers, whereas the most significant one is protectionism. Challenging conditions, 
Indigenous rights and environmental aspects are important factors in economical and other 
decision making. The Arctic calls for decisionmakers’ support in lowering barriers of trade for the 
best of sustainable export and import as well as tapping the investment potential of the Arctic. 
 
Helsinki, 28 September 201
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October 14, 2017 – Arctic Yearbook 2017 is launched in Reykjavik.  
November 23 – The Inuit Circumpolar Council releases the recommendations of the 
Pikiakasorsuaq Commission calling for the creation of an Inuit-identified, Inuit-managed protected 
area between Canada and Greenland in the High Arctic.  
November 30 – Arctic 5 + 5 agree to a fisheries accord. The Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High 
Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean is formally signed October 3, 2018 in Greenland. 
December 11 – Video of an emaciated polar bear goes viral after National Geographic posts it on 
their website. They later stated they went “too far” in conflating the bear’s health condition with 
climate change.  
January 26, 2018 – China releases its Arctic Policy through an official White Paper. 
March 7 – The Arctic Council’s Working Group on Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and 
Response (EPPR) runs a table top exercise on oil spill response in the Arctic in Oulu, Finland.  
May 1-3 – Canada hosts the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable in Halifax – without Russia.  
May 22-23 – Denmark and Greenland host a high-level meeting on the occasion of the 10 year 
anniversary of the Ilulissat Declaration. 
May 23 – The Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation, signed at the 
Arctic Council Ministerial in Fairbanks in May 2017, enters into force.  
May 25 – The International Maritime Organization approves a joint proposal by the United States 
and the Russian Federation for safer ship routing in the Bering Strait and Bering Sea. 
June 28 – U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin meet in Helsinki; 
black carbon in the Arctic is referenced. 
August 23 – Maersk sends its first container ship through the Northern Sea Route. 
September 10 – MV Xue Long II, China’s second research icebreaker, is launched. 
September 15 – Canada’s first Arctic Offshore and Patrol Vessel, HMCS DeWOlf, is launched. 
October 11-12 – The Arctic Environment Ministers’ Meeting is held in Rovaniemi, Finland. 
October 25-26 – The 2nd Arctic Science Ministerial is held in Berlin, Germany. 
November 1 – Arctic Yearbook 2018 is launched in Rovaniemi, Finland. 
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Introduction  
Arctic Development, In Theory and In Practice 
 
Heather Exner-Pirot & Lassi Heininen 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Few concepts are as contested as ‘development’. It can have economic, political, or social 
implications, but in most cases connotes progress or improvement.  
And then there is the concept of ‘sustainable development’, which has found substantial currency 
in the Arctic region, even consisting of one of the Arctic Council’s two mandates. It adds an 
environmental caveat to the concept of development, contending that progress only happens if 
there isn’t a permanent environmental cost to it. 
Although Arctic governance, policy and social science is overwhelmingly concerned with 
development, it can be argued that the art and the science of it is poorly understood, though not 
for lack of effort. Arctic development is hard: tensions exist between industrial activity and 
environmental protection; and between Western and Indigenous perceptions of quality of life. 
Populations are sparse and remote, and so difficult to provide public services for. There is a 
widespread lack of labour and financial capital, affecting investment and prosperity. Infrastructure 
– roads, airports, ports, broadband, housing and hospitals - is expensive, where it exists at all. 
Southern or urban models of development don’t usually apply, and even within the Arctic lessons 
learned do not always transfer across regions.  
This year’s Arctic Yearbook theme, “Arctic Development, In Theory and In Practice” is dedicated 
to better understanding development in the Arctic region: how can we improve the well-being and 
prosperity of the residents of the Arctic? What kind of development do we want, and how can it 
be practically achieved? Development is multifaceted; so too is the scholarly focus of the 2018 
Arctic Yearbook. The articles in this volume approach these questions from a variety pf 
geographic, epistemological, and theoretical perspectives. As a whole, it continues discussions 
started in previous Arctic Yearbooks: on Change & Innovation (2017); Human Capital & Capacity 
(2014) and Governing & Governance (2015), addressing perennial questions of development.  
Arctic Yearbook 2018 
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Arctic Developments 
Political  
One bright spot in Arctic development has been political development. Few places in the world 
can claim to have assumed the level of innovation and ingenuity in political development as the 
Arctic since the 1970s, driven largely by Indigenous self-determination efforts at the local and sub-
national levels; and by a proliferation at the regional level of international organizations such as 
the Arctic Council. While far from terra nullius before the Cold War period, the growth in 
formalized governance and legal structures in the region is remarkable.  
At the same time political development in the Arctic is far from complete. There is an ongoing 
incongruity at the local level between ambitions for self-government and greater independence, 
and the tyranny of finances, whereby the tax base of northern polities is almost always inadequate 
to the need for public sector spending. Northern and Indigenous governments will not soon 
relinquish their dependence on resource revenues and/or southern capitals, though there are 
guidelines, such as the Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic and that on 
Resource Development Principles in Inuit Nunaat (in 2009), for economic self-sufficiency that 
redefine (state) sovereignty, including resource sovereignty.  
At a regional level, the burgeoning constellation of environmental, marine and other regulations 
constitutes political progress. There remain concerns however that the global warming is causing 
the Arctic to change faster than governments can manage. The diversity of stakeholders – 
Indigenous and northern communities, scientists, industry, and environmental NGOs in addition 
to governments - likely means political development processes will continue to evolve and seek 
balance.   
Social  
Social elements of development are hard to define. While much of the world accepts the basic 
parameters of the UN Human Development Index – life expectancy, education and income per 
capita – it is considered inadequate in an Arctic context. Considerable effort has gone to 
quantifying Arctic social development, for example via the Arctic Social Indicators (ASI) and 
Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic (SLiCA). Fate control and cultural vitality, for example, 
have a disproportionate importance in the Indigenous Arctic. And health encompasses much more 
than mortality, especially given the disproportionate burden of mental illness in the region, 
including substance abuse, depression, family violence and suicide, a result of colonialism and 
marginalization.  
Having influence and control over education, health care, research; and the rate and nature of 
resource development; are essential elements to the quality of social development in the Arctic. So 
is meaningful occupation, whether in the form of wage employment, subsistence activities, school 
attendance or care giving. The transition from a traditional to a wage economy, and towards a 
globalized society, has disrupted social norms and ties. Arctic communities are seeking a new 
equilibrium in their social development, but there remains little consensus on what that should or 
will look like.  
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Economic 
Economic development in the Arctic comes primarily in two very different shapes: industrial and 
local. Public discussions about Arctic development mostly focus on the former: oil & gas, large 
scale mineral development and global shipping. There is a reasonable amount of academic analyses 
on these topics, though they are often written from a commodities or markets-centred perspective, 
rather than an Arctic-specific one. Popular approaches to the subject often fall into a hype trap, 
assuming that Arctic commodities will be exploited based on conventional market forces without 
looking closely at the larger political, social, technical and environmental context dominated the 
aspect of centralization and controlled by states and their State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), as well 
as Trans National Corporations (TNCs). Arctic resource development is highly subject to boom 
and bust periods, not only in exploration but in attention. The nuance and broader perspective 
provided by scholarly analyses is needed.       
Local regional development in the Arctic remains a puzzle. We do not have a good handle on 
strategies to diversify economies, create jobs or attract investment in the rural Arctic beyond large 
scale resource development. This is exacerbated in the Indigenous territories of the North 
American and most of the Russian Arctic, where distances are vast, infrastructure is more limited, 
and a market-oriented culture has yet to develop. In the absence of a market economy, the public 
sector has flourished, but with the unintended consequence of making the development of small 
business a challenge in the North due to wage inflation, high costs and competition from 
government employers. Traditional economies – hunting, fishing, gathering and reindeer herding 
– remain important but often require participation in the wage economy to support the purchase 
of gasoline, snow machines/mobiles, rifles and other equipment. Tourism is often pointed to as a 
solution but is better seen as complementing, rather than leading, rural Arctic growth.  
Despite the need, relatively little academic analysis has focused on regional economic development 
– at least not from an economics or business perspective (though tourism is proving an exception). 
The field is dominated by political scientists, anthropologists, geographers and sociologists; but 
has few economists. The results are predictable: economic development strategies that produce 
policies and recommendations divorced from basic economic principles.  
Sustainable   
The concept of sustainable development has an almost ethereal quality in the Arctic: the raison 
d’être of so many government policies and efforts. And yet it is essentially contested. If resource 
development is the basis of the Arctic economy, can it ever be truly sustainable? What happens 
when the two elements – sustainability and development – are at odds? Can you have political self-
determination without economic development, and can you have economic development that is 
sustainable? If sustainable development consists of three elements: society, economics and the 
environment, can you have economic development that is sustainable without having clear, even 
strict, environmental regulations? In few places of the world is balance achieved; in the Arctic, the 
scales are arguably tipped in the direction of sustainability, as moratoria, regulations and protected 
areas dominate policy efforts. Efforts to promote entrepreneurship, small business development 
or the knowledge economy remain largely abstract.        
The Arctic Council has as a mandate ‘sustainable development’ and a dedicated Working Group 
for the purpose. The Finnish Chairmanship has focused on making links between the United 
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Nations 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Arctic context. Furthermore, the 
question is if the SDGs, or the UN Global Compact 10 Principles, fit to the reality of Arctic local 
and regional actors, and reflect their priorities. But there is a sense that these have been imposed, 
or juxtaposed, on to the region. If everything is sustainable development, is anything sustainable 
development? 
Arctic Yearbook 2018 Content 
As an effort to address many of these questions and more, we are proud to publish here a 
comprehensive and diverse collection of articles all focused on solving a piece of the Arctic 
development puzzle.  
The scholarly articles are divided into six sections addressing the issues of greatest contemporary 
interest in Arctic development. 
Thinking About Arctic Development  
A handful of articles provide some high level thinking on Arctic development history, character, 
and processes. Andrey N. Petrov, in his contribution entitled Re-Tracing Development Paths: Exploring 
the Origins & Nature of the 20th Century’s Northern Development Paradigms in Russia and Canada, explores 
the history of the 20th century development ‘projects’ in Canada and Russia/USSR, focusing on 
the relationship between state-promoted modernization discourses, power, and development.  
Maxwell C. McGrath-Horn & Ryan R. Uljua attempt to answer the question Is the Arctic an Emerging 
Market? in their article entitled the same. After discussing the prominent frameworks and assessing 
available data they find that by most customary metrics the Arctic is not a traditional emerging 
market, but rather a nascent transactional arena nestled inside of stable, highly developed 
economies where buyers and sellers nonetheless have difficulty in conducting transactions, 
particularly in capital markets. 
Jessica Metuzals & Myra J. Hird examine the fundamental differences in approach between 
Western and Inuit epistemologies and development strategies using Areva’s (now Orano), a 
uranium miner, efforts in Qamani’tuaq/Baker Lake in Nunavut, Canada, as a case study in their 
paper “The Disease that Knowledge Must Cure”?: Sites of Uncertainty in Arctic Development. The paper 
demonstrates how the differing approaches – with Areva seeking certainty and the Inuit 
community seeing uncertainty as a given, resulted in claims that were deeply contested and 
deconstructed when positioned against the contextual and relational knowledge of local residents.  
Finding Sustainability in Development 
Sustainable development is a hot topic, as well as a hotly debated topic. Several authors attempt to 
define and describe sustainable development in the Arctic and the efforts to advance it.  
In his paper on Indexing Arctic Urban Sustainable Development Planning Strategies: The Case of Russia, 
Alexander Sergunin discusses possible indicators to evaluate the Sustainable Development 
Strategies (SDS) of the major industrial cities of the Russian Arctic, where efforts are ongoing to 
develop and implement the proper conceptual, legal and institutional settings. 
Continuing the focus on cities, David Chapman, Kristina L. Nilsson, Agatino Rizzo and Agneta 
Larsson explore urban design principles for winter settlements in their article Updating Winter: The 
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Importance of Climate-Sensitive Urban Design for Winter Settlements. Winter communities have evolved 
lifestyles and means suited to living and working with local conditions and seasonal variation. 
However, climate change will cause changes in weather that will require adaptation in such 
communities.  
Jørgen S. Søndergaard brings a more philosophical perspective on sustainable development, 
arguing about the importance of language in his article When Words Matter: The Concept of “Sustainable 
Development” Derailed with Words Like “Economy,”, “Social,” & “Environment”. The struggle for 
recognition of the cultural dimension as an integral part of sustainable development thus remains 
important in an Arctic context. Focusing on the main points of the Finnish Presidency’s Arctic 
Council Program for the period 2017 - 2019, he concludes that the struggle to expand the 
understanding and definition of ‘sustainable development’ to include the cultural dimension - and 
thus go beyond “economy”, “social” and “environment” - continues. 
Naja Carina Steenholdt and Daniela Chimirri explore a case of local, sustainable development in 
the form of tourism in their article Tourism & Quality of Life in Greenland: Exploration through farm 
Stays in South Greenlandic Settlements. They explore how the developing tourism industry in South 
Greenland interrelates with resident quality of life in this area. By applying the bottom-up spillover 
theory as a theoretical frame, they investigate whether generated income from farm tourism can 
contribute to people’s state of wellbeing, but find that there is more to wellbeing than “just” 
money. 
Pierre-Louis Têtu, Jackie Dawson and Julia Olsen examine another aspect of Arctic tourism in 
Navigating Governance Systems & Management Practices for Pleasure Craft Tourism in the Arctic. Their study 
identifies practices regarding the management and governance of pleasure craft in Arctic regions, 
including inventorying national, regional and local regulations. Using data from secondary sources, 
statistical information, and Coast Guard reports, they discuss the diversity of management policies 
that exist throughout the Arctic that support and manage pleasure craft tourism, and conclude that 
harmonization of governance frameworks and improved reporting mechanisms among Arctic 
states could be beneficial. 
Research, Education & Arctic Development  
Perhaps more so than any other region, research is an integral aspect of Arctic development, for 
better and for worse. Who has the capacity to direct, conduct, and benefit from such research is a 
topic of debate. Samantha Darling, Aynslie Ogden and Gordon M. Hickey assess one aspect of 
this in their paper Reviewing Northern Capacity for Enhancing Impact Assessment (IA) in Yukon Territory, 
Canada. They explore the concept of ‘capacity’ in its various forms and considers its core relevance 
to ensuring effective IA processes associated with northern development. Through a literature 
review, they identify that ambiguity surrounding the concept of capacity requires careful policy 
attention to fully appreciate conditions that prompt appeals for increased northern research 
capacity and help minimize confusion amongst different actors and institutions working to build 
northern capacity. 
Rapid development of digitization and replication technologies reveals a potential for empowering 
community heritage restoration and perpetuation, as well as strengthen abilities of distant 
stewardship institutions to improve access, improve community collaborations and enhance their 
capacity for cultural preservation. Medeia Csoba DeHass and Eric Hollinger address this 
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development potential for research in the Arctic in 3D Heritage Preservation & Indigenous Communities 
in the Circumpolar North. 
What role can education play in promoting development? A large network including Lau Øfjord 
Blaxekær, Martin Mohr Olsen, Hanne Thomasen, Maria Tammelin Gleerup, Sune Nordentoft 
Lauritsen, Anne Lise Kappel, Kristoffer Buch, Pål Simon Fernvall and Jay Friedlander describe 
one model in their paper The Sustainable Development Goals & Student Entrepreneurship in the Arctic. 
Their article analyses their joint project which sought to support the entrepreneurial potential 
among students to the benefit of the sustainable development of Arctic societies. The project built 
on two key frameworks: 1) The UN Sustainable Development Goals, and 2) The Abundance Cycle 
framework. By incorporating social, environmental as well as financial aspects, the internationally 
recognised Abundance Cycle framework provided an operational approach for working with 
sustainable entrepreneurship and a toolkit for incorporating sustainability thinking into teaching 
and entrepreneurial projects in higher education in the Arctic.  
Mîtdlârak Lennert examines education from a grassroots perspective in Coherence in the Greenlandic 
Education System? Educational Planning & Evaluation in Greenland from a Complexity Theory Perspective. 
She analyzes Greenland’s primary and lower secondary school governance system and how the 
central level design organizes and steers education systems across complex multilevel governance 
arrangements. How these central and decentralized levels interact and communicate, and how this 
affects trust, cooperation and negotiation of conflicts, and ultimately the outcomes of reform, is 
discussed using interviews with local officials and stakeholders, as well as field observation. 
In another collaborative project, Kamilla Nørtoft, Sidse Carrol, Anu Siren, Peter Bjerregaard, 
Christina Viskum, Lytken Larsen, Merete Brædder, Lise Hounsgaard and Tenna Jensen discuss 
how collaboration between research and practice can be an important factor in sustainable 
development in Enhancing Well-Being Among Older People in Greenland through Partnerships of Research, 
Practice & Civil Society. In their project they study ageing policy, homecare, institutions, professional 
practices and the municipal administration of these as well as older people’s health, well-being, 
everyday life and historical perceptions of the roles of older people in Greenland. Researchers and 
municipalities collaborate together to develop relevant and appropriate policies and initiatives.  
Science Based Governance & Regulation of Arctic Energy Installations 
This section provides an overview of the potential risks and impacts associated with the 
construction and operation of offshore installations in the Arctic, drawing on expertise from a 
range of disciplines including law, environmental science, management, and politics. The content 
of the special section has its roots in a network established with the support of the UK Arts and 
Humanities Research Council: The Science Based Governance and Regulation of Arctic Energy 
Installations Network (SciBAr Installations) and is guest edited by Elizabeth A. Kirk of 
Nottingham Trent University.  
The papers give some indication of the range of relevant disciplines and issues to be addressed if 
we are to ensure a 360 degree review of the regulation of offshore energy installations in the Arctic.  
Thus Vinogradov & Azubuike take a traditional legal approach in assessing the current global and 
regional regulations relating to pollution from offshore petroleum operations in the Arctic and 
propose solutions to identified gaps in the existing Arctic regime in the form of a regional 
intergovernmental framework or an industry-wide compensation scheme. Kirk & Miller provide 
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an interdisciplinary analysis of the ways in which gaps in scientific understanding of the potential 
impacts from oil and gas installations on the marine environment may raise legal questions such 
as what “significant transboundary pollution” means in the Arctic context. Poppel’s paper also 
directly links to oil and gas activities, but focuses more on the impacts or potential impacts on the 
political discourse in Greenland.  
Two of the papers range slightly more widely, in that they address topics which encompass issues 
pertaining to Arctic offshore energy installations as well as broader issues. Thus Basaran’s paper 
on civil liability for oil pollution has potential implications for the transit passage of oil tankers as 
well as pollution from shipping transporting oil from Arctic installations. Similarly, Andræsen, 
Borch & Ikonen’s analysis of Arctic marine emergency response draws out how Arctic operational 
conditions add to inter-organizational coordination challenges in delivering emergency response 
to all maritime operations, not just those relating to offshore energy installations.    
Russian Arctic Development & the Environment 
Covering half the Arctic and with a majority of its inhabitants as well as its economic activity, there 
can be no discussion on Arctic development without addressing Russian Arctic development; and 
there is no addressing Russian Arctic development without discussing the environment.    
Irina Chesnokova, Emma Likhacheva and Aleksandra Morozova look at the imminent 
environmental risks to the Russian Arctic in Stable Development of the Natural Environment in the Arctic 
Region of the Russian Federation. These dangers are associated with extreme climate conditions, the 
focal character of economic development, remoteness from major industrial centers, and low 
stability of ecological systems, which are susceptible even to minor climatic and anthropogenic 
impacts. Attention is paid to changing geocryological and geomorphological conditions, which 
lead to the activation of exogenous processes in the continental part of the Arctic zone.  
Daryana Maximova considers the fundamental problem of ensuring sustainable development of 
the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation in her article Sustainable Development of the Russian Arctic 
Zone: Challenges & Opportunities. This paper examines the Russian Arctic’s challenges and 
opportunities regarding sustainable development, including an analysis of the recent Russian plans 
in relation to the territorial development. These plans include the new edition of the Russian state 
program on the Arctic’s socio-economic development, released in August 2017. The main idea of 
this document and the future law “On the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation” is to create 
support zones which will be complex projects of social and economic development of the Arctic 
territories, with the Northern Sea Route as the main navigable artery and the central project. 
Despite external perceptions, Russia has a notable, stewardly emphasis concerning the Arctic 
offshore environment. Troy J. Bouffard explains why in his article Authoritarian Administration: An 
Environmental Paradox in the Russian Arctic. He suggests that Russia not only enables deliberately 
different behaviors, but could also be setting conditions through its Arctic maritime environmental 
priorities in order to eventually leverage soft power for the purposes of contesting established 
international rules. In support of this examination, the use of authoritarian environmentalism 
provides the framework in which to view the evidence and perspectives.  
In determining the economic efficiency, or rationale, for Russian Arctic oil and gas investment, 
purely commercial considerations are no longer sufficient due to high capital intensity, the use and 
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creation of special (innovative) materials, machinery and technologies, the lack of production 
infrastructure in most of the territories, and the increased sensitivity of the natural environment of 
the Arctic zone to man-caused stresses. Mansur H. Gazeev, Natalia A. Volynskaya and Anatoly B. 
Rybak develop a more realistic and comprehensive equation for investment in their article Complex 
Efficiency Assessment of Development of Arctic Oil & Gas Resources in Russia.  
The Polar Silk Road & Arctic Maritime Development 
The release this year of China’s White Paper on Arctic policy, and their particular interest and 
potential for influence in polar shipping, led to a spate of analysis on the Polar Silk Road. Providing 
the context for this issue, Kong Soon Lim’s article on China’s Arctic Policy & the Polar Silk Road 
Vision considers three questions: (1) what are China’s key interests in the Arctic, (2) what are the 
aims and basis of China’s Arctic policy as outlined in the White Paper and (3) how does China’s 
Arctic policy complement with its Polar Silk Road vision as an extension of its Belt and Road 
Initiative?    
Examining this issue from a regional perspective is Lau Øfjord Blaxekær, Marc Lanteigne and 
Mingming Shi’sThe Polar Silk Road & the West Nordic Region. On the one hand, China’s enhanced 
Arctic engagement and strategic collaboration with the Nordic region, which includes the Arctic, 
maritime economy, and bio-economy, seem very promising for West Nordic development. On the 
other hand, geo-political unease about Chinese investments in the Arctic raise questions about 
what happens when the large-scale geopolitics meet the micro-scale geopolitics of the West Nordic 
Region.  
In Arctic Blue Economic Corridor: China’s Role in the Development of a New Connectivity Paradigm in the 
North, Vasilii Erokhin, Gao Tianming and Zhang Xiuhua discuss the critical points in the 
implementation of China’s paradigm of collaboration and connectivity in the Arctic. They further 
focus on the promotion of bilateral win-win investment and trade projects with the countries along 
the potential Arctic Blue Economic Corridor (ABEC). The authors conclude that the ABEC may 
be efficiently incorporated into China’s Belt and Road network, but emphasize that specific 
technological and economic challenges have to be considered and met before a sustainable 
connectivity between the markets of Asia and Europe is established in the Arctic. 
Derek Moscato examines how China’s pursuits in the Arctic region are being perceived in The Polar 
Silk Road in the Popular Press: Global Media Framing of China’s 2018 Arctic Policy White Paper. Drawing 
from media framing theory, his study establishes how three prominent media outlets from North 
America, Europe, and Asia covered China’s high-profile Arctic publication. China’s self-
identification as a “Near-Arctic State” created an inevitable focal point for the press and 
subsequent dialogue highlighting the convergence of Chinese and Arctic affairs. 
To conclude the section, Arctic Yearbook’s Chair of its Editorial Board, Lawson Brigham, 
contributes his seventh straight commentary, this year focusing on China’s Polar Ships and Future 
Operations, adding a dose of reality to the hyperbole one often finds in the Western media about 
Chinese capabilities in the Arctic.  
Briefing Notes 
Finally, as in previous volumes, the Arctic Yearbook 2018 contains a number of Briefing Notes – 
shorter, more analytical than theoretical pieces, on issues of current relevance.   
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Ashlee-Ann E. Pigford, Samantha Darling and Gordon M. Hickey describe the many expenses 
involved in contemporary, ethical Arctic research in The Need to Better Unpack the Transaction Costs 
Associated with Northern Research in Canada. 
Afroja Khanam provides a much needed Global South perspective on the widespread impacts of 
global warming in her piece On the Link between Climate Change and Forced Migration: The Impact of 
Climate Change in the Arctic and Global South – An Analysis in the Context of Bangladesh. 
Malgorzata Smieszek, Tahnee Prior and Olivia Matthews describe their exciting and increasingly 
influential initiative Women of the Arctic: Bridging Policy, Research & Lived Experience.  
Stefan Brocza and Andreas Brocza offer their scepticism on the European Union’s future 
involvement in the Arctic in their short article entitled Less EU in the Arctic Region after 2020. 
Finally, Peter Kujawinski provides an eloquent summary of the 2018 Calotte Academy, an annual 
travelling symposium crossing the Euro-Arctic which has been organised by Lassi Heininen for 
decades.  
In addition, for the first time the Arctic Yearbook has published a separate Special Section, which 
we warmly welcome, on China & the Arctic, containing seven scholarly articles and one Briefing 
Note, and guest edited by Ane Bislev, Ulrik Pram Gad and Jesper Willaing Zeuthen. This timely 
collection, focusing on the recent Chinese White Paper on the Arctic, Chinese resource 
development, China’s role in Arctic governance and politics, is available at: 
https://arcticyearbook.com/arctic-yearbook/2018/china-the-arctic.    
Conclusion 
Strategies for Arctic development remain a puzzle, despite, or perhaps because of, decades of state 
led efforts to grow economies, create jobs, improve health and wellness, and increase educational 
attainment. While investment and interest in Arctic scientific research has been growing over the 
past decade in the face of climate change, the academic research on Arctic development has largely 
stagnated, both intellectually and financially. This volume represents our effort to stimulate the 
field. Social science research cannot improve Arctic development outcomes in and of itself, but it 
is an essential component to finding smarter and more effective strategies that positively impact 
human wellbeing in the Circumpolar North. 
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This paper lays the ground for re-tracing and re-examining the 20th century discourses of regional development in the Russian 
and Canadian North. Comparing development paths of the two Norths in the 20th century, it is appropriate to ask whether 
these distinctions and commonalities stem from similarities and differences between development discourses in these regions. The 
paper explores the history of the 20th century development ‘projects’ in Canada and Russia/USSR focusing on the relationship 
between state-promoted modernization discourses, power, and development. In doing so, it also investigates the link between 
social construction and material production of the North. It argues that both development trajectories bear a considerable level 
of similarity attributable to the types of discourses that empowered the development policies in the 20th century. At the same 
time, it identifies differences which led to the divergence of development paths of the Canadian vs. Russian North. 
 
 
Introduction 
Public policies can be seen as institutionalized products of dominant discourses, empowered by 
regional development actors, e.g., state and corporations (Duhaime, 2010). In Jessop’s terms 
(1990), discourses embraced by such ‘hegemonic blocks’ are societalized through societal 
structures and actor strategies, in which the state plays a central role. Therefore, when studying 
development policies, it is necessary to analyze the predominant discursive paradigms. Discourse 
is a socially embedded practice of obeying certain rules (Foucault, 1970). It is in possession of 
knowledge that is considered to be the ‘truth’, and it constructs a ‘topic’ (or a particular paradigm) 
by producing the objects of knowledge shared by people. A discourse of development is thus 
related to power, and through formal or informal means of regulating governs the behaviors of 
societal actors.  
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This paper is an essay that attempts to lay the ground for re-tracing and re-examining the 20th 
century discourses of regional development in the Russian and Canadian Norths. Given both differences 
and similarities in regional development paths of the two Norths (Agranat, 1992; Barr & Bradshaw, 
1983; Petrov, 2012), it is appropriate to ask whether they reflect distinctions and commonalities 
between development discourses in these regions. This paper sets up an argument that both 
development trajectories share a considerable level of similarities attributable to the types of 
discourses that empowered the (colonial) policies in the 20th century. At the same time, the study 
points to systemic differences that determined the divergence of the development paths of the 
Canadian vs. Russian Norths. Although the paper limits its analysis to a number of key texts and 
documents that most explicitly introduce and describe predominant discourses on northern 
development, the essay builds a case for further examination of archaeologies and genealogies of 
these discourses and their influence on development processes and outcomes in the Canadian and 
Russian Norths.       
Northern Development in the Context of Global Development ‘Projects’  
In the 20th century, the northern frontier has been an object of discursive development policies 
and, in effect, has been a discursively constructed space (West, 1991). From the constructivist 
position, one may argue that the material being from the North and its development path is a 
reflection of discursive policies, empowered by social actors and societal institutions throughout 
the history of colonization. In order to unveil the nature of regional development regimes in the 
North, it is necessary to find out how development in the North has been socially produced. 
Therefore, one needs to contemplate the archaeologies and genealogies of hegemonic northern 
development discourses in Canada and Russia.  
Any discussion of this matter, however, is impossible without placing development in the North 
into the global context of development projects that have been imposed around the 
“underdeveloped” world throughout the 20th century. Summarizing these experiences, Peet & 
Watts (1993) pointed out the existence of the dominant Western regional discursive formation of 
development that crosses political and geographic boundaries in shaping development doctrines. 
This formation (exposed and criticized in the postcolonial literature) presents an overarching 
framework for modernist discourses of development; a framework “calibrated around the relative 
weight attributed in its normative vision to the role of the state, the market, and civil institutions” 
(Peet & Watts, 1993: 233), all of which share a number of principal similarities. It is based on the 
normative views on development imported from the West (Escobar, 1995; Watts, 1993). Resting 
on assumptions and ideals invented by classical and neoclassical economists, equipped by the 
Western strategies of economic growth and enforced by the state or international organizations, 
the colonial development doctrine emphasizes industrialization, external aid and development 
planning. By emulating the Western economic success, development efforts were designed to fulfill 
a “civilizing mission” of colonialism and attempt to create “modernist utopias” (Scott, 1998), 
neither acknowledging economic differences nor appreciating cultural diversity around the world 
(Power, 2003). While the manifestation of the Western discourse of development are largely 
documented in the “Third World,” the “internal colonies” within more developed countries have 
also been deeply affected (Sidaway, 2002).  
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Interpretation of development as a hegemonic discursive project (Radcliffe, 2005; Sidaway, 2007), 
applies to the Canadian and Russian Norths. The ‘Western’ discourse of development was intact 
in the northern frontier as much as it was in the ‘developing’ countries: “[t]he systemic exploitation 
and Othering of ethnically or spatially distinct populations” (Sidaway, 2002: 18-19) and the 
marginalization of internal colonies constituted the dynamics of the “settler capitalism” in Canada. 
As their counterparts in Asia, Latin America, and Africa, northern developers believed that “a 
majority of the people who live in the north want a change in present conditions which 
corresponds to what is generally understood as modernization” (Orvik, 1983: 11). Applied at the 
national scale, this development discourse juxtaposed the ‘developed’ mainland versus the 
‘underdeveloped’ frontier; this justified the ‘regime of truth’, under which the superiority of 
‘developed’ was unquestionable (Pretes, 1988). The assumption of the mainland’s supremacy over 
the hinterland validated the state-led economic, political, and social intervention in the periphery.  
The Canadian and Soviet development doctrines engaged the ‘othering’ of the North in order to 
separate the North from the South (just like the Orient from the Occident (Said, 1978)), to 
accentuate its dissimilarity and distinction through ‘nordification’ (West, 1991) and then to exploit 
and govern the North. Much like in other parts of the ‘developing’ world, ‘othering’ has been 
utilized and promoted by the state and corporations; this estrangement of the North is therefore 
used as a justification for commodification and means of governing it (see Watts, 2003 for a 
discussion of links between capitalism, governance and development). On the other hand, a ‘dis-
othering’, i.e. the emulation of the Western (or, in the context of Russia and Canada, ‘southern’) 
development path, was the implicit objective of development policies. ‘Dis-othering’ through 
development served the task of making the North an exploitable and governable space.  
The Canadian North  
The invention of the “Canadian North” as a space of economic colonization is captured by Harold 
Innis’s (1956) notion of a perpetual dichotomy between the North and the South (“mainland”). 
The “Innisian” hinterland discourse was a manifestation of the European colonial discourse, in 
which the alienation of the ‘other’ (e.g. the frontier, the North, the Orient) was a prerequisite for 
its subsequent exploitation by metropolis (Pretes, 1988). The ‘staple theory’ of Harold Innis 
continues to be one of the most powerful conceptualizations of the nature of the Canadian 
resource frontier (Barnes, 1993), and is considered foundational for understanding Canadian 
nordicity (Barnes, 1993; Evenden, 1999; Francis, 2003; Katerberg, 2003). For Innis “the economic 
history of Canada has been dominated by the discrepancy between the centre and the margin of 
western civilization” (Innis, 1956: 385). By this Innis favored the ‘othering’ of the North from the 
rest of Canada implying the alienation of the North from the South and subsequent exploitation 
of the former by the latter.  
The Hudson’s Bay Company that governed the Canadian North on behalf of the British 
government was engaged in exploiting the region, but never ventured to develop or settle it (Rich, 
1958). Notably, this paradigm of colonization contrasted with the American ‘Turnerism’ practiced 
in colonizing the Great American West and the Canadian Prairies. The latter was a colonial 
discourse of acquisition and expropriation of the frontier (Francis, 2003), when the frontier has 
been deemed a continuation of the mainland, not its antipode (Wood, 2006). Although the 
immediate effect of both approaches was a subordination of colonized spaces and a ‘cyclonic’ 
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(using Innis’s metaphor) nature of regional development (Barnes et al, 2001) in association with 
resource cycles and extreme instability of economies and population, the long-term differences 
emerged in the ability of regional systems to withstand the economic ‘storms’ and ‘calms’. 
However, by the early 1950s, the Canadian (or was it British?) discourse of development in the 
North underwent significant changes. The Canadian state found itself in a new political, economic 
and geographic environment, when the importance of northern resources and of the space itself 
increased (Pearson, 1946). In the emerging national consciousness with its mythical representation 
of Canada as a nation of the ‘true North’, the northern frontier has increasingly become “a resource 
and economic hinterland, which is simultaneously incorporated in a social spatialization as a mythic 
heartland” (Shields, 1991: 163). In addition, the country had to respond to the increasing demands 
of the resource-thirsty Fordism (Jensen, 1989) and to assert its political control over northlands. 
It also could no longer ignore critical social problems in the region and its socioeconomic 
backwardness, even compared to Alaska and Siberia (Rea, 1968).  
The formal inauguration of the new discursive paradigm of developing the North came in the 
1950s, when Canada’s Prime Minister John Diefenbaker launched a new national policy for the 
North known as the Northern Vision. Diefenbaker’s program emphasized the development of 
infrastructure and communication using public funds in order to facilitate access to resources and 
link staple regions with the south (Diefenbaker, 1958; Rea, 1976; Bone, 2003). Implicitly, this 
program aimed to make the North a more exploitable and governable space, a utopist land of 
modernization and prosperity. According to the new discursive paradigm, the federal and 
provincial governments assumed the responsibility for maintaining growth and welfare in the 
hinterland. They also implemented measures to facilitate Indigenous ‘social modernization’ 
(Hamilton, 1994). Development and planning were formally institutionalized through establishing 
and expanding responsible government agencies and passing regulatory legislation (e.g., “instant 
town” acts).  
The Northern Vision was a manifestation of a new hegemonic discourse of northern development 
that may be termed ‘Diefenbakerism’. Diefenbakerism brought about a doctrine of centrally-
planned publicly-funded development and of shared responsibility between the state and 
monopolistic capital. It became a central component of the new development regime in the 
Canadian North. This regime, dominant in the 1950-1970s, secured the rapid expansion of 
resource exploitation through the ideologies of Fordism. Not entirely dis-alienating the frontier, 
Diefenbakerism moved closer to ‘Turnerism’ in its desire to make the North an integral part of 
the national territory and national identity. Not accidentally, Diefenbaker offered this metaphorical 
connection in his Northern Vision speech: “Sir John A. Macdonald … opened the West. He saw 
Canada from East to West. I see a new Canada - a Canada of the North” (Diefenbaker, 1958: 1).  
Diefenbakerism was almost uncontested until the early 1970s, when alternative counter-discourses, 
propelled by environmentalism and Aboriginalism, began to emerge (Hayter, 2003). The adequacy 
of the industrialism (and “high modernism” as termed by Scott in 1998) for delivering viability to 
northern regions was boldly challenged. The 1972 Federal Government strategy of northern 
development demonstrated a shift towards mixed development, community viability, 
environmental issues and Aboriginal people. The policy studies by the Canadian Council on Rural 
Development (1974) and the Science Council (1977) advocated abandoning the objective of 
“industrial growth” by means of mega-projects in favor of “locally based development strategies” 
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and mixed development options (industrial and traditional sectors, non-renewable and renewable 
resources (Barrie, 1987: 97). Most vocally, the Diefenbakerist doctrine was confronted in the 
Berger’s inquiry (1977) that disputed the legacy of resource mega-projects and emphasized the 
importance to Indigenous rights and institutions in regional development. In essence, these 
writings outlined a counter-discourse that rejected the idea of “opening and modernizing the 
North,” i.e. the central premises of Diefenbakerism and the Western development discourse in 
general.   
The Soviet North  
The development regime in the Russian-Soviet North was based on different, although not 
completely opposite, approaches. Much like in Canada, the Soviet discourse of developing the 
North was based on ‘othering’ the North from the mainland and assigning a unique role to the 
region in the national mythology. If the Canadian northern development discourse could be traced 
to Harold Innis, the genealogy of the Soviet one points to Vladimir Lenin. However, Bolsheviks’ 
views largely inherited the core components of the Russian Imperial discourse on Siberia. In the 
public consciousness of the Imperial Russia, Siberia has always been the ‘other’, but yet has been 
considered ‘ours’ (Weiss, 2007). Much like the American West, Siberia emerged as a mythical realm 
of future power and prosperity, therefore an exotic, yet, integral part of Russia.  
After taking power, Lenin (1918) strongly promoted the idea of rapid exploration and development 
of the North. A new discourse of development fully emerged in the 1920s, when the Bolsheviks’ 
government proposed an ambitious plan of economic and social development of the country, 
known as the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia (GOELRO) plan (Bandman & 
Chistobaev, 1990). The leitmotif of GOELRO, derived from the Marxist economic theory, was 
the “rationalization of allocation of productive forces” based on the geographic division of labor. 
GOELRO propagated the minimization of transportation costs by moving production closer to 
raw materials. In addition, GOELRO as a spatial planning document, advocated so called 
“complex” development (Granik, 1971). The regional economy was based on developing “not of 
one industry, not one factory, but of a sum of all economic relations, sum of all economic turnover” 
(Lenin, 1918 (1972), emph. orig.). The origins of the GOELRO strategy could be found in Marx’s 
and more extensively in Engels’s works, by whose writings Bolshevik’s agenda was justified.  
In “Anti-Duhring” Engels contended that “large scale industry has hereby to a considerable extent 
freed production from the restrictions of space…Society liberated from the barriers of capitalist 
production can go much further still” and reach “the most equal distribution possible of large scale 
industry over the whole country” (as cited in Hill & Gaddy, 2003). This ‘Engels dictum’ became a 
major discourse of the Soviet planning and economic geography. Laid upon Lenin’s concept of 
complex economic and social development, the paradigm of the equalization of development 
across the county was seized as a goal of socialism. Not surprisingly, a great Soviet explorer and 
geographer Ivan Papanin called the development of the North “a ring in a chain of the great 
[socialist] transformation of the country” (Papanin, 1977: 141, translation A.P.). 
Soviet planners fully embraced this discourse. The themes of “the conquest of the North” and 
“overcoming the nature” became quintessential for planning in the early Soviet period (e.g., 
Sergeev, 1949). Northern romanticism and desire to drastically transform the North were going 
hand-in-hand with policies of socialist collectivization and industrialization (McCannon, 1998), 
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which these planners designed. It is quite interesting that some romantic and development clichés 
were borrowed directly from the North American experience, specifically from the Turnerist 
practices of territorial acquisition by conquering and populating the hinterland.  
For example, an article with an intriguing title “Canadianization of the Murmansk Railway” 
(Chirkin, 1923), published in one of the northern Russia local magazines in the early 1920s 
advocated using the Canadian Prairies experience to colonize the Russian North. (A Turnerist 
discourse was prevalent in the Canadian Prairies, but has not been ‘extended’ to the Canadian Far 
North (Wood, 2006)). Canadians, in this article author’s opinion, introduced a successful system 
of attracting settlers and investment to areas along the newly built transcontinental railways that, 
he argued, should be adopted in Russia. In other literature sources of the time, the references to 
the “Canadian scheme” of development have also been made in relation to the settlement of 
peasants in Siberia (Voronov, 2006). 
By accepting a more proactive modernization paradigm, the Soviet discourse and associated policy 
of northern development substantially diverged from the Canadian discourse of that time. In fact, 
it appears to be closer to Turnerism; it viewed the frontier as an extension and not an adversary of 
the core. The North was “true” and “purely” Soviet, just like the Great West was American (i.e., 
an extension of the U.S. eastern core). The Soviet discourse empowered ideas of acquisition and 
expropriation of the North-space and its resources. This fundamental difference is the ultimate 
reason for drastically more extensive development of the Soviet North.  
The early Soviet discourse of the North was a discourse of romanticism and modernistic 
triumphalism. From heroic explorers (Papanin, 1977) to economic planners (Slavin, 1972) and the 
general public (see McCannon, 1998), there was a common belief in making the North a Soviet 
stronghold. Some geographers even argued that soon enough the North will shrink and eventually 
become an irrelevant concept, because it would be indistinguishable from the rest of the country 
(Sergeev, 1949). It is interesting to mention that the Russian/Soviet literature on the subject has 
always used the term ‘osvoenie’ to describe the process of development in the northern frontier. 
Osvoenie literally means “making something your own”. Osvoenie, implies not merely domestication, 
but expropriation and acquisition. In Russian texts, it is often conflated with modernization, 
settlement, and resource exploitation (Agranat, 1984; Bandman & Chistobaev, 1990; Slavin, 1972; 
Karpov, 1972).    
The dominant discourse materialized in public policies. In 1932, the Soviet Government (State 
Committee for Planning or Gosplan) adopted the concept of northern development, which 
required including the North into the plans of ‘rational [i.e., equalized or even] distribution of 
productive forces’ (Letopis’ Severa, 1979). It was argued that single-industry development was 
disadvantageous and against the principles of socialist political economy, which required balancing 
among economic sectors in each region (Egorov & Lischenok, 1987). It was believed that northern 
regions would ultimately become self-sufficient. At this point, the Soviet discourse of hinterland 
development substantially diverged from the Canadian colonial discourse of the pre-Diefenbaker 
times. The Soviet paradigm of ‘conquering’ the North magnified and empowered the Turnerist 
ideas of acquisition and expropriation of the frontier space and its’ resources. Soviet regional 
planning was building upon the ideology of acquiring and remaking the North by expropriating 
its’ riches for the Stalinist “mobilization economy” (Gregory, 2003; McCannon, 1998). The 
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economic ideology also served a geopolitical goal of Soviet planners to re-construct Soviet nation-
space and make the USSR self-sufficient through the extraction of natural resources.  
The orthodox paradigm of northern development was challenged by the Party’s discontent with 
the slowing rates of economic growth and by the strengthening counter-discourse of development 
that demanded a quicker and less costly exploitation of northern resources. The adoption of the 
Third Program of the Communist Party cemented the shift. The new doctrine now advocated a 
“temporary” resource-reliant variant of regional development in the North: “in order to save time, 
first of all to use natural resources available for quick extraction and giving the largest economic 
effect” (Programma KPSS, 1961: 74). Thus, the Soviet discourse since has been focused on 
resource exploitation of the northern space, a paradigm inherited in the post-Soviet times. This 
shift is important to explain persisting economic marginality as well as sectoral and geographic 
disproportions in regional development in the Russian North.   
Discourse, Power and Development: The State in the Norths 
The role of the State in the formation and empowering of northern development discourses and 
policy in Canada and USSR/Russia deserves specific focus to fully grasp. Foucault argued that 
discourse and knowledge are related to power; the discourse is regulatory, and it legislates 
inclusions, exclusions, and criteria for acceptability. This may be expressed in forms of 
governmentality that sets ‘rituals of truth’ and creates a particular style of subjectivity with which 
one conforms to or resists (Foucault, 1970). The role of the State as a conveyer of governmentality 
is crucial for the production of the discourse of northern development. Capitalist and communist 
states both propagated northern development and modernization. The State, as an institution and 
societal structure, empowered through implementing governmentality, facilitated creating the 
‘regimes of truth’ about the North suitable for its own interests, which were discursively 
understood in terms of recourse expansion and development. Certainly, the Soviet northern 
economic development policies are an outstanding example of the state-enforced ideological 
dogmatism (Hill & Gaddy, 2003); however, the northern planning in Canada was also heavily 
influenced by the government, which determined the allocation of a large share of research and 
development funding in the North (Barre, 1987).  
In other words, the State has controlled the state of the North in both the USSR and Canada. Since in 
both countries the State has always been the central negotiator and actor in the ‘hegemonic project’ 
of developing the frontier, the history of regional development policy-making in the North can be 
well illustrated by the history of government interventions. Whereas the analysis of public 
development policies in the Canadian and Russian North is outside the scope of this paper, the 
bottom line here is that the evolution of development paradigms (propagated by the State) has 
always been followed by the transformation of public policies (enforced by the State).  
From Social Construction to Material Production of the North 
How did the discourses of northern development in the 20th century impact material production 
of the Norths? Table 1 attempts to associate selected characteristics of northern development, 
shared by the two development regimes, with their outcomes (elaborated from the framework 
proposed by Bourne (2000)). Given the previous discussion, it is not surprising that the strategies 
of development in Canada and Russia produced rather similar and disappointing outcomes, for 
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instance, in respect to relative economic prosperity (Glomsrød et al., 2015) and community well-
being (Larsen & Fondahl, 2014; Larsen et al., 2015). The colonial developmentalist project in the 
North showed poor results — in the sense that it was unsuccessful in mitigating perpetual 
marginality and delivering sustainability to northern regions. Instead, it generally exacerbated the 
levels of marginality and worsened dependency and vulnerability of northern economies. This 
approach to development in the North was unsuccessful much like their counterparts in the Third 
World (Watts, 1993; Escobar, 1995; Scott, 1998).  
Table 1. Selected similarities of Canadian and Soviet northern development and development outcomes 
20th Century Development Policy 
Characteristics 
Development Outcomes 
 
● Modernist imperatives 
● Paternalism 
● Inadequate planning 
● Mega-projects 
● Political dependency 
● Neglect to Indigenous cultures 
● State intervention 
 
● Marginalization of locals 
● Culture of dependency 
● Dependency on government, social 
marginalization, and high mobility 
● Environmental destruction                 
& dislocation of people and resources 
● Powerlessness 
● Social marginalization 
● Bureaucratization  
 
The fundamental reason for the lack of success of the 20th century development projects has been 
suggested by the ‘postdevelopment’ scholarship: the modernist normative premises of 
development (and of “high modernism” in economic planning), upon which the western 
development project was constructed in the ‘developing’ world, brought this effort to a devastating 
collapse (Escobar, 1995). Another fundamental problem, associated with both development 
regimes in the North is that discursive public policies were responsible for creating hegemonic 
inequities between the North and South and among northern regions (Petrov, 2012). This not only 
undermined the development of regional economic sovereignty and political power as well as 
deepened dependency of the North, but also placed northern communities in the midst of the 
conflict between various levels of government, different ministries, and corporations.  
It is also important to convey that northern development projects in Russian and Canada exhibited 
considerable differences. Table 2 (below) summarizes some of them. Major dissimilarities stem 
from the origins of the discursive formations and their evolution in both countries, for example, 
the Innisian approach to development of the frontier vs. the Russian version of Turnerism 
dominated in the USSR.    
Indeed, the development regimes in the North have not been completely unsuccessful. After all, 
resource extraction in the Norths has continued and expanded throughout many decades. In fact, 
resource economy worked well for some places and for some periods of time. Regions involved 
in mega-projects received enormous investments, drastically improved their infrastructure and 
population well-being (Agranat, 1992; Rea, 1976; Slavin, 1972). 
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Table 2. Selected differences of Canadian and Soviet northern development and development outcomes 
Canada USSR/Russia Development Outcomes 
Exploitation and ‘othering’ of 
the North (“Innisianism”) 
Expropriation and acquisition 
of the North (“Turnerism”)  
Greater exploitation of 
resources, grand scale of 
development, resettlement of 
millions to the Soviet North  
Small/medium scale 
development 
Very large scale development  Large cities, overpopulation, 
developed infrastructure, major 
extractive operations in the 
Soviet North 
Slower tempo of development High tempo of development Planning lagged behind 
development, mismanagement 
of growth in the Soviet North 
Relatively low level of national 
resource mobilization for 
development  
Low level of national resource 
mobilization for development 
Enormous financial, labor, 
social, infrastructure 
commitments in the Soviet 
North that was hard to 
maintain. 
 
Workers in the northern wage sector were well paid and lived in state of the art industrial towns 
developed through urban planning and design (Stelter & Artibise, 1978). The material wellbeing 
and employment in Indigenous communities generally increased (Stabler & Howe, 1990), although 
the welfare gap has never been closed (Petrov et al., 2015) and negative impacts always accompany 
and often surpass the benefits. As powerful cyclones (Barnes et al., 2001), these development 
surges dissipated, often leaving ruins with intermittent miniscule successes behind (Hayter, 2003, 
Gaxinger et al., 2016).   
As the result of the fundamental inadequacies of the 20th century development policies, both the 
Canadian and Russian North continue to share high levels of economic, political, and social 
marginality. Although some radical thinkers have questioned the very possibility to ‘develop the 
North’ (Pivovarov, 1997; Howard & Widdowson, 1999), it is certain that developmental projects 
in the North are far from being over. This optimistic view may be related to at least two 
considerations: a continuing (and increasing) importance of northern resources as the assets of the 
future and a surge of the post-developmentalist discourses of regional renewal (both globally and 
locally) aimed at bringing sustainable development to the northern peripheries. The emphasis on 
regional growth as endogenous and socially embedded it appears, perhaps may also be helpful in 
devising new northern policies (House, 2003; Southcott, 2015; Petrov, 2016).  
Concluding Remarks 
Being the products of the Western development discursive paradigm, the 20th century Soviet and 
Canadian northern development projects shared some principal commonalities. As in other parts 
of the ‘developing’ world, they included ‘othering’ and subordinating the North to the metropolis. 
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The normative development paradigm attempted to dis-other the North by emulating 
development paths of the ‘South’. Whereas the ideological bases of the Canadian and Soviet 
development discourses were different, the idea of ‘taking care’ of the North by ‘taking advantage’ 
of its’ resources was the key value that both countries embodied through their actions; as was the 
idea of State involvement and State intervention as a primary regulation mechanism. In congruence 
with other authors (Bolotova, 2004; Hill & Gaddy, 2003; Watts, 1993) we can observe that the 
common discursive elements of the development regimes in the Norths included: a teleological 
modernist approach to planning based on normative and discursively constructed set of goals, the 
conception of nature as an object of activity and as an inexhaustible storage of resources, the 
mythology of frontier as an empty space which ultimately devoid its own value and meaning, the 
ideology of ‘othering’ the North from the South, and the positioning of state as a primary actor 
and the leader in the developmentalist ‘hegemonic block’. However, a many important questions 
remain unanswered. Among them how different are the current, 21st century’s, development 
models of the North from its 20th century predecessors and have the lessons been learned and 
what do they mean under the new circumstances (such as globalization, climate change, Indigenous 
self-governance, post-colonialism, etc.)?  
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Is the Arctic an Emerging Market? 
 
Maxwell C. McGrath-Horn & Ryan R. Uljua 
 
 
For the last decade, while annual sea-ice has declined and economic activity has increased, many observers have eagerly described 
the Arctic as the world’s next “emerging market.” While emotively compelling, this popular claim is founded neither in theory 
nor quantitative analysis. In this paper, we attempt to more thoroughly answer the question “is the Arctic an emerging market?” 
After discussing the prominent frameworks and assessing available data we find that by most customary metrics the Arctic is 
not a traditional emerging market. However, using a new framework put forward by emerging market theorists Khanna and 
Palepu of Harvard University, which describes an emerging market as a transactional arena characterized by institutional 
voids which inhibit buyers and sellers from easily coming together, we argue that the Arctic can in many ways be considered an 
emerging market (Khanna & Palepu, 2010). Ultimately, we propose a new way to think of the ‘Arctic economy’ in the global 
context: as a nascent transactional arena largely nestled inside of stable, highly developed economies where buyers and sellers 
nonetheless have difficulty in conducting transactions, particularly in capital markets. 
 
 
Introduction 
The opening Arctic and its wealth of resources inspire sweeping claims that the region represents 
a new emerging market. However catchy, these claims are not backed by data nor based in theory 
regarding what constitutes an emerging market. In one basic sense, the term ‘emerging’ emotively 
fits the changing dynamics of the region: as ice retreats, untapped resources emerge from beneath 
it. Just as the ice recedes and the resources beneath it are uncovered, so too is the Arctic emerging 
into investors’ collective consciousness—and therefore intuitively the Arctic feels like an emerging 
market. 
Over the past decade, analysts, observers, and journalists have been quick to describe the region 
as the world’s next, or even last, emerging market. A quick Google search returns the following 
headlines: 
 
● “Is the Arctic the Next Emerging Market?” (Karlsson & Smith, 2013) 
● “The Arctic as an Emerging Market” (Larsen, 2014) 
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● “Climate Change: The Arctic as an Emerging Market” (Harris, 2012) 
● “The Arctic: the next emerging economy” (Henriksen, 2014) 
● “The Arctic as an Emerging Market” (Jones, 2012) 
● “Should we be considering the Arctic as the next emerging economy?” (Aplin, 2015) 
● “The Arctic is an emerging market...” (Emmerson, 2012) 
● “The Emerging Arctic Market” (Klein, 2017) 
 
The problem of defining what is—and what is not—an emerging market (EM) goes well beyond 
the Arctic. Traditional definitions of EMs, which are discussed below, tend to coalesce around 
measurements of poverty, national capital market openness, and a country’s growth potential. 
There are more than a dozen definitions of what constitutes an EM, but no single framework is 
widely accepted by economists, statisticians, and investors. Worse, many EM classifications are 
qualitative or based on ‘gut calls’ and do not adhere to or carry out rigorous economic analysis. 
Perhaps the most significant challenge in determining whether the ‘emerging market’ label should 
be applied to the Arctic is that traditionally the smallest jurisdictional unit for EM classification is 
found at the country level, whereas the Arctic is a collection of sub-regions spread across eight 
nations. We propose that emerging markets do not necessarily exist exclusively at the national-
level in developing nations but can also be found at the subnational level within jurisdictions of 
developed countries. In doing so, we also note that the Arctic ‘market’ is not a monolith but can 
instead be considered as three distinct sub-markets: the North American, European, and Russian 
Arctic.1 
In this study, we first survey the existing ecosystem of EM definitions and classifications and assess 
whether they describe the economic conditions found in the Arctic. We determine which EM 
definitions hold up when applied to the Arctic, and which do not. We then argue that the Arctic 
can in fact be considered an EM by using a novel EM definition that we propose is more germane 
to the Arctic than traditional frameworks. With this proposed definition in mind, we conclude by 
discussing mechanisms that can better facilitate the flow of investment capital to the Arctic. 
Existing EM Definitions and How they Apply to the Arctic 
There are many ways to define emerging markets, and investors, researchers, and financial service 
providers have found myriad ways to classify, categorize, and package them. Traditionally, EMs 
have been considered low- or middle-income countries with low average standards of living, where 
capital markets are underdeveloped, and a process of economic liberalization is taking root or 
expected (Mody, 2004). 
The term ‘emerging market’ was first coined by Antoine Van Agtmael and a team of economists 
at the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a World Bank organization, in 1981 (IMF, 2017). 
The group was trying to sell investors on a “Third World mutual fund” but needed a more 
aspirational and attention-grabbing term and came up with “emerging markets” (“Establishing 
Emerging Markets”). Since then, economists, financial firms, development organizations, 
governments, and news agencies have developed their own definitions and classifications of which 
countries deserve the EM designation.  
Below we examine three of the most prominent frameworks and assess whether they would 
consider the Arctic an EM. Here we define the Arctic as the 25 sub-national jurisdictions found in 
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the eight Arctic states that are located either partially or entirely above of the 66th parallel north.2 
In all following work we endeavor to use 2010-2015 as our study period due to the lag in national 
and regional statistical bureaus reporting of key indicators.  
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
The International Monetary Fund’s biannual World Economic Outlook (WEO) classifies 
countries as being advanced economies, emerging markets, or low-income developing countries 
(LIDCs). The IMF deems an economy an emerging market if it does not meet its definitions of an 
advanced economy or a LIDC, which makes it one of the more inclusive EM definitions. As of 
June 2018, the IMF categorized 39 countries as advanced economies and 59 countries as LIDCs, 
leaving 95 EMs (IMF, 2018). The IMF distinguishes between advanced economies, EMs, and 
LIDCs based on (1) per capita income levels, (2) export diversification, and (3) degree of 
integration into the global financial system.  
Per Capita Income Levels 
In order to compare how the Arctic fits into the IMF’s classification system, a few assumptions 
are necessary. First, statistical bureaus generally do not track gross national income (GNI) at the 
regional level (which would be gross regional income (GRI)), thus making a comparison between 
subnational Arctic jurisdictions and countries based on these metrics difficult. In the absence of 
these data, we use per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and per capita gross regional product 
(GRP) as proxies for “per capita income levels” as the IMF uses in its national classification system.  
The IMF defines LIDCs as having annual per capita income levels below 2,700 USD (in 2016 as 
measured by the World Bank’s Atlas method), as well as structural features consistent with limited 
development, and linkages to external financial systems that are insufficient to be considered 
emerging market economies (IMF Fiscal Monitor, 2018: 95). The IMF does not, however, provide 
a similar statistical income cutoff to distinguish between advanced economies and EMs. In the 
absence of a clear per capita income threshold separating advanced economies from EMs, we use 
the average of the five lowest per capita GDPs (in USD-PPP) among the IMF’s advanced 
economies to estimate the income cutoff between advanced economies and EMs. 
The average of the five lowest per capita GDPs among the IMF’s advanced economies in 2016 
was 26,839 USD. As Table 1 shows, the average per capita GDP for all advanced economies was 
42,750 USD. Meanwhile the IMF’s 96 emerging economies’ average per capita GDP was 17,215 
USD. The BRICS average per capita GDP was 13,776 USD.3 
Between 2010 and 2015 average pan-Arctic GRP per capita was 35,735 USD, with a low of 13,453 
USD (Arkhangelsk) and a high of 214,647 USD (Nenets Autonomous Okrug). Of the three sub-
regions of the Arctic, the Russian Arctic has the lowest average per capita GRP (29,977 USD), 
although it is still higher than the lowest advanced economy––Latvia––which has a per capita GDP 
of 21,006 USD. See Appendix 1 for a full breakdown of average per capita GRP 2010-2015 for all 
25 Arctic jurisdictions. 
Based on the IMF’s per capita income definition, the Arctic is considered an Advanced Economy, 
not an EM. It is important to note that there are shortcomings in using per capita GRP in the 
Arctic to measure economic activity and output. These issues are discussed in further details in the 
section titled “Shortcomings of GRP in the Arctic.” 
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Table 1 
 
Average per capita GRP, 2010-2015 (PPP) 
Region/Country GRP/GDP per capita (USD) 
The Arctic $35,735 
North American Arctic $73,897 
European Arctic $43,955 
Russian Arctic $29,977 
Reference Markets  
Norway $63,515 
United States $50,885 
Advanced Economies (IMF) (avg) $42,750 
Russian Federation $24,796 
Emerging Markets (IMF) (avg) $17,218 
BRICS $13,779 
China $11,457 
India $5,121 
 
Export Diversification 
The IMF does not use per capita income alone to determine a country’s classification. The IMF 
also evaluates markets based on export diversification, a metric devised primarily to prevent oil 
exporters that have high per capita GDP from entering the advanced economy classification. The 
IMF does not publish a standard threshold for export diversification, instead using it as a 
qualitative measure.  
In the Arctic, data related to export diversification is scarce. The last major study of export 
diversification in the region was conducted in 2005. The study found that petroleum and mining 
accounted for 33.2% of GRP in Alaska, 27.7% in Canada, and 56.9% in Russia (Huskey, Mäenpää 
& Pelyasov, 2014: 165). Furthermore, qualitative evidence since 2005 suggests that the share of 
GRP derived from these sources has increased (Forbes, 2005). For instance, 88% of Greenland’s 
exports are from the seafood industry (Government of Greenland, 2018). Meanwhile, the 
European Arctic as a whole did not have any single export sector account for greater than 7% of 
GRP (Huskey, Mäenpää & Pelyasov, 2014). 
On this measure the pan-, North American, and Russian Arctic all exhibit poor export 
diversification, which is typically associated with EMs and not advanced economies (IMF, 2014) 
(Agosin, 2007). 
Degree of Integration into the Global Financial System 
The IMF describes the “degree of integration into the global financial system” primarily as capital 
account openness, particularly the degree to which foreign investors can engage in an economy’s 
capital markets (IMF, 2016). If there are little to no restrictions on foreign engagement in a 
country’s capital markets, then it is classified as a developed economy by this metric. Meanwhile, 
if there are restrictions on foreign participation in a country’s stock, debt, or derivatives markets, 
the country warrants an EM classification according to this dimension of the IMF framework. If 
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restrictions on foreign involvement in a country’s capital markets are severe, the market could be 
designated a frontier market (IMF, 2017). 
In order to quantify the Arctic’s degree of integration into the global financial system, we must use 
a proxy measure. Here, we use the country classifications issued by MSCI, a financial indexing 
company that produces indices covering hundreds of market segments including emerging 
markets. MSCI primarily classifies countries as developed, emerging, or frontier based on nine 
measurements of a country’s capital market openness. Of the eight Arctic states, MSCI classifies 
seven as developed and only one, Russia, as emerging (MSCI, 2017).   
IMF Definition in Review 
Overall, we find that the pan-Arctic, as well as the three Arctic sub-regions, meet very few of the 
IMF’s emerging market criteria.  
Table 2 
The Arctic and the IMF’s EM Definition 
 Per capita income levels Export diversification Integration with global financial markets 
Pan-Arctic X ✔ ? 
   North American Arctic X ✔ X 
   European Arctic X X X 
   Russian Arctic X ✔ ✔ 
  
✔ = meets definition     X = does not meet definition     ? = unknown or unclear 
 
The World Bank 
The World Bank’s criteria to define EMs differs slightly from the framework used by the IMF. 
The World Bank defines emerging markets as having (1) lower-than-average per capita GDP, (2) 
rapid growth, (3) high volatility, (4) immature capital markets, and (5) higher-than-average returns 
for investors (World Bank). 
Lower-than-Average per capita GDP 
Like the IMF, the World Bank employs a per capita GDP measurement to classify EMs. However, 
the World Bank does not elaborate what specific per capita GDP threshold is necessary to be 
considered an EM beyond “lower-than-average.” For the period 2010-2015, the World Bank 
assessed that global average per capita GDP was 14,350 USD. In both Table 1 and Appendix 1 
we note that the pan-Arctic, as well as all 25 Arctic jurisdictions in our study, have a per capita 
GRP higher than the world average. Once again, on this metric the Arctic does not qualify as an 
EM.  
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Rapid Growth 
From 2011 to 2015, the Arctic averaged 2.9% annual growth on a per capita GRP basis, driven by 
a 3.38% average growth rate in the Russian Arctic (see Table 3). Notably, over this period the 
North American Arctic experienced negative average growth rates while the European Arctic 
averaged 1% annual growth. 
The World Bank does not provide further clarification on what constitutes ‘rapid growth’ in order 
to be considered an EM. Therefore, we must infer reference growth rates from other markets. Of 
the BRICS countries, the total Arctic growth rate was higher than that of Russia, South Africa, and 
Brazil and only trails annual growth rates in China and India over this period. Similarly, the average 
growth rate for the pan-Arctic area outpaced growth in the United States (1.44%) and the 
European Union (0.91%). It is worth noting that when we expand the time series to include the 
period 2002 to 2015, the pan-Arctic has an average annual growth rate in GRP per capita of 5.28%.  
Table 3 
Arctic per capita GRP growth, 2010-2015 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 
Pan-Arctic4 6.74% 2.39% 1.87% 1.79% 1.73% 2.90% 
      North American Arctic 0.12% -1.80% -0.67% 0.06% -2.81% -1.02% 
      European Arctic 1.42% -0.78% 1.36% 1.24% 1.71% 0.99% 
      Russian Arctic 6.99% 0.26% 1.02% 2.69% 5.95% 3.38% 
Reference Markets (World 
Bank) 
      
China 9.01% 7.33% 7.23% 6.76% 6.36% 7.34% 
India 5.25% 4.13% 5.10% 6.23% 6.76% 5.49% 
United States 0.85% 1.46% 0.97% 1.81% 2.11% 1.44% 
Russian Federation 5.20% 3.48% 1.57% -1.04% -3.04% 1.23% 
European Union 1.78% -0.65% -0.04% 1.43% 2.01% 0.91% 
South Africa 1.94% 0.80% 1.02% 0.26% -0.08% 0.79% 
Brazil 2.99% 0.97% 2.06% -0.38% -4.59% 0.21% 
World Average 1.97% 1.23% 1.41% 1.65% 1.63% 1.58% 
 
Based primarily on growth rates in the Russian Arctic in comparison to our reference markets, we 
assess that both the Russian Arctic (3.38%) and the pan-Arctic (2.9%) display rapid growth 
characteristics consistent with EMs. 
High Volatility 
The World Bank does not provide a standard definition of volatility, or what it considers to be 
“high.” In order to test this criterion, we use the volatility of annual GRP growth rates in the 
Arctic, as measured by standard deviation. Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of 
growth rates for each of the above definitions of growth rates (Chatterjee & Shukayev, 2006). Due 
to sample size concerns, we expand the time series to include the period from 2002 to 2015.  
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Table 4 
Average GRP/GDP Growth & Volatility, 2002-20155 
 Avg. Annual Growth Volatility (std deviation) 
Pan-Arctic6 5.28% 4.15 
     North American Arctic 2.70% 6.34 
     European Arctic 1.93% 2.87 
     Russian Arctic 7.66% 5.61 
Reference Markets (World Bank)   
Russian Federation 3.76% 4.65 
Brazil 1.87% 2.84 
sIndia 5.94% 2.01 
China 9.17% 1.96 
South Africa 1.79% 1.91 
European Union 0.96% 1.91 
United States 1.04% 1.66 
World 1.63% 1.57 
 
In the 14-year study period the pan-Arctic exhibits a volatility in GRP growth rates (4.15) that is 
higher than all reference markets other than Russia (4.65). We find that the North American 
Arctic exhibits the highest volatility in growth rates among Arctic regions (6.34) during this 
period, likely due to its reliance on commodity exports, which exposes it to global commodity 
price fluctuations.  
 
Immature Capital Markets 
The World Bank definition of “immature capital markets” is similar to the IMF’s definition of 
capital market integration discussed previously. We can again use MSCI’s Emerging Market 
classification system to infer that seven of the eight Arctic states have developed capital markets 
while Russia is an EM by this dimension. 
 
Higher-than-Average Returns for Investors 
Quantifying investor returns in the Arctic is difficult due to a lack of publicly available data. As 
yet, no financial indices of public equities with operations in the Arctic have been published that 
could serve as proxies for total expected returns. Furthermore, whether the North American 
Arctic, for example, provides higher-than-average returns compared to the Russian Arctic is 
similarly difficult to observe in the absence of regional Arctic equities indices. In the private 
investment space, including private equity investments, returns data are proprietary and generally 
not made publicly available. 
World Bank Definition in Review 
Overall the pan-Arctic and its three sub-regions meet some, but not all, of the features of an EM 
according to the World Bank. The Russian Arctic exhibits the most EM criteria given its high 
growth rates and immature capital markets.  
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Table 5 
The Arctic and the World Bank’s Emerging Market Definition 
 Lower-than-average 
per-capita GDP 
Rapid growth High volatility Immature capital 
markets 
Higher-than-average 
returns for investors 
Pan-Arctic X ✔ ✔ ? ? 
   North American Arctic X X ✔ X ? 
   European Arctic X X ✔ X ? 
   Russian Arctic X ✔ ✔ ✔ ? 
✔ = meets definition     X = does not meet definition     ? = unknown/unclear 
 
Financial Index Providers 
A third major classifier of the state of national economies is the financial indexing industry. For 
many in the financial community these classifications are among the most commonly used 
definitions of emerging markets. However, the methodology that financial index providers use to 
judge whether a market is emerging is imperfect when applied to the Arctic.  
As of June 2018, leading index provider MSCI identified 24 EM countries for its Emerging Markets 
Index, which has more than 1.6 trillion USD in assets benchmarked to it (MSCI, 2018). Like the 
IMF and World Bank, MSCI sets a minimum income threshold in order to be considered a 
developed economy rather than an EM. As of June 2018, MSCI used a minimum per capita GNI 
of 12,476 USD in order to qualify as a developed economy (MSCI, 2017). Based on the above 
data, the pan-Arctic, as well as all 25 sub-jurisdictions, exceed this threshold on a GRP basis and 
would be considered developed—not emerging—economies. In addition to per capita income, 
MSCI evaluates markets on nine other dimensions to determine whether they are developed, 
emerging, or frontier markets. However, these nine other dimensions are all related to the nature 
of a country’s national stock market, including size of publicly traded companies, stock market 
liquidity, openness to foreign ownership, and trade settlement procedures. These requirements of 
a country’s national stock market size and openness are not applicable to the pan-Arctic, but rather 
apply only at the national level among the eight Arctic states.  
As of June 2018, MSCI defined seven of the eight Arctic states as developed markets, with Russia 
classified as an EM. Other index providers, including FTSE Group, S&P, Dow Jones, and STOXX 
have each developed their own market classification criteria that, like MSCI, are primarily based 
on national capital market regulations, integration, and openness. See Table 6 for a full breakdown 
of how these financial index providers assess the eight Arctic states. 
Due to the nature of the methodologies employed, it is difficult to apply the financial indexers’ 
classification systems to the Arctic to help answer the question “is the Arctic an emerging market?” 
Indexers like MSCI assess where each country’s national capital markets fall on the frontier-emerging-
developed spectrum. In the Arctic, we are assessing sub-national jurisdictions. There is no 
“Yellowknife Stock Exchange,” for example, on which shares of Northwest Territories companies 
are traded, so we cannot apply the indexers’ methodologies to assess the hypothetical Yellowknife 
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Stock Exchange’s rules and regulations regarding settlement methods or foreign ownership limits, 
and other metrics that the index providers use to measure markets. Nonetheless, it is useful to 
keep in mind where the Arctic nations as a whole are on the index providers’ spectrum. 
 
Table 6 
Classification of Arctic States by Indexing Company, April 2018 
 MSCI FTSE S&P Dow Jones STOXX 
Canada Developed Developed Developed Developed 
Denmark Developed Developed Developed Developed 
Finland Developed Developed Developed Developed 
Iceland Developed Not Classified (FTSE, 2018)7 Not Classified Not Classified 
Norway Developed Developed Developed Developed 
Russian Federation Emerging Secondary Emerging Emerging Emerging 
Sweden Developed Developed Developed Developed 
United States Developed Developed Developed Developed 
 
Shortcomings of GRP in the Arctic 
In the above EM definitions, per capita income and per capita production feature prominently. 
However, there are well-known shortcomings to using GDP (or GRP) to evaluate economies, 
particularly in a sparsely populated, resource-rich geography like the Arctic. In particular, 
shortcomings include issues related to residency, government assistance, and subsistence activities. 
Residency  
In the Arctic, particularly in the extractive industries, a significant portion of the workforce can be 
composed of non-resident seasonal workers. For instance, in the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous 
Okrug, which ranks third highest of the 25 Arctic sub-national jurisdictions by GRP per capita, 
15% of the workforce is non-resident (Nalimov & Rudenko, 2015). Similarly, physical capital and 
profits from these activities can be controlled by owners outside of the region. A recent study 
found that this region, while among Russia’s richest by GRP per capita, presents some of the 
country’s lowest social and income equality measures (Nalimov & Rudenko, 2015). Much of the 
income produced in the Arctic leaves the region through rents, taxes, and wages paid to owners 
of resources and extraction processes who are located in non-Arctic regions. These residency 
issues would cause Arctic residents’ actual per capita incomes to be lower than per capita production 
as stated by GRP (Glomsrød, Goldsmith, Mäenpää & Wei, 2017). 
Government Assistance & Transfers 
Similar to issues related to residency, government transfers to Arctic jurisdictions in the form of 
public assistance and subsidies may similarly skew Arctic GRP figures. Rural jurisdictions in the 
Arctic, particularly in the North American Arctic, often do not generate sufficient tax revenue to 
pay for all public services needed in the region, requiring central governments to provide 
assistance. GRP includes government spending, which in jurisdictions in the North American and 
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European Arctic can account for approximately 30% of total GRP, including up to 40% in 
northern Norway (Huskey, Mäenpää & Pelyason, 2014). GRP does not include direct transfers 
such as welfare (Lounsbury, 2010). 
Graphic design: Malte Humpert, The Arctic Institute 
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Subsistence Activities 
A portion of the Arctic’s population, both Indigenous and non-Indigenous, engage in forms of 
production that are not included in traditional measures of economic activity, particularly hunting 
and other subsistence activities. In the United States, for example, these activities are not included 
in GRP. Although these activities are culturally significant in many parts of the Arctic, and many 
small communities rely on them for food security, they are not estimated to be a significant 
contribution to Arctic economies (Larsen, Schweitzer & Petrov, 2015).  
Cost of Goods and Services 
The costs of goods and services in the Arctic are typically higher than in southern regions of Arctic 
states (Poppel, Kruse, Duhaime & Abryutina, 2007). This means Arctic residents’ purchasing 
power is in most cases lower than the purchasing power of non-Arctic residents in the same 
nations (Larsen, Schweitzer, & Petrov, 2014). Consequently, the per-capita GRP figures featured 
in this study are inflated in comparison to their relative purchasing power. The authors of the 
Arctic Social Indicators II report addressed this issue in their case study on Alaska by applying the 
Anchorage Consumer Price Index (Larsen, Schweitzer & Petrov, 2014). Such indices exist for 
certain Arctic regions and are lacking in others. In our study we concluded that using price 
adjusting indices where available would distort the data on a pan-Arctic level and introduce new 
and unknown data reliability issues. To keep data comparable, we use national level PPP 
conversions provided by the OECD.  
An Emerging Market Framework for the Arctic 
To this point, we’ve surveyed the traditional definitions of ‘emerging markets’ put forth by the 
IMF, the World Bank, and financial indexing companies and we’ve examined how the Arctic stacks 
up against these frameworks. Overall, the results are mixed: neither the pan-Arctic nor the three 
sub-regions of the Arctic meet all the definitions of an EM. We’ve also highlighted some of the 
unique challenges of using per capita GRP as a measure of economic activity in the Arctic. While 
the exercise of comparing Arctic metrics to global standards and frameworks offers insights into 
the nature of economic activity in the various regions of the Arctic, no single definition we’ve 
examined fully encapsulates the region to a satisfactory degree.  
We propose that a definition of EMs more germane to the Arctic comes not from the standard 
definitions issued by large intergovernmental organizations or financial service providers, but from 
the literature of international business management and strategy. Specifically, we argue that the 
EM definition that best fits the Arctic comes from the work of Tarun Khanna and Krishna Palepu 
of the Harvard Business School, who propose that “emerging markets reflect those transactional 
arenas where buyers and sellers are not easily or efficiently able to come together” (Khanna and 
Palepu, 2010: 6).   
The concept introduced by Khanna and Palepu offers a number of advantages over traditional 
EM definitions when applied to the Arctic. First, it avoids defining EMs strictly at the nation-state 
level, and instead focuses on transactional arenas. This distinction allows us to better apply the 
framework to a collection of sub-national jurisdictions spread across eight nations, as is the case 
in the Arctic. Second, it is not bounded by the application of metrics such as economic size, growth 
rate, or length of time since emergence into the global economy. Instead, Khanna and Palepu 
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emphasize that the most fundamental characteristic of an EM is the degree of difficulty buyers and 
sellers have in conducting transactions in the product, labor, and capital markets (Khanna & 
Palepu, 2010).  
Finally, this definition captures the realities and difficulties of working and investing in the Arctic, 
particularly for companies and portfolio managers from outside the area with little or no 
experience operating in the region. Khanna and Palepu cite two specific symptoms of buyers and 
sellers having difficulty coming together in EMs: (1) high transaction costs and (2) insufficient 
market intermediaries (Khanna & Palepu, 2010: 56).  
High Transaction Costs 
Transaction costs are simply defined as the costs of participating in a market, which in the Arctic 
can be extraordinarily high due to the region’s unique operating challenges.  
Transaction costs unique to the Arctic include challenges related to physical access, including a 
lack of infrastructure in comparison to the natural resources present. Challenges related to physical 
access are manifested in the need for specialized equipment at higher cost. Among the most 
notable examples of this phenomena include Shell's failed drilling efforts in the Chukchi and 
Beaufort seas, which required the company to build a specialized light icebreaker at a cost of 200 
million USD (Uljua, 2018). Other examples of transaction costs in the Arctic include salary 
premiums, communications infrastructure challenges, licensing and environmental issues, 
indigenous and First Nations relationship management, icebreaker fees along the Northern Sea 
Route, reputational costs, requirements for equipment resilience in harsh weather, and, in the case 
of the Russian Arctic, sanctions risk (Andersson & Lundström, 2007: 4). Reducing transaction 
costs for businesses, investors, and residents of the Arctic will result in improved living and 
economic conditions as well as greater ease of doing business (Andreassen, 2018: 21) (Len, 2016). 
Insufficient Financial Intermediaries 
Khanna and Palepu argue that in EMs the dual symptoms of high transaction costs and a lack of 
financial intermediaries are largely the result of institutional voids in the labor, product, and capital 
markets (Khanna & Palepu, 2010: 6). In the case of Arctic capital markets, we argue that the most 
glaring institutional void is a lack of financial intermediaries.  
A financial intermediary is an entity that acts as middleman between two parties to facilitate a 
transaction. In emerging markets, Khanna and Palepu find that intermediaries that are usually 
lacking include market research firms, financial analysts, mutual funds, private equity funds, and 
venture capital firms (Khanna & Palepu, 2010: 57). 
In July 2011 David Rubenstein, co-founder of the 200 billion USD money manager Carlyle Group, 
assessed that the Arctic would need an increase in financial intermediaries in the coming decades 
to better facilitate the flow of capital through the Arctic (Rubenstein, 2011). Mr. Rubenstein called 
for Arctic-focused investment funds, including private equity funds and vehicles for institutional 
investors to gain exposure to the Arctic. Mr. Rubenstein offered a forecast: such firms and funds 
would proliferate in the Arctic in the next five to ten years to fill this institutional void. Seven years 
later, Mr. Rubenstein’s call for Arctic financial intermediaries has not yet fully materialized. 
Despite hinting at the creation of an Arctic infrastructure investment vehicle since 2011, 
Guggenheim Partners Investment Management, a large manager of institutional wealth, has yet to 
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invest in the region (Hickman, 2011). PT Capital, a small, Alaska-based boutique private equity 
firm focused exclusively on the Arctic, was only founded in 2015. There are a handful of regional 
funds that invest in bonds and equities in the Nordic region, but these vehicles do not focus 
specifically on the European Arctic. Beyond that, few other financial intermediaries exist in the 
Arctic.  
The lack of financial intermediaries in the region is compounded by difficulties in securing 
traditional financing for Arctic business activities. The 2018 Business Index North (BIN), a 
publication that tracks business activity in the European Arctic and parts of the Russian Arctic, 
found: 
Companies [in the Arctic] find it difficult to grow organically because of lack of financing. 
In countries like Germany and Japan companies are supported to a greater extent by banks. 
Many banks in the [European and Russian Arctic] area, however, are reluctant and have 
fewer opportunities to support businesses. Investors are therefore crucial to support any 
business...Therefore, more knowledge is needed to develop an awareness of companies 
which operate far from the known capital markets (Bullvåg et al, 2018: 95). 
It should be noted that in addition to capital and financial markets, firms operating in the Arctic 
also struggle in the labor market, where growth is stifled by a lack of access to human resources, 
as well as the product market, as non-commodities face severe challenges in entering global 
markets (Bullvåg et al, 2018: 6). 
Overcoming the Arctic’s Institutional Voids 
The dual problems of high transaction costs and a lack of financial intermediaries in the Arctic are 
inherently linked: in frontier and emerging markets worldwide, transaction costs are reduced 
through the introduction of increasingly sophisticated intermediaries (Kababi, 2014). From a 
capital markets standpoint, in order to channel funds to attractive investment opportunities and 
facilitate access to capital for Arctic entrepreneurs and established companies, an increase in the 
size and innovative capacity of intermediaries is necessary. Intermediaries needed include Arctic-
focused private equity, venture capital, commercial banks, mutual funds, and insurance companies. 
Given the operating and investing challenges unique to the Arctic, creative, unique solutions will 
be needed. One example of a unique financial mechanism to reduce transaction costs in the Arctic 
is the Arctic Council’s Project Support Instrument (PSI) (Arctic Council). The PSI, which launched 
in March 2014, provides Arctic projects with additional financing in order to reduce costs of 
pollution mitigation programs.  
Furthermore, the Arctic has certain unique financial institutions including Norway’s sovereign 
wealth fund, the Alaska Permanent Fund, and Alaskan and Canadian Indigenous corporations and 
land claim organizations. What role these institutions play in Arctic economies, and how they could 
fill or exacerbate institutional voids, warrants further academic research.  
Despite the challenges in developing business and investing activity in the Arctic, we believe there 
is reason to be optimistic about the future development of such intermediaries in the region. In 
the process of financial innovation in EMs, a key factor in capital markets is the presence of 
financial regulatory bodies and central banks, which reduce risk for investors and thereby lower 
the cost of capital for entrepreneurs and capital-needy companies. In most emerging markets, these 
government and regulatory institutions are absent or slow to develop, often lagging behind the 
development of financial intermediaries. Fortunately, in the Arctic, particularly in the North 
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American and European Arctic, the opposite is true: regulatory infrastructure on the national-level 
is among the most highly developed in the world, and only the Arctic-focused intermediaries are 
lagging behind.  
A Framework for Placing Arctic Economies in the Global Context 
The Arctic is physically emerging due to climate change, technological improvements, and geo-
economic shifts. Despite intuitively feeling like the Arctic, with its trove of untapped resources 
and valuable geopolitical position, should be considered an emerging market, the region itself does 
not meet many of the traditional, albeit stale, definitions of an EM. Based on the quantitative 
analysis performed in the beginning of this study, we concluded that the Arctic is not a EM by 
traditional standards. However, based on the qualitative analysis in the second part of this study, 
which looks at the Arctic through the lens of institutional voids, we do believe that the Arctic can 
be considered an EM. This inherent contradiction prompts the recommendation of a new 
framework for evaluating the Arctic economy, which borrows from both the traditional and the 
alternative methods of evaluation. 
We propose that the Arctic should be thought of as a nascent transactional arena nestled inside of 
stable, highly developed economies where buyers and sellers nonetheless have difficulty coming 
together to conduct transactions, particularly in capital markets. In this sense, the Arctic is an 
emerging market, at least until the high transaction costs of investing and conducting business in 
the region are reduced. The introduction of new, more sophisticated market intermediaries, 
derivatives, and investment vehicles tailored for the Arctic will be key. 
 
 
 
Notes 
1. We group the 25 Arctic jurisdictions as follows: North American Arctic [Alaska (USA); 
Yukon, the Northwest Territories, and Nunavut (Canada)]; European Arctic [Nordland, 
Troms, and Finnmark (Norway); Norrbotten and Västerbotten (Sweden); Lapland, 
Kainuu, and Northern Ostrobothnia (Finland); Iceland; Faroe Islands and Greenland 
(Denmark)]; Russian Arctic [Chukotka, Murmansk, Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Republic 
of Karelia, Arkhangelsk, Komi Republic, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District, 
Krasnoyarsk Krai, Sakha Republic, and Magadan]. 
2. Due to government reporting practices, we include five Russian sub-national jurisdictions 
that are only partly located in the Arctic: Magadan, Komi Republic, Karelia Republic, 
Krasnoyarsk Krai, and Sakha Republic. Determining gross regional product at more finite 
jurisdictional level (ie solely including towns / municipalities / counties located within the 
Arctic) is not possible with government-reported data. Other regions that are excluded due 
to inadequate data coverage include Nunavik (Canada) and Svalbard (Norway). 
3. BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa. 
4. Source: authors. 
5. Note: Study period is 2002-2015; longer than the 2010-2015 period referenced in the prior 
table. 
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6. Source: authors. 
7. Note: As of April 2018, Iceland was under review for possible inclusion in September 2018 
as a frontier market due to easing of capital controls following the 2008/2009 banking 
crisis. 
8. Source: See Appendix 2. 
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Appendix 1: Arctic per capita Gross Regional Product (GRP) Data8 
 
GRP PER CAPITA, adjusted for PPP (constant, 2010) 
Arctic Jurisdiction Average (2010-2015) 
Arkhangelsk $13,453 
Republic of Karelia $13,602 
Murmansk $19,820 
Krasnoyarsk Krai $23,580 
Komi Republic $27,127 
Kainuu $28,822 
Magadan $29,208 
RUSSIAN ARCTIC $29,977 
Sakha Republic $30,439 
Lapland $33,408 
Greenland $33,511 
TOTAL $35,735 
Västerbotten $36,567 
Nordland $38,654 
Finnmark $39,111 
Iceland $40,231 
Troms $40,321 
Faroe Islands $40,685 
EUROPEAN ARCTIC $43,955 
Norrbotten $44,371 
Nunavut $48,931 
Chukotka $51,538 
Yukon $55,572 
NORTH AMERICAN ARCTIC $73,897 
Alaska $75,413 
NWT $83,605 
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District $122,900 
Northern Ostrobothnia $142,109 
Nenets Autonomous Okrug $214,647 
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Appendix 2: Arctic GRP (see Appendix 3 for sources and methodology) 
 
Gross Regional Product of Arctic Jurisdictions 2001 – 2015 adjusted for PPP (billions USD constant 2010) 
Jurisdiction 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Nordland  
$7.88 
 
$8.18 
 
$8.55 
 
$8.44 
 
$8.14 
 
$8.29 
 
$8.35 
 
$8.38 
 
$8.88 
 
$9.10 
 
$8.63 
 
$8.72 
 
$9.06 
 
$9.67 
 
$10.27 
Troms                        
$5.32 
               
$5.73 
               
$5.80 
               
$5.75 
               
$5.45 
               
$5.41 
               
$5.32 
               
$5.34 
               
$6.18 
               
$6.13 
               
$6.03 
               
$6.08 
               
$6.45 
               
$6.77 
               
$7.22 
Finnmark                        
$2.20 
               
$2.34 
               
$2.32 
               
$2.30 
               
$2.34 
               
$2.30 
               
$2.33 
               
$2.34 
               
$2.67 
               
$2.78 
               
$2.77 
               
$2.77 
               
$2.82 
               
$3.01 
               
$3.28 
Västerbotten                
$7.74 
               
$7.87 
               
$8.20 
               
$8.75 
               
$8.98 
               
$9.63 
               
$9.31 
               
$9.31 
               
$8.68 
               
$9.40 
               
$9.44 
               
$9.59 
               
$9.44 
               
$9.47 
               
$9.91 
Norrbotten                        
$8.36 
               
$8.51 
               
$8.63 
               
$9.14 
               
$9.65 
            
$10.44 
            
$10.23 
            
$10.89 
               
$8.89 
            
$11.47 
            
$11.57 
            
$11.12 
            
$10.93 
            
$10.71 
            
$10.52 
Lapland                        
$5.33 
               
$5.36 
               
$5.43 
               
$5.71 
               
$5.66 
               
$6.37 
               
$6.10 
               
$6.11 
               
$5.53 
               
$5.85 
               
$5.95 
               
$6.09 
               
$6.23 
               
$6.16 
               
$6.29 
Kainuu                        
$2.12 
               
$2.12 
               
$2.13 
               
$2.21 
               
$2.17 
               
$2.32 
               
$2.35 
               
$2.41 
               
$2.08 
               
$2.27 
               
$2.36 
               
$2.30 
               
$2.13 
               
$2.18 
               
$2.09 
Northern 
Ostrobothnia 
                    
$10.83 
            
$12.24 
            
$12.95 
            
$13.51 
            
$13.79 
            
$13.69 
            
$14.65 
            
$14.75 
            
$12.85 
            
$13.40 
            
$13.45 
            
$13.34 
            
$13.24 
            
$12.88 
            
$12.38 
Nunavut                        
$0.94 
               
$1.02 
               
$0.99 
               
$1.05 
               
$1.05 
               
$1.10 
               
$1.13 
               
$1.29 
               
$1.29 
               
$1.57 
               
$1.61 
               
$1.72 
               
$1.77 
               
$1.80 
               
$1.83 
NWT                        
$3.19 
               
$3.20 
               
$3.77 
               
$4.23 
               
$4.04 
               
$3.93 
               
$4.00 
               
$4.14 
               
$3.38 
               
$3.94 
               
$3.75 
               
$3.44 
               
$3.46 
               
$3.62 
               
$3.71 
Yukon                        
$1.35 
               
$1.31 
               
$1.31 
               
$1.37 
               
$1.43 
               
$1.50 
               
$1.55 
               
$1.68 
               
$1.80 
               
$1.89 
               
$1.98 
               
$2.00 
               
$2.04 
               
$2.08 
               
$2.04 
Iceland                        
$9.84 
               
$9.87 
            
$10.11 
            
$10.93 
            
$11.67 
            
$12.25 
            
$13.40 
            
$13.60 
            
$12.66 
            
$12.20 
            
$12.45 
            
$12.60 
            
$13.15 
            
$13.41 
            
$13.96 
Greenland                        
$1.03 
               
$1.08 
               
$1.07 
               
$1.15 
               
$1.16 
               
$1.30 
               
$1.36 
               
$1.48 
               
$1.61 
               
$1.71 
               
$1.90 
               
$1.84 
               
$1.90 
               
$1.95 
               
$2.04 
Faroe Islands                        
$1.09 
               
$1.17 
               
$1.13 
               
$1.19 
               
$1.21 
               
$1.41 
               
$1.52 
               
$1.55 
               
$1.57 
               
$1.71 
               
$1.86 
               
$1.80 
               
$2.00 
               
$2.15 
               
$2.28 
Alaska                     
$34.51 
            
$35.43 
            
$37.39 
            
$39.97 
            
$44.08 
            
$47.70 
            
$51.16 
            
$56.56 
            
$51.08 
            
$54.13 
            
$57.57 
            
$58.58 
            
$56.62 
            
$54.13 
            
$49.05 
Republic of 
Karelia 
                       
$4.09 
               
$4.49 
               
$4.87 
               
$4.84 
               
$5.99 
               
$6.85 
               
$7.48 
               
$8.17 
               
$7.58 
               
$8.07 
               
$8.24 
               
$8.78 
               
$9.06 
               
$8.83 
               
$9.17 
Republic of 
Komi 
                    
$10.77 
            
$10.05 
            
$11.50 
            
$12.22 
            
$13.58 
            
$16.80 
            
$17.33 
            
$20.61 
            
$21.50 
            
$22.28 
            
$25.01 
            
$26.04 
            
$25.27 
            
$22.88 
            
$22.72 
Arkhangelsk 
Region 
                       
$6.66 
               
$7.33 
               
$8.35 
               
$9.64 
               
$9.88 
            
$11.64 
            
$13.48 
            
$14.41 
            
$13.75 
            
$13.28 
            
$15.78 
            
$16.52 
            
$17.54 
            
$16.96 
            
$17.35 
Nenets 
Autonomous 
Area 
                       
$1.52 
               
$1.80 
               
$2.55 
               
$3.67 
               
$3.50 
               
$4.72 
               
$7.04 
               
$6.38 
               
$9.29 
               
$9.22 
               
$9.59 
               
$8.87 
               
$8.85 
               
$8.74 
               
$9.45 
Murmansk 
Region 
                       
$7.08 
               
$7.33 
               
$8.27 
            
$10.23 
            
$11.14 
            
$12.38 
            
$13.74 
            
$15.05 
            
$14.39 
            
$14.84 
            
$15.01 
            
$15.18 
            
$15.83 
            
$15.24 
            
$16.96 
Yamalo-
Nenetsky  
                    
$22.46 
            
$30.13 
            
$33.07 
            
$36.44 
            
$35.00 
            
$43.08 
            
$44.53 
            
$49.69 
            
$46.50 
            
$48.80 
            
$55.47 
            
$64.58 
            
$70.72 
            
$76.69 
            
$78.76 
Krasnoyarsk 
Krai 
                    
$28.62 
            
$25.45 
            
$28.63 
            
$32.93 
            
$34.70 
            
$46.44 
            
$52.52 
            
$51.61 
            
$53.39 
            
$66.41 
            
$68.53 
            
$64.60 
            
$64.71 
            
$67.73 
            
$70.28 
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Republic of 
Sakha  
                    
$12.03 
            
$12.39 
            
$13.49 
            
$14.22 
           
$14.54 
            
$16.31 
            
$17.63 
            
$21.27 
            
$23.52 
            
$24.33 
            
$27.85 
            
$29.27 
            
$29.30 
            
$31.41 
            
$32.57 
Magadan 
Region 
                       
$1.88 
               
$2.26 
               
$2.33 
               
$2.05 
               
$2.03 
               
$2.37 
               
$2.53 
               
$2.92 
               
$3.43 
               
$3.68 
               
$4.33 
               
$4.17 
               
$4.56 
               
$4.62 
               
$5.41 
Chukotka                         
$0.94 
               
$0.84 
               
$1.86 
               
$1.31 
     
$1.01 
               
$1.16 
               
$1.52 
               
$2.14 
               
$3.24 
               
$2.66 
               
$2.58 
               
$2.64 
               
$2.42 
               
$2.69 
               
$2.78 
Pan-Arctic  $197.7 $207.4 $224.7 $243.2 $252.2 $289.4 $310.5 $332.1 $325.7 $351.1 $373.7 $382.6 $389.5 $395.8 $402.3 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3: GRP data sources and methodology 
 
Territory Data Source Manipulation 
Alaska OECD Converted from millions of USD to billions 
Nordland  OECD Converted from millions of USD to billions 
Troms OECD Converted from millions of USD to billions 
Finnmark OECD Converted from millions of USD to billions 
Nunavut OECD Converted from millions of USD to billions 
NWT OECD Converted from millions of USD to billions 
Yukon OECD Converted from millions of USD to billions 
Greenland 
World Bank Reported in current USD. Converted to DKK using 
current year xrate as reported by WB. Converted to 
current USD using PPP rate for DK.  
Faroe Islands 
World Bank Reported in current USD. Converted to DKK using 
current year xrate as reported by WB. Converted to 
current USD using PPP rate for DK. 
Chukotka 
ROSSTAT Reported in current basic prices, billions of rubles. 
Converted to USD by dividing by Russian OECD 
PPP for corresponding year. 
Murmansk 
ROSSTAT Reported in current basic prices, billions of rubles. 
Converted to USD by dividing by Russian OECD 
PPP for corresponding year. 
Nenets Autonomous Okrug 
ROSSTAT Reported in current basic prices, billions of rubles. 
Converted to USD by dividing by Russian OECD 
PPP for corresponding year. 
Republic of Karelia 
ROSSTAT Reported in current basic prices, billions of rubles. 
Converted to USD by dividing by Russian OECD 
PPP for corresponding year. 
Arkhangelsk 
ROSSTAT Reported in current basic prices, billions of rubles. 
Converted to USD by dividing by Russian OECD 
PPP for corresponding year. 
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Komi Republic 
ROSSTAT Reported in current basic prices, billions of rubles. 
Converted to USD by dividing by Russian OECD 
PPP for corresponding year. 
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous 
District 
ROSSTAT Reported in current basic prices, billions of rubles. 
Converted to USD by dividing by Russian OECD 
PPP for corresponding year. 
Krasnoyarsk Krai 
ROSSTAT Reported in current basic prices, billions of rubles. 
Converted to USD by dividing by Russian OECD 
PPP for corresponding year. 
Sakha Republic 
ROSSTAT Reported in current basic prices, billions of rubles. 
Converted to USD by dividing by Russian OECD 
PPP for corresponding year. 
Magadan 
ROSSTAT Reported in current basic prices, billions of rubles. 
Converted to USD by dividing by Russian OECD 
PPP for corresponding year. 
Iceland OECD Converted from millions of USD to billions 
Norrbotten OECD Converted from millions of USD to billions 
Västerbotten OECD Converted from millions of USD to billions 
Lapland OECD Converted from millions of USD to billions 
Kainuu OECD Converted from millions of USD to billions 
Northern Ostrobothnia OECD Converted from millions of USD to billions 
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“The Disease that Knowledge Must Cure”?:  
Sites of Uncertainty in Arctic Development 
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After nearly eight years of formal environmental review, in July 2016, the Canadian federal government rejected the French 
multinational AREVA’s proposal to construct a uranium mine 80 kilometers west of Qamani’tuaq/Baker Lake, a small 
inland and mainly Inuit hamlet in the Kivalliq region of Nunavut. The decision not to grant a license for resource development 
based on a technical uncertainty (AREVA was not able to provide a start-date for the mining project due to a depressed 
uranium market) underlies a far more complex and ongoing negotiation with uncertainty. Sites of uncertainty are spaces —
physical, temporal, emotional, material, discursive and so on—that are occupied by a state of not knowing. Based on recent 
qualitative fieldwork in Baker Lake, this paper will identify key sites of uncertainty where AREVA, government officials, 
Inuit organizations, and community residents constructed, negotiated, expressed, transformed, experienced, and responded to 
uranium mining as a resource development controversy. Our analysis reveals how AREVA understood uncertainty as the 
“disease that knowledge must cure”, that is, the view that uncertainty is something to be reduced through the acquisition of 
increased expertise (Jasanoff, 2007: 33). This paper will demonstrate how this epistemological approach resulted in claims to 
certainty that were deeply contested and deconstructed when positioned against the contextual and relational knowledge of local 
residents. It will conclude by detailing how local residents’ calls for improvements in education can be understood as a strategic 
intervention, one that is reflective of an intermeshing of Inuit and western epistemologies.  
 
Introduction 
You affect the land, the people, you affect everything, and at the same time it’s not just the 
start-up of the mine it’s what happens to the mine with the decommissioning, where they are 
being decommissioned… Once AREVA leaves it [is] not like we can go down the road and talk 
to them, once they are gone they are gone, so AREVA can’t help us in that area, the government 
can’t help us in that area, there are so many unknowns, so many more unknowns in Nunavut 
because nobody can say exactly what the answer is, we know exactly how to contain everything, 
it’s never been done how could they say that? (Inuit Interviewee, December 12th, 2016, Baker 
Lake). 
On July 15th 2016, the Honorable Carolyn Bennett, Minister of Indigenous and Northern Affairs 
Canada1, rejected French mining conglomerate AREVA’s proposal (known as the Kiggavik 
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Project), to develop a uranium mine 80 kilometers west of Qamani’tuaq2/Baker Lake. The decision 
aligned with the Nunavut Impact Review Board3 (NIRB)’s recommendation that the Kiggavik 
Project not proceed at the time. The recommendation pivoted on what might appear to be a 
technicality: prior to the NIRB’s Final Hearings, AREVA stated that, due to the depressed uranium 
market4, the Kiggavik Project was not currently economically viable. As a result, AREVA was not 
able to provide a specific start date or development schedule during the final review process. The 
NIRB contended that this served to amplify existing knowledge uncertainties in the assessment, 
stemming from current limitations in scientific data related to the impacts on caribou, fish, and 
marine wildlife (NIRB, 2015a). This said, the NIRB explicitly stated that its recommendation did 
not preclude future approval, as AREVA may resubmit their proposal once they are able to provide 
a start date. 
In this paper, we will argue that the Kiggavik Project deliberations, hotly contested and at times 
acrimonious, demonstrate diverging engagements with uncertainty. It will explore how AREVA’s 
understanding of uncertainty as the “disease that knowledge must cure”, that is, the view that 
uncertainty is something to be reduced through the acquisition of increased expertise (Jasanoff, 
2007: 33), resulted in claims to certainty that were deeply contested when positioned against the 
contextual and relational knowledge of local residents. Studies in Baker Lake have focused on 
exploring the diverse, heterogeneous, and conflicting socio-economic and socio-cultural impacts 
related to relatively recent experiences with the mineral economy, and more specifically focused 
on the development of the Meadowbank Mine (Czyzewski et al. 2014; Makisimowski, 2014; 
Nightingale et al. 2017; Peterson, 2012; Rixen and Blangley, 2016). While these studies have 
identified a key disconnect between community concerns related to resource development and 
what is addressed and captured in formal review processes (Jones & Bradshaw, 2015; Bernauer, 
2016), our paper focuses on what we term sites of uncertainty, which are spaces occupied by a “state 
of not knowing” (Cameron, 2015: 34). This theoretical framework will enable an exploration of 
diverging engagements with, and responses to, uncertainty in the context of resource development 
conflicts. Our empirical study employed qualitative research methods, including archival research5, 
participant observation, and semi-structured interviews. This paper draws on fieldwork conducted 
in Baker Lake during November and December of 2016. This study consisted of 22 interviews. 
All interviewees were Baker Lake residents, 19 identified as Inuit and three identified as 
Qablunaat.6 The sites of uncertainty framework acted as a point of entry into the controversy. 
While uncertainty and not knowing guided the research process, data analysis was performed in 
an inductive thematic manner; themes and issues “emerged” from the data (Reeves et al. 2008), 
yet always within the scope of this framework.7  
We begin by situating the controversy within its historical context. Following this, we introduce 
the concept of sites of uncertainty. Drawing on this theoretical framework, we then outline 
AREVA’s approach to uncertainty and explain how local residents contested and deconstructed 
AREVA’s knowledge claims. We conclude by exploring how local residents’ calls for 
improvements in education can be understood as a strategic intervention with uncertainty, one 
that served to deflect the decision into the future.  
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Uranium Mining Proposals and Baker Lake 
Baker Lake is a small inland and mainly Inuit community in the Kivalliq region of Nunavut. 
Nunavut is the largest northern territory in Canada. Baker Lake is located close to the geographic 
centre of Canada and has a population of fewer than 2,000 people (Ladik, 2013). As an inland 
community, local residents rely heavily on terrestrial wildlife including barren-ground caribou and 
to a lesser extent muskox, as well as Arctic char, lake trout, and other fish from Baker Lake (Scottie, 
1992).  
Baker Lake shares with other communities in Canada’s Arctic a colonial heritage as profound as it 
is recent. Between 1913 and 1931, a Hudson’s Bay trading post, Anglican and Catholic missions, 
and a permanent Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) station established European trading 
in Baker Lake (Bernauer, 2011; Dana and Anderson, 2014). The introduction of the fur trade 
initiated a relationship of economic dependence by transforming the prevailing subsistence 
hunting economy into a mixed subsistence-trading economy (Bernauer, 2015; Légaré, 2008; Hird 
2016; Hird & Zahara 2017; Zahara & Hird 2015). However, it was not until after the Second World 
War that Inuit experienced intensive Canadian government interest, control, and governance. By 
the end of the 1960s, most Inuit in the Kivalliq region had relocated into settlements in large part 
because of the forced settler colonial education of their children (Bernauer, 2011; McGregor, 
2010). Increased dependency on government economic support, cultural and economic 
transformation, and loss of political autonomy, land and resource control has had acute and 
ongoing economic, social and cultural implications. Many Inuit communities, including Baker 
Lake, now face severe challenges such as marginal access to health services, overcrowded housing, 
and high rates of food insecurity, unemployment, substance abuse, and suicide (Billson, 2001).  
The difficult path to some degree of Inuit self-determination is too lengthy to describe here (but 
see Hicks & White 2000; Ritsema et al., 2015). Yet, its entanglement with mineral exploration 
activities, caribou habitat, and the Kivalliq region is particularly relevant for contextualizing the 
Kiggavik Project controversy. Since the late 1960s the region has experienced extensive and 
ongoing uranium exploration, which has resulted in the identification of multiple high-grade 
uranium deposits beneath sensitive caribou habitat (McPherson, 2003). Opposition to mineral 
exploration began in the early 1970s, mostly out of concern that these activities were adversely 
impacting caribou herds. In 1978, the Hamlet of Baker Lake, the Baker Lake Hunters and Trappers 
Association, and many local residents launched a court case to halt mineral exploration on Inuit 
hunting grounds, based on the claim that exploration was infringing on Aboriginal rights, including 
the right to hunt, fish, and move freely on traditional Inuit land (Bernauer, 2015; Elliot, 1983). 
While this court case recognized Aboriginal title, setting the stage for future land claim 
negotiations, it highlighted that unless Inuit could prove that their rights were being infringed 
upon, they had little control over land use management in the region: mineral exploration 
continued in the Baker Lake area (Bernauer, 2015; McPherson, 2003). After years of negotiations 
between Inuit organizations and the federal government, the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement 
(NLCA), the largest land claims agreement settled in Canada to date, was signed in 1993 (Légaré, 
2008). The Agreement stipulates that Inuit organizations receive defined rights and benefits in 
exchange for the abolishment of their Aboriginal title. These rights and benefits include 1.14 billion 
CAD in capital transfers, ongoing royalties, ownership of just over 353,000 square kilometers of 
land (18% of surface rights), and mineral rights to 36,000 square km of that land (2% of mineral 
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rights) (Légaré, 2008; Price, 2000). The Agreement further outlines protocols for rights concerning 
non-Inuit lands, resource development environmental assessments, and land-use planning 
(Cameron, 2015). 
It is in this compromised social and economic context that Baker Lake residents have repeatedly 
found themselves at the centre of multinational extraction industry attention. Globally, Canada is 
the second largest producer of uranium. Currently, Canada’s only operational uranium mines are 
located in the resource-rich area of northern Saskatchewan where the French multinational 
AREVA corporation has been actively involved in uranium extraction and processing (World 
Nuclear Association, 2016), and up until recently intense international industry interest was 
focused on exploiting and discovering new deposits. Historically, uranium mining proposals have 
been met with resistance from Baker Lake residents. In 1989, the German company 
Urangesellschaft (UG) proposed the construction of two open-pit uranium mines, a transportation 
corridor, a work camp, and a two-kilometer-long airstrip (McPherson, 2003). The proposal met 
overwhelming opposition from local residents, over 90% of whom voted against the proposed 
project (ibid). Shortly afterwards, UG abandoned their proposal and sold the property, which was 
eventually acquired by AREVA.8 While resistance to uranium mining is still very vocal in Baker 
Lake, local residents’ perceptions of risks related to uranium mining are increasingly divided 
(Bernauer, 2011; Ladik, 2013). This shift has in part been attributed to increases in employment 
opportunities from Agnico Eagle’s Meadowbank Mine as well as provisions outlined in the NLCA 
that intend to create opportunities for Inuit to exert more control over extractive projects 
(Bernauer, 2011).  
In 2008, AREVA submitted a proposal (the Kiggavik Project) to develop Nunavut’s first uranium 
mine 80 kilometers west of Baker Lake. On two separate sites, the Kiggavik Project proposed to 
develop four open-pit mines and one underground mine. Had it been approved, the Project would 
have extracted and processed approximately 44,000 tonnes of uranium, consumed 1.4 billion 
tonnes of water per annum of operations, and produced a total of 11.5 million tonnes of tailings 
solids as waste, which would have remained on-site. All of this would have occurred in a 
permafrost environment with extremely high winds, which undermines the stability of long-term 
tailings storage and facilitates the rapid dispersion of contaminants if an accident were to occur. 
Moreover, the proposed site was located in close proximity to sensitive caribou habitat and the 
Thelon River, which flows directly into the community’s drinking water source (AREVA, 2008; 
NIRB, 2015a).  
The federal government’s rejection of the proposal pivoted on AREVA’s unwillingness to provide 
a start date for the mine’s development, which AREVA claimed it was unable to specify due to 
the depressed uranium market. Essentially, AREVA wanted to secure extraction and long-term 
uranium tailings storage rights indefinitely and begin its operations in a more economically 
profitable climate. In the lead up to the federal government’s rejection in 2016, the Kiggavik 
Project was highly contentious, uncertain, and faced significant community opposition. As this 
paper will demonstrate, this controversy underlies a complex and ongoing negotiation with 
uncertainty, one that calls for a cautionary and reflexive approach to claiming knowledge about 
the future.  
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Sites of Uncertainty 
The federal government’s decision regarding the Kiggavik Project is an outcome of what Callon, 
Lascoumes and Barthe refer to as a socio-technical controversy, which focuses on “situations of 
uncertainty” (2009: 21). These are situations in which:  
We cannot anticipate the consequences of decisions that are likely to be made; we do not have 
sufficiently precise knowledge of the conceivable options, the description of the constitution 
of possible worlds comes up against resistant cores of ignorance, and the behavior and 
interactions of the entities making them up remain enigmatic. The conditions required for it to 
be relevant to talk of risk are not met. We know that we don’t know, but that is almost all we know: 
there is no better definition of uncertainty (p.21 (emphasis added)). 
As Callon et al. (ibid) note, socio-technical controversies are engendered by both technical and 
social uncertainties whereby even the differentiation between what is technical and what is social 
may become the subject of controversy. Indeed, it is these shifting boundaries that drive the 
‘fluctuations’ in the controversy depending on which actors enter the debate, what alliances are 
formed, what technological options are eliminated or revealed, and what type of information is 
being circulated. As such, the direction in which these controversies unfold is largely unknown 
and unpredictable; it depends not only on the nature and degree of these uncertainties, but also 
how some uncertainties are resolved through political, economic, social and/or cultural means 
(ibid).  
Drawing on Callon et al.’s ‘situations of uncertainty’, in this paper we develop the concept of sites 
of uncertainty as an analytic framework with which to better understand the Kiggavik Project 
controversy. A site of uncertainty is a space—physical, temporal, emotional, material, relational, 
discursive and so on—that is occupied by a “state of not knowing” (Cameron, 2015: 34). As 
Cameron (2015) emphasizes, there are different ways of engaging with and relating to the 
‘unknown’; it is precisely these differences as well as their implications that will be explored 
through the sites of uncertainty framework. Indeed, this framework helps to reveal the unique and 
diverse dimensions of uncertainty that constitute these spaces and so too the controversy. More 
importantly, it helps us to trace the dimensions of uncertainty that are of interest (or not) to 
different actors and why. 
In the following sections, we further refine this framework through an exploration of two key sites 
of uncertainty: the environmental impacts of the proposed project and its socio-economic costs 
and benefits. Through our empirical analysis, we identified these two sites as key areas of concern 
both at the community-level and during the environmental review process. We will investigate the 
various ways through which AREVA, government officials, Inuit organizations, and community 
residents negotiated, expressed, transformed, experienced, and responded to uncertainty at these 
sites. Our analysis contrasts two epistemological approaches to knowledge that were embedded in 
these sites: a western epistemology anchored by certainty gained through reason provisioned by a 
stable and unchanging environment, and an Inuit epistemology that forefronts provisional actions 
within the context of a constantly changing environment. First, we demonstrate how AREVA 
attempted to maintain a consistent western epistemological approach to uncertainty. Secondly, we 
explain how local residents’ concerns revealed a complex and contradictory composite of western 
and Indigenous epistemological responses to uncertainty, as a consequence of a profound and 
recent history of settler colonialism. Lastly, we argue that local residents resolved this entangled 
Arctic Yearbook 2018 
   
Metuzals & Hird 
62 
 
response by further knotting together western and Inuit epistemologies – through calls for increased 
education – rather than by simply rejecting one or the other approach to knowledge.  
“The Disease that Knowledge Must Cure”: AREVA’s Response to 
Uncertainty 
Western cosmologies claim that uncertainty stems from the absence of human intervention and 
that the environment responds to human will (Qitsualik, 2013). This anthropocentric worldview 
considers nature to be both separate from humans and ultimately amenable to human intervention 
and control (Klein, 2000). In western epistemologies, not knowing tends to refer to an absence, 
lack, or failure of knowledge (Cameron, 2015). Therefore, the response to uncertainty is to enhance 
the quality and scope of the knowledge base, as Shelia Jasanoff (2007) emphasizes:  
The great mystery of modernity is that we think of certainty as an attainable state. Uncertainty has 
become the threat to collective action, the disease that knowledge must cure. It is the condition that poses 
cruel dilemmas for decision-makers; that must be reduced at any cost; that is tamed with scenarios 
and assessments; and that feeds the frenzy for new knowledge, much of it scientific (2007: 33, 
emphasis added). 
Uncertainty is understood to be both a threat and a barrier to rational decision-making and 
effective action. As such, predictive methods, such as those used by the extractive industry, have 
been developed to manage, control, and ultimately reduce what is deemed to be uncertain 
(Jasanoff, 2003). Yet, as Callon et al. (2009) note, in the context of socio-technical controversies, 
predictive methods may intend to reduce technical uncertainties, but as new actors and information 
enters a controversy, uncertainties often amplify. Predictive methods are valuable insofar as they 
can quantify, organize and conceptualize what, from an industry, government and/or community 
perspective, is known and unknown, but these methods suffer from significant limitations 
(Jasanoff, 1999). For instance, the approaches are overly fixated on what can be known, and, 
consequently, downplay uncertainties that escape prediction and calculation (Jasanoff, 1999, 2003). 
As such, these methods fail to address and adequately respond to uncertainties that exist outside 
of their explicit as well as tacit framing assumptions (Jasanoff, 2003).  
According to AREVA (2014), its framework for environmental protection and management was 
based on the view that inadequate control over environmental uncertainties is largely related to 
knowledge inadequacies, and, consequently, focuses on increasing that knowledge (i.e. through 
predictive methods, follow-up programs, and monitoring schemes) (Wynne, 1992). For example, 
during the Final Hearings, AREVA did acknowledge the uncertainty contained within their 
assessment of the potential impacts on caribou populations:  
We’re uncertain about the overall effect on mortality of animals, because, again, our effects 
assessment and the cumulative impact on mortality is based on hunter access and how many 
caribou those hunters will take and the redistribution of harvest. We don’t know exactly how 
that’s going to happen. We don’t know exactly what’s going to happen to caribou movement. 
Again, we’ve learned that through our baseline studies and through the community and 
members of the HTO telling us that caribou movement is variable within the year, year to year, 
over the long term. So, again, we don’t have strong confidence in exactly how the caribou are 
going to behave in the future.  (NIRB, 2015b: 223-224) 
AREVA attributed this state of not knowing to “information uncertainties” (NIRB, 2015b: 194), 
reflecting a western representation of uncertainty as a state that can be rectified with more 
information. In order to address this (temporary) state of not knowing, AREVA represented 
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uncertainty in such a way that it is amenable to reduction, control, and management through the 
acquisition of more and better knowledge, or as Jasanoff puts it, “the disease that knowledge must 
cure” (2007: 33). Brian Wynne (2007) contends that this “artificial reduction of uncertainties” 
results in the “externalization of unknowns” (7). For instance, AREVA represented uncertainty in 
a way that shifted the responsibility for the uncertainties onto other actors (Shackley & Wynne, 
1996). Specifically, AREVA displaced the uncertainties concerning the effects on caribou mortality 
and movement onto the harvesting practices of local residents and the variability in caribou 
migration patterns. Paradoxically, while this externalizing technique meant that AREVA 
necessarily acknowledged (ongoing) uncertainty, it also determined that the Kiggavik Project 
would not have significant impacts on caribou herds. For instance, in the impact assessment’s Final 
Hearings, AREVA stated: 
That’s how we come up with our conclusion of not significant, presuming that mitigation will 
work, because it’s proven to have worked in other areas, and we have faith that it will work here as well 
too and that people will collaborate (NIRB, 2015b: 225). 
What is so interesting about AREVA’s statement is its dependence upon non-rational measures: 
experience and faith. This invocation of reason and faith amounts to what Wynne argues is an 
“implicit projection of an exaggerated degree of control” (2007: 7) over both humans and nature. 
Here, AREVA’s conclusion that their proposal would not have significant impacts on caribou 
herds relies heavily on their ability (and confidence) to ‘manage’ any adverse effects through 
ongoing collaboration and mitigation.  
AREVA’s response to the socio-economic uncertainties of their proposal focused on establishing 
certainty between the proposed project and potential benefits, while again externalizing the 
unpredictable and uncontrollable uncertainties onto a catch-all category of “other forces of 
change” (NIRB, 2015c: 456). In the Final Hearings, an AREVA representative recognized the 
complex nature of the socio-economic environment:  
Socioeconomic change is ongoing. It is the result not only of a given project, but of the 
interaction of that project with the broader, continuously evolving economic, social, and 
cultural environment. Other projects, government initiatives, improved technologies, and other 
factors continuously influence the socioeconomic environment. It is important to recognize 
that any future changes in the socioeconomic environment will not be the result only of the 
project but also of other forces of change (in NIRB, 2015c: 455-456). 
While this statement appears to recognize the difficulty in establishing causal relationships between 
the proposed project and socio-economic impacts, AREVA was nevertheless confident in their 
determination that the project would have overall positive and significant socio-economic impacts. 
AREVA contended that this determination was based on their assessment of positive and 
significant effects within the following major socio-economic components: community 
economies; community well-being; public infrastructure and services; non-traditional land use and 
land use planning; and the economy of Nunavut (ibid). And although AREVA noted that Inuit 
traditional culture would be negatively affected by the Project, it nonetheless argued that this 
negative impact would be outweighed by local residents’ increased opportunities to participate in 
the (settler colonial) wage economy (NIRB, 2015c).  
The positive and significant impacts attributed to community economies were related to predicted 
(which became certain) increases in employment, income, contracting, education and training 
opportunities (AREVA, 2014). AREVA (2014) contended that the Kiggavik Project’s “primary 
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effect is the creation of economic opportunities for Kivalliq labour and businesses” (131); the 
company emphasized how these “direct benefits” would have ripple effects throughout the 
regional economy (ibid). This strategy attempts to create certainty surrounding the positive 
benefits, specifically employment and the consequential increases in income. This certainty 
permeated AREVA’s determination that the proposed project would have significantly positive 
effects on local resident well-being. In the Final Hearings, an AREVA representative expanded 
upon their determinants of well-being:  
The effects on well-being were predicted to be overall positive and significant. The negative 
effects on culture may erode well-being for some people but broadening choices and 
opportunities for livelihoods are counteracting factors. Generally, reductions in income poverty 
are associated with improved well-being. Well-being is influenced by many factors including 
culture, employment, education, personal-health habitats, but socioeconomic status is generally 
agreed to be the most important determinant to well-being (NIRB, 2015c: 457). 
As such, AREVA conceptualized well-being in a way that emphasizes the importance of 
employment, while minimizing the importance of culture, enabling AREVA to determine that the 
project would have overall positive and significant effects on community well-being. It is important 
to note that AREVA’s assessment of community economies did not include harvesting activities, 
which along with food security were assessed under traditional culture. This demonstrates how 
AREVA’s claims to certainty were highly selective and deeply embedded with cultural biases.  
Deconstructing Certainty: Contextual and Relational Sites of Uncertainty 
In Inuktitut, Nunavut means “Our Land” or “Our Home” (Kusugak, 2000). Inuit have lived in 
the Arctic for thousands of years and have developed practices that support an intimate 
relationship with a changing environment (Kuptana, 1993). Jose Kusugak emphasizes how Inuit 
cosmologies do not view humans and nature as separate entities:  
The Arctic has sustained us and defined us. We are part of the Arctic landscape and seascape 
and the Arctic landscape are a part of us (2000: 20). 
As such, Inuit cosmology reflects an awareness of “the impossibility of actual independence” 
(Qitsualik, 2013: 24) between humans and other living and non-living entities; an inextricable 
connection and deep respect for the land, weather, and wildlife (Price, 2007). The epistemological 
approach that follows characterizes the environment as constantly changing, which requires 
ongoing human adaptation. Knowledge (of the land, of living) is always, therefore, provisional and 
based on experience. The Inuktitut word qaujimanngit aligns closely with the western understanding 
of lack of knowledge. But nalunaq refers to not knowing; it signifies a “relationship with an 
uncertain state” (Cameron, 2015: 31). According to Emilie Cameron, the appropriate response to 
(or interaction with) this perennial state of uncertainty is to take time:  
First, to acknowledge the way things are. It is foolhardy to pretend to know or understand when 
one does not. Similarly, to act quickly without understanding a situation is to risk a great danger; 
acting without keen knowledge and understanding is worse than doing nothing at all…it is to 
remain open, attentive, and prepared to respond to the moment. Importantly, there is no value 
attached to being in a state of not knowing. It simply is, and one simply responds to the situation 
(ibid: 34). 
As such, what is certain (“the ways things are”) is that knowledge is uncertain. Cameron 
emphasizes that responding to uncertainty in this way is based on an epistemology that does not 
imply a need to master a set of circumstances. Rather, it reflects a patient engagement with the 
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future and an acceptance of the confusion, and limits that necessarily accompanies living within, 
and as part of, permanently changing (and therefore uncertain) environments (ibid). 
Traditional Inuit knowledge has not, of course, evaded settler colonial influence and erasure. Inuit 
ways of knowing (which means acknowledging and working with uncertainty) have been 
threatened by globalization, neoliberal policies, capitalist modes of production, and Inuit 
communities’ profound experience of settler colonialization (failure to implement the NLCA; the 
introduction of lethal diseases, and so on). In contemporary Nunavut, these two diverging 
epistemologies have, and continue to, operate in uneasy and often conflicted parallel (Zahara & 
Hird, 2015).  
Uncertainties Concerning Caribou Harvesting and Inuit Ways of Living 
Thus, while AREVA’s assessment of its proposed project’s impact on caribou populations was 
isolated from the effects on those who harvest caribou (AREVA, 2014), local organizations and 
residents of Baker Lake were attentive to the complexity and interconnected nature of these 
potential impacts not only in the short- but also the long-term. In the Final Hearings, the 
Government of Nunavut, the Beverly Qamanirjuaq Caribou Management Board, and the Baker 
Lake Hunters and Trappers Organization noted that changes in movement, both seasonal 
migration and localized movement, would constitute a significant impact for many Nunavummiut 
in the region (NIRB, 2015a). Critically analyzing AREVA’s own in-house scientific reports, and 
drawing on their own inter-generational experience of caribou hunting and migration patterns, two 
interviewees noted:   
Also, a big thing, is caribou migration patterns, they’ve studied where the caribou migrate 
through and it’s quite close to where the mines would open and so the mining companies 
themselves have stated that if anything the impact that the migration pattern would go further 
away from the community to avoid, to avoid the noise or you know activity that is happening 
in the area, and that would directly impact our community too (Female Inuit Interviewee, 
November 27th, 2016, Baker Lake). 
The Kiggavik proposed mine was in a major migration route and we depend on caribou even 
if we are not fulltime hunters, that’s our normal diet, its caribou, so that was the biggest thing 
(Male Inuit Interviewee, December 12th, 2016, Baker Lake). 
Local residents and organizations noted that AREVA’s determination did not include information 
related to caribou movement: rather this determination was based on the long-term viability of the 
caribou population and delay to its recovery (NIRB, 2015a). AREVA did not include information 
related to caribou movement because, from a western perspective, this information would 
necessarily be provisional, and AREVA was interested in making statements of certainty. For their 
part, local residents contested AREVA’s projected impacts, which residents saw contextually and 
relationally situated, not as separate and discrete biophysical impacts amenable to certain control. 
Moreover, for Baker Lake residents, caribou are intimately embedded in Inuit culture, traditions, 
and social relationships. One Inuit interviewee elaborated on the importance of caribou to the 
community:  
I guess the biggest impact to me, in my opinion, is via the caribou, we are so dependent on it 
as a people, and I think it will directly affect our caribou from what I have read, from what I 
understood from the Environmental Impact Statement, and having been a part of the process, 
I think it will directly affect our caribou and I think that will be the biggest impact, because our 
food is very much our culture in that many of our family members make garments out of it, we 
eat it, we love getting together as a family, all our family functions really surround the eating of 
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caribou. That would be the biggest impact (Inuit Interviewee, November 27th, 2016, Baker 
Lake). 
In Baker Lake, harvesting caribou represents a key point of intersection between Inuit culture, 
well-being, self-sufficiency, social cohesion, and the biophysical environment. The land is a site of 
cultural memory and collective identity; it is a source of Inuit history, knowledge, values, cultural 
practices, and language (Kushwaha, 2013). For many Inuit, well-being is intimately tied to the land 
(Kral et al. 2011) as it is “imbued with and provides for cultural connectivity” (Jones & Bradshaw, 
2015: 89). Many interviewees described how land-based activities such as hunting, camping, drying 
caribou meat at one’s cabin, and simply just “being out on the land” brought peace and ease to 
their lives. For instance:  
Being out on the land it’s very peaceful, and there’s family staying close together, spending a lot 
of time with each other, and learning how to hunt and fish and all the survival skills (Inuit 
Interviewee, December 5th, 2016, Baker Lake). 
So it’s home, out there. If I didn’t have to make money I would be out there all the time (Inuit 
Interviewee, December 12th, 2016, Baker Lake). 
Thus while AREVA sought to isolate the impacts on caribou populations from myriad other 
issues, (as a technique used to increase certainty), for Inuit and other local residents, the uncertainty 
concerning caribou hunting – which is taken for granted within Inuit epistemology – is necessarily 
implicated in other issues including Inuit cultural traditions, food security, social connections as 
well as well-being, self-sufficiency, and identity.  
Uncertainties Concerning Socio-economic Benefits  
Thus, the local organizations questioning AREVA’s certainty with regard to socio-economic 
benefits to the Baker Lake community focused on the necessarily provisional status of AREVA’s 
claims. Makita (2012) emphasized that AREVA’s determination that the proposed project would 
result in significant positive impacts on community well-being was isolated from their 
determination that the project would have significant negative impacts on Inuit traditional culture. 
In other words, local residents expressed concern that AREVA’s presentation of the certainty of 
socio-economic benefits failed to capture the complex, diverse, and dynamic nature of Inuit well-
being as well as the entanglement of values and modes of self-sufficiency experienced in 
contemporary Inuit society. For instance, interviewees describe the conflicted space that 
characterizes the controversy at the community-level:  
The fact that employment for families is very important and also full-time hunters need to be 
able to harvest their traditional diet, so that’s where we are today we are caught in the middle 
of something like this...I wish we were able to have the best of both worlds where we can have 
a mining production open and traditional harvesting happening at the same time with no effects 
on the other (Inuit Interviewee, December 5th 2016, Baker Lake). 
People that are working at the mine [Meadowbank] because they have to feed their family, to 
live, but they also don’t want the caribou or the wildlife to be harmed, and so they are, they’re 
stressed about it. They know that mining is playing a part in it, the mining industry, and it’s also 
affecting the caribou and they are, they are stuck. They need the job to feed their family, but 
they also don’t want to lose caribou or the fish. (Inuit Interviewee, December 4th 2016, Baker 
Lake) 
Community residents repeatedly expressed that they felt torn between two ways of life, or “caught 
between two cultures” (Kral et al., 2011: 432).  
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For local residents, even AREVA’s narrowly defined category of socio-economic well-being 
proved problematic. While employment opportunities were important to local residents, the 
degree to which they would actually be realized by Inuit (and contribute to well-being) was 
questioned. Specifically, AREVA’s Inuit employment target of 50% for later years of operations 
was highly contested during the Final Hearings. Inuit organizations and the territorial government 
were skeptical about this target, referring to experiences with other mines9, the current labour 
shortage, turnover rates, and the all too common trend of southern labour filling these positions 
(NIRB, 2015a). These limitations, compounded with the lack of start date and the expansion of 
Agnico Eagles operations10, made it difficult to predict whether or not the Kiggavik Project would 
compete with Agnico Eagle for human resources or result in staggered development. Baker Lake 
residents, referring to Meadowbank, stated:  
They have trained everybody in Baker Lake, like literally everybody that wanted a job up there 
had it (Baker Lake Resident, November 25th, 2016, Baker Lake). 
 
What we are seeing right now is almost a total saturation of the workforce…You are going to 
have a whole bunch of people from Baker Lake already employed there, so if there was a 
uranium mine you would see proportionally there would be less, less beneficiaries working in 
those roles because you would have essentially competition for human resources across you 
know two locations, so if there was going to be a uranium mine, thinking from a human 
resources perspective, I think it would need to be a staggered (Inuit Interviewee, December 4th, 
2016, Baker Lake). 
These statements question the extent to which Baker Lake residents would truly benefit from 
additional employment opportunities in the mineral sector, further challenging AREVA’s claims 
to certainty.  
Improving Education, Slowing Things Down 
Faced with competing claims regarding the certainty of the projected benefits and harms to the 
people of Baker Lake and their environment, local residents developed a nuanced strategic 
response. This strategy consisted of calling for improvements in education. Education was mentioned 
by 17 of the 22 interviewees and 13 of the 17 Inuit interviewees. These interviewees referred to 
education in a decidedly western way, that is, they emphasized positive attributes of both increases 
in education in general and the southern Canadian school system. Moreover, interviewees 
problematized Inuit education and positioned it in a state of deficit. For instance:  
We are not educated...We need to get educated (Inuit Interviewee, December 12th, 2016, Baker 
Lake). 
 
I think that our community and every community can do a lot better encouraging our youth to 
get educated, that’s bottom line (Inuit Interviewee, December 8th, 2016, Baker Lake). 
 
Baker Lake residents noted that improving education would enhance the community’s ability to 
capitalize on employment opportunities at all levels, not just non-skilled or semi-skilled positions. 
Additionally, this response was understood as a way to enhance the community’s understanding 
of the potential impacts of uranium mining, and, through this acquisition of knowledge, enable 
them to make a more ‘informed’ decision.  
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We need to be educated to understand the whole process, and the people at the hearing, the 
first round of interveners, there were no Inuit there, there were experts at the table and I said 
that maybe once we are ready and we have Inuit at all those levels of expertise then its time to 
make a decision about that (Inuit Interviewee, December 4th, 2016, Baker Lake). 
 
We as Inuit aren’t prepared for in the way to have all the different types of jobs, not just the 
lower rung jobs, but the higher rung jobs like mechanical engineers, tailing pit management 
engineers, understanding the chemistry and the physics of uranium processing, extraction, a 
whole gamut of understanding uranium, I don’t believe we as a people understand it yet (Inuit 
Interviewee, December 4th, 2016, Baker Lake). 
 
Hopefully in the future they will have of [sic] solved some of the issues we have in terms of the 
migration of caribou, what effect it has on the stocks we have in terms of fish, and you know 
people who have better education/are better educated to be able to work in the mine and 
understand what uranium mining really is and how it affects people and the environment (Inuit 
Interviewee, November 22nd 2016, Baker Lake). 
Yet, while this response to uncertainty may well appear to conform to a western epistemology 
(that is, the “disease the knowledge must cure”), it simultaneously grounds an Inuit engagement 
with the future, one that is underpinned by patience and a cautionary relationship towards claiming 
knowledge in uncertain situations. In other words, calling for increased education was a way for 
the Baker Lake community to slow the process down in order to gain valuable time to further reflect, 
observe and experience a changing (uncertain) environment: 
The resource that is increasing rapidly within our territory is people, we have a young population 
and so we need to make sure we are educated in both English and Inuktitut to be able to get 
ahead. Otherwise I just felt that we were rushing into this game a little too soon, without really 
understanding what we were getting into…We are not ready, as people, educationally to be 
there, we don’t need to just only have the mining jobs, the housekeeping jobs, and I said to the 
community that they need to wake their children up, have them go to school, finish their 
homework, keep on top of their education, and make sure they can be doing the best that they 
can do. Invest in our resource that is growing (Inuit Interviewee, December 4th 2016, Baker 
Lake). 
 
Wait another generation or so. Let these kids decide, today’s kids decide, what they think…wait 
until we have 100 more college graduates, or 100 more college or university graduates, just wait 
for another few thousands in post-secondary, maybe they will have a better understanding on 
[sic] the environment. Since we are getting better every generation at voicing concerns, and life 
generally up here. I can’t answer that right now (Inuit Interviewee, November 24th 2016, Baker 
Lake). 
As such, this highly creative response reflects a contemporary Inuit engagement with the future, 
one that connects Inuit and western worldviews and as such strategically responds to both industry 
and Canadian government (intense) pressures at the same time that it slows the whole mining 
approval process down, thereby benefiting from an Inuit epistemology that forefronts 
provisionality, caution, and long-term experience in living with the environment. While our Inuit 
interviewees emphasized the importance of education in terms of engagement in the wage 
economy and enhancing the community’s knowledge related to uranium mining, using wording 
such as “rushing into this game”, “we are not ready”, “wait another generation”, and “I can’t 
answer that right now” suggest a response that is far more intentional than simply complying with 
settler colonial priorities. Insisting that current and future Baker Lake residents require ‘more 
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information’ effectively stalls any assumption on the part of AREVA, other extraction industries, 
and/or the Canadian government that the Baker Lake community will accede to their priorities.   
Conclusions  
Sites of uncertainty developed in this paper provides a useful framework for the divergent ways in 
which AREVA, government officials, Inuit organizations, and local residents expressed, 
transformed, experienced, and responded to uncertainty during the Kiggavik controversy. In this 
paper, we have argued that AREVA represented uncertainty in a way that aligns with western 
epistemologies, that is as “the disease that knowledge must cure”, and consequently focused on 
establishing certainty through techniques of control, prediction, management, externalization, and 
isolation. We have shown how these claims of certainty were deeply contested and deconstructed 
when positioned against local residents’ relational and contextual knowledge, and failed to capture 
the complex, diverse, and dynamic nature of Inuit well-being, self-sufficiency, and identity. Indeed, 
local residents’ concerns revealed a composite of Inuit and western epistemological responses to 
uncertainty. Local residents’ calls for improvements in education is, we argue, a strategic 
intervention, one that reflects a contemporary Inuit engagement with the world. Advocating for 
more education and increased knowledge strongly resonated with AREVA’s (and the Canadian 
government’s) emphasis on educating local residents (using a deficit model approach) as a way of 
increasing local support for the proposal. Local residents endorsed this solution because it also 
necessarily slowed the whole process, giving local residents time to reflect, deliberate, and imagine 
their future in ways that respect Inuit ways of understanding. 
It might be argued that this strategy reflects Audre Lorde’s contention that “the master’s tools will 
never dismantle the master’s house” (1984: 112). That is, we may view Inuit calls for more (settler 
colonial) education as validating the very system that continues to limit their own self-
determination. However, this, as Lorde also points out, assumes that settler colonial knowledge is 
the only option, which the Baker Lake residents have proven to be unfounded through their 
successful opposition to the Kiggavik Proposal. Calling for improvements in education draws on 
other sources of support, including Inuit ways of knowing and being that have persisted, 
flourished, and creatively adapted to contemporary resource development.  
 
 
Notes 
1. The Honourable Carolyn Bennett was previously the Minister of Indigenous and 
Northern Affairs Canada. In August 2017, the department of Indigenous and Northern 
Affairs Canada was dissolved, and replaced by two new departments: The Department of 
Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs and the Department of Indigenous 
Services. Carolyn Bennett is now the Minister of Crown-Indigenous Relations and 
Northern Affairs.  
2. In Inuktitut, Qamani’tuaq means “where the river widens”, referring to the mouth of the 
Thelon River, which ultimately drains into Hudson’s Bay. 
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3. The NIRB is the institution of public government responsible for assessing, using both 
traditional knowledge and scientific methods, the potential biophysical and socio-
economic impacts of proposed development in Nunavut, Canada (NIRB, 2015a). 
4. In 2007, the price of uranium hit a high of just above US$135 per pound, however with 
the 2008 financial crisis prices fell to US$40 in 2009. While prices recovered to just above 
US$70 by 2011, the Fukushima Daiichi accident resulted in the shutdown of many 
nuclear reactors. This, combined with huge stockpiles of uranium and the long-
production cycle, has resulted in a decrease in demand and consequently spot price (2018 
prices are just above US$20 per pound) (De Clercq, 2016; UxC, 2018).  
5. Transcripts from the Kiggavik Project’s Final Hearings (accessed through the NIRB’s 
public registry) as well as the NIRB’s Final Hearing Report on the Kiggavik Uranium Mine 
Project, and AREVA’s Kiggavik Project Proposal and Draft and Final Environmental 
Impact Statements were key archival sources as they provided insight into how the 
contemporary uranium mining controversy unfolded. Additionally, media reports, mainly 
from Nunastiaqonline, Northern News Service Ltd., and CBC North were critical to 
understanding the variety of viewpoints embedded in this controversy. 
Lastly, non-governmental organizations that were involved in the controversy such as 
Makita, Mining Watch, and World Wildlife Foundation webpages also provided valuable 
contextual and positional information.  
6. The term Qablunaat (singular Qablunaaq) refers to a “white” or “white person”, more 
specifically it refers to non-Inuit, non-Indigenous, settlers; Cameron (2015) emphasizes 
how this is a relational term that is embedded in racialized, hierarchical power structures. 
7. For more information see Metuzals (forthcoming). 
8. In 1993, the property was acquired by AREVA, previously COGEMA (AREVA, 2008).  
9. For comparison, in 2015, Meadowbank’s Inuit employment rate was 37% (Stratos, 2016) 
10. Meadowbank was expected to close in 2018, however with the discovery of the Amaruq 
satellite deposit, located 55 kilometers northwest of Meadowbank, in 2013, the life of 
Meadowbank has been extended by an additional seven years (Agnico Eagle, 2017). 
Additionally, Agnico Eagle’s Meliadine Project, located just outside of Rankin Inlet in the 
Kivalliq region, commenced construction in 2017 (ibid). 
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Indexing Arctic Urban Sustainable Development 
Planning Strategies: The Case of Russia 
 
Alexander Sergunin 
 
Russian Arctic cities acknowledge the need to build sustainable development strategies (SDSs) to ensure their long-
term socioeconomic and ecological viability. They try to create proper conceptual, legal and institutional settings for 
the development and implementation of such strategies. First and foremost the Arctic cities aim to create and develop 
an efficient strategy planning system which is seen as a necessary precondition for successful urban SDS. This paper 
aims to discuss possible indicators to evaluate the SDS planning process in the major industrial cities of the Russian 
Arctic). The following indicators will be discussed: 
• Ability to acknowledge the need for SDS planning.  
• Integrated/comprehensive nature of planning.  
• The existence/non-existence of a planning office in the city. 
• Clearly defined goals, outcomes/expectations, implementation strategies, including indicators and 
benchmarks. 
• Quality and accuracy of assessments (whether it is based on science or wishful thinking). 
• Coordination with the regional and federal SDS. 
• Transparency of the planning process. 
• Public input/community engagement (opinion polls, public discussions in the media, hearings in the 
public chambers, NGO’s role).  
• Ability to take into account private and public interests.  
• Centralized or indicative planning. 
 
Introduction 
The Russian Arctic municipalities view the need to build sustainable development strategies (SDS) 
as an important policy priority for themselves. They try to create proper conceptual, legal and 
institutional settings for the development and implementation of such strategies. First and 
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foremost the Arctic cities aim to create and develop an efficient strategy planning system which is 
seen as a necessary precondition for successful urban SDS.  
Planning is an integral part of any urban development strategy, including for Russian Arctic cities 
and towns. City administrators understand that planning gives more power over the future. 
Planning is deciding in advance what to do, how to do it, when to do it, and who should do it. 
This bridges the gap from where the city is, to where it wants to be. The planning function involves 
establishing goals and arranging them in logical order. A well-planned city achieves goals faster 
than the ones that don’t plan before implementation. 
Planning is especially important for designing a proper urban sustainable development (SD) 
strategy because the latter requires an integrated approach to the developmental policies where all 
aspects of such strategy – economic, social and environmental - should be harmonized and 
coordinated. Planning for urban sustainability is also important because all potential stakeholders 
– municipal, regional and federal authorities, companies, universities and civil society 
institutions/NGOs – should be involved in the SD strategy formulation and implementation. 
This paper aims to discuss possible indicators to evaluate the SDS planning process in the major 
industrial cities of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF), including Arkhangelsk, 
Murmansk, Nickel, Norilsk, Salekhard, Severodvinsk and Vorkuta. 
Data and Method 
The data for this study are drawn from the following sources:  
• Regional and municipal development and action plans;  
• Regional/local government reports; 
• Position/background papers;  
• Analytical reports produced by research centers and NGOs; and 
• Media reports.  
As with any study of sensitive political issues, it’s difficult to compile a set of reliable data. 
Information is often contradictory, misleading or not fully reported. Research is also complicated 
by differences of opinion between scholars as regards methods of assessment and interpretation 
of sources. Moreover, research techniques and terminology vary. Therefore, the exercise of 
judgment and comparing of sources are important elements in compiling the database.  
Since the study does not just entail data collection but also data assessment three main principles 
are implemented with regard to selecting and interpreting sources:  
• Validity. Data should represent most important and typical trends rather than occasional 
or irregular developments in the AZRF cities’ SD policies. 
• Informativeness. Sources that provide valuable and timely information are given priority.  
• Innovativeness. Sources that offer original data, fresh ideas and non-traditional approaches 
are preferable.  
These research techniques help to overcome the limitations of the sources and compile substantial 
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and sufficient data for this study. 
The Russian Urban Development Planning: Conceptual and Legal 
Aspects 
Given the highly centralized nature of Russian political and administrative systems, the AZRF 
municipal SD strategies are dependent on and interlinked to federal policies in this area. Municipal 
strategies are based on numerous conceptual and normative documents issued by Moscow, 
although the federal centre encourages subnational units to take into account local peculiarities 
and suggest solutions to the specific problems of the AZRF. That’s why it is important to 
understand what kind of conceptual/doctrinal and legal basis for SD strategies exists on the federal 
level. 
It should be noted that conceptually the Russian (then Soviet) SD national strategies (in their 
environmental form) date back to Mikhail Gorbachev’s 1987 Murmansk speech, which included a 
section on the ecological problems of the Arctic. That speech was well received by the Nordic 
countries and led to various environmental initiatives, such as Finland’s 1989 initiative on Arctic 
environmental protection cooperation, which resulted in a number of technical and scientific 
reports between 1989 and 1991. This ultimately led to the development of the Arctic Environment 
Protection Strategy (AEPS) in 1991 and the establishment of the Arctic Council in 1996 (Heininen, 
2004: 208-209). 
In the social sphere, Moscow’s policies aim to foster favorable conditions for the sustainable 
development of Indigenous peoples. For example, in 2009, the Russian government approved the 
concept of sustainable development for the Indigenous small-numbered peoples of the North, 
Siberia, and the Far East (Putin, 2009). Among other things, the concept set forth the general task 
of raising the quality of life in these regions to the Russian average and the specific task of halving 
the infant mortality rate (as of 2007) by 2025. However, these policies have still not come close to 
their targets and are harshly criticized by Russia’s Indigenous peoples and national and 
international human rights organizations (Rohr, 2014). 
Moscow actively partook in developing the UN Sustainable Development Goals (2015) and 
accepted them as a conceptual basis for its national strategy. 
As far as legal aspects of Russia’s SD strategies are concerned Moscow signed and ratified the most 
important international agreements on environment protection and SD: the UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (1982); Convention on Biodiversity (1992); International Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling (1946); Fish Stocks Agreement (1995); the UNESCO Convention 
Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972); Convention on the 
Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (1979); Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (1973); Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping of Waste and Other Matters (1972); International Convention on Oil 
Pollution Preparedness, Response, and Cooperation (1990); Agreement on Cooperation on Marine 
Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (2013); the International Maritime 
Organization’s Polar Code (November 2014 and May 2015); and the 2015 Paris Agreement under 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
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To date, Russia has a reputation as a responsible regional player that duly implemented the above 
international agreements. 
Moscow made great strides to internalize these international documents and make them an integral 
part of its national legislation. The Russian national legislation on environment protection includes 
the following legal acts: Federal Law on Environment Protection (2002), Water Code of the 
Russian Federation (2006), Federal Law on Internal Marine Waters and Territorial Sea (1998), 
Federal Law on the Continental Shelf (1995), Federal Law on Fauna (1995), Russian Federal Law 
on the Ratification of the Convention on Biodiversity (1995), and Federal Law on the Northern 
Sea Route (2012). This legislation constitutes an integral part of the international governance 
system in the Arctic region. 
In addition to the SD/environmental legislation, the Kremlin managed to develop the normative 
basis for strategic planning. In June 2014, President Putin (2014) signed a federal law on strategic 
planning that prescribed for all levels of government – national, regional and municipal – having 
three types of strategic documents: a strategy for socioeconomic development, a forecast of 
socioeconomic development and specific programs to implement the two former documents. 
According to this law, the municipalities should define strategic objectives for socioeconomic 
development and organize monitoring and control over strategic plans implementation. The law 
also established major principles of strategic planning, such as coherence and integrity; delimitation 
of powers between various levels of government; sustainability and continuity; balanced nature of 
the planning system; result-oriented approach and efficiency; clear responsibilities of managers; 
transparency of the planning process; feasibility and realistic approach; resource-based approach; 
measurability; relevance of indicators to objectives and program-targeted principles. 
The law on strategic planning has become a legal basis for the development of various normative 
documents regulating the planning process at the regional and municipal levels. For example, in 
2012 the Russian Agency for Strategic Initiatives (ASI) has launched an Investment Standard 
(Standard 1.0) to improve the business climate in the Russian regions and increase their investment 
attractiveness (see http://asi.ru/investclimate/standard/). Having started as a pilot project in 
eleven Russian regions, the Standard 1.0 became a mandatory instrument for assessment of a 
region’s efficiency in the investment sphere since 2013. 
The similar investment standard (Standard 2.0) was developed for municipalities as well. The focus 
was made on creation of planning and managerial structures in the city/town administrations, 
including the so-called investment boards; identification of proper objects for investment; building 
infrastructure for investment projects; training municipal officials, etc. 
Initially, it was planned to launch the Standard 2.0 implementation in 2014. However, only a limited 
number of Russian cities and towns were able to do it. Currently, this standard is being introduced 
only on a voluntary basis and mainly in the regions that successfully implemented the Standard 1.0 
(Emelyanova, 2014). 
Although both standards were heavily criticized for their technocratic character and ignorance of 
local realities (especially in Russia’s remote regions), it was a rather useful exercise in strategic 
planning which can bring some fruit in a foreseeable future. 
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Measuring Sustainable Development Planning in Russia’s Arctic 
Industrial Centers 
When indexing the progress in planning the AZRF SD strategies the following indicators should 
be taken into account. 
First and foremost it is important to find out whether the Russian Arctic cities aim to create and 
develop an efficient strategy planning system. To make judgments on the 
administrative/management mechanism’s efficiency it is necessary to examine whether the city 
leadership is able to acknowledge the need for SD strategy planning or not. As municipal documents 
show, the AZRF local governments understand the importance of having a sort of SD strategy. 
None of the AZRF industrial cities has a special SD strategy but there are sections in the city 
development plans/strategies that are relevant to this problematique. These sections can be titled 
differently, such as, for example, “Human/social capital development”, “Sustainable socio-
economic development”, “Sustainable ecological development”, etc.  
It is also important to know whether city planning is of an integrated/comprehensive nature or addresses 
specific SD-related challenges. It should be noted that only large (by Arctic standards) cities have 
development strategies of their own. Relatively small urban settlements usually have the so-called 
‘target programs’ related to the SD problematique. For example, Nickel (the Murmansk Region) 
has a municipal program on provision of urban amenities and urban development but lacks an 
integrated development plan (see http://admnickel.ru/celevye-programmy.html). Interestingly, 
Severodvinsk, which is a rather large city with a population of some 185,000, stopped adopting 
complex and long-term plans of socio-economic development and replaced them with some three-
year forecasts/indicative plans and targeted programs (see http://severodvinsk.info/?idmenu=48 
http://severodvinsk.info/?idmenu=48). 
It is also important to know whether a special strategy planning office exists in an Arctic city or not. 
Most AZRF municipalities prefer to charge their economic departments with planning functions 
rather than involve units responsible with environmental or social policies. This brings a certain 
“economic bias” to their development programs at the expense of social/humanitarian and 
environmental dimensions of their SD strategies. This also may challenge the 
integrated/comprehensive nature of planning and give the local development plans a 
sectoral/single-issue character. For example, the Murmansk (Murmansk City Government, 2013) 
and Severodvinsk (Severodvinsk City Government, 2010) development plans include almost all 
aspects of the SD strategy (except food security). However, the Arkhangelsk development strategy 
(Arkhangelsk City Government, 2008) prioritizes only sectors, such as transport infrastructure, 
health care, education and cultural heritage preservation and almost completely ignores food, 
environmental, community, personal and political security. 
Planning units are very small and normally consist of several managers even in the largest AZRF 
cities, such as Arkhangelsk, Murmansk and Norilsk. For this reason, these units are often unable 
to fully comply with all classical requirements of the planning management algorithm, including 
strategy formulation and implementation. It is also very difficult for them to properly coordinate 
their activities with other city administration units which are also involved in the planning and 
implementation process. For the same reason, it is uneasy to ‘mainstream’ urban sustainability 
plans in the sense that all parts of the government have some stake in achieving the goals. 
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One more indicator of successful SD city planning policy is whether it has clearly defined goals, 
outcomes, expectations and implementation strategies. It appears that most city development programs 
have clearly defined objectives, outcomes and implementation strategies, including indicators and 
benchmarks. However, they may differ by specific details. For example, while the Murmansk 
(2013), Norilsk (2012), Severodvinsk (2010) and Vorkuta (2014) strategies have a detailed 
description of the implementation mechanisms and indicator systems, the Arkhangelsk (2008) and 
Salekhard (2007) ones limit themselves to depicting specific project management procedures and 
setting some general indicators.  
It is also useful to know what quality and accuracy of assessments are inherent to the policy planning 
process? In other words, whether planning is based on science or wishful thinking? It should be 
noted that strategy planning documents of the AZRF municipalities are based on empirical data 
and research produced either by analytical units of city administrations or research/educational 
organizations – local or from other Russian regions. Among the latter the Moscow-based ASI, 
Institute for Urban Economics, Council for the Study of Productive Forces (Russian Foreign 
Trade Academy), as well as the St. Petersburg-based Leontief Center, Russian State Research 
Institute for Urban Studies, etc. should be mentioned. 
To shape efficient SD strategies the AZRF municipalities should effectively coordinate their policies with 
regional and federal authorities. The AZRF municipalities aim to develop a proper legal basis for SD 
strategies, including power-sharing with the federal and regional governments. As mentioned 
above, by federal law, the Russian municipalities must coordinate their development 
plans/programs with the regional and federal SD strategies. However, this is done by the AZRF 
cities in different ways. For example, in the Murmansk development plan each strategic priority is 
linked to the specific regional and federal programs (Murmansk City Government, 2013: 108-169). 
On the contrary, the Arkhangelsk, Norilsk, Salekhard and Vorkuta development strategies mention 
the need to coordinate it with the higher levels of governments in passim (Arkhangelsk City 
Government, 2008: 51-52; Norilsk City Government, 2012: 105-107; 170; Salekhard City 
Government, 2007: 32-33; Vorkuta City Government, 2014: 84). 
The AZRF municipalities are rather cautious about any federal initiatives in the field of strategic 
planning. For example, Moscow’s efforts to introduce the Standard 2.0 got a cold shoulder in the 
northern cities. In 2014, about 80 municipalities across the country were selected to implement 
the project. However, in the AZRF, only the Murmansk region, where the Standard 1.0 was fully 
implemented, participates in the experiment with the Standard 2.0. Four municipalities are 
considered pilot ones (Pechenga and Kola districts, Monchegorsk and Murmansk); other 
municipalities (Polyarnye Zori, Apatity, Kirovsk, Olenegorsk, and Kovdorsky, Lovozersky, Tersky 
and Kandalaksha districts) implement only certain elements of the Standard 2.0. The only 
municipality that has fully implemented all elements of the Standard 2.0 is Murmansk itself. This 
can be explained by the fact that it is a capital of the region that has larger financial and human 
resources than other municipalities (Emelyanova, 2014). 
To provide SD strategies with a proper societal setting/support transparency of the planning process as 
well as public input/community engagement should be ensured. These indicators are also important for 
a proper assessment of the planning process’ quality. Theoretically, the Russian Arctic 
municipalities have several instruments to organize the planning and implementation process in 
an open/democratic way: regular opinion polls, public discussions in the media, regular hearings 
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in the so-called public chambers, dialogue with NGOs, etc. However, only Severodvinsk has a 
special municipal program to facilitate the local NGOs’ development (Severodvinsk City 
Government, 2016). The Murmansk and Vorkuta development plans hardly mention the need for 
a dialogue with civil society institutions; other AZRF cities simply ignore this issue resting the SD 
strategy planning process entirely within governmental structures. 
Ability to take into account private and public interests is one more indicator of a strategy planning’s 
efficiency. In principle, all AZRF city development plans acknowledge the need to build a proper 
public-private partnership. However, in reality few Arctic municipalities (e.g. Salekhard) are able 
to harmonize public interests with those of business communities which often behave in a rather 
self-willing and selfish way. 
One more important question is about the nature of planning. In the Soviet era, the centralized 
planning and control system prevailed both in Russia’s Arctic and in the country at large. In the 
post-Soviet period, new modes of decentralized planning and control that are more sensitive to 
the dynamic AZRF realities have emerged. For example, ‘indicative planning’ loosens up the 
planning process: instead of setting taut and unchanging targets, it merely points in certain desired 
directions and recalibrates future targets in light of what past practice has shown to be realistic 
aspirations. More generally, the present-day Russian policy makers can rely more heavily on 
‘loose’/‘soft’ laws and regulations. Instead of tightly specifying exact performance requirements, 
the laws and regulations can be written in more general and vaguely aspirational terms (Goodin, 
2006: 18). It should be noted that most of the AZRF urban development strategies are written in 
the spirit of indicative planning rather than in a centralized, Soviet-type way. 
As far as the environmental aspect of the SD strategies is concerned, the AZRF municipalities 
have the following priorities: 
• Now the Arctic cities focus on prevention and reduction of pollution rather than on 
cleaning up the environmental mess as was the case before. 
• Rehabilitation of damaged natural environmental systems (damage assessment, targeting 
the priority areas, clean-up programs, monitoring). 
• Solid and liquid waste treatment. 
• Targeted programs to protect endangered species. 
• Development of public-private partnerships in the environment protection sphere. 
• Encouraging environmental research (support for the local universities and research 
centers). 
• Developing environmental education and culture. 
• Cooperation with the local environmental NGOs and mass media to promote “green” 
projects and culture. 
• Development of monitoring system in various areas (prevention of natural and man-made 
disasters; air and water pollution; endangered species, etc.). 
It should be noted that the AZRF cities differ by their views on the significance of environmental 
problems in the SD strategies. While for some municipalities, such as Arkhangelsk, Murmansk, 
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and Salekhard, environmental issues are one of several policy priorities, for Monchegorsk, Nickel, 
Norilsk, and Severodvinsk, where the ecological situation is rather grave, the need to solve the 
environmental problems is really critical. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 1. Impact zones in the Russian Arctic. Source: redesigned from Dushkova & Evseev 2011: 2. 
These cities are traditional centers of metallurgical production, machine- and ship-building 
industries and for this reason are heavily polluted and pose serious health hazards. Russian 
scientists identified 27 so-called impact zones where pollution has led to environmental 
degradation and increased morbidity among the local population (see Map 1). The main impact 
zones include the Murmansk Region (10% of total pollutants in the 27 impact zones), Norilsk 
urban agglomeration (more than 30%), West Siberian oil and gas fields (more than 30%) and the 
Arkhangelsk Region (around 5%) (Dushkova & Evseev 2011; Ekologicheskoe Sostoyanie 
Impactnykh Raionov, 2012). In sum, about 15% of the AZRF territory is polluted or contaminated 
(Kochemasov et al., 2009). 
As mentioned above, the AZRF cities pay little attention to the purely human security 
problematique preferring to focus on the economic and environmental issues. The “human 
dimension” of the SD strategies is mostly represented by the municipal programs on civil defense 
(Murmansk City Government, 2013; Severodvinsk City Government, 2010; Vorkuta City 
Government, 2014) to protect the local population from natural and man-made catastrophes. 
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Some development plans (Murmansk City Government, 2013; Severodvinsk City Government, 
2010) also have sections on personal security, including the need to fight street violence. 
Almost all city development plans mention the need for international cooperation, including 
venues such as the Arctic Council, Barents Euro-Arctic Council, International Polar Year, 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, UNDEP and UNESCO programs, country-to-
country, region-to-region, town-to-town collaboration, etc. 
Conclusions 
To sum up, the Russian Arctic municipalities have familiarized themselves with the concept of 
sustainable development. To some extent, this concept was embedded in municipal development 
plans/strategies, although the AZRF cities lack special SD strategic documents, and, quite often, 
economic, ecological, and social dimensions are not properly harmonized with one another. The 
Arctic municipalities view the development of sound urban planning strategies as an important 
policy priority for themselves. They have tried to create proper legal and institutional settings for 
the development and implementation of such strategies. They also tried to cooperate with regional 
and federal authorities in the field of strategic planning and solving concrete socioeconomic and 
ecological problems 
They have made great strides in implementing some SD-related (mostly economic and 
environmental) projects over the last 10 to 15 years. There was a clear shift from survival/reactive 
to capacity-building/proactive SD strategies. These efforts resulted in some success stories albeit 
rather modest ones. 
However, there is still a long way to go, in terms of both the development of adequate policies and 
their effective implementation. The main problem is how to solve the “words and deeds” problem 
because many of the SD projects still remain on paper and have never been implemented. In other 
words, the gap between strategy formulation and implementation still exists. 
The weak points of the AZRF urban development strategies include a lack of transparency in the 
policy planning process and a lack of cooperation with and involvement of civil society institutions. 
To a large extent, the policy planning and implementation process is still of the top-down rather 
than bottom-up nature. Moreover, not all issue areas of the SD problematique are addressed, and 
different strategic approaches are not properly harmonized/synchronized with one another. 
Finally, quite often, municipal SD programs and projects are understaffed, underfunded and not 
supported by regional and federal authorities. Hence, larger staff and funding as well as better 
coordination of SD strategies between different levels of government are badly needed. 
To conclude, despite the above problems and shortcomings, the total “balance sheet” of the Arctic 
cities’ SD strategies and general dynamics is rather positive. The AZRF municipalities are serious 
about solving numerous socioeconomic and environmental problems and making these urban 
areas better and more comfortable places to live in. 
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Updating Winter: The Importance of Climate-
Sensitive Urban Design for Winter Settlements 
 
David Chapman, Kristina L. Nilsson, Agatino Rizzo & Agneta Larsson 
 
This study explores urban design principles for winter settlements to identify climate-related conditions that affect soft mobility 
(walking and cycling) in these communities. Winter communities have evolved lifestyles and means suited to living and working 
with local conditions and seasonal variation. However, climate change will cause changes in weather that will require adaptation 
in such communities. These changes may present new risks and unexpected challenges to outdoor soft mobility in the community. 
Physical inactivity has emerged as a major focus of concern in public health policy. Winter weather has always limited outdoor 
soft mobility in winter settlements. In particular, outdoor activity in winter can be reduced by inclement weather and fear of 
accidents. People’s understanding of the barriers to and enablers of soft mobility are also often based on experience and ability 
to detect environmental clues. To help winter communities maximise the opportunities for outdoor soft mobility and the 
associated wellbeing benefits, built environments must be designed with an understanding of climate change.   
This study explores barriers to and enablers of soft mobility in winter and discusses them in light of climate change and human 
wellbeing. It is argued that established principles of urban design may require re-evaluation if we want to increase outdoor soft 
mobility in winter. Increases in physical activity could help reduce costs and pressures on health services by creating safer and 
more walkable communities. The paper concludes by suggesting that communities should focus on more context-based winter 
urban design principles that account for ongoing climate change. 
 
Introduction 
All over the world, the form of the built environment plays a key role as an enabler or inhibitor of 
urban outdoor activities such as soft mobility. The public realm can make it more attractive for 
people to be mobile outdoors and to participate in public life, or it can put people off venturing 
outside. A key urban design challenge in winter cities is to create environments that encourage 
outdoor activity in both the winter and the summer. A closely related challenge is to understand 
how changes in weather due to climate change will influence people’s soft mobility choices. 
The reason for studying this is the importance of understanding how the relationship between 
urban form, weather, seasonal variations, and climate change influences human outdoor activity. 
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In this study, the focus on outdoor activity is problematised around the concern that people spend 
a low percentage of their time outdoors in winter conditions. 
To explore this issue, the study focuses on the question: What is the current state of knowledge 
and practice relating to the urban design of winter cities? For the purposes of this work, winter 
settlements are defined as places with significant seasonal climate variation, temperatures that are 
normally below zero, precipitation that is mainly in the form of snow, and limited hours of 
sunshine & daylight (Pressman, 1989). Many of these settlements are sub-Arctic; notable examples 
include Luleå (Sweden), Tromsø (Norway), Arkhangelsk, (Russia), and Yellowknife (Canada).  
 
 
Figure 1: Seasonal variation in Luleå, Sweden. Photographs taken at the same location in winter and 
summer. 
The rationale for this study is the proposition that while urban design should support outdoor 
activity (Boverket, 2012; CABE, 2009; Carmona, Punter, & Chapman, 2002; Cowan, Adams, & 
Chapman, 2010; Eriksson, 2013), the urban design principles for Winter settlements may not 
account for evolving Winter barriers to outdoor soft mobility and the associated impacts on human 
wellbeing (Chapman & Larsson, 2018; Chapman, Nilsson, Larsson & Rizzo, 2017; Koivurova & 
Kähkönen, 2018). 
While the study was not limited to any particular location or type or scale of winter city, most of 
the analysed guidance emanated from northern Europe and North America. The documentation 
also focused on places large enough to be settlements with some form of facilities, rather than 
groupings of individual buildings. As such, the research is primarily oriented towards more urban 
winter communities. 
 Climate Change 
Global warming is changing sub-Arctic seasons and winter (Chen & Chen, 2013). Consequently, 
average temperatures and levels of precipitation in the sub-arctic are expected to rise between now 
and 2100. 
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In light of environmental concerns, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was 
set up in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP). Reports issued by the IPCC in 1990, 1992 and 1995 
highlighted the risks of substantially reduced snow cover with impacts on ecosystems and social 
& economic activity. Later assessments in 2001 (IPCC) concluded that the proportion of winter 
precipitation falling as rain will increase and that snow conditions will become less reliable, 
affecting tourism. 
The IPCC’s 2007 report continued this theme, highlighting the impact of snow and glacier melt 
runoff on drinking water and the likelihood of extensive species lose in mountainous areas. The 
latest Climate Change 2014, Synthesis Report reinforces these conclusions and presents climatic 
trajectories suggesting that the northern hemisphere’s spring snow cover may have fallen by 
between 7 and 25% by the end of the 21st Century (IPCC). 
At the national level, Finland’s environmental administration has concluded that climate change 
may result in winters that are more humid and cloudier, with diminished snow cover and increased 
rainfall (Vaccia, 2014). The County Administration Board of Norrbotten, Sweden (Länsstyrelsen i 
Norrbottens län, 2012) concluded that by 2100, annual average temperatures will have increased 
by 4-6 °C, annual precipitation will have increased by 15-50%, snowfall will have declined, and the 
snow cover period will be more than a month shorter than it presently is across the country 
(Gustavsson, 2011).  
 
 
The Norwegian Environmental Agency, Miljødirektoratet, predicts that by 2100, annual 
temperatures will have increased by around 4.5 °C and precipitation by about 18%, with more 
frequent and intense rainfall (Hanssen-Bauer et al., 2017). The 2007 (Updated 2015) ‘Final Report’ 
from the Swedish Commission on Climate and Vulnerability notes that Sweden will be strongly 
Figure 2: The changing face of winter – the E4 motorway, Sweden, during a 
rainstorm in December 2017. 
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affected by climate change, stressing the risks of flooding and adverse impacts on water (Swedish 
Commission on Climate and Vulnerability, 2007). 
Research from international and national agencies sets out the environmental context of this study 
by illustrating that annual average temperatures are generally rising and precipitation as rain is 
increasing, while snowfall and snow cover are decreasing. Put simply, they suggest that winter 
settlements are getting warmer and will have more rain and less snow. This is important when 
discussing soft mobility in winter settlements because the weathers associated with warmer winters 
may influence people’s choices and ability to be outdoors and active in winter. In this study, soft 
mobility is seen as a type of everyday physical activity and is defined as human-powered, non-
motorized ways of getting around that have relatively little environmental impact, such as walking, 
cycling, rollerblading, or skiing. 
 
Figure 3: Historical and predicted mean winter temperatures in Norrbottens län, Sweden, under Scenario 
RCP2.6, showing that mean winter temperatures are projected to exceed 0 °C. Generated using SMHI’s 
Climate scenarios tool: https://www.smhi.se/en/climate/climate-scenarios/haag_en.html  
Urban Health 
Koln et al (2012) cite physical inactivity as the fourth leading cause of death worldwide, and note 
that 31% of the world’s population do not achieve the minimum recommended level of physical 
activity. Similarly, Murray et al (2013) identified physical inactivity and low physical activity as the 
risk factor with the fourth highest attributable burden of disease in the UK; together, diet and 
physical inactivity accounted for 14.3% of the UK’s disability-adjusted life-years in 2010. The U.S. 
Surgeon General links health directly to activity, highlighting physical activity as one of the most 
important steps to improving health at all ages (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
2015). 
The U.S. Center for Disease Control (1999) estimates that $1 invested in measures that encourage 
physical activity leads to medical cost savings of $3.20 (WHO, 2002). The WHO classifies 
measures to improve ‘diet and physical activity’ as ‘best buys’ - high impact, cost-effective 
programmes that can be delivered with constrained resources (WHO, 2014). In 2015, the WHO 
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estimated that the additional healthcare costs attributable to physical inactivity in a population of 
10 million people (roughly the population of Sweden) of whom 50% are insufficiently physically 
active would be 910 million EUR per annum (WHO, 2015). 
Outdoor soft mobility in winter communities can be hindered by inclement weather. It has been 
estimated that people spend 90% of their lives indoors (Evans & McCoy, 1998), and Winter-related 
reductions in physical activity have been found in various countries (Chan & Ryan, 2009). In 
Finland, for example, population-based studies showed that people spend only 4% of their total 
time exposed to cold outdoor climates, with most of this exposure occurring during their leisure 
time (Mäkinen et al., 2006). 
If this is even close to correct, it indicates that the winter can reduce outdoor activity in general, 
resulting in lower levels of physical activity. Therefore, actions to enable soft mobility and make it 
easier and more practical for people to regularly use soft mobility modes of transport could 
increase physical activity, energy expenditure (metabolic rate), and physical capacity. All of these 
are known to improve human health and reduce health care costs (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, 2015; House of Lords, 2016; WHO, 2018). 
To develop successful winter communities, it is important to facilitate year-round outdoor soft 
mobility in a way that accounts for and accommodates changing climatic conditions. Because 
around 100 million people live in sub-Arctic regions, this is an important focus for both winter 
settlement planning and public health policy. 
 
Figure 4: Examples of outdoor winter activities. 
Methods 
The objective of this study is to explore winter settlement urban design principles to identify 
climate-related conditions that affect opportunities for soft mobility in winter communities.  
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A literature search was performed using the keywords ‘winter cities’, ‘urban design’, and ‘health’ in 
the Scopus and Web of Science databases. The number of hits obtained ranged from 233 (for 
searches using the keywords ‘winter cities’ and ‘urban design’ individually) to six when all keywords 
were used together. After an initial review of the 233 documents, 13 documents relevant to the 
urban design of winter settlements were identified. Further literature searches were undertaken 
using the reference lists included in these documents. This revealed 22 additional relevant 
documents. This review is thus based on a total of 35 documents (22 journal articles, 9 books, 2 
citywide urban design guides and 2 academic theses) covering various aspects of Winter urban 
design. 
A deductive content analysis (Patton, 2002) of the literature was performed (Fig. 9) to identify 
relevant knowledge and information on winter conditions in relation to the built environment. 
Winter settlement urban design considerations in the literature were then used to populate a matrix 
that juxtaposed aspects of urban form (siting & layout, height & massing, façade & interface, and 
public realm & landscape) with Winter conditions (solar access, wind, snow, rain, cold, darkness, 
and the presence of snow- and ice-covered surfaces). The literature coverage of each aspect of 
urban form in relation to each winter condition was then ranked using a traffic light system: green, 
orange, and red denoted combinations that were discussed extensively, to a limited degree, and 
very little or not at all, respectively. Once all relevant information had been sorted, the outcomes 
were analysed; this analysis is presented below. The discussion and conclusions sections compare 
the results of the analysis to the current discourse on climate change and human wellbeing. 
Analysis 
The architect Ralph Erskine famously said that in winter communities: 
houses and towns should open like flowers to the sun of spring and summer but, also like flowers, 
turn their backs on the shadows and the cold northern winds, offering sun warmth and wind-
protection to their terraces, gardens and streets (Collymore, 1994: 26). 
While Erskine can be seen as a leading figure in winter design and his 1959 Grammar for High 
Latitude Architecture is an early set of design principles for winter settlements, the Canadian planner 
Dr. Norman Pressman was one of the most prolific advocates of the concept of winter cities. 
Pressman was a founding member of the Winter Cities Association (the WCA; 1982 to 2005), 
which focused on ways of improving the environments of winter settlements. Over time, the WCA 
shifted from advocating glassing over cities (Pressman, 1985) to favouring more urban concepts 
such as compactness, higher density, streets for people, and mixed-use and transit-oriented-
development (Pressman, 2004). The dominance of Pressman and the WCA’s studies on winter 
settlements is reflected in their high number of publications on the subject. Of the 35 documents 
reviewed for this paper, 17 were produced either by the WCA or in Canada; the others came from 
North America, Norway and Sweden. The demise of the WCA in 2005 resulted in a near-complete 
cessation of research into the design of winter cities. Nevertheless, the work of Pressman and the 
WCA defined three key issues that are still prominent in Winter settlement urban design, namely 
design for solar access, wind defence, and snow management (Andbert, 1979; Bengtsson, 1980; 
Børve, 1982; Werier, 1983; Pihlak, 1983; Pressman, 1985; Pressman & Zepic, 1986; Gappert, 1987; 
Børve, 1987; Pressman & Mänty, 1988; Matus, 1988; Glaumann & Westerberg, 1988; Børve, 1988; 
Sterten, 1988; Zrudlo, 1988; Pressman, 1988; Pressman, 1989a; Pressman, 1989b; Pressman, 
1989c; Westerberg & Glaumann, 1990; Pressman, 1991; Pressman, 1994a; Pressman, 1994b; 
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Pressman, 1995; Pressman, 1996; Urban Systems, 2000; Bergström & Magnusson, 2003; Pressman, 
2004; Eliasson, Knez, Westerberg, Thorsson, & Lindberg, 2007; Westerberg, 2009; Ebrahimabadi, 
2012; Ebrahimabadi, 2015; Ebrahimabadi, Nilsson, & Johansson, 2015; Edmonton, 2016; 
Ebrahimabadi, Johansson, Rizzo, & Nilsson, 2018). 
 
Figure 5: Years of publication of the 35 documents selected for inclusion in this review.  
Maximising Solar Access 
The review indicated that sunshine and solar access are mainly seen as positive factors, and urban 
designers commonly seek to capture their general benefits (Pressman, 1986, 1988; Pressman, 1988; 
Pressman, 1989a; Pressman, 1989b; Pressman, 1989c; Pressman, 1991; Pressman, 1995; Pressman, 
1996; Urban Systems, 2000; Pressman, 2004; Ebrahimabadi, 2012; Ebrahimabadi, 2015; 
Ebrahimabadi et al, 2015; Edmonton, 2016; Ebrahimabadi et al, 2018). In the context of winter 
settlement design, two varieties of solar illumination are commonly considered: direct and reflected 
sunlight. 
It has been noted that the case for maximizing direct solar access in high-latitude cities is complex 
because there can be significant issues of shadowing. Pressman & Zepic (1986) observe that in 
high-latitude winter settlements, the low angled winter sun can cast shadows whose length is up 
to 15 times an object’s height. The large design distance between buildings suggested by Matus 
(1988) to overcome this issue is arguably too high a price to pay for the benefits of direct solar 
radiation. This was confirmed by Ebrahimabadi et al (2015) in a study on the New Kiruna 
settlement in Arctic Sweden, which concluded that the large open spaces needed to maximise solar 
access cannot be accommodated in central areas, making maximisation of solar access untenable 
as a major design objective. 
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Figure 6: A bright spring winter day making it attractive to be outdoors in sub-zero temperatures. 
For winter settlements with low light levels and long winters, reflected light can bring significant 
benefits and should be considered in parallel with direct solar access. Andbert (1979) and Børve 
(1987) both suggest that snow reflects around 85% of directly incident solar radiation, whereas 
tarmac reflects only around 10% (Børve, 1987). 
Other important features of nature light in high-latitude winter settlements are ‘polar nights’ and 
the ‘midnight sun’. High-latitude settlements, and especially those above the Arctic Circle, can have 
extended periods of ‘daylight’ that may last for all 24 hours of the day in summer, and periods of 
almost continuous darkness during the winter.  
 Shelter from the Wind 
Wind is commonly cited as one of the most uncomfortable outdoor weather conditions. However, 
Pressman’s research (1995) suggested that improved outdoor microclimates can be achieved by 
good design, and that this could increase the number of comfortable outdoors days in winter 
settlements by as much as 30% in a year.  
Of the three major issues in winter settlement urban design, wind is probably the most extensively 
studied. It is generally agreed that built forms and vegetation can either reduce or compound the 
effects of wind (Børve, 1982; Børve, 1987; Børve, 1988; Sterten, 1988; Glaumann, 1988; Zrudlo, 
Pressman, 1988; Pressman, 1989a; Pressman, 1989b; Pressman, 1989c; Pressman, 1991; Pressman, 
1995; Pressman, 1996; Pressman, 2004; Ebrahimabadi, 2012; Ebrahimabadi, 2015; Ebrahimabadi 
et al, 2018). The literature and guidance on designing based on wind in winter settlements is often 
similar to that for more temperate climates, and suggests that it can be preferable to have low 
buildings that all have similar heights because they conduct wind over the buildings, reduce wind 
speed, and minimise turbulence at pedestrian level. Tall buildings (buildings that are at least twice 
the average height in a neighbourhood or area) should be avoided because they create their own 
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microclimates and downdrafts, and increase wind speeds at pedestrian level (Ebrahimabadi et al, 
2015; Edmonton, 2016). 
Ebrahimabadi also suggests that wind intensity can be reduced by around 50% if buildings more 
than twice the average height in an area are avoided (2015). Other urban design solutions for 
mitigating the impact of wind include stepping or terracing buildings where taller buildings are 
needed (Pressman, 1995), adding podium levels to protect pedestrians from strong wind at ground 
level (Glaumann, 1988; Pressman, 1995; Edmonton, 2016), or using closed blocks to the north 
and east to block cold wind (Pressman, 1995). 
Trees can be used as windbreaks and have the advantage that they filter the wind without stopping 
it entirely (Pressman, 1995). It has been suggested that coniferous trees are preferable in winter 
settlements because they buffer wind and provide colour during winter (Pressman & Zepic, 1986). 
They also reduce airborne pollution better than deciduous trees. 
Designs for winter settlements can also exploit the beneficial effects of wind. Snow gathers where 
wind speeds are low, so it is possible to control where snow gathers by understanding how wind 
is affected by the orientation of buildings, streets, and spaces (Glaumann & Westerberg, 1988; 
Pressman, 1995; Sterten, 1988). For example, a main road aligned with the prevailing wind benefits 
from natural snow clearing. 
 Design for Snow 
Snow is one of the most prominent features of winter. On the one hand, it brings beauty and light, 
by reflecting up to 85% of solar radiation (Andbert, 1979; Børve, 1987). On the other, it brings 
slippery surfaces and risks of injury from falling. Discussions of snow in urban design often focus 
on its design opportunities, issues of safety & management, and its storage and removal (Andbert, 
1979; Børve, 1982; Børve, 1988; Sterten, 1988; Pressman, 1988; Pressman, 1989a; Pressman, 
1989b; Pressman, 1989c; Pressman, 1991; Pressman, 1995; Pressman, 1996; Urban Systems, 2000; 
Pressman, 2004; Ebrahimabadi et al, 2015; Edmonton, 2016). 
 
Figure 7: Snow cover in the public realm can create hazards, as illustrated by this outdoor staircase. 
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The literature indicates that it is better to have multiple snow storage areas distributed across a city 
than to have a single storage location, and that where possible, storage areas should be 
incorporated into street designs (Urbansystems, 2000; Ebrahimabadi et al, 2015; Edmonton, 2016). 
It has also been argued that snow should not be stored in shaded places where colder and more 
humid microclimates prevail (Glaumann, 1988). Small storage areas with solar access are preferable 
because they accelerate melting (Edmonton, 2016). 
Standing snow and snow cover can also be problematic in the melting period because they cause 
streets to fill with water and slush, making it very unpleasant to be outdoors (Edmonton, 2016). 
This issue can be exacerbated because snow that has been standing for a long time tends to carry 
greater levels of pollution than stormwater (Bengtsson, 1980), which can be unpleasant to 
pedestrians and users of the public realm.  
 
Figure 8: A residential street can be significantly affected by water-based barriers to soft mobility in winter. 
Here the street is covered by water, slush, snow and ice all at the same time. 
While the literature often focuses on maintenance, the reviewed publications highlight several ways 
in which the urban form influence snow. The siting and layout of buildings, streets, and vegetation 
can be used to control snowdrift and where snow gathers (Børve, 1987; Børve, 1988; Sterten, 1988; 
Pressman, 1995). The design of façades and interfaces (including roofs) can also be critical because 
it can affect the throw or falling of snow off roofs and icicle formation. The literature suggests 
that building entrances and roofs should be designed to limit falling ice, snow and other discharges 
from above (Urbansystems, 2000; Edmonton, 2016). Transition zones such as canopies, arcades, 
and other overhead shelter systems should also be considered to provide weather protection for 
outdoor soft mobility (Pressman & Zepic, 1986; Pressman, 1995; Urbansystems, 2000; Edmonton, 
2016). 
At ground or pavement level, it is recommended to slightly raise pedestrian streets or grade them 
to eliminate curb-side accumulation of snowmelt or ice formation (Urbansystems, 2000; 
Edmonton, 2016). Street designs should also direct snowmelt away from building entries (towards 
roadways), and roads should be dished in the middle to collect slush. 
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 Other Weather Concerns 
The main weather considerations examined in the included literature were solar access, wind 
defence, and snow management; other aspects of winter weather received less attention. In 
particular, the literature only rarely touches on issues relating to rain, darkness, and ice. References 
to rain are limited and confined to issues such as pooling in streets and spaces, and the use of 
permeable surfaces to mitigate heavy rainfall (Urbansystems, 2000; Edmonton, 2016). Almost 
nothing is said about how urban form and the public realm can mitigate the effects of rain on 
outdoor soft mobility. 
Similarly, very little is said about darkness beyond the observation that it is a prerequisite for 
creative lighting (Edmonton, 2016) and enables architectural lighting to create focal points in the 
urban form (Urbansystems, 2000). Finally, ice and ice cover are only mentioned as the basis for 
various Winter sports (Ebrahimabadi, 2012) and as factors that should be considered when 
designing streetscapes (Urbansystems, 2000; Edmonton, 2016). 
 
Figure 9: Matrix showing the treatment of different urban design issues and climate-sensitive aspects of 
winter weather in the urban design literature. Green, orange, and red dots indicate issues that have been 
covered extensively, to a limited degree, and little or not at all, respectively.  
The results of the literature review are summarized in the above matrix, which shows how 
extensively the urban design literature discusses different aspects of winter weather in relation to 
various aspects of urban form. It is clear that the classical concerns of urban design for winter 
settlements – sun, wind, and snow - are well covered by research articles, books and policy, but 
issues relating to ice, darkness and rain are only lightly addressed. 
Discussion 
This study set out to explore winter settlement urban design principles and evaluate their fitness 
for purpose in light of climate change. The intention was to add to the discussion of how we can 
help communities maximise opportunities for outdoor soft mobility in winter and the physical 
wellbeing benefits this can bring. 
The most striking result of this study is the age of the reviewed documents. Twenty-five of the 35 
documents were published before the year 2000, and only one was published between 2010 and 
2014. This is problematic for urban design and academia because new agendas emerged during 
these periods that have not been addressed in the literature. This is especially concerning because 
it means that many older (and possibly now outdated) books and articles continue to serve as 
cornerstones of urban design thinking for winter settlements. 
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Few of the reviewed publications mentioned the concept of sustainability even though it was 
introduced in 1987 by the report “Our common future” (WCED). They were also silent on the 
term climate change, which came onto the international agenda in 1988 with the establishment of 
the IPCC, as well as the issue of human health and wellbeing, which came to prominence in 1996 
as a consequence of the U.S. Surgeon General’s report on physical activity and health. The two 
notable exceptions were Pressman’s article Sustainable Winter cities: Future directions for planning, policy 
and design (1996) and his book Shaping Cities for Winter, Climate Comfort and Sustainable Design (2004), 
which mention emerging agendas of reducing pollution, resource efficiency, sustainability, and 
human health. 
Although Pressman references ‘sustainable development’ and ‘human health’ in these publications, 
knowledge about these issues has increased rapidly since they were written. Major climate 
frameworks have been developed since the 1990s under the aegis of the IPCC and are regularly 
updated with new information on climate change. The same is true for human health: although 
the 1996 Surgeon General’s report was available when some of the included documents were being 
prepared, this issue has only really gained traction in the past decade. One of the key policy 
documents, Step it up?, which promotes walking and walkable communities and their health 
benefits (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services) was only published in 2015. Another 
important recently published policy document is the WHO’s 2018 global action plan on physical 
activity, which places safe and enabling active outdoor environments at the heart of the WHO’s 
mission. The recent publication of these two policy statements highlights the rapidly developing 
nature of this field. 
While it can be argued that the reviewed urban design publications are dated, the more recent 
publications did focus more on creating compact settlements with higher densities, streets for 
people, and public transit-oriented development. This was likely done on the basis of 
contemporary policy concerns relating to resource efficiency and pollution (Gordon, 1997; Jenks 
et al, 1996) rather than human wellbeing. Nevertheless, such approaches also increase the 
walkability and cycle-ability of communities, which is beneficial for human wellbeing.  
The reviewed publications largely focused on the three traditional urban design considerations for 
winter settlements – solar access, shelter from the wind, and design for snow storage and removal. 
These issues can be discussed individually in terms of their impact on outdoor soft mobility.  
Almost all the reviewed publications highlight solar radiation as a positive contributor and 
facilitator of outdoor human activity (Andbert, 1979; Urbansystems, 2000; Ebrahimabadi et al, 
2015; Edmonton, 2016).  While many discussions are based on experience, such as the warmth 
created by direct sunlight, some focus on design considerations. Discussions around solar 
penetration and urban form highlight the difficulty of maintaining solar penetration in winter 
settlements. It is argued that the low sun angles experienced at high latitudes can create extensive 
shadowing over long distances (Matus, 1988). 
This review does not indicate that these arguments conflict with efforts to address issues relating 
to climate change. Direct solar access is likely to remain as important in the future as it was when 
the principles of winter urban design were first established. However, the discussion about indirect 
lighting is likely to evolve. Light reflected from snow accounts for an appreciable proportion of 
the ambient light in winter, so reductions in snowfall and cover due to warming may mean that 
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communities benefit less from this indirect light. Consequently, climate change may necessitate 
better outdoor lighting in winter settlements.  
Unlike sun and wind, snow is seen as both a positive and a negative (Andbert, 1979; Børve, 1987; 
Berggård & Johansson, 2010; Gard, Berggård, Rosander, & Larsson, 2018). Its beauty is noted, 
but various authors highlight its potential to inhibit the functioning of people and communities.  
Analyses of its beauty and leisure benefits are often limited to common sense discussions whereas 
information on its maintenance and management are often quite technical. Climate change is likely 
to significantly alter the impact of snow on winter settlements. As temperatures rise, potentially 
above 0 °C, some winter cities are likely to experience more rain and less snow, which could have 
a major effect on outdoor soft mobility in winter. Rain in winter settlements is highlighted as a 
major barrier to soft mobility in winter (Chapman et al, 2017), so this issue may become 
increasingly important for urban design. 
Climate change is not expected to significantly change wind patterns. Therefore, protecting against 
and minimising the effects of wind will probably continue to be important in winter settlement 
design (Erell, 2011). 
Overall, the results of the review indicate that climate change will probably alter the balance 
between snow and water in winter. This effect is relatively straightforward: in general (although 
not inevitably), if the temperature is below 0 °C, precipitation will fall as snow. However, above 0 
°C, it is likely to fall as rain. As winter cities warm, water is likely to become a bigger barrier to soft 
mobility in winter and the positive effects of physical activity on wellbeing. This issue may not be 
limited to the occurrence of precipitation as rain; it may cause a range of problems including the 
build-up of standing water, the accumulation of ice if the temperature fluctuates around 0 °C, and 
the formation of slush. All of these could be barriers to soft mobility and increase the risk of being 
outdoors in winter. 
 Method Discussion 
A unique aspect of this review is that it considers the treatment of urban design considerations in 
relation to individual weather conditions. This allowed the discussion of focus on the relationships 
between urban form and specific weather types, and to identify gaps in the research literature. 
Whilst literature was systematically searched using appropriate keywords to identify publications 
with relevant content, the search protocol could only retrieve publications listed in research 
databases (namely Web of Science or Scopus) or cited in a relevant document listed in such a 
database. Consequently, relevant works may have been overlooked if they were not listed in the 
databases, not cited by listed documents, or not published in English. 
While the climate data and trajectories considered in this work are drawn from IPCC documents, 
the implications of these trajectories were primarily considered in terms of their effects on Finland, 
Norway and Sweden. Consequently, the analysis is primarily relevant to the Nordic context. 
Conclusions 
This review indicates that most of the publications that serve as cornerstones in the field of urban 
design for Winter settlements do not account for current knowledge of climate change (including 
climate adaptation and climate resilience) or the impact of outdoor soft mobility on human 
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wellbeing. This is simply because most of the relevant publications were written either before or 
very shortly after these issues first came to prominence. 
While the design principles of solar access, wind, and snow management remain important for 
modern winter settlements, winter warming due to climate change is significantly affecting snowfall 
and snow cover. Many winter settlements are likely to experience more rainfall and more 
fluctuations around 0°C because of warming; while this change may be minor in numerical terms, 
it will have profound implications for outdoor soft mobility because 0°C is the point at which 
snow (commonly seen as a positive attribute of the environment) becomes rain, water, and slush, 
all of which are commonly seen as negative attributes that create barriers to soft mobility. 
We suggest that to facilitate outdoor soft mobility in winter and reduce risk under these changing 
conditions, the urban design principles for winter settlements may need to be widened in scope to 
encompass new winter conditions associated with climate change. 
Warmer winter cities with temperatures that are often around 0°C and fluctuate more rapidly than 
they do at present will compel designers to consider how these conditions affect outdoor 
environments. Both present risks for outdoor activity because fluctuations around 0°C can rapidly 
change the nature of water in the public realm, transforming snow into ice, water, or slush. 
Designers must consider how the qualities of the ‘built’ public realm can be retained when streets 
and pathways are covered by winter precipitation. This may necessitate creating larger pedestrian 
areas within the public realm that can successfully accommodate both soft mobility and the build-
ups associated with winter. Alternatively, designs could be created that exploit the sun and wind 
to help clear snow, ice, water and slush. 
 
Figure 10: The Great Park Development, UK has green natural spaces that are designed flood with 
excessive storm water. 
We may also consider how buildings and the public realm can be designed to help manage more 
rain in winter. Buildings and the public realm can be designed to provide temporary water storage 
when needed without affecting the usability of streets and pathways. Future building designs for 
winter cities may also include more features such as roof overhangs, arcades, and colonnades to 
provide street-level protection from rain and wind. 
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Urban designers working on high-latitude winter settlements will also need to consider how 
increasing levels of rain and lower levels of snow cover are likely to affect ambient light in winter. 
Ensuring adequate ambient outdoor lighting in winter may become an increasingly important 
design challenge. While rising outdoor temperatures are expected in winter, these changes are 
unlikely to change the natural seasonal lighting patterns of high-latitude settlements. Traditionally, 
light levels in winter are increased by reflection from snow, which mitigates against the impact of 
limited daylight hours and ‘polar’ nights. Reduced snow cover will therefore reduce the ambient 
lighting of the outdoor environment. This effect will be compounded because while snow is highly 
reflective, water is light absorbing and makes places visually darker. The reduction of outdoor 
ambient lighting in winter will present a fairly unique design challenge and will require an increased 
focus on making the outdoor environment attractive in winter. 
These changes could all affect levels of outdoor soft mobility in winter and thus the wellbeing 
benefits associated with physical activity. However, because climate change will affect different 
winter settlements in different ways, designers should seek to understand its impact in the local 
context, and avoid generic ‘one size fits all’ approaches to climate mitigation, adaptation or 
resilience for winter settlements. 
Designers will also benefit from looking at places whose present environmental conditions 
resembles those predicted for their settlement in future. For example, northern Scandinavian 
settlements that are expecting more rain could look to southerly settlements such as Bergen, 
Norway, which are designed to accommodate high levels of rain. 
By taking such approaches and designing in context, urban designers of winter settlements may be 
better able to enable soft mobility in winter, reduce the risks of being outdoors in this season, and 
increase opportunities for residents to gain the associated physical wellbeing benefits.  
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When Words Matter: The Concept of “Sustainable 
Development” Derailed with Words like “Economy”, 
“Social” & “Environment”1 
 
Jørgen S. Søndergaard 
 
Dedicated to Finn Lynge (1933 – 2014) in memory of many good discussions on the 
concept of “sustainable development”. 
 
The words used control the discussion, which means that something important can be forgotten. The discussion of Sustainable 
Development was derailed using the words “economy”, “social” and “environment”. This also applies to Arctic societal 
development. The article is based on the definition of the Brundtland Commission and shows that the understanding of the 
sustainability concept consisting of three dimensions: an economic, a social and an environmental, as it was usually defined 
in the years after the UN Conference in 1992, originating in the 1990s implementation discussions in the UK. The Earth 
Charter was an initiative that wanted to bring the concept of sustainable development back to the right track so that all elements 
of the Brundtland Commission's definition were included. 
The discussion in Greenland has been focused on the exploitation of the living marine resources, which is reflected in the way 
the concept is translated into Greenlandic. At the same time, there has been an awareness in Greenland that the cultural 
dimension is part of the discourse, although the national implementation of sustainable development initiatives still mostly is 
economically motivated. The Arctic Council’s Fairbanks Declaration (2017), paragraph 13 states that “the Arctic Council 
in promoting sustainable development through the harmonization of its three pillars in an integrated way: economic development, 
social development and environmental protection”. The struggle for recognition of the cultural dimension as an integral part of 
sustainable development thus remains important in an Arctic context. Focusing on the main points of the Finnish Presidency’s 
Arctic Council Program for the period 2017 - 2019, it can be concluded, that the struggle to expand the understanding and 
definition of ‘sustainable development’ to include the cultural dimension and thus go beyond “economy”, “social” and 
“environment” continues. It is important to use the right words. 
 
Introduction 
“Economy”, “social” and “environment” are the words that most often have captured the 
discussion on sustainable development. Politicians and NGOs, to a large degree, use these words 
when they want to discuss whether a particular initiative contributes to sustainable development.  
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But life is more than economy, social issues and the environment. The focus of this article is to 
reveal part of the story of what went wrong and what significance it had for Greenlandic and some 
of the Arctic discussion, and how this for example is reflected in the reports and declarations from 
the Arctic Council. 
Since the first international conference on environment and development in Stockholm in 1972 
and the publication of the book “The Limits to Growth”2 (Meadows et al., 1972), the question of 
(the relationship between) the environment and the increase in consumption of resources has 
been on the agenda nationally and internationally. In the 1980’s, the World Commission on 
Environment and Development was set up by the UN, and under Gro Harlem Brundtland’s 
chairmanship, published the report “Our Common Future”3 (WCED) in 1987. The report 
presented a definition of sustainable development which subsequently became widely accepted.  
 
The Brundtland report explains sustainable development as follows: 
 
Humanity has the ability to make development sustainable to ensure that it meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs4(WCED, 
1987). 
 
 
“The Limits to Growth” was seen by many as a doomsday prophecy, which focused on the danger 
of a catastrophic future. The Brundtland Commission’s definition was therefore well received by 
all because it showed a positive way forward, as, to a large extent, the contradictions inherent 
within the definition were overlooked. Some have claimed however, that Brundtland’s 
formulation sought to “square the circle” of the environment problem in order to gather the 
consensus of the UN commission. 
On the other hand, the “Our Common Future” report comes with the following, often 
overlooked, recommendation: “We recommend that the General Assembly commit itself to 
preparing a universal Declaration and later a Convention on environmental protection and 
sustainable development”5(WCED, 1987). 
The report emphasized that this declaration should prescribe new norms for governmental and 
inter-governmental behaviour which are necessary for the preservation of livelihoods and life on 
our planet”6 (ibid). This recommendation was seen by some groups as a call for the global 
community to develop an “Earth Charter”, which countries should adhere to in their future 
national and international development (Rockefeller, 2000). 
The recommendation resulted in “The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development” 
which the Rio conference followed up with “Agenda 21 – a comprehensive blueprint for the 
global actions to affect the transition to sustainable development”7 (Earth Summit ‘92, 1992). 
After Rio 1992, many countries began to work on finding ways to adapt national policy in ways 
that would enable changing the societal activities in alignment with the Brundtland commission’s 
definition of sustainability. But the title of the Rio Declaration was in itself a contribution to focus 
on the environment. 
A Concept is “Shaped to Fit” 
In an article about the possibilities of ever finding a meaningful definition of sustainable 
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development, Susan Owens8 (Owens, 2003) writes that a central problem occurs when market 
economists and neoliberalists refuse to acknowledge the difference between “need” and 
“demand” and thereby avoid discussion about preference, i.e., that some choices are better and 
more constructive for sustainable development in a society than others.  
Over the course of the many discussions a learning process emerged, leading to a more nuanced 
understanding of the connections between economy, society and environment. Owens describes 
what happened in the UK in the 1990’s when the government was politically forced to 
operationalise the concept of sustainability. It became necessary: 
to capture it to ensure that growth and development remain at the core. Thus, from around 
the mid-1990’s onwards, we see a vigorous re-insertion of the economic dimension of 
sustainability, followed by inclusion of social consideration, alongside environmental 
protection. The UK Government was now at pains to stress that “achieving all these 
objectives at the same time is what sustainable development is about9 (Owens, 2003). 
Ultimately, the discussions resulted in the British government’s redefining of the Brundtland 
commission’s concept of sustainability, so that; “relationships between economy, society and environment” 
became “economic dimension of sustainability”, which includes: “social consideration alongside environmental 
protection”. The main point here is that the word “society” has now become “social consideration”. 
Thereby, the cultural dimension of society, which is so important for the people of that society, 
disappears and society’s inhabitants become mere social elements. This development took place 
in a legitimate search for indicators that could indicate whether a given policy led to sustainable 
development, but the search also had the effect that the discussion to a large extent was somewhat 
derailed. 
In subsequent discussions about sustainable development, it has become standard that the concept 
has an economic, a social and an environmental dimension. From there on the three words had 
set the standard for how sustainability should be discussed and planned for. 
A Concept Sticks 
The result of this British discussions lodged itself in the international dialogue where it became the 
norm that sustainable development had three pillars; economy, social and environment! And it 
also became part of the official UN language use. 
This is exemplified by the introduction to the resolution from The World Summit on Sustainable 
Development in Johannesburg in 2002:  
Reaffirming the need to ensure a balance between economic development, social 
development and environmental protection as interdependent and mutually 
reinforcing pillars of  sustainable development10 (UN, 2002). 
It is not only in the introduction that this way of  thinking about sustainability occurs. It 
also features as the heading of  section IV of  the main document of  the conference, entitled; 
“IV Protecting and managing the natural resource base of  economic and social development”11(UN, 
2002). 
In the 10 years leading up to the 20th anniversary in Rio de Janeiro, the 3 pillars become so well 
established in the discourse that they feature in the first section of the meeting’s final document: 
1. We, the heads of State and Government and high-level representatives, having met at Rio 
de Janeiro, Brazil, from 20-22 June 2012, with full participation of civil society, renew our 
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commitment to sustainable development, and to ensure the promotion of economically, 
socially and environmentally sustainable future for our planet and for present and future 
generations12 (UN, 2002). 
Grassroots Strike Back – Civil Society’s Rebellion Against a Misinterpretation 
of the Brundtland Commission’s Sustainability Concept 
Internationally, discussions developed after Rio de Janeiro 1992 about what sustainability was, and 
whether the result from Rio fulfilled the expectations for the formulation of an Earth Charter that 
had arisen on the basis of the Brundtland Commission’s recommendations.  
For the various groups around the globe who were interested in sustainable development, it could 
be ascertained that, although the discussion about an “Earth Charter” had been part of the 
preparations for Rio 1992, it was evidently not the time for such a charter. As the declaration from 
Rio de Janeiro contained just 22 principles and the task developing an earth charter including the 
ethical and moral deliberations from the Brundtland Commission was still not solved.  
This unsolved task inspired the general secretary of the summit in Rio 1992, Maurice Strong, and 
Mikhail Gorbachev, each of whom founded environmental organisations, Earth Council and 
Green Cross International respectively, joining forces in a civil society initiative to shape an earth 
charter. An independent Earth Charter Commission13 (Earth Charter, 2000) was formed in 1994. 
Several years’ dialogue between many cultures about the common goals and values which civil 
society laid out as elements of an Earth Charter followed. In 2000, the results of the commission’s 
work, Earth Charter, were presented at a meeting in The Netherlands by the commission’s 
chairman, Steven Rockefeller. The commission behind the Earth Charter views the results as “an 
ethical framework for building a just, sustainable, and peaceful global society in the 21st 
century”14(ibid.). 
At its launch in 2000, the commission’s chairman expressed this in the following manner: “The 
Earth Charter vision reflects the conviction that caring for people and caring for Earth are two 
interdependent dimensions of one task. We cannot care for people in a world with collapsing 
ecosystems, and we cannot care for Earth in a world with widespread poverty, injustice, economic 
inequity, and violent conflict”15 (idem.). 
The Earth Charter movement shows that people with deep knowledge of the UN process and of 
the discussions about sustainable development at a global level, concluded that the ethical and 
cultural issues which need to be considered while applying the Brundtland Commission’s 
sustainability concept to practical politics, do not feature clearly enough in the documentation of 
Rio 1992. Therefore, the Earth Charter was necessary.  
Representatives of the civil society of the Arctic and of Greenland’s Home-Rule had also noted 
that focus on the 3 pillars left out the ethical and thereby the important cultural elements, which 
are of great significance for people’s lives and, not least, the ways in which they relate to nature 
and its living resources.  
Discussions within IUCN, while Finn Lynge16 represented Greenland’s Home-Rule, raised 
awareness of Maurice Strong’s and Mikail Gorbechev’s initiative, and it was agreed that the former 
cabinet member Henriette Rasmussen17 should be “the voice of the Arctic” in the Earth Charter 
commission, which was responsible for the final shaping of the Earth Charter.  
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The Brundtland Report led to the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, but as it 
has been indicated above, part of the international discussions in the 1990s, tried to get all the 
elements in the Brundtland definition back on track and fight back against the derailment that had 
taken place. 
The Arctic and the Culture in Which One Lives 
The debate about sustainability in the Arctic has been taking place both in Greenland and in the 
international dialogue on nature and pollution that began after Gorbachev’s Murmansk speech on 
the 1st of October 1987.18 
Finland had long had major problems with the pollution that came from the Russian blast furnaces 
that extracted nickel in the Murmansk area. Finland saw the environmental section in Gorbachev’s 
speech19, as an invitation from the Russian side for cooperation on environmental issues in the 
Arctic. Finland's diplomatic efforts in 1989 - 1991 were called “The Finnish Initiative” or “the 
Rovaniemi Process” in the Arctic. 
As a result, in 1991 the eight Arctic countries signed the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy 
(AEPS) in Rovaniemi. This environmental strategy became the foundation on which the Arctic 
Council was built in 1996. 
Denmark has responsibility for Greenland’s foreign policy. As environmental issues are also a part 
of Greenland’s own fields of responsibilities, the Greenland representatives played an important 
role in the Kingdom of Denmark’s delegation during the negotiations. In a Greenlandic context, 
the environment is intimately connected to ‘nature’ because of the Greenlanders’ utilization of the 
natural resources which has been the ultimate precondition for the existence of Inuit in both 
Greenland and other parts of the Arctic. Living off the land and the sea is the foundation of the 
Inuit culture. 
A Greenlandic requirement in the negotiations on AEPS was therefore that the NGOs Inuit 
Circumpolar Council (ICC), Sami Council and the Russian Indigenous Peoples’ Organization 
(RAIPON), all had a seat at the negotiating table with the right to participate in negotiations at all 
agenda points. For Greenland, it was important that the hunters’ and fishermen’s culture could be 
an integral part of the discussions on environmental issues concerning the nature that was and is 
Inuit’s livelihood.  
With the formation of the Arctic Council in 1996, the circle of “permanent participants” was 
expanded to a total of 6 NGOs.20 In this way, Greenland hunting culture was involved in 
international discussions in the Arctic on environmental issues. One might say that this part of the 
cultural dimension was included in the discussion on Sustainable Development in the Arctic from 
the very beginning. 
Exploitation of Greenland’s living resources has for many years been a part of the discussion 
about sustainability in Greenland. There has also been an international discussion about what 
Inuit and Greenlanders ought and ought not to do in this regard. In the late 1970’s, whaling 
attracted great interest from so-called environmental activists21 (Lynge F., 2013), and later, 
attention was turned towards seal hunting22 (Lynge F., 1992). 
In 2003 the transcripts of ten radio lectures about sustainable development, broadcast in both 
Danish and Greenlandic, on Kalaallit Nunaata Radioa/KNR (Greenland’s Radio) were published. 
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These were given in connection with the so called Tulugaq campaign23 (Tulugaq, 2003), which 
had been initiated by the government. Nine of the lectures were given by H.C Petersen24 (H.C. 
Petersen et al., 2003) and one by Finn Lynge on the subject of whaling.  
The first lecture, entitled “The legacy of the ancestors”, was introduced with a section about 
cultural heritage. H.C. Petersen expressed, among other things, the following:  
We have understood that if we are to live in and preserve our country, it must continue to be 
possible to make our living from it. We must also have a clear understanding that it is only 
possible to secure for our descendants the possibility to remain living in this country if we 
use its resources in an orderly manner, which is to say, that we make it clear to ourselves that 
there are limits to how much we can exploit this country’s resources, its animals, birds and 
fish25 (H.C. Petersen et al., 2003). 
In a shortened form, H.C. Petersen later said; “Certain doctrines were imprinted from childhood, for 
example,” “You can take the animal you need (i.e. kill it). But not the animal you don’t need”26 (2003). As was 
stated later in the same lecture, such an intention about wanting to behave in a particular way is 
an ethical way of thinking, and it is interesting that the question of how one behaves in certain 
situations is something that occupies all cultures in one way or another.  
The thinking behind the modern sustainability concept is essentially the idea that the securing of 
immediate needs must not destroy the possibility for future generations to fulfil their needs. In 
his book “Platons Gåde. Den levende Skrift” Ivar Gjørup, in reference to the Fourth Book of 
Plato’s REPUBLIC, writes that; “Entrepreneurship is driven by our needs. Each one of us endeavours to 
master oneself. Some manage to do so, others do not, others learn to do so eventually. They are clever enough to 
understand that we cannot satisfy our own needs endlessly as it leads to abuse and misery”87 (2016). The problem 
with the concept of sustainability is thus not new. The idea has deep cultural roots!  
On the Application of the Concept of Sustainability by Greenland Authorities 
In 2008, a short report was developed by the administration of Greenland’s Home Rule, the 
purpose of which was to describe the work being done on sustainability and globalisation in 
Greenland. The report shows that the sustainability concept was at no point applied consistently 
by the changing political coalitions of Greenland governments. It was the same situation when 
the issue was simplified by applying the three dimensions stated above.  
The case is further complicated by their focusing on “sustainable exploitation” rather than “sustainable 
development”. Added to this is how, in different situations, different Greenlandic expressions are 
used for the concept of “sustainable exploitation”. The report provides five different Greenlandic 
expressions for “sustainable exploitations” when used in particular contexts, as shown in the table 
below. The concept was and still is an important part of the discussion concerning the use of 
living resources28 (Nielsen, 2008). 
 
Sustainable Exploitation 
Various translations to Greenlandic (from Danish) 
which have been used 
Translated back to Danish (and then to English) 
Nungusaataanngitsumik atorneqarnissaq The continued use of something in such a 
way that it doesn’t run out.  
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Piujuartitsinissamik tunngaveqarluni  
Iluaquteqarneq 
To make use of something in such a way 
that it remains at one’s disposal.  
Imminut nammassinnaasoq Which has to carry (take responsibility for) 
itself.  
Piujuartitsisumik iluaquteqarniarneq To make use of something in such a way 
that it will always be at one’s disposal.  
Nungusaataanngitsumik To use something in such a way that it 
doesn’t run out.  
 
In 2016, a new linguistic formulation arrived. This occurred in connection with Naalakkersuisoq 
for Finances presentation of Naalakkersuisuts. Sustainability and Growth plan29 (Department 
2016). Here, the following designations were used30 (ibid):  
 
Piujuartitsineq Sustainability 
 
Since the Nordic Prime Ministers, in connection with the Nordic Council’s session in 1998, 
adopted a declaration on “A Sustainable North”, Greenland has been active in the shaping of 
subsequent Nordic strategies, the purpose of which has been to operationalise the Nordic 
government leaders’ declaration.  
The various linguistic designs of the sustainability concept in the reports pinpoints what in a 
Greenlandic culture is not just important but fundamental, namely the exploitation of the living 
resources of nature. 
As stated in the previous section, this approach has been central to Finn Lynge’s responses to the 
hunters’ right to kill and eat marine mammals and sell for example sealskin in order to become 
part of the modern society’s monetary economy.31 
Very easily, one can thus see how culture is used to defend the maintenance of a group of people’s 
personal economy. Fishermen and hunters – and thus the hunting culture – are dependent on 
being able to sell their catches on the market in order to acquire other things necessary to live in a 
modern Arctic society. A culture survives through the wise use of economic, social and 
environmental elements. 
As mentioned, Greenland was instrumental in getting ICC on board from the very beginning of 
the AEPS process. At the AEPS 2nd ministerial meeting in Nuuk, Greenland in 1993, the ICC 
specifically expressed the desire to discuss what is known as “Indigenous Peoples Knowledge” as 
a way of knowing in line with the knowledge gained through conventional research based on, for 
example, biological measurements in nature. Iceland offered a seminar on the subject and 
Denmark funded the report.32 
It was at the same meeting in Nuuk that the eight Arctic countries agreed to establish a “task force” 
to discuss issues of social and cultural conditions.33 This task force was later the inspiration for the 
formation of the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG), which was established as 
part of the Arctic Council in 1996. 
The most recent Nordic strategy is entitled “A good life in a sustainable North – Nordic strategy 
for sustainable development” (Ett gott liv i ett hållbart Norden – Nordisk strategi för hållbar 
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utveckling), and was adopted by the Ministers for Cooperation in the Nordic Council of Ministers 
in 2013. 
As stated in the introduction, the concept of “sustainable development” lost an important 
dimension when it became the norm to characterise the concept as development which was based 
on three pillars; the economic, social and environmental dimensions. The aspect, which concerns 
people’s culture was left out when “society” became “social” in everyday talk about the issue.  
From the outset of its international cooperation, Greenland’s Home-Rule, and later Self-
Government, has argued that the UN, and moreover, organisations internationally, should work 
for the rights of the Indigenous peoples, more specifically, the right to preserve their own culture 
and identity. A noteworthy point in this endeavour was the establishment of the Permanent 
Forum of the UN in 2000. It has also been the Greenlandic government, Naalakkersuisut’s, policy 
that culture should be included on equal footing with the three stated dimensions when 
discussions dealt with the following-up of Brundtland’s “Our Common Future”. In 
Naalakkersuisut’s case, this happened at “Rio+20”, which was the world community’s marking of 
the 20th anniversary of the United Nations’ adoption of the declaration on sustainable 
development from 1992. At that time, Greenland found out it had entered the discussions in Rio 
de Janeiro too late to influence language usage on that point. Instead, Greenland focused its 
political efforts on avoiding losing ground on the theme of “Indigenous Peoples”.  
In May 2016, Greenland’s Self-Government worked on applying the sustainability concept in 
connection with the published Sustainability and Growth plan for Greenland. It is interesting to 
note here that sustainability becomes one of five guiding principles.  
The Sustainability and Growth Plan’s Five Guiding Principles:  
• Sustainability 
• Increased self-sufficiency 
• Good and stable frameworks for private investments 
• Holistic and effective problem solving 
• An attractive place to grow up and live in as part of a community”34 (Department, 2016) 
 
In its broader presentation, one can see that sustainability is bound to the management of nature’s 
resources, which in this article is a part of the environmental component of the sustainability 
concept.  
One can surmise that the application of the concept in ways that include the cultural dimension is 
not something being worked on in all parts of the Greenlandic administration up to now. Looking 
at a Greenland context, and focusing on the three words “economy”, “social” and “environment” 
it is easy to get the impression that “economy” is the most significant underlying factor for the 
principle mentioned above. 
The Sustainability and Growth plan is the first attempt in Greenland to develop a document 
which, viewed ideally, should encompass all parts of the sustainability concept. It will be 
interesting to see whether the work that is underway, and which stems from the UN’s 2030 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), leads to including the cultural dimension and thus 
ensuring that culture also ‘finds its place’. This can then become a substantial contribution to the 
discussion about moral and ethical questions, which humanity in general must ask itself if the 
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planet in the far future is supposed to include humans at all. The planet will probably remain in 
its place in the solar system. In this context it can be pointed out that Earth Charter was a proposal 
of how these considerations might be included in the thinking about sustainability.   
The Original Starting Point: Is There a Way Back?   
As stated above, there are good historical and factual reasons for including ‘culture’ as a fourth 
pillar or dimension, if a dividing up of the Brundtland Commission’s concept “sustainable 
development” is wished for. The concept thereby becomes broader, its implementation more 
practicable, and the concept’s inner logic and more holistic approach easier to understand and 
preserve. This logic, however, both includes and highlights the contradictions, which demand that 
political decisions be taken to implement sustainability in day-to-day politics.  
The historical development of the concept, which we have witnessed on a global level, has been 
mirrored by the Nordic dialogue at the Nordic Council of Ministers and the Nordic Council. The 
Nordic Council of Ministers created its first regional sustainability strategy in 2001 entitled “New 
Course for the North”. It also states here that sustainable development contains “three 
interdependent dimensions: an economic, a social and an environmental dimension”35 (Nordisk 
Ministerråd, 2001). 
At the most recent revision of the Nordic strategy for sustainable development in 2013, it was the 
Greenland government’s policy that culture should be discussed on equal footing with the three 
pillars. This was not exactly the case, but the Greenland government contributed with the 
formulation of the following text, which features in the introduction to the latest strategy:    
There are three interdependent dimensions of sustainable development: the economic, the 
social and the ecological. One of these dimensions must not undermine the conditions for 
development in the others. Culture is also very important for the Nordic values. Culture 
concerns, for example, choice of lifestyle, consumption patterns, relationship to the 
environment and acceptance of the processes of change in society. Consequently, it is 
important to include cultural issues in the work on sustainable development.36 (ANP, 2013). 
In the Autumn of 2017, the Nordic Council of Ministers and the Nordic Council adopted a 
regional follow-up document for the UN Sustainable Development Goals, called Generation 
2030. With this document it can be argued that now, also the Nordic framework has departed 
from “the three pillars way of thinking”, in preference to a more holistic approach.  
As mentioned, the sustainability concept is included in the Self-Government’s current work with 
a Sustainability and Growth plan, which had its point of departure in the UN’s 2030 SDG agenda 
and in the Nordic plan of action, Generation 2030. The Greenland plan has the potential for 
further development, so that, if it is politically desirable, a future update can present an actual 
strategy for “The sustainable arctic welfare society”. It can be argued that this will require a 
government in Greenland that will prioritize other than economic growth. In this connection, it 
should be recalled that economic growth in Greenland is particularly motivated by the desire to 
create the foundation for the independent Republic of Greenland. 
The full understanding of Brundtland’s sustainability concept is something that most people and 
their politicians still have to work with. Or, one might argue, that this is ‘a gift’ that is unopened 
on most politicians’ tables in the Arctic – as it is in the rest of the world.    
The work carried out in concretising the sustainability concept in the UN framework continued 
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after the 20-year anniversary in 2012, and several years of negotiating led to the UN’s 2030 
Sustainable Development Goals. The resolution: Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development37 (UN, 2015) was passed, and it is now this document that sets 
the framework for the regional, national and international execution of the General Assembly’s 
decisions.  
The cultural element is included in many places in UN’s 2030 SDGs, and it is also the main 
element of goal 16, which includes striving to: “Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable 
development, provide access to justice for all, and; build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels”38 
(ibid). 
If subsequent discussions continue to regard the application of the sustainability concept in terms 
of “pillars”, then as a minimum these must be extended to include a cultural pillar, which contains 
the ethical questions which were taken into consideration through Earth Charter. It can be further 
argued that ‘culture’ has from the start been a central part of the concept. The circumstances 
under which it fell out of ordinary language usage after the British discussions about how ‘Our 
Common Future’ was to be implemented, shows how far-reaching and influential the effects can 
be when a globally used concept is interpreted and developed in a world language. 
This is particularly important in a Greenland/Arctic context where the struggle for cultural rights 
in general, and the rights of Indigenous peoples in particular is a fundamental part of, for example, 
the Greenland Self-Government’s understanding of itself. However, the continuing regional 
cooperation in the Arctic is still not without its problems, particularly when addressing the 
sustainability issue. Whereas the regional cooperation in the Nordic Council of Ministers made 
the decision in Autumn of 2017 and adopted Generation 2030, there are still unresolved issues in 
relation to the understanding of sustainable development in the Arctic Council.  
If the Arctic Council is to be attributed a significant role in the general development of societies 
in the Arctic, one must look critically at how the Council’s ministerial declarations are shaped 
around the area we are discussing here.39  
The latest ministerial declaration is from the 10th Arctic Council’s meeting of Ministers in 
Fairbanks in 201740 (Arctic Council, 2017). Over a range of points, the concept “sustainable 
development” is used, such as in the third section of the introduction; “Reaffirming our 
commitment to the well-being of the inhabitants of the Arctic, to sustainable development and to 
the protection of the Arctic environment.”  
It is noteworthy that it is deemed necessary to mention the protection of the Arctic environment 
as well as ‘sustainable development’, which otherwise traditionally encompasses the environment. 
The seventh section of the introduction states: 
Noting with concern that the Arctic is warming at more than twice the rate of the global 
average, resulting in widespread social, environmental, and economic impacts in the Arctic 
and worldwide, and the pressing and increasing need for mitigation and adaptation actions 
and to strengthen resilience. 
This is a return to the classic three-part concept, but this is hardly because it is thought that the 
residents’ culture won’t be affected by the stated warming, just as adaptation and resilience to the 
changes clearly have specific cultural conditions and implications. Coming to the last of the 
sections in the preamble, it is as if there is a glimmer of hope prior to recognition that culture is 
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included in the discourse surrounding sustainability, in that it states; “Reaffirming the United 
Nations Sustainable Development Goals and the need for their realisation by 2030.” 
But this hope is short lived. The actual declaration is divided into sections, the second of which 
has the heading “IMPROVING ECONOMIC AND LIVING CONDITIONS”. And the 
following point 13 states: “13. Reaffirm the role of the Arctic Council in promoting sustainable development 
through harmonizing its three core pillars in an integrated way: economic development, social development and 
environmental protection”41 (Arctic Council, 2017). 
Not only are the three pillars reiterated, but are also viewed as the realization of sustainable 
development “through harmonizing its three core pillars”. You don’t need to be a fortune teller 
to predict that there will be a pressing need to apply the ethical and cultural considerations, as laid 
out in Earth Charter, when this policy is carried out in the Arctic.  
When it concerns the Arctic Council, Greenland’s formal position differs from that it holds in, 
for example, in the Nordic cooperation, where countries sit under their own flag during 
discussions in the Nordic Council of Ministers. In the Arctic Council, Greenland is a part of the 
Kingdom of Denmark’s delegation. From a Greenlandic perspective, it could be claimed that the 
Arctic Council has established “the rights of Arctic indigenous peoples”, with this “s”, which gave 
rise to an American footnote in the AEPS Minister declaration from Inuvik back in 1995, and 
thereby has gained some ground in the struggle for recognition of culture as being important for 
a society’s development.  
It seems fair to conclude that the Arctic Council has not yet taken the UN 2030 Sustainable 
Development Goals into consideration on an operational level but will Finland accomplish that?42  
From the start AEPS was the result of a highly professional diplomatic effort from Finland, so the 
question is what to expect from the current Arctic Council leadership. From the outset, Finland 
announced the following 10 areas43 which should be prioritized: 
• Paris Climate Agreement 
• UN Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development 
• The economic perspectives 
• Environmental protection 
• Connectivity 
• Meteorology 
• Education 
• The Environment and Climate 
• The Seas 
• The People 
 
One might ask about the understanding of the concept of sustainability that lies behind this list of 
priority topics. The UN Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development is mentioned as an 
independent point, but if one re-reads the UN 2030 goals, including the sub-sets of the individual 
goals, it is obvious that the other prioritized AC-areas are also included in the UN 2030 goals. 
A proper application of the UN 2030 goals would require that the UN 2030 was part of the 
Declaration’s headline, indicating in each of the priority areas which UN 2030 targets they are part 
of. The prospects for a consistent application of the classic concept of sustainability in the political 
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declaration signed by ministers and reports designed by diplomats with input from scientists of 
the forthcoming Arctic Council’s ministerial meeting in Finland in 2019 is not necessarily 
promising. 
Another relevant question is: how will political decisions made in parliaments and governments 
affect the places where people live? If governments in the long run want to find out they need 
indicators that can be used for systematic measurements. 
Each country, of course, has the opportunity to develop and apply its own indicators, but an 
example shows that countries and groups of countries rarely use resources to develop new 
indicators to get data because of a politic declaration.44 They try to use whatever statistics they 
already have.45 
A promising example contradicting a skeptical expectation is EUROSTAT that has organized and 
developed its data and thus its statistical information according to the UN 2030 SDGs targets and 
indicators. 
The Arctic Council has not yet defined specific indicators to measure and assess the different 
aspects of sustainable development. A number of projects such as the Survey of Living Conditions 
in the Arctic, SLiCA (see e.g. Kruse et al., 2007 and Poppel, 2005), the Arctic Human Development 
Report I and II46, and Arctic Social Indicators I and II.47 It will therefore be the present article’s 
suggestion that a statistical follow-up to the political declarations of the Arctic Council be 
structured according to the UN 2030 targets. Then one might be tempted to argue that ‘sustainable 
development’ is back on track. 
Conclusion 
This article substantiates the understanding that the Brundtland Report’s sustainability concept 
was derailed shortly after the conference in Rio in 1992, when the concept had to be made 
operational through political implementation in the United Kingdom. 
With the Earth Charter initiative, this interpretation and operationalisation came under pressure, 
and during the years following there has been a fight for Greenland to preserve the general 
acceptance of its hunting cultures’ way of living.  
Through the participation of the Arctic NGOs the cultural dimension was included in the AEPS 
and was further developed in the Arctic Council, where it has been a part of the discussions in 
SDWG. But this case also shows that the wording used to establish and carry out policy in the 
Arctic Council is still under influence of the “the 3 pillars” thinking. Even when it comes to the 
priorities set out by Finland in their chairmanship of the Arctic Council for the period 2017-19 the 
term “Sustainable Development” is mentioned as one of eight priorities and along with it, different 
dimensions. 
A more consistent – and loyal to the UN’s application of the term “Sustainable Development” - 
would have the term in the headline, and as a service to the reader each of the priorities could have 
a badge with the number of the UN 2030 Sustainable Development Goals to where it belongs. 
This would have shown the people of the Arctic what part of sustainable development in the 
Arctic would be the political focus under Finland’s chairmanship. 
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Despite an overall Arctic Council commitment to the UN Sustainable Development Goals – and 
the fact that all UN members (including the eight Arctic states) develop national SDGs – it will 
most likely be an ongoing struggle to broaden the understanding of sustainable development and 
include the cultural dimension as an important pillar.  
 
Notes 
1. A smaller part of this article was previously published in Tidskriftet Grønland juni 2017 [The 
Greenland Journal, June 2017] Acknowledgements to Birger Poppel for the idea of 
bringing my thoughts about sustainable development to an English speaking audience. 
2. Meadows et al., 1972 
3. WCED, 1987 
4. WCED, 1987 
5. WCED, 1987: 2 (Chapter 12 II section 5.2 A paragraph 86) 
6. Vores fælles fremtid. 1987 FN – forbundet og mellemfolkeligt Samvirke,p.311[Our 
common future. World commission on Environment and development 1987] 
7. Earth Summit ‘92. The Regency Press corporation, Gordon House, 6 Lissenden Gardens 
London NW5 ILX 
8. Owens, 2003   
9. Owens, 2003 p. 4-5 
10. UN, 2002 p. 2 
11. UN Doc A/conf.199/L.1 p.16 
12. UN 2012. First paragraph 
13. See http://earthcharter.org/discover/the-earth-charter/ 
14. From speech by Steven Rockefeller when The Earth Charter was formally launched in 
ceremonies at The Peace Palace in The Hague. 29 June 2000. www.earthcharter.org  SR 6-
29-00 p. 2 
15. Ibid. 
16. Finn Lynge (1933 – 2014). Educated in philosophy and theology in Rome and USA, he 
was Nuuk’s Catholic priest and a social worker. He was also Director of Greenland’s radio 
and in 1979 was elected to the European Parliament until Greenland altered status to an 
OCT country in relation to the EU. He later became Greenland consultant in the Danish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He then became a member of Greenland’s self-government 
commission from 2000 – 2003. He authored a range of articles and books on sustainable 
development, and particularly Greenlandic hunters’ rights regarding the exploitation of 
sea-mammal resources in Greenland’s coastal waters. 
17. Henriette Rasmussen (1950 – 2017). Journalist and politician. Member of the Greenlandic 
parliament from 1991 -1995. Member of government responsible for social affairs and 
labour markets. From 1995-97, employed by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
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in. Geneva, responsible for indigenous peoples’ rights. Member of Earth Charter 
Commission responsible for the Arctic. 
18. Poppel, B., 2018, p. 314 
19. For some background on the creation on the environmental part of the Gorbatjov speech, 
see Lynge F (2013) p 174 -75. 
20. Arctic Council, 2006 
21. In 1981, when their anti-whaling campaign, which lacked any biological rationale in relation 
to Greenland, fell on political deaf ears, Greenpeace made a direct personal attack on the 
Danish representative for the international whaling commission. Lynge 2013, p.213, note 
103. 
22. For deeper insight into this, see Lynge F., 1990 
23. Tulugaq: Handlingsplan for kampagnen om bæredygtig udnyttelse af levende ressourcer, 
Tusagassiivik, Landsstyrets sekretariat 2003. [Tulugaq: Plan of action for the campaign for 
sustainable exploitation of living resources, Tusagassiivik, Government secretariat 2003] 
24.  H. C. Petersen (1925 - 2015) was headmaster of Knud Rasmussenip Højskolia in Sisimiut 
from 1962 to1975. He was active in working to promote awareness about Greenlandic 
culture and the development of its society, in the later years, particularly around the use of 
Greenland’s resources and the relation to old cultural values. 
25. Petersen H.C. & Lynge F., 2003 p. 8 
26. Petersen H.C. & Lynge F., 2003 p. 14 
27. Gjørup I., 2016, p. 290. 
28. Nielsen P., 2008. 
29. Power Point Presentation of 30th of May 2016. Department of Finance and Taxes. 
30. “Piujuartitsineq” was the word used in the Power Point Presentation with the translation 
that showed here.  
31.  See Lynge F., 1992 
32. “Arctic Environment. Report on The seminar On Integration of Indigenous Peoples 
Knowledge. Reykjavik – Iceland 20 - 23. September 1994 
33. Poppel, B., 2018, p. 314 
34. Slide 15 from Power Point Presentation, 30th of May 2016, see www.naalakkersuisut.gl. 
35. ANP 2013: 728, p.5 
36. ANP 2013: 728, p.5 
37. UN 2015 Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 
38. Ibid. 
39. For an in depth analysis of the declarations of the Arctic strategies in the participating 
countries see for example Poppel. B, 2018 
40. Arctic Council, 2017.  
41. Ibid. 
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42. Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG). Working within the Arctic Council, 
this group is currently discussing sustainable development from an Arctic perspective. In 
this context, agreement about an operational application of the concept of sustainability is 
being sought. If the nations involved take the UN’s 2030 goals as their starting point, there 
would be a chance that culture gets a natural placing in future operationalizing of the 
sustainability concept in Arctic Council documents. 
43. See https://oaarchive.arctic-
council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/2027/Finnish_Chairmanship_Program_Arctic_Co
uncil_2017-2019.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y 
44. From the first sustainability strategy in the Nordic Council of Ministers from 1996 up to 
the latest from 2013, the present writer was a representative of Greenland for the working 
group, who formulated the texts of the strategies. Following a political decision in the 
Nordic Council of Ministers, the first set of Nordic indicators was drawn up in relation to 
the Nordic strategy for sustainable development in 2006. There was a recognition in the 
working group that no country would spend money developing new indicators, so the task 
was to find the right part of the existing statistics, that could show something about the 
development of the goals, that the strategy included. Modern statistics in the Nordic 
countries are well developed. It was possible to find a number of relevant indicators, but 
it did not change the principle that the existing statistics was determinative for the feedback 
the politicians received on the strategy they had adopted. (Fokus på bæredygtig udvikling. 
Nordiske indikatorer 2006. Nord 2006:002 ISBN 92-893-1357-9 [Focus on sustainable 
development. Nordic indicators 2006]) 
45. The Survey of Living Conditions, SLiCA (www.arcticlivingconditions.org) was based on a 
questionnaire developed in partnerships between the research team and representatives 
from the indigenous peoples to reflect the welfare priorities of the indigenous peoples in 
the SLiCA survey regions (Inuit, Saami and the indigenous peoples of Chukotka and the 
Kola Peninsula) (see e.g. Poppel, 2015). The first Data results were grouped according to 
the AHDR recommendations. 
46. The Arctic Human Development Report, AHDR, concluded that a combination of the 
UN Human Development Indicators (HDI) focusing on ‘longevity’, ‘education’, and 
‘material success’ should be supplemented by three dimensions of human development of 
special importance to indigenous peoples and other Arctic citizens: ‘Controlling one’s own 
destiny, Maintaining cultural identity and Living close to nature’ (AHDR, 2004: 240). 
47. The Arctic Social Indicators, ASI I (ASI I, 2010) and ASI II (ASI II, 2014) further 
elaborated, both methodologically and empirically, on the AHDR recommendations into 
indicators. 
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Tourism & Quality of Life in Greenland: 
Exploration through Farm Stays in South Greenlandic 
Settlements 
 
Naja Carina Steenholdt & Daniela Chimirri 
 
  
Studies of how the development of industries impacts resident quality of life in Greenland have largely focused on fisheries and 
mining, neglecting the emerging tourism industry in the country. In this article, we aim to contribute to the reduction of this gap 
within academia and praxis by exploring how the developing tourism industry in South Greenland interrelates with resident 
quality of life in this area. Based on the lack of existing academic literature and public awareness within tourism and quality 
of life in South Greenland, we investigate the relevance of the tourism industry, specifically farm tourism, effect on resident 
quality of life. Through a small-scale exploratory case study of farm stays in South Greenlandic settlements, we aim to create 
an understanding of how resident quality of life and farm tourism interrelates. By applying the bottom-up spillover theory as 
theoretical frame, we investigate whether generated income from farm tourism can contribute to people’s state of wellbeing, but 
also that there is more to wellbeing than “just” money. Based on generated data, our study concludes that there is a close 
interrelation between farm tourism and resident QoL in South Greenland. Subsequently, we argue that there are relevant 
grounds in a larger perspective for further research within the field of tourism and QoL in Greenland.  
 
 
Introduction 
The increasing amount of debates in Greenland, centering on economic growth, reflects the 
widespread acknowledgement of its essentiality for the welfare state as such as well as on the way 
to independence from Denmark. Common grounds proclaiming economic development as an 
inevitable step on the way towards this goal can certainly also be found across academic 
perspectives and related arguments. According to the current political administration: “regardless of 
whether the aim is a strong welfare economy, independence, or trade and industry growth, the Number One resource 
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is the nation’s population. […] This makes it imperative to raise the general level of education and training, and 
creating good conditions for coming generations to grow up in” (Naalakkersuisut, 2017). This illustrates the 
necessity to enlarge the perspective of and create grounds for development that embrace the 
economic as well as the socio-economic dimensions. Up until the present, quality of life studies in 
Greenland like the Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic (SLiCA) have addressed how fishing, 
hunting and mining have affected resident quality of life (Poppel, 2015; Snyder & Poppel, 2017, 
Poppel et al. 2007).  
Within the tourism related debates in Greenland, public discussions beyond the point of economy 
and its monetary significance for the country as well as research on the role of tourism in socio-
economic dimensions for the Greenlandic people are scarce. Undeniably, as researched by 
numerous academics: tourism happens within communities and therefore influences local life in 
positive as well as negative ways (Adanan et al., 2010). Arguably, since the communities are affected 
by tourism, the social dimension needs to be granted the same attention as the economic 
dimensions of tourism development. Hence, policy makers, tourism actors and researchers need 
to consider the causal relation of resident quality of life and tourism development in Greenland. 
In order to raise the awareness and inspire a rethinking in this direction, we explore how tourism 
development in Greenland, in our specific case farm tourism in South Greenland, interrelates with 
quality of life. To do so, we proceed with a bottom-up hypothesis, which is the understanding that 
different life domains, such as material wellbeing, health, emotional wellbeing etc. have an impact 
on overall quality of life, where the different life domains can spill over one another.  
Let’s Talk About South Greenland: The Status Quo  
During the past century, development in South Greenland has, setting aside the comprehensive 
development of the public sector, evolved mainly around natural resources, such as fisheries and 
mining of raw materials. There are, however, promises and expectations linked to the development 
of other sectors. As Prime Minister Kim Kielsen stated in his New Year’s speech in 2018, “(w)ith 
the economic challenges we have in this country, it is of upmost importance to secure the framework for business 
development of the four business pillars – fisheries, raw materials, tourism and industry” (Kielsen, 2018). They 
constitute the foundation of the Greenlandic economy, generating income and offering jobs. The 
fishing industry, a well-established sector, has been a pillar of the country’s economic policy since 
the early 1900s, and the prospects of its importance remains. “Increased growth and employment in the 
private sector is decisive in safeguarding the foundation for the future welfare and prosperity. […], we need to boost 
the development in the fisheries, which continue to be our most important trade and industry sector” said Karl-
Kristian Kruse, then Minister of Fisheries of Naalakkersuisut1 at a recent conference (2017). 
Tourism, which has existed in Greenland since the middle of the 20th century, lacks hitherto to 
serve as a stable pillar of society like the fisheries; however, the potentials are not unrecognized: 
“We are now seeing an upturn in our tourism industry. Tourism could ultimately become one of Greenland’s leading 
industries” (Naalakkersuisut, 2017). Even though discussions around development of fishery, 
mining and tourism are significantly focusing on the monetary aspect of it, there are occurrences 
illustrating an extent towards a more socio-economic perspective. However, this largely occurs 
within the context of fishery and mining. Naalakkersuisut states by example: “Earnings from the 
fisheries must not only generate revenue for Greenland. It is also important to maximize the socio-economic return 
from our resources, whether these are fish or minerals for example” (2017) and in another example regarding 
mining, “(t)here is promise and expectation among national policymakers and community members alike that 
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development and nearby industrialization could further improve living conditions in Qeqertarsuatsiaat” (Snyder & 
Poppel, 2017). The existence of diverse research2 with a socio-economic perspective on fishery 
and mining reflects the awareness of how these sectors contribute in more than monetary senses. 
Based on the apparent awareness for the link between economic means and well-being in these 
two sectors, we decided to put our focus on tourism. As tourism is considered the third economic 
pillar of Greenland’s economy and has been flourishing within the past few years, it feels crucial 
to also investigate how this sector interrelates with well-being and QoL in Greenland. By looking 
at the concept of farm stay as an example within the tourism industry, we explore how this specific 
type of tourism contributes to resident quality of life. We aim to broaden the discussion and to 
create awareness that tourism, as research in the field of fisheries and mining already showed, also 
has the potential of contributing to the quality of life in Greenland. We are aware that this means 
that we are coming short in addressing the interrelation between tourism and quality of life in 
Greenland as a whole, however, the ambition here is primarily to launch an important debate rather 
than discussing multifaceted development in Greenland in general. 
Agriculture, Tourism & Farm Stays in Greenland 
Before exploring how South Greenlandic farm stays contribute and interrelate with resident’s 
quality of life, we provide a short introduction to agriculture, tourism in Greenland and farm stays 
in South Greenland in the following section. This will pave the way for our analysis section 
“Exploring the present – Interrelation between quality of life and farm tourism”, in which we 
unfold how farm tourism in South Greenland and QoL are interrelated. 
 Agriculture 
“Agriculture in Greenland!” – That might sound strange to some ears, but farming as such has a 
long tradition in South Greenland, tracing back to the Norsemen and Eric the Red in 982 (Bichet 
et al., 2013). It still represents an important occupation in the small settlements in the South, for 
example in Qassiarsuk (Visit Greenland, n. d., b). However, it is not surprising that the connection 
to agriculture is often not made outside of Greenland. Even though agriculture as a department is 
represented within the governmental bodies, its allocated significance as part of the national 
economy is shown by its lack of appearance within the annual report of Greenland (Statistics 
Greenland, 2017). Here, it is merged together with fishery and hunting (when it comes to numbers) 
and only mentioned within this context (as illustrated by the only explicit mentioning as followed: 
“Agriculture – products: Sheep, cows, reindeer, fish”, Statistic Greenland, 2017: 7). Due to the 
lack of accountable numbers regarding agriculture and more specifically farming, the assumption 
that the generated income to the nation’s economy through agricultural activities is relatively low 
(in comparison to fishery and mining) seems substantial.  
 Tourism in Greenland  
Tourism is a relatively new economic sector in Greenland as it has been carried out in an organized 
way since the 1960s (Christensen, 1992; Kaae, 2002; Kaae, 2006; Johnston & Viken, 1997). Even 
though tourism might not be considered a long-established industry in Greenland, it certainly 
affects the turnover and employment rate in many professions, such as e.g. transportation by air 
and sea, the hospitality and catering sector, as well as touristic services and offers, such as the trade 
with souvenirs (Naalakkersuisut, 2015; Statistics Greenland, 2010). Tourism plays an increasing 
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role in the economy of these professions. Accordingly, the interest in and focus on tourism and 
its development in Greenland has increased over the past years (Bjørst & Ren, 2015; Ren & 
Chimirri, 2017; Ren & Chimirri, 2018).  
As shown in the figure below (fig. 1), the tourism sector has been growing over the last years. 
Although, this development has not been smooth (due to multiple reasons such as SARS, 
terroristic attacks, which also affected tourism wordlwide) (Statistics Greenland, 2017), it 
nevertheless led to the further development of the tourism landscape.   
 
Figure 1: Number of overnight stays in Greenland (Statistics Greenland, 2017) 
However, there are no figures on the total economic impact of tourism on society as the statistical 
reports published by Statistics Greenland presents descriptions of bednights, number of 
passengers and so forth. 
Tourists arrive in Greenland by either cruise ship or international flights into Kangerlussuaq, 
Ilulissat, Nuuk, Narsarsuaq, Kulusuk or Nerlerit Inaat in Ittoqqortoormiit. Inside Greenland, 
tourists travel the country by using either flights and/or ships or a combination of both (Statistics 
Greenland, 2018). So far, tourism in Greenland has been known to be most successful in places 
like Ilulissat in the Disco Bay area as well as further south in Nuuk and Qaqortoq. Ilulissat is visited 
by individual travelers, package and cruise ship tourists. This main destination offers tourists to 
experience the “Big Arctic Five”, where tourists get to go on dog sled trips, whale-watching, 
meeting local people through the cultural tradition of “kaffemik”3, experience the phenomena of 
Aurora Borealis and to see or stand on the ice cap. In addition, cruise ship tourism, coming with 
vessels from all over the world visiting settlements and major cities like the capital Nuuk is one of 
the largest tourism segments when it comes to arrivals (Visit Greenland, 2016). One example of 
development within the tourism sector are farm stays in South Greenland. Following we will 
introduce the landscape of farm stays in South Greenland.  
 Farms Stays in South Greenland 
As part of the agricultural landscape in South Greenland, tourists have had the opportunity to be 
acquainted with the concept of farm stays for some time. “For years the visitors in South Greenland have 
had the option to stay at sheep farms” (Visit Greenland, n. d., a) located around Qaqortoq, Narsaq, 
Igaliku and Qassiarsuk.  
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Ten farm owners in South Greenland offer a 
variety of tourism products to visiting guests, 
from lodging and experiencing the life of 
farmers, hiking and trekking, hiring kayaks, 
fishing, horseback riding, participating in  iceberg 
tours, and enjoying homemade Greenlandic food 
(Visit Greenland, n. d.).  
Due to the recent developments in South 
Greenland leading to a growth in the number of 
farms diversifying their traditional farm life and 
complementing it with tourism related activities, 
announcements in the public (Visit Greenland, 
2017; Jørgensen, 2017) illustrate an increased 
interest in this field - its growth and future 
development.  “South Greenland has a unique opportunity to develop this special product, and we know from 
Iceland that the demand is there.”  (Visit Greenland, 2017) This growing 
interest is confirmed by the local tourist operator stating, “[…] the 
farmers never thought that this could be interesting for tourists […], but now I 
think that these farms are developing something” (Tourism operator in 
Narsarsuaq). In addition, the newly established association “Farm 
Holidays Greenland” (consisting of ten farms located in the South - 
see Figure 3) as well as the collaboration between this association, the 
Kujalleq municipality4, Icelandic operators and Visit Greenland (Visit 
Greenland, n. d., a) indicate the growing awareness of the significance 
and potential of this type of tourism for Greenland.  
 
Theoretical Approach 
In the following, we introduce the reader to what we 
understand by using the notions of wellbeing and quality of 
life. For the purpose of interrelating quality of life with 
tourism, we apply the bottom-up spill over theory, which is 
further elaborated below. Finally, this theoretical “layout” is 
linked to farm tourism as concept, based on the notion of 
farm diversification. Due to the focus of this article, we are 
not discussing farm diversification as such. The farmers in our 
case study are mainly farmers becoming tourist hosts, but 
continuing their farming business as a main source of income. 
Even though this complies with the characteristics of farm 
diversification (Ilbery, 1991; Mahoney, 2004, in Barbieri & 
Mahoney, 2009), we do not aim to investigate motivations or 
reasons for such a diversification. We aim to unfold the larger 
issue on the interrelation between QoL and tourism. 
Figure 2: The settlement Qassiarsuk near 
Narsarsuaq where tourists have an opportunity 
to stay as guests on the local farms (Photo: Naja 
Carina Steenholdt) 
 
Figure 3: Places of farm 
stays in South Greenland 
 
Figure 4: Overview of the 
location of the farm stays in 
Greenland (outlined with 
municipalities) 
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Therefore, farm diversification as concept functions in this article as a tool to generate an 
understanding of and unfold a connection between the economic and social dimension of tourism 
development.   
 Quality of Life and Wellbeing  
There is no widely accepted single definition on the concept of quality of life (QoL) or wellbeing. 
The two terms are more than often mentioned in the same context (Glatzer, 2015). In this article, 
we apply both terms in the same meaning. In our application of the terms, we lean upon the 
definition of perceived QoL according to the Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Wellbeing 
Research, which states: “Perceived quality of life refers to how people perceive and evaluate their life. It is a 
perception that reveals the subjective evaluation of the life experience. The components focus on overall life satisfaction 
and happiness, as well as satisfaction with specific domains of life, e.g., marriage, interpersonal relationship, work, 
leisure activities, and health.” (Liao, 2014: 4702). In order to analyze and discuss QoL, we apply the 
theoretical concept of social indicators. A social indicator is a statistical measure that can track 
change over time on different aspects of social phenomena (Land et al., 2012). Data about social 
indicators can derive of both objective statistics, such as e.g. crime rates and more qualitative data, 
such as perceived satisfaction with life. As Larsen and Fondahl (2010) put it, social indicators are 
“simple measurements of key phenomena in complex human systems, (which) enable us to track the direction and 
rate of change, and thus performance in various domains, and progress toward specified goals” (p. 22). 
Furthermore, they are “valuable simply in building awareness of current conditions and trends over time” 
(ibid)”.  In this article we follow an exploratory approach, meaning that the introduced theory and 
data about social indicators function as base in the analysis and discussion of how the developing 
concept of farm stay in South Greenland affects resident QoL. 
 Quality of Life in Greenland 
Interest within QoL studies in Greenland arose in the 1970s. Since then there have been few 
studies on wellbeing and QoL in Greenland and most of those focused on social indicators in 
quantitative measures, such as household income, education levels and crime rates (From, 1975; 
Bjerregaard et al., 1995; Bjerregaard & Dahl-Petersen, 2008). Furthermore, the majority of the 
studies were conducted in frameworks developed in the context of Western societies (Andersen 
et al., 2002).  
The Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR 2004, AHDR 2014) depicts trends and the 
development state of the Arctic communities. The report recommended applying six distinct 
indicators in assessments of QoL in the Arctic. Three of the indicators applied were from the 
Human Development Index (HDI) from the United Nations Development Programme, namely 
GDP per capita, education and health. However, acknowledging that the HDI indicators failed to 
address Arctic human development comprehensively, a list of Arctic social indicators was 
suggested. This formed the basis for further studies with the aim of “filling the gaps” that 
conventional studies left. In 2010, the studies resulted in the report Arctic Social Indicators (ASI), 
presenting three social indicators essential for the Arctic communities. The three indicators were 
fate control, cultural vitality and contact with nature. Fate control can be described as the overall 
ability to carry life out on own terms. Cultural vitality represents the aspects of cultural community 
belonging. Contact with nature concerns the close ties to the natural world. 
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These indicators were also applied in the methodological approach in the Survey of Living 
Conditions in the Arctic (SLiCA), which was one of the first to address wellbeing and QoL on a 
redefined level, taking an interest in the distinctive characteristics of the Greenlandic culture and 
background (Poppel et.al, 2007). The overall purpose of SLiCA is listed as to:  
• Measure living conditions in a way relevant to Arctic residents 
• Document and compare the present state of living conditions among the indigenous 
peoples of the Arctic 
• Improve the understanding of living conditions to the benefit of Arctic residents (ibid). 
One of the major findings, which were based on nearly 8,000 interviews with Indigenous 
populations of Canada, Alaska, Greenland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Chukotka and the Kola 
Peninsula, indicated a strong connection between cultural ways of life, cash employment and 
quality of life (Poppel, 2015). 
 Theoretical Link between Tourism and Quality of Life 
There seems to be academic consensus that tourism has an influence on resident QoL in tourist 
destination communities (Kim et.al., 2013; Adanan et al., 2010; Fang et.al., 2010; Jurowski et.al., 
1997; Cecil et.al., 2010; Nawijn et.al., 2012; Meyer, 2011; Aref, 2011; Liu & Var, 1986). By example, 
Kim et al. (2013) found that there is a link between the impacts of tourism and perceived overall 
satisfaction with life. Fang et al. (2010) explored QoL with objective measures, their study implied 
a connection between increased tourist development and increased QoL. Adanan et al. (2010) 
discovered that tourism had both positive and negative impacts on residents perceived QoL. When 
tourism offered economic benefits to the community, the QoL increased. When tourism, on the 
other hand, resulted in e.g. an increase in cost of living, the QoL decreased. Related to the case of 
Greenland there is, however, little literature addressing the interrelation between tourism and QoL. 
Taking our point of departure in the existing literate investigating the link between tourism and 
QoL in Greenland, this article’s general understanding of the interrelation between tourism 
(including farm tourism) and QoL rests on the bottom-up spillover theory. We chose this specific 
theoretical approach due to a lack of academic literature and missing statistical data specifically 
focusing on QoL in connection with tourism in Greenland. Even though an extensive body on 
literature regarding tourism and its economic, social, cultural and environmental impacts exists, we 
deliberately chose to use an approach that has not been used to investigate the link between QoL 
and tourism in Greenland. The spillover theory offers us the possibility to investigate whether 
generated income from farm tourism in South Greenland can contribute to people’s state of 
wellbeing and if there is more to wellbeing than “just” money.  
The bottom-up spillover theory suggests that overall satisfaction of life prerequisites the 
satisfaction of different life domains and sub-domains (Diener, 1984). In other words, wellbeing 
is the outcome of the levels of wellbeing in various domains. The life domains and sub-domains 
are as Kim et al. (2013) characterizes: material wellbeing (e.g. income and cost of living), health 
and safety wellbeing (physical and mental health as well safety indicators such e.g. crime rates), 
community wellbeing (living conditions in the communities) and emotional wellbeing (e.g. cultural 
vitality, leisure time). The principle of the theory signifies that the set of life domains as well as 
each one of the sub-domains contribute to the overall satisfaction with life, meaning e.g., 
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dissatisfaction with income or with the community can “spill over” to the other domains and 
eventually have an impact on overall QoL (Diener, 1984; Kim et al., 2013). In this article, we apply 
the theory in connection to the concept of farm stay, as illustrated below:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Additionally, we apply the bottom-up spillover theory to our thematic focus by interconnecting it 
with the Arctic social indicators (Larsen & Fondahl, 2010) forming part of the theoretical frame 
of this article. The Arctic social indicators are marked in color, as illustrated beneath: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By interconnecting the bottom-up spillover theory with the Arctic social indicators, it becomes 
clear that a significant share of the Arctic social indicators are contained in a single life domain 
(emotional wellbeing). This underlines its importance within the frame of QoL research in the 
Arctic. Moreover, it displays our hypothesis of QoL being “more than money”.  
Finally, the theoretical approach to tourism is inspired by the concept of farm diversification 
forming the ground for farm stays as part of farm tourism. Farm diversification, the recombination 
of farm related resources with new and (for a traditional working farm) non-agricultural offers and 
 Material success, education 
 Health 
 Education 
 Cultural continuity, fate control, 
contact with nature 
Figure 5: Bottom-up spillover theory and QoL (own visualization based on Aref, 2011) 
Figure 6: Bottom-up spillover theory and the Arctic social indicators (own visualization based on Aref, 
2011) 
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services on the farm (Ilbery, 1991), leads to the establishment of farm stays (as part of farm tourism 
as such). Farm diversification is considered farm tourism when it is incorporated into a working 
farm and with the purpose of (primarily or secondarily) generating additional income through 
tourism offers (Mahoney, 2004, in Barbieri & Mahoney, 2009).  
Methodology 
In this article, we explore how the developing tourism industry in South Greenland interrelates 
with resident quality of life. Based on the scarceness of existing academic literature and public 
awareness within tourism and quality of life in Greenland, we investigate the relevance of the 
tourism industry, specifically farm tourism, effect on resident quality of life. Through a case study 
focusing on the concept of farm stays in South Greenlandic settlements, we aim to create an 
understanding of how resident quality of life and farm tourism interrelates.  
 Phronesis – An Exploratory Research Approach 
Phronetic research by Flyvbjerg (2001) is a research approach which produces “experience in context 
as the most appropriate means of generating knowledge that matches social priorities and can contribute to public 
debate” (in Thomas, 2012: 2). Accordingly, this specific research approach is exploratory in nature 
focusing on activities and practical knowledge in everyday life situations and thereby aims to 
explore current practice as well as historic circumstances in order to find ways to understand praxis 
(Dredge, 2011) and inform the discussions in Greenland. The farmers’ experiences and 
motivations to engage in farm tourism are presumably related to the awareness of the significance 
of tourism and its potential to contribute to their daily life.  
In consequence, this exploratory single, small-scale case study aims to generate knowledge and 
create an understanding of the interrelation of QoL and tourism. Therefore, we believe, that this 
article can contribute to the ongoing public debate to enlarging the perspective of and to creating 
grounds for tourism development that embraces economic as well as socio-economic dimensions. 
 Case Study Approach 
The case study approach used for this article is qualitative and was applied to get close to the 
‘object under study’ as such an approach “aims to develop understanding of the context in which phenomena 
and behaviors take place” (Altinay et al., 2008). Following, this article serves as exemplary for doing 
research in the field of QoL and its relation to the economic sectors in Greenland. We try to 
contest the prevalent perception towards development in Greenland focusing on economic growth 
and monetary wealth and aim to inspire a different debate on the significance of tourism as a 
contributor to the QoL of Greenlanders. This way, we aim to contribute a case study that might 
also be transferable to the investigation of other similar cases in the Arctic (Swanborn, 2010). We 
are aware of critics posing the question on how far findings of a single case study are applicable 
and generalizable to similar cases (Ryan & Bernard, 2000, in Kohlbacher, 2006: 22). Here we follow 
Flyvbjerg (2006), who emphasizes, that “one can often generalize on the basis of a single case, and the case 
study may be central to scientific development via generalization as supplement or alternative to other methods” (ibid: 
12). Therefore, the force of our single case studies should not be underestimated, as similar 
groundings could be found in the Arctic and it potentially can generate knowledge essential in the 
debate on achieving economic growth on socio-economic terms in Greenland.    
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Data Collection  
The case study application entails conducting in-depth investigations (Stake, 1995; Creswell, 2013) 
of qualitative and quantitative data material. The primary data collection of this article derives from 
three qualitative interviews conducted during a joint field trip in South Greenland in April 2018 as 
well as the quantitative online survey “Tourism in South Greenland – Farm Stays”. A collection 
of secondary data material found within the thematic frame of quality of life, tourism and farming 
is analyzed. The secondary data material consists of relevant publications, articles, reports, press 
releases and statements from both academic and non-academic sources.  
Qualitative Interviews 
In the context of this article, three semi-structured interviews from Narsarsuaq, and the nearby 
settlements are analyzed. It is important to state that the interviews were not conducted within the 
frame of this article, as they are each part of the author’s individual PhD projects. Even though 
the questions were not intentionally posed with the aim of unfolding the connection between 
tourism and QoL, the content and the following findings revealed such a link leading to the 
initiative to write this article in the first place. The interviewees, one local tourist operator and two 
residents working with tourism, were found via a convenience sampling. The residents are married 
to local farm keepers in settlements near Narsarsuaq and are the primary persons on the farms 
managing the farm stays. Both of them have more than one occupation and are pursuing other 
occupations besides activities related to the farm stays. The tourist operator interviewed is a local 
operator that has been active in the industry for more than 30 years and is involved with farm 
stays.  
Online Survey “Tourism in South Greenland – Farm Stays”  
To complement our qualitative interviews we created an online survey titled “Tourism in South 
Greenland – Farm Stays”5 to collect quantitative data about farm stay tourism and elements of 
quality of life. Complementing refers here to the fact that the interviews were not specifically 
conducted with focus on QoL in connection with tourism. The survey was created at a later stage 
(one month after the fieldwork) and served as a tool to enrichen existing knowledge and gain new 
insights. To make it more concrete, one question of the survey specifically asked if the respondent 
thinks that tourism enrichens his/her personal well-being. In the process of working on this article, 
the need to ask farmers such additional questions appeared and was met by creating the survey. 
We invited (by email as well as publication on social media platforms, e.g. the Facebook group 
“Greenland’s Tourism Outback”6) farm keepers to answer the survey from the beginning of April 
until the end of May 2018. Sixty per cent (6 respondents) of the present (10) farm stay owners 
completed the survey. The questions were categorized into basic data, such as location and year of 
establishment, and questions on personal opinions e.g. the development of their own business, 
motivation for starting farm stays, growth potential, challenges and barriers for the business and 
opinions on possible roles of tourism in their perspectives as farm owners.  
Exploring the Present - Interrelation between Quality of Life & Farm Tourism  
Findings in the online survey “Tourism in South Greenland – Farm Stays” indicate that farm 
owners in South Greenland are aware of the significance and potential of farm stays to their 
traditional farming activities. All of the respondents credit the motive of “developing their 
communities” as being one of the most crucial reasons for starting the farm stays. The results from 
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the online survey “Tourism in South Greenland – Farm Stays” show that farmers commenced to 
offer farm stays in order to generate further income. Additionally, in the interview with the farm 
keepers’ wife in Farm B, she expressed: “Ten years ago, we had more rain. The fields had water and grass, 
which is what we feed the sheep with during wintertime. Now we are having trouble feeding them, all the sheep 
farmers here experience this, because of the drought. That is why we began to think about getting involved with 
tourism. That way we do not have to change the lifestyle, we have become accustomed to on the sheep farm”. The 
changing climate affects, in other words, both positively and negatively, which supports the 
notions of Barbieri and Mahoney (2009). Linking it with the bottom-up spillover theory, the 
changing climate challenges the sustainability of the sheep farm, with the reduction in household 
resources (material wellbeing and safety wellbeing). However, it also provides an opportunity to 
combine their livelihood with tourism, which generates more income (material wellbeing) to help 
sustain the farm lifestyle. Following Getz and Carlsen (2000), farm tourism as the only source of 
a supplementary non-agricultural income to the existing farm is “not an end in themselves but a means 
to support a rural lifestyle” (Barbieri & Mahoney, 2009: 60). The farm keeper’s wife from Farm A 
supported this conception, when asked to describe what made her feel dissatisfied: “I feel so frustrated 
sometimes at our place. (…) We could use our time better if it was not so expensive to feed the sheep. We could use 
that money to develop our farm. Almost all of our money goes to feed the sheep. It’s like we’re being strangled. If I 
did not have my job on the side, it would be very difficult to live the way we do now”. This supports the 
aforementioned theoretical link between material wellbeing and QoL, and it leaves this analysis 
with the notion of sustaining a specific lifestyle through the livelihood, feeding into the discussion 
on the good life in relation to QoL. So far, we have taken a glance into the concept of QoL, 
including social indicators significant for QoL in Greenland.  Later we addressed how farm stays 
as an up-and-coming segment come into play in the Greenlandic tourism development. We have 
constituted its relevance and its need for awareness. The remaining question of whether the 
concept of farm stays contribute to resident QoL in more than monetary aspects, however still 
remains. 
The Effect of Farm Tourism on Quality of Life 
Literature on farm tourism refers to the potential of this type of tourism as a motor for economic 
development in order to face socio-economic challenges (Lobo et al., 1999; Barbieri & Mahoney, 
2009; Dernoi, 1983; Ilbery et al., 1998; Sharpley & Vass, 2006). Existing studies illustrate that 
significant changes for farmers (e.g. globalization leading to an increase of competition, more 
efficient cultivation systems, etc.) lead to major difficulties (Barbieri & Mahoney, 2009). Farm 
diversification, relating to the combination of farming and tourism, became increasingly popular 
in the light of these significant challenges for farmers. As stated by Barbieri and Mahoney (2009), 
“studies have demonstrated the economic value of farm diversification as one alternative strategy that farmers can 
utilize to survive and even prosper in today’s changing agriculture climate” (ibid: 58). However, even though 
tourism seems to be depicted in academia as this magic wand to nurture economic progress 
offering the door to economic and socio-economic benefits for the farm owners, questions arise 
on how it looks in South Greenland. As mentioned before, the three social indicators cultural 
continuity, contact with nature and fate control, as applied in SLiCA, are key to QoL studies in the 
Arctic, including the Greenlandic people. As part of the discussion, we assess if the data from our 
case study refer to these indicators. Albeit there is potential, farming as well as tourism currently 
play a minor role in the bigger picture of the economy of Greenland. The minor role of tourism 
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and farming might serve as explanation for their absence in existing QoL studies, like SLiCA, when 
putting a focus on Greenland.   
Analyzing the perspective in SLiCA, by examining the full questionnaire and connecting it to QoL 
aspects, it is clear that the focus on societal sectors effect on QoL mainly evolves around natural-
resource industries like hunting, fishing and oil/mineral extraction as well as public administration. 
Tourism is mentioned in a few places connected with job opportunities in e.g. Alaska (Poppel, 
2015); however, there are no apparent references to tourism in a QoL perspective in Greenland. 
The same applies for farming. The study addresses the importance of cultural activities, such as 
hunting, fishing and other nature-related activities like gathering and processing, however farming 
as such, is not included in simple terms. There are a few references to elements tracing into 
farming, such as the categories ‘harvesting’ and ‘growing crops’, however, it is unclear whether the 
findings represent leisure or business farmers. As it is now, farm tourism may play a minor role in 
the overall picture of both tourism and QoL in Greenland. Nevertheless, tourism in general plays 
an important role in developing communities in Greenland, as seen in e.g. Ilulissat.  
Studies from the newest entry from SLiCA show that in some cases, industrial growth can 
contribute to improving quality of life. A recently published article by Snyder and Poppel (2017) 
explores the living conditions in the settlement Qeqertarsuaatsiat, near Nuuk. As part of their 
research, they uncover how a nearby mine is 
affecting the living conditions in the adjacent 
community. The study shows, that “(…) living 
conditions in one settlement have improved regardless of 
the presence of a fully-operational mine.” (Snyder & 
Poppel, 2017). We are aware that occupations 
within mining and tourism cannot be directly 
compared, however, since Greenlandic people 
are not known to traditionally be a mining 
people, one could argue that the improved living 
conditions in Qeqertarsuaatsiat are a result of an 
increase of labor opportunities and income 
rather than the sole opportunity to work in a 
mine. With some reservation, it is thus not an 
unlikely thought that a similar increase in 
opportunities within the concept of farm stays 
and tourism in general will result in improved living conditions in South Greenland, as well as 
other places. Some indications supporting this hypothesis can be found in our analysis. As stated 
earlier by the farm keepers’ wife from Farm A, she could not sustain the lifestyle they have become 
accustomed to, without her job on the side. When asked about her overall satisfaction with life, 
she further elaborated the notion: “I want a job where I am in control and make the decisions. A job, where 
I am not so dependent upon others. I mean, of course we are dependent on the tourists, but where I can make the 
decisions on my own. I am a bit frustrated with the fact that I have yet to reach that goal, but all it takes is the 
courage to go and do it.”. The opportunity of working fully self-employed with farming, would in other 
words, improve her sense of QoL, thus indicating that fate control as an indicator contributes to 
resident QoL. When asked to describe QoL in her own words, the farm keeper’s wife from Farm 
A further answered: “Quality of life for me is to be self-employed, that I can take care of myself, that I can go 
Figure 7: The main street of Qassiarsuk where 
horses walk freely around. There are two farms in 
the settlement that offers stays for tourists. (Photo: 
Naja Carina Steenholdt) 
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out in nature and use the resources in nature”. This is on track with the answer from the farm keeper’s 
wife from Farm B that stated: “Quality of life is for me is having the sheep. To be able to make our own roast 
lamb. I think money controls a lot. Of course, you need money, but I feel that quality of life is to be close to nature.”. 
These perspectives illustrates the importance of farm tourism as a means to a self-sustaining 
lifestyle and the interrelation between the farm lifestyle and contact with nature, fate control as 
well as cultural vitality, which furthermore supports the findings in SLiCA. They also support the 
bottom-up spillover theoretical approach in terms of overall QoL being influenced by the QoL 
levels on different domains. Based on these perspectives, we argue, without discarding the 
importance of material wellbeing, that being able to sustain the farm lifestyle is thus more than 
generating an income; it contributes to the improvement of the residents’ QoL. 
Remarks & Reflections 
Our study suggests that there is a close interrelation between farm tourism and resident QoL in 
South Greenland. This is supported by our findings that showed, that  
a) Farm tourism provides the opportunity for a self-sustaining lifestyle,  
b) Farm tourism corresponds with residents’ needs, analyzed in terms of social indicators, 
such as cultural continuity, fate control and contact with nature and finally, thus contributing to 
overall QoL. 
These findings are illustrated in our model of the interrelation between farm tourism and resident 
quality of life, that serves to demonstrate how tourism, farming and QoL are connected in the case 
of the farm stays in South Greenland. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Model of interrelation between farm tourism and QoL in South Greenland 
 
We explain this model, by stating that when farming is connected with tourism there is an 
economic as well as socio-economic interrelation. The Arctic social indicators constitute the 
interrelation between farming and QoL. When we look at tourism in the optics of QoL we learn 
that it helps sustain the farm life. In the middle where all three segments meet, we find the 
aspiration, the point where interrelations contribute to positive results within tourism, farming as 
well as QoL.  
Interchangeably 
contributing to 
economic and socio-
economic means 
Sustaining farm life 
Constituting social indicators The aspiration 
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Furthermore, this exploratory case study situated within the tourism field as well as the studies of 
QoL offers a theoretical contribution by applying the bottom-up spillover theory. We ascertained 
that our study supports the bottom-up spillover theory in the sense that our qualitative interviews 
corresponded with the notion of overall QoL being influenced by the levels of well-being in 
different life-domains. Income and money were indeed important means to sustain the farm 
lifestyle and develop it further. However, we found that the emotional value of being close to 
nature and having some autonomy over one’s own fate were significant indicators and contributed 
to a higher sense of quality of life in our case study.  
As a final reflection, we argue that there are relevant grounds in a larger perspective for further 
research within the field of tourism and QoL in Greenland. Based on our analysis, we think it is 
safe to assume that the thousands of tourists coming in all over Greenland every year with cruise 
ships or visiting households for “cultural experiences” etc., have positive as well as negative 
impacts on resident QoL. 
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Notes 
1. The Government of Greenland. 
2. By example, Hertz (1995) addresses how fishing and mining affects living conditions in 
North Greenland, Poppel (2006; 2015) explore how subsistence economy deriving partly 
from hunting and fishing, affects the living conditions throughout Greenland. As a last 
example, Snyder & Poppel (2017) investigates living conditions in a settlement nearby a 
mine, and subsequently how mining affects the living conditions in the settlement.     
3. A unique Greenlandic tradition, where people serve coffee and homemade cakes and 
traditional food for family and friends and where everyone who are interested are invited. 
The custom politeness in a “kaffemik” is that you don’t stay for too long, but rather eat 
and drink at a reasonable pace and then leave the space for the next in line.  
4. The most Southern municipality out of the 5 municipalities in Greenland. 
5. Original title: ”Turisme i Syd Grønland - Bondegårdsferie” 
6. Original name: “Turismens Bagland I Grønland”, public group, initiated by a tourism actor 
in Greenland. 
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Navigating Governance Systems & Management 
Practices for Pleasure Craft Tourism in the Arctic  
 
Pierre-Louis Têtu, Jackie Dawson & Julia Olsen  
 
 
Pleasure craft are one of the fastest growing sectors of maritime transportation across the global Arctic and increasingly also in 
the Antarctic. The increase in interest among pleasure craft operators in traveling to polar regions presents a number of local 
economic development opportunities. However, current governance systems do not yet fully address the numerous safety, security 
and environmental concerns associated with developing this sector, which compounds an already precarious situation considering 
the remoteness and harshness of the polar environment. This study aimed to identify practices regarding the management and 
governance of pleasure craft in Arctic regions, including inventorying national, regional and local regulations. Using data from 
secondary sources, statistical information, and Coast Guard reports, this study discusses the diversity of management policies 
that exist throughout the Arctic that support and manage pleasure craft tourism, and concludes that harmonization of 
governance frameworks and improved reporting mechanisms among Arctic states could be beneficial.  
 
A Complex Set of Governance Systems & Management Mechanisms in the 
Arctic: Introduction 
Climate change is having disproportionately large impacts on the polar regions – including both 
biophysical changes and related socio-economic responses. For example, the reduction in the 
extent and thickness of sea ice has resulted in an increase in both industrial and private sector 
shipping and maritime transportation opportunities in the region (Melia et al, 2017). Increased 
access and open water season lengths in the Arctic bring both risks and opportunities. Quantitative 
assessments of Arctic shipping from 2011 to 2014 shows increasing activity, particularly for the 
Norwegian and Barents Seas (Eguiluz et al., 2016), but also around Svalbard and the western coast 
Arctic Yearbook 2018   
Têtu, Dawson & Olsen  
142 
of Greenland, and to a lesser extent through the Northwest Passage in Arctic Canada (Dawson et 
al., 2017b; Dawson et al., 2018).  
There are good records of commercial shipping for the entire Arctic region as well as a large 
foundation of literature and research focused on Arctic commercial and expedition cruise tourism.1 
However, there is very little information and only a limited number of studies focused on the 
trends, movements, and impacts of pleasure craft (i.e. private yachts) in the Arctic (Krakau & 
Herata, 2013; Johnston et al., 2017). More attention has been given to understanding pleasure craft 
movements and management in the Antarctic and insight from these studies (and others) can be 
used to establish a better understanding of potential challenges in the Arctic (see Johnston et al., 
2013). Furthermore, Orams (2010) underlines the fact that cruising yachts have the potential to 
produce similar environmental impacts as cruise ships, albeit on a smaller scale and therefore it is 
also useful to understand the impacts of these cruise vessels. Even still, the increase in private 
yacht tourism, requires focused management and research attention due to the unique range of 
potential impacts these vessels pose for the marine environment, biodiversity, safety, and security 
(Speckman et al., 2004; Keller et al., 2010; Bergmann & Klages, 2012). For example, pleasure craft 
can be a vector for the spread of invasive species, leading to biosecurity concerns (Hall & Wilson, 
2010) and they are more nimble than larger vessels and thus have the option to travel into unknown 
and more dangerous and uncharted areas. In extreme cases there are recorded concerns about 
cruise ships and pleasure craft engaging in surreptitious operations to map the sea floor and spy 
on military operations and infrastructures, importing illegal goods, or having involvement in 
human or other trafficking activities (IMO, 2018a; Johnston et al., 2017; Dawson et al., 2014). 
Local residents across the Arctic have commented on their increasing concern about these 
potential impacts of marine tourism and have revealed a number of undesirable behaviour among 
some pleasure craft operators including trading drugs for local Indigenous art, causing general 
community disruptions – such as using fireworks nearby communities, disrespecting Inuit burial 
grounds and cultural heritage sites - and being culturally disrespectful in general (Stewart et al., 
2012; Dawson et al., 2014). Compounding all of these concerns is the fact that pleasure craft are 
exempt from many of the regulatory mechanisms that are mandatory for larger ships meaning 
there are much less systematic data on smaller vessel movements and impacts as well as less 
oversight.  
The majority of larger expedition style cruise vessels that are currently engaged in marine tourism 
activities in the Arctic are already required to carry an Automatic Identification System (AIS), 
which is a worldwide vessel tracking system, and it is mandatory for them to report when entering 
various national maritime authorities. Smaller vessels such as fishing vessels and pleasure craft are 
types of vessels that fall below the size requirements of the mandatory regulation established by 
the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), and as such do not have the 
same level of traceability (Arctic Council, 2015). Another significant challenge associated with 
understanding the trends and impacts of pleasure craft is the fact that different jurisdictions and 
nations use dissimilar sampling, reporting protocols, and management approaches, which makes 
it difficult to estimate, compare, and understand traffic trends and implications (Johnston et al., 
2017; Fay & Karlsdottir, 2011). As such, there is a pressing need to understand the implications of 
the increase of pleasure craft tourism across the polar regions – including related risks and 
opportunities. The harmonization of Arctic shipping rules and regulations for pan-Arctic polar 
waters to ensure consistent regulations within all exclusive economic zones across the Arctic region 
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(Dawson et al., 2015; Fauchald, 2011) require the identification of various national regulations and 
the study of institutional governance structures and their interplay. This paper attempts to respond 
to this challenge and aims to identify the management and governance practices of pleasure craft 
by reviewing existing literature on the governance structures that exist to manage pleasure craft 
across the polar regions (when data is available) and especially in the Arctic in order to draw global 
comparisons and understanding. 
Governance, Institutional Structures and Legal Regimes  
There is a diverse set of management and legal regimes that collectively serve to govern shipping 
operations in the Arctic. These governance structures are administered by a diverse set of multi-
scale institutions that have been set up to serve specific purposes, including for example, building 
knowledge, strengthening norms, enhancing problem-solving capacity, or enforcing rule 
compliance (Stokke, 2012). As defined by Stokke (2012), “institutions are sets of rules, decision-
making procedures, and programmatic activities that serve to define social practices and to guide 
the interactions of those participating in these practices”. Two of the main international 
institutions involved in Arctic shipping governance (broadly defined) include: the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) and the Arctic Council. There are many other relevant international, 
national and regional institutions and the most relevant of these are discussed in this paper.  
The IMO works “… to protect ships and people aboard them, both seafarers and passengers, in 
the harsh environment of the waters surrounding the two poles” (IMO, 2018a). It is an institution 
that is further supported by a number of other non-governmental institutions that provide more 
specific guidance on how to fulfill international standards and that determine if requirements are 
fulfilled (Fauchald, 2011). The IMO institution serves in large part to build knowledge and to 
establish and suggest options for enforcing rule compliance. For example, the IMO was 
instrumental in the development of the Polar Code and has now adopted this international code 
for ships operating in polar waters making it mandatory under both the International Convention 
for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) (IMO 2018b). The Polar Code officially entered into force on 1 
January 2017.  
The Arctic Council is a “high level intergovernmental forum to provide a means of promoting 
cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic states” (Arctic Council, 2015). 
Throughout most of the post cold-war period, there were few international regimes across the 
east-west divide in the Arctic region: relations were marked by the strategic sensitivity of the region. 
The initiative launched by Gorbachev in 1987 – the Glasnost and the Perestroïka - for broader 
collaboration and opening with the West– led to the implementation of the creation of the Arctic 
Council by the Ottawa Declaration ratified by eight states in 1996. In addition to several 
transnational associations of Arctic Indigenous peoples that have gained status as Permanent 
Participants, Switzerland (2017), China, Italy, Japan, India, Singapore and Korea (2013) joined 
other non-Arctic States approved as Observers such as Spain (2006), France (2000), Germany, 
Poland, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands (1998). Unlike the IMO, the Arctic Council 
mainly serves to build knowledge and to enhance problem solving capacity (again see Stokke, 
2012). The Arctic Council has only eight official and full member states and lacks the ability to 
enforce legally binding rules (Stokke, 2012: 16). However, the institution is particularly well suited 
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to produce knowledge relevant to Arctic shipping that is credible, legitimate, and salient and is 
thus still very capable of triggering political action and influencing formal governance structures.  
International Frameworks 
Various terms exist internationally to describe pleasure craft, including yachts, recreational vessels, 
small boats etc., but there is no uniform or single definition among Arctic states for these vessels. 
However, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) does specify that the category of 
‘pleasure craft’ broadly defined are not subject to the International Convention for the Safety of 
Life at Sea (SOLAS) and they do not routinely engage in commercial activities such as carrying 
cargo or passengers for hire. The term pleasure craft is missing in the IMO Convention on the 
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Seas (COLREGs, 1972). Instead, the 
Organization developed non-mandatory guidelines on security aspects of the operation of vessels, 
such as pleasure craft, in order to ensure some coverage for vessels that do not fall within the 
scope of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code 
(2008).  
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), one of the 
most important international marine environmental conventions, was designed to minimize 
pollution from ships at sea, including from dumping, oil and exhaust emissions. All ships flagged 
under countries that are signatories to MARPOL are subject to its requirements. However, in 
terms of pleasure craft, MARPOL does not often apply considering are most vessels are under 
400 Gross Tons (GT) and carry less than 15 persons. Annexe 1 states that yachts having a gross 
tonnage equal to or over 400 GT and are engaged in an international voyage must provide an 
International Oil Pollution Prevention Certificate. Annexe IV, which deals with sewage, is also 
only applicable to yachts with a gross tonnage equal to or over 400GT or carrying more than 15 
people. In 2010, Annexe I was amended to ensure that any yacht or pleasure craft with a fuel tank 
capacity exceeding 30 cubic metres must be protected by a double hull (see Annexe 1 of Lasserre 
& Têtu (2015) for a synthesis) to prevent accidental spillage in case of collision or grounding.  
The idea of creating a Polar Code (IMO 2018) dates back to the Exxon Valdez oil spill on the 
coasts of Alaska in March 1989 (Berlanga, 2017). With the 2018 IMO led implementation of the 
international polar code regime, management of global commercial shipping in the Arctic within 
a framework of ocean conservancy became the central objective. However, not all ships travelling 
in the Arctic are subject to all provisions of the Polar Code. Vessels that are not subject to SOLAS 
(fishing vessels, cargo ships of less than 500 GT (SOLAS, 1974), warships, pleasure yachts, ships 
not propelled by mechanical means and wooden ships of primitive build) all do not have to adhere 
to the core Part 1-A on Safety Provision of the Polar Code (IMO, 2018a). The Polar Code however 
has recommended that in the Arctic, the vessel’s crew should include at least one ice navigator 
with documented evidence of having completed an ice navigational training program (O’Rourke, 
2014).   
Industry Association Initiatives 
The Association of Expedition Cruise Operators (AECO) is an example of industry associations 
that has implemented environmental management on a voluntary basis to ensure safe tourism in 
what we refer to as the Euro-Russian Arctic and to a lesser extent in Arctic Canada. AECO 
members voluntarily agree to respect the guidelines issued by the association, but those guidelines 
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typically apply to shore locations rather than regulations concerning marine activity, which in 
Svalbard is under the responsibility of both the Governor of Svalbard and the Norwegian Maritime 
Authority (NMA) and in Canada is under the responsibility of the federal, territorial or Indigenous 
led governments. Recognizing the urgency of developing pleasure craft guidelines, AECO 
established a Yacht Working Committee in 2016 to look at the possible establishment of yacht (i.e. 
pleasure craft) guidelines. In Antarctica, the International Association of Antarctica Tour 
Operators (IAATO) plays a similar role to AECO and has led previous efforts to improve 
regulations of private and non-IAATO-members yachts with some success. In Svalbard, there is a 
clear need to continue this focus on yacht/pleasure craft voluntary or guidelines- based 
management considering the rapid increase in traffic. In Canada, where the increase has indeed 
been rapid, the numbers still remain small and thus it is less urgent in this region comparatively. 
However, it should be remembered that the risk and related consequences of a major pleasure 
craft accident are much higher in the Canada considering it is more remote and has less 
infrastructure and services. In general, the development of specific guidelines or management 
regimes for pleasure craft operation in the Arctic is needed to avoid development without the 
strategic benefit of an adequate mandatory system (Orams, 2010). Lessons from Antarctica can be 
applied in the Arctic and should be overseen in large part by industry associations. 
National Frameworks and Initiatives 
In Svalbard, the Spitsbergen Treaty provides the legal framework for maritime areas (Anderson, 
2007).  Article 2 and 3 of the Spitsbergen Treaty make explicit reference to the territorial sea where 
the Norwegian Marine Authority (NMA) ensures safety of navigation from 4 to 12 nautical miles 
(nm), and in the waters beyond to the outer limit of the Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) (200 
nm) of Svalbard. Section 7 of the 2017 amended regulations No. 1400 of 2009 (NMA, 2017) 
contains provisions on the operation of vessels carrying 12 passengers or less and without a 
superstructure set Operating Limitations2 within 12 nm of Svalbard (See Table 1 for a list of acts 
and regulations). Those small vessels must limit their activities in the territorial sea (12 nm) 
whenever they have or not a superstructure. Despite this regulation, it seems that there is a high 
level of pleasure craft involved in accidents, violating site visitation rules, and generally being 
unaware of risks of navigation in the Arctic waters (NCA, 2015). The Svalbard Environmental 
Protection Act (2002) amended in 2012 stipulates as a fundamental principle that “all access and 
passage in Svalbard shall take place in a way that does not harm, pollute or in any other way damage 
the natural environment or cultural heritage. Moreover, it should not result in unnecessary 
disturbance to humans or animals” noting that the area of its application extends to 12 nm from 
the coast. To limit the possibility of negative consequences, a number of local regulations and 
guidelines were developed for visitors (The Governor of Svalbard/Sysselmannen 2016: 69). 
“Safety precautions must be top priority when travelling in Svalbard” (ibid.) especially outside 
Management Area 10 (Isfjorden area) where planned trips will be evaluated on the need for 
insurance/bank guarantee to cover the cost of search and rescue operations and patient 
transportation should the need arise. A registration card is also mandatory. As such, all private 
boat operators travelling to Svalbard must “comply with the notification and SAR-insurance 
requirements” (ibid). Moreover, they are obligated to learn about local “regulations, particularly 
those dealing with environmental and safety precautions” (ibid).  
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Table 1. List of National Level management acts and regulations addressing Pleasure Craft in the Arctic 
Area of application Act Regulations Typology of Pleasure craft Authority 
All Canadian Waters 
for all vessels* 
Canada 
Shipping Act 
(2001) 
 
Small Vessel 
Regulations 
(2010) 
Pleasure Craft Transport 
Canada, 
Canadian 
Coast 
Guard 
Passenger carrying not more than 15 GT and ≥ 12 passenger 
Workboat ≥ 15 GT 
Human-powered vessel other than a pleasure craft 
Not more than 6m; more than 6m but not more than 9m; more 
than 9, not more than 12; more than 12 but less than 24m; 
23m or more 
NORDREG Area 
(Arctic) (EEZ, 0-200 
nm) 
Canada 
Shipping Act 
(2001) 
NORDREG 
Typology 
Pleasure  Craft/adventurers Canadian 
Coast 
Guard 
Greenland’s Water (0-3 
nm); Danish Waters 
(3-200 nm),  
Order on safety with recreational 
craft 1687 (2016); 
New and existing recreational craft with a hull length > 24m;  Danish 
Maritime 
Authority Recreational craft with hull length < 24m (built before 2004) 
Order for Greenland on safe 
navigation (1697) (2015) 
Cargo ships of more than 150 Gross Tons and  ships with 12 
passenger or more 
Technical 
Regulation 
no. 10 on 
small vessels 
carryings ≥ 
Regulation 9 – 
Radio 
equipment; 
Regulation 10 – 
Measure to 
prevent pollution 
12 passenger or less, Length > 15 meters and scantling 
numbers > 100 
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12 passengers 
(2003) 
Svalbard’s water (0-12 
nm); Norwegian Waters 
(4-200 nm) 
Ship Safety 
and Security 
Act (2007) 
 Vessel carrying 12 passengers or less 
  
Norwegian 
Maritime 
Authority 
Russian Waters CU TR 
026/2012 
"Safety of 
small-boats" 
(2012) 
 Vessels carrying 12 passengers or less, non-commercial 
purposes, and designed for recreation 
Russian 
Ministry of 
Emergency 
Situations 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Several pleasure crafts berth in a port of Longyearbyen, Svalbard. In background: the expedition 
vessel MS Fram owned by Hurtigruten. August 2017 
 
Source: Julia Olsen 
The implementation of regulations dealing with environmental and safety precautions is something 
that is also observed in the Canadian Arctic (Johnston et al., 2017). Under the Canada Shipping 
Act, 2001 (S.C. 2001, c.26) every vessel of 300 gross tons or more must report to the Northern 
Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone (NORDREG), a system of management of shipping in the 
Arctic and administered by the Canadian Coast Guard’s Marine Communications and Traffic 
Services (MCTS) when entering or leaving Canadian Arctic waters. In addition, vessels carrying 
more than 453 cubic metres of fuel are also required to notify the relevant authorities. However, 
pleasure craft, along with fishing vessels, tugboats, research vessels and other vessels, are not 
required to report to authorities. These categories of vessels are also not currently required to carry 
equipment that automatically tracks their movement, but a recommendation has been made by the 
Arctic Council to make carriage of AIS transponders by all tourism vessels in the Arctic mandatory 
(see Arctic Council, 2015). According to the Office of the Auditor General of Canada (VOA), the 
paucity of information on local weather conditions and the lack of mandatory reporting 
requirements for pleasure craft in the NORDREG area pose significant environmental risks 
relative to the enforcement mandate of the system (VOA, 2014). Most pleasure craft operators are 
aware of the risks posed by these challenges and according to Johnston et al (2017) the majority 
of operating pleasure craft report to the Canadian Coast Guard MCTS voluntarily because of the 
related benefits including access to ice and weather information and improved safety protocols. 
In Canada, Transport Canada sets minimum requirements for pleasure craft and non-pleasure 
vessels. One program of particular relevance is the Office of Boating Safety (OBS), which helps 
educate boaters about these requirements with the help of tools such as guides for various areas, 
but no including the Arctic waters of the Northwest Territories and Nunavut. In the Canadian 
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Arctic (Northwest Territories and Nunavut), just like in Yukon as well as southern waterways, 
various safety organizations are working together such as the Canadian Safe Boating Council, the 
Canadian Red Cross and other agencies with prevention-based programs to reduce risks and 
environmental impacts of boating such as the National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces, 
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, etc. The harsh conditions and the vastness of the Canadian 
Arctic Archipelago is however an important constraint for search and rescue missions.  
Figure 2. The SV ‘Fine Tolerance’ in Cambridge Bay, Canada 
 
Source: Jackie Dawson/Emma Stewart 
At the national scale, The Canada Shipping Act stipulates that in Canada a pleasure craft is defined 
as a vessel used for pleasure, holidays or daily life (Transport Canada, 2018). The Canada Shipping 
Act on Small Vessel Regulations (SOR/2010-91) states that pleasure craft respecting the safety 
equipment requirements of another country is not captured by Part 2 of the Act on the Safety 
Equipment for Pleasure Craft. However, the Small Vessels Regulations does not apply to pleasure 
craft in the NORDREG Area, but provides guidance on defining a pleasure craft (see Table 2 for 
a list of pleasure craft by length of hulls). For example, a rented charter vessel is a commercial 
vessel if the master is the owner or someone provided by the owner, or if it is used other than for 
pleasure (Transport Canada, 2018). Moreover, if an individual rents or charters a vessel without 
crew and either hires a master or operates it oneself, it is a pleasure craft only so long as it is used 
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solely for the purpose of pleasure, hunting, fishing, food harvesting, or for other daily living needs 
(Ministry of Justice of Canada, 2001).   
Table 2. List of 204 pleasure craft sailing in the Canadian Arctic waters (1990-2015), based on length of 
hulls 
Length (m) Number of Pleasure Craft % of Total Pleasure Craft 
1-5 3 1,47 
6-10 19 9,31 
11-15 100 49,02 
16-20 27 13,24 
21-25 15 7,35 
26-30 5 2,45 
31-40 6 2,94 
41-50 10 4,90 
51-60 4 1,96 
61 or more 7 3,43 
No data 8 3,92 
Total 204 100 
Source: CCG 2018 
On the St Lawrence Seaway, a popular boating region in southern Canada, a guide for pleasure 
craft is available for those vessels that are equal to or more than 317.5 tons of displacement. Vessels 
less than 6 metres (20 feet) or less than one ton are not authorized to navigate the seaway.  
However, in all Canadian waters, every pleasure craft less than 12 metres in length and with a 
motor over 10 horsepower must be licenced through a free registration process and can be 
transferred to future owners. Transport Canada’s newly drafted Canadian Guidelines for Passenger 
vessels operating in the Canadian Arctic make a distinction between pleasure craft and non-
pleasure craft, but also states in section 1.3.4 that vessels such as pleasure craft are exempt from 
the environmental impact screening process (Transport Canada, 2017).    
Similar to Canada and Norway, Greenland has a higher provision for maritime safety than is set 
out within the IMO’s Polar Code. In Danish and Greenlandic waters, the Act on Safety at Sea 
(2002) sets administrative provisions relating to recreational crafts, but does not apply to the Faroe 
Islands and Greenland, according to section 36. Technical regulations on radio equipment and 
other measures to prevent pollution by small vessels carrying no more than 12 passengers were 
issued in 2003. Nearly two years after the Danish Act on Safety at Sea (2002) was put into force, a 
Danish royal decree (2004) amending the Land Regulations for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of Greenland gave Nuuk full jurisdiction over the marine area up 3 nm from 
baseline. “This means the Greenlandic territorial sea consisting of inland waters on the landing 
side of the baseline of the territorial sea and the waters up to the outer boundary of the territorial 
sea. This is the line which at any point is at distance from the nearest point on the baseline 
corresponding to the latitude of the sea rhythm” (Department of Law and Justice of Greenland, 
2004: Ch.1, par. 2). As stated on its website, the Government of Greenland is working on updating 
the regulations to enhance the protection of oceans to international standards. Danish maritime 
authorities have responsibilities for waters beyond 3 nm to 200 nm. 
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Figure 3. The increasingly diverse pleasure craft vessels in the Canadian Arctic increase challenges for 
coastal communities 
 
Source: National Aerial Surveillance Program (NASP), Government of Canada 
The transfer of jurisdictional authority by Copenhagen to Nuuk shares similitudes with the 
Principles in Law contained in both article 211 and 234 of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (Beckman et al., 2017). The Article 211 on pollution from vessels 
emphasize the need to harmonize policy and adopt laws and regulation for the prevention, 
reduction and control of marine pollution from foreign vessels exercising their right of innocent 
passage (UNCLOS, 1982, Section XII). Article 234 (Idem, Section 8) also stipulates that on ice-
covered areas stipulates that coastal states have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory 
laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution that could cause 
major harm or disturbance of the ecological balance. However, “such Laws and regulations shall 
have due regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine environment 
based on the best available scientific evidence” (UNCLOS, 1982, Section XII). However, this 
argument has not been used by Copenhagen vis à vis Greenland just like Norway did around 
Svalbard; Oslo could have used this argument to reinforce maritime protection and safety around 
Svalbard waters by arguing that these areas are “ice-covered” in the sense of article 234 of 
UNCLOS (Fauchald, n.d.). Just like Canada and other states, Norway has the “right to adopt and 
enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention of marine pollution” within 
the territorial sea, as long as such standards do not hamper the right of innocent passage 
(UNCLOS, art. 17-21). However, states must respect the ‘freedom of navigation’ (Fauchald, 2011). 
While Norway could pass legislation that would only allow ships fulfilling certain standards into 
its ports or internal waters, such rules would not prevent ships that do not fulfill such requirements 
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from sailing in the territorial sea or the EEZ. On the Polar Code and guidelines, they cannot be 
regarded as any authoritative delimitation of the geographical scope of application of article 234 
and constitute an evidence of states practicing an opio juris concerning the minimum extension of 
ice-covered areas (art. 31(3)(C) of Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties (ibid). Furthermore, 
Canada and Russia have adopted standards on vessel discharges and design construction 
equipment stricter than those agreed in regulations of the IMO.  
In 2015, the Danish Maritime Authorities issued an order for Greenland on safe navigation (2015). 
The main purposes were to enhance safe navigation in Greenlandic waters, covering four types of 
vessels: 1) Cargo ships of more than 150 GT and ships carrying 12 passengers or more; 2) ships 
carrying more than 250 passengers; 3) all kind of foreign ships; and 4) ships of war, troopships and 
naval auxiliaries like other state-owned ships. Sections 7 and 13 of the order for Greenland on safe 
navigation are particularly relevant in the field of marine safety where the former underlines that 
ships shall have at least one person on board with the necessary competencies in ice-covered waters 
and documented relevant person’s local knowledge of the waters to be navigated (Idem, Section 
7). Section 13 states that the ship shall have an ice class corresponding, as a minimum, to the ice 
that it is navigating, but is much stricter when it comes to ships in the northern navigation zone 
of Greenland. Within this zone, it has stated that the ship shall have a minimum ice class 1C or 
equivalent ice class. In this regard, the Crystal Serenity, a cruise ship with a 1D-classification 
equivalent in the Baltic System that crossed the Northwest Passage in 2016 and 2017, wouldn’t 
have been allowed in Greenland’s waters, as illustrated by several Russians and French cruise ships 
with the same classification in coastal areas of Arctic Canada since 1990.  
Data on the pleasure craft sailing along the coastline of Greenland is absent but there has been a 
large portion of pleasure craft or adventurers sailing in the Canadian Arctic since 1990 who 
wouldn’t have been allowed to visit Greenland internal waters following these regulations. Finally 
and not the least importantly, Order 1687 issued by the Danish Maritime Authority in December 
2016 regarding safety when operating recreational vessels addressed the category of smaller 
recreational craft with a length below 24 meters. A powerboat license confirming basic skills may 
be required depending on the hull length or power output of certain engine-drive pleasure craft.  
In Russian Arctic waters, many foreigners need a visa to enter the Russian Federation. However, 
there are very few English speakers in Russian Arctic ports and most of the regulations are in 
Russian (Pashkevich et al., 2015). As explained by Pashkevich, there is no central authority in 
Russia to govern the growth marine tourism industry nor specific cruise or yacht management 
plans or guidelines except those on Franz Josef Land. In the frame of the Eurasian Customs Union 
Commission (2012) between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, a Russian Federal Law came into 
force and changed the legislative acts of the Russian Federation relating to the definition of the 
term ‘small-sized vessel’” (Eurasian Customs Union Commission, 2012; Solski, 2013; Gutsulyak, 
2017). The law of the Eurasian economic commission on safety of small-size vessel (pleasure 
vessels) of 2012 introduced the notion of a pleasure craft, defined as a vessel with a total number 
of not more than 12 people, used for non-commercial purposes, and designed for recreation on 
water objects. 
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A Decentralized Regulation Process among Arctic States but Not Less 
Efficient: Discussion 
The longer shipping seasons in the Arctic as well as increased access to Arctic waters bring both 
risks and opportunities and there are growing concerns regarding management of pleasure craft 
sailing in the Arctic. Given the range of potential socio-ecological impacts on marine environments 
and biodiversity that those pleasure craft could have, the aim of this paper was to review 
governance systems in Canada and to some extent in other polar and non-polar regions, in order 
to provide a global picture of an emerging and less studied challenge area and to identify areas for 
future research. Here we provide some comparative insights regarding the governance of pleasure 
craft across the Arctic and make some suggestions for potential research and policy needs.   
Shipping is a global industry and despite complementarity between the IMO and the Arctic 
Council, the shipping and marine transport industry and relevant industry associations therefore 
typically prefer any region-specific rules to be hammered out within the IMO where their 
participation is well established. They also prefer to avoid spatially fragmented regulations or 
dealing with complementary or harmonized environmental protection regulations. In this regard, 
there was very little chance that the Arctic Council would emerge as the leader in the provision 
and implementation of a mandatory Polar Code. A mandatory Polar Code led by the Arctic 
Council would have touched underlying geopolitical controversies over coastal states’ jurisdiction 
in Arctic waters. Moreover, the Polar Code seems to be much less stringent than Canadian 
regulations. In sum, the IMO seems to be the most suitable institutional body to implement a 
harmonized Polar Code for pleasure craft as underlined by Stokke (2012). A dual & 
complementary action by the United Nations IMO and the Arctic Council would be to enhance 
the strength of regulations, but the IMO is much more recognized at the world level which would 
have an impact on its authority to implement mandatory regulations. It can be argued that the 
adoption of a Polar Code does not affect the freedom of states to adopt measures in accordance 
with article 234. If the Polar Code were set up as a treaty, it would have been binding for the states 
that accept it and they would not have the right to invoke article 234 as a basis for regulatory 
jurisdiction. 
The implementation of the Polar Code adds a new set of regulations for certain types of shipping 
across all polar regions, and is a promising initiative to deal with national data and management 
differences; but as of yet the Code does not specifically comment on or regulate smaller private 
tourism vessels such as pleasure craft. At the national level of Arctic states, there are some 
regulations covering different descriptions of what we usually use as ‘pleasure craft’ based on 
NORDREG’s terminology in Canada but there are significant variations amongst each regime.  
Canadian regulations applying to Canadian waters could provide a useful management system and 
typology, but currently do not apply to the waters of Nunavut and the Northwest Territories, and 
the NORDREG recording system is not mandatory for pleasure craft.  
There is certainly a need for further discussion on what should be a pleasure craft and what should 
not, but in terms of monitoring, a large proportion of pleasure craft seem to report to NORDREG 
for the access to real-time information on sea ice, meteorological conditions, etc. Based on various 
datasets and auxiliary data from Environment Canada, there is a high possibility that there are in 
fact many more pleasure craft traversing the Canadian Arctic than statistical information reveals. 
The lack of traceability of a vessel not carrying an AIS transponder such as pleasure craft and 
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fishing vessels and the more private dimension of voyages organized by billionaires or mega-yacht 
owners are amongst some of the reasons.  
The regulations established by the Danish Authority in partnership with Greenland’s government 
and the Norwegian Authority regarding Svalbard are two good examples of how the precautionary 
safety principle has been integrated as a core principle in the management of marine and coastal 
environments. In both cases, the governments of Greenland and Svalbard are responsible for their 
coastal environments from the baseline to 3 and 4 nm from the shore respectively. The 
precautionary principle is a widely accepted general principle in environmental management that 
provides action to avoid environmental damage in advance of scientific certainty of damage, 
sometimes resulting in regulation forbidding human activities (Hagen et al., 2012).  
Of importance to note is Danish Authority’s 2003 Technical Regulation no. 10 on small vessels 
carrying 12 passengers or less, particularly the regulations providing measures to prevent pollution 
and regulation on the necessary radio equipment required. Regarding the type of vessels the 
regulations covers, (12 passenger or less, with a hull length of less than 15 meters), Arctic states 
could adopt these regulations on radio equipment and measures to prevent pollution such as the 
dumping of garbage and wastewater. The Order for Greenland on safe navigation of 2015, which 
applies to vessels of more than 150 gross tons and ships with 12 or more passengers, ensures that 
all vessels sailings in the northern navigation zone of Greenland must be classified at least as an 
ice-strengthened hull of category 1C.  
These regulations differ from other jurisdictions, such as in Svalbard where the Governor of 
Svalbard implemented a fee system and regulation limiting as much as possible the activities of 
vessels with 12 or less passengers without a superstructure in the territorial sea. Additionally, and 
in collaboration with the AECO, the Governor of Svalbard for the cruise industry has already 
created guidelines, and the AECO is in the process of developing guidelines for pleasure craft, but 
this applies to lands and not seas.  
Some regions of Svalbard also require pleasure craft to carry special insurance for SAR 
emergencies. Safety precautions are a top priority for the Svalbard government, especially outside 
the main Management Area 10 (Isfjorden area), and indeed seem to be a top priority for most 
governments, although approaches to safety precautions differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. A 
similar system fee and anchorage free as it is now could be interesting for coastal communities in 
Arctic Canada. The need to address the fiscal aspects of managing the cruise industry and pleasure 
craft tourism in order to present a common voice to federal partners is at the core of the 
Government of Nunavut 2016-2019 Marine Tourism Management Plan.   
Finally, in Antarctica, governance of pleasure craft is even stricter, as there is a distinction between 
IAATO members and private yachts, with the latter highly encouraged to join the IAATO. A 
pleasure craft sailing in Antarctica with more than 12 passengers is automatically classified as an 
expedition vessel making landings, and as such could be required to provide a dockside observer 
scheme, highly encouraged to carry an IAATO observer on board, provide all planned Antarctic 
itineraries, and comply with all IAATO by-laws, objectives and standard operating procedures. 
Arctic regions should pay careful attention to lessons learned and to established governance 
(formal and informal) that exist in Antarctica where pleasure craft are already operating to a greater 
extent. 
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A major challenge is certainly the fact that different jurisdictions and nations use significantly 
different definitions, methods of sampling, reporting protocols, and management legislation. It 
could pose a problem for a crew circumnavigating the Arctic and not willingly committing illegal 
acts or not possessing required permits. Without interfering with the sovereign jurisdictions of 
nation states, there is certainly a need for more centralized information for pleasure craft on best 
practices for various sites and communities of the Arctic, especially in the Canadian Arctic. 
International mechanisms such as UNCLOS also exist and are managed by the Government of 
Greenland. Given Canada’s position that the Northwest Passage constitutes internal waters, 
invoking section 7 and 13 of the UNCLOS could potentially increase the safety in the waters 
surrounding the Canadian archipelago. Canadian Rangers or any relevant local or regional body 
could be an important tool for ensuring local safety and security throughout light and rapid water 
patrols.  
In sum, the melting of sea ice in the Arctic increase opportunities for shipping activities but also 
increase risks and challenges associated with understanding the impacts of pleasure craft in 
different jurisdictions using dissimilar reporting approaches. Shipping across the Arctic region 
requires sailing through various national regulations monitored by different institutional 
governance structures that interplay with each other’s. By identifying the management and 
governance practices that exist to manage pleasure craft across the polar regions, this paper has 
attempted to respond to this challenge to draw global pan-Arctic comparisons and understandings. 
More research will be needed to understand behaviors, motives and their impacts on communities 
and shore locations. Exploring the possibility of introducing stricter Arctic safety equipment 
provisions for recreational boaters is an approach that deserves more research. As we have seen 
in recent years, drifting pack ice in the Canadian Arctic is a major safety and security challenge for 
Arctic ship owners and mariners.  
 
Notes 
1. See, among others, Maher, 2010; Dawson et al. 2014; Maher et al. 2014; Pizzolato et al. 
2014; Viken, 2014; Lamers & Pashkevich, 2015; Lasserre and Têtu, 2015; Shirokiy, 2015; 
Borch et al. 2016; Lasserre et al. 2016; Pizzolato et al. 2016; Bystrowska & Dawson, 2017; 
Bystrowska & Dolnicki, 2017; Bystrowska et al. 2017; Huijbens & Lamers, 2017; Johnston 
et al. 2017; Lamers et al. 2017; Stewart et al. 2017; Têtu, 2018; Dawson et al. 2017a; 2018.  
2. A superstructure is an extended construction of any building or platform that rises above 
the rest of the building or platform in a distinct manner. 
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in Yukon Territory, Canada 
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Northern ‘capacity’ has long been identified as a priority area for public policy in Canada and recognized as a major constraint 
to regional social and economic development. The concepts of capacity and sustainability often meet in impact assessment (IA) 
processes in Canada, which include environmental, social and economic aspects of development and where there has been an 
important evolution in the role of both communities and science in the process. In Yukon, the Yukon Environmental and 
Socio-Economic Assessment Board (YESAB) is the legislated mechanism for impact assessments. The establishment of 
YESAB provided sites for the inclusion of local perspectives and traditional knowledge in assessments; however, calls for 
enhanced northern research capacity to inform impact assessment and associated decision-making remain prominent. This paper 
explores the concept of ‘capacity’ in its various forms and considers its core relevance to ensuring effective IA processes associated 
with northern development. Through a literature review, we identify that ambiguity surrounding the concept of capacity requires 
careful policy attention to fully appreciate conditions that prompt appeals for increased northern research capacity and help 
minimize confusion amongst different actors and institutions working to build northern capacity. 
 
Introduction 
The term ‘capacity’ is commonly identified as central to sustainable natural resource management 
and socio-economic development (Kolhoff, Driessen & Runhaar, 2018; Konovalova, Kuzmina, 
Hansevyarov & Persteneva, 2016). In Canada, capacity has been formally acknowledged as an 
important factor in northern development since at least the 1970s (Buckler, Wright & Normand, 
2009; de la Barre, 1979; Science Council of Canada, 1977). However, the concept of capacity tends 
to be ambiguous in practice, despite attempts to develop coherent definitions and identify 
common characteristics across disciplines (Brinkerhoff & Morgan, 2010; Condell & Begley, 2007; 
Simmons, Reynolds & Swinburn, 2011). This literature review seeks to unpack the concept of 
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‘capacity,’ and in particular ‘research capacity’ – on its own and as it relates to ‘community capacity’ 
and ‘governance capacity’ -- in northern Canada using the case of Impact Assessment (IA) in 
Yukon Territory. It begins by outlining the broad connections between scholarship on capacity, 
IA and sustainable natural resource management in Canada, the northern territories, and Yukon; 
focuses on how capacity is conceptualized in key disciplines; and concludes with a discussion of 
future directions. 
Impact Assessment and Sustainability in Canada 
The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) first initiated the practice of Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) in 1970 as a “...decision tool employed to identify and evaluate the 
probable environmental consequences of certain proposed development actions,” (Cashmore, 
2004: 404). In Canada, the Environmental Assessment Review Process (EARP) was put in place 
in 1972 to establish the federal position on environmental impact assessment (Gibson, 2000; 
Noble, 2009).  The importance of considering the socio-economic aspects of development in the 
IA process very quickly came to the fore with the Berger Inquiry in 1977, completed as part of the 
impact assessment of the Mackenzie Delta Pipeline (Berger, 1977; Burdge, 2002; Gamble, 1978). 
Similar discussions occurred in James Bay, northern Quebec, around the same time (Berkes, 1988). 
The EARP continued as a Guideline Order after 1984, until the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Act (CEAA) passed into legislation in 1992. This legislation harmonized the federal 
and provincial systems (to varying degrees) and facilitated impact assessment at regional levels 
(Gibson, 2000; Herring, 2005; Hickey, Brunet & Allan, 2010; Noble, 2009). The recognized need 
to incorporate local, regional and traditional knowledge in Canadian IA processes (Paci, Tobin & 
Robb, 2002; Sallenave, 1994; Stevenson, 1996) led to the adoption of more participatory and 
inclusive approaches (Burdge, 2002; Joyce & MacFarlane, 2001) and the inclusion of social impact 
assessments in larger processes as standard practice (Morgan, 2012).   
Importantly, local capacity has become a recurring challenge identified in the transition towards 
more participatory and localized IA and sustainable development (Nuttall, 2002).  Shifting 
accountability for IA processes to regional and local contexts was meant as a mechanism for 
encouraging regional development through providing more local control over development 
projects (Angell & Parkins, 2011; Arctic Council, 2004; Armitage, 2005; Huskey & Southcott, 
2016). Concurrently, the shift away from ‘minimal damage’ towards ‘maximum desirable net gains’ 
requires project proponents to more explicitly consider local sustainability in their permit 
applications (Gibson, 2000). To a large extent, requiring community participation in the IA process 
has contributed to the popularity of local approaches to natural resource management in the 
circumpolar North, such as co-management agreements (Barker, 2005; Ellis, 2005; Gibson, 2000; 
Joyce & MacFarlane, 2001; Robards & Lovecraft, 2010). However, barriers to the quality of 
available scientific knowledge, the recognition of traditional knowledge, differences in knowledge 
systems, assumptions of community homogeneity, and the ‘insider-outsider dialectic’ all contribute 
to the challenge of meaningful participatory assessment processes (Caine, Salomons & Simmons, 
2007; Ellis, 2005; Greig & Duinker, 2011; Nadasdy, 2003; Natcher, Davis & Hickey, 2005; Staples 
& Natcher, 2015). For example, Prno and Slocombe (2012) recognized a shift in decision-making 
towards community inclusion for northern mineral development, accompanied by implications for 
community ability to participate in decision-making processes. According to Raik (2002), the 
success of co-management and co-production relationships rely on the capacity of all participants, 
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and so “…should be of keen interest for co-management,” (Raik, 2002: 2). Similarly, Booth and 
Skelton (2011) considered First Nations participation in assessment processes in B.C. from 
industry and government perspectives, citing a lack of capacity as one of the major limitations. 
Calls for capacity building with regards to IA are commonly justified in the academic literature. 
Impact Assessment and Capacity in the Canadian North 
The rapid and sustained social and economic development of the Canadian North continues to 
challenge the capacity of local actors to fulfill legislated obligations. The relationship between the 
territorial and federal government also continues to change through the devolution of various 
responsibilities (Abele, 1987; Bielawski, 1984; Dacks, 2004; Hodgins, 2009). In 1979, the Science 
Council of Canada (SCC) argued that IA processes were under-supported by national capacity 
building programs (de la Barre, 1979). The pre-1990 politics of assimilation heavily influenced 
discussions of northern development in terms of giving a greater voice to local communities, but 
only through certain avenues (Angell & Parkins, 2011). Interestingly, the SCC recommendations 
were echoed by a House of Commons Standing committee in 1997, which underlined the 
development of territorial capacities as a requirement for future northern development, and 
supported the argument that local voices have been purposely directed through chosen 
mechanisms (Graham, 1997).  
Since 1990, the discussion around sustainable development and local empowerment has changed 
considerably, particularly after the implementation of the Umbrella Final Agreement and the 
establishment of Nunavut (Angell & Parkins, 2011). In 2008, the Minister of Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development commissioned a review of northern regulatory systems. The resulting 
report pointed out that new regulatory bodies, such as those facilitating IA processes, were aimed 
at giving voice to local populations but lacked the corresponding increase in institutional, 
community, and research capacities (McCrank, 2008). Similar work done on boards established by 
land-claims and settlement agreements, including wildlife and resource management boards, have 
identified the ongoing presence of constraints on Indigenous participation in natural resource 
management (White, 2008). Research on the social impacts associated with increased research 
funding, a common capacity building strategy in northern Canada, has largely focused on economic 
impacts and community-researcher interactions, with little formal evaluation of local capacity 
outcomes (Abele, 2009; Brunet, Hickey & Humphries, 2014; Carr, Natcher & Olfert, 2013; 
Gearheard & Shirley, 2007; McCrank, 2008; Pfeifer, 2018). The research agenda for northern 
environmental assessment presented by Noble, Hanna, and Gunn (2013) included capacity for 
meaningful engagement as a major theme. Other work has focused on the incorporation of 
traditional knowledge, another aspect of research capacity, into the northern IA process either 
through proponent submissions or through public review, with mixed results (Angell & Parkins, 
2011; Bowie, 2013; Usher, 2000). Research into, and evaluations of, the impact of capacity building 
activities on northern development continues to be limited (Angell & Parkins, 2011; Carlson, 2016; 
Pfeifer, 2018). 
The economic development timelines associated with primary industries in northern Canada have 
often reduced the positive impacts of resource development on northern community capacity, 
leaving regions exposed to the variability of boom-and-bust economies (Banta, 2006; Leadbeater, 
2007). For example, work done on the Mackenzie Valley Environmental Impact Review Board 
(MVEIRB) by Galbraith, Bradshaw and Rutherford (2007) identified limited capacity as a major 
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deficiency in the northern IA process. There have since been calls for a comprehensive federal 
northern policy that addresses this lack of capacity (Gilmore, 2016; Ogden, Schmidt, Van Dijken 
& Kinnear, 2016; Simon, 2017), particularly as the effects of global climate change manifest at local 
levels. For example, local capacity to accommodate the opening of the Northwest Passage shipping 
route, and the regulatory needs that will accompany it, or the degradation of permafrost resulting 
in increased mineral exploration, are of increasing policy concern (Barber et al., 2008; Fenge & 
Penikett, 2009). In response, the territorial governments and national organizations have released 
science agendas and strategies to inform assessments and associated decision-making, underlining 
the need for northern research capacity (Table 1) (Territorial Governments, 2016).  
 
Table 1. Northern Canadian science and research policy documents emphasize the need to develop 
capacity. 
Title Organization/Author Year Mentions of capacity 
Building a Path for Northern Science  GNWT’s Science Agenda  2009 11 
A pan-northern approach to science GNWT, YG, NT 2016 19 
Government of Yukon Science Strategy Government of Yukon 2016 6 
Knowledge Agenda: Northern Research 
for Northern Priorities 
Government of Northwest 
Territories 2017 8 
National Inuit Strategy on Research  Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK)  2018 22 
 
Since 2011, various government departments and national organizations, including the Conference 
Board of Canada, through the Centre for the North, have attempted to address the question of 
various northern capacities including labour force (Martin, 2011), economic potential (Auditor 
General of Canada, 2014b; The Canadian Chamber of Commerce, 2013), governance capacity 
(AANDC & CPC, 2013), and the ability of communities to participate in IA (Auditor General of 
Canada, 2014a). Another progress report on northern capacity was produced by the Canadian 
Polar Commission, focusing on adaptive and community capacities and outlining shortcomings in 
labour force, forestry, and environmental monitoring (Canadian Polar Commission, 2014). Within 
this context, IA often serves as a connection between development, primary industry, and 
governance, acting as both an instrument for the empowerment of communities in decision-
making, while also facilitating clashes between knowledge systems and political visions for 
development (Bowie, 2013; Morgan, 2012).  
Impact Assessment and Capacity in Yukon 
IA in Yukon offers an interesting example of network governance1, with multiple actors interacting 
within a complex landscape of overlapping formal and informal authorities and responsibilities. 
The traditional territories of 14 First Nations often overlap with each other, as well as sharing 
interests with the Yukon and federal governments in some decision-making processes, including 
natural resource management in certain areas. The Yukon Territory was established in 1898, after 
the influx of Klondike gold stampeders caused concern for Canadian sovereignty (Abele, 2009; 
Coates, 1985). In 1979, ‘responsible government’ was granted to the territorial legislature. The 
Council for Yukon Indians (CYI, now Council for Yukon First Nations) at that time chose to 
work with existing territorial structures for service support, while negotiating individual self-
government agreements between each First Nation and the federal government, that included the 
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delineation of settlement lands (Abele, 1987). The IA process in Yukon was negotiated and 
established as part of the Umbrella Final Agreement, taking the form of federal legislation in the 
Yukon Environmental and Socio-Economic Assessment Act (YESAA) in 2006 (Noble, Hanna, & 
Gunn, 2013). YESAA federally established the independent Yukon Environmental Socio-
Economic Assessment Board (YESAB), through which all development projects in the Yukon are 
reviewed, including mining and infrastructure projects. First Nations interests and local public 
review are included in recommendations provided to the ‘decision-body’ who renders the final 
decision, which varies depending on the project. The Board of Directors for YESAB include an 
Executive committee, with representatives nominated by the Council for Yukon First Nations 
(CYFN) and Yukon Government, who then confer with the federal Minister of Environment to 
appoint a chair. Four additional board members are nominated as follows: two nominees from 
CYFN, one from Yukon Government, and one directly appointed by the federal Minister. District 
offices located throughout the territory are intended to engage with community contexts. Certain 
major projects are forwarded to an executive committee for assessment  (Government of Canada, 
2003). A comparison of territorial, provincial, and federal environmental assessment legislation 
shows that YESAA shared a very similar distribution of mandatory requirements with the federal 
CEAA (Hickey, Brunet & Allan, 2010). 
With a resource-based economy that depends heavily on the ‘boom-and-bust’ cycle of commodity 
prices and rates of development, including the highly variable mining sector (Petrov, 2010; The 
Conference Board of Canada, 2017; Tukker, 2016), Yukon and First Nations governments rely 
quite heavily on the IA process to support and guide sustainable economic development (Noble 
& Hanna, 2015). In addition to labour shortages, changes to the CEAA in 2012 included 
amendments to YESAB operations and changes to assessment timelines which have stressed local 
capacity (Banks, 2014; Rodon & Therrien, 2015). International discussions around environmental, 
strategic, and health impact assessment and Aboriginal and public participation often include 
references to Yukon as a positive example of multi-governmental collaboration but few academic 
publications have focused directly on the territory and its IA processes (Kwiatkowski, Tikhonov, 
Peace & Bourassa, 2009; Udofia, Noble & Poelzer, 2017). The context of Yukon Territory 
therefore offers an interesting landscape to further examine the role of research capacity in 
northern impact assessment processes, as the general need for capacity has been well outlined in 
government documents and popular media. 
But What is Capacity? 
Defining ‘Capacity’ 
The concept of capacity has been identified as being overused and highly variable both within and 
between disciplines, despite considerable efforts to clarify the concept (Analoui & Danquah, 2017; 
Brinkerhoff & Morgan, 2010; Gadsby, 2011; Lauzon, 2013; S Louafi, 2016; Raik, 2002; Simmons, 
Reynolds, & Swinburn, 2011; Suarez-Balcazar, Balcazar, Iriarte, & Taylor-Ritzler, 2008). 
Contributing to the ambiguity of the term, capacity can be (and often should be) built at many 
scales, from individual to collective, occupying “…a nether world between individual training and 
national development” (Morgan 2003, as cited in (Brinkerhoff & Morgan, 2010)). Considering 
capacity development at the scale of individuals, organizations and institutions allows for a more 
systemic perspective, which can be useful for addressing development strategies that transcend 
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scale (Brinkerhoff, 2010). Capacity as a goal and a concept has been examined in fields such as 
public administration, international development, education, health and agriculture, and is often 
tied directly to development goals and governance processes (Analoui & Danquah, 2017; Grindle 
& Hilderbrand, 1995; Ika & Donnelly, 2017; Selim Louafi, 2016; Wetterberg, Brinkerhoff & Hertz, 
2015). Distinctions are broadly made across disciplines between adaptive, community, governance, 
policy, and research capacities, though they tend to overlap considerably in practice. This suggests 
the need for a more refined working lens specific to the capacities engaged in the context of IA in 
order to help assess and improve capacity building efforts (Kolhoff, Driessen & Runhaar, 2018).  
The Components of Capacity 
The term ‘capacity’, here understood to mean the ability of a system to function and adapt, often 
considers two components: capability and competence (Chaskin, 2001; Fowler & Ubels, 2010; 
Frank & Smith, 1999; Howlett & Ramesh, 2015; Morgan, 2006; Wu, Ramesh, & Howlett, 2015). 
Within this definition, capability is the availability of appropriate resources for a particular problem, 
while competence is the knowledge and understanding necessary to utilize these resources (Wu, 
Ramesh & Howlett, 2015). The concept of capability extends beyond conventional resources like 
financial and human to include resources such as access to knowledge and institutional authority 
(Araral et al., 2015; Howlett & Ramesh, 2015). For example, Chan, Kirsop and Arunachalam (2005) 
have illustrated how the capabilities of post-secondary institutions, including access to journal 
subscriptions, can affect regional economic and political development. International development 
organizations have often focused on the capability component of capacity, since these challenges 
can be the easiest to overcome, often in the form of technology transfer (Analoui & Danquah, 
2017; Lansang & Dennis, 2004). There is, however, a general movement away from this approach 
towards more community-instigated capacity development strategies for growing local 
competence (Bockstael & Watene, 2016) through wider knowledge system development (Lansang 
& Dennis, 2004), such as agricultural and health extension (Coutts & Roberts, 2003). It is broadly 
understood that the combination of competencies and capabilities will influence the overall 
capacity of any system at any level, from the individual to the network scale (Howlett & Ramesh, 
2015; Van Loon, Driessen, Kolhoff & Runhaar, 2010). 
Conceptual Frameworks for Understanding Capacity 
There are many conceptual frameworks available to help understand capacity. Potter and Brough 
(2004) offer a framework for systemic capacity building in the context of health policy that 
separates four hierarchical types of capacity, including: tools, skills, staff/infrastructure, and 
institutions. They then examined the interactions between nine sub-capacities that include: 
performance, personnel, workload, supervisory, facility, support service, systems, structural, and 
role capacities. Kirchhoff (2006) applies and expands this framework to the IA context in Brazil, 
using the systemic approach to add human, scientific, technological, organizational, institutional 
and resource capabilities to the previous findings. Fowler and Ubels (2010) review two of the 
leading frameworks for understanding capacity in international development: European Centre for 
Development Policy Management (ECDPM) with the ‘five capabilities’ framework; and 
Community Development Resource Association (CDRA), which identifies six elements of 
capacity. Gupta et al. (2010) approaches adaptive capacity through an institutional (social rule) 
perspective, identifying six dimensions to consider: variety; learning capacity; flexibility for self-
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initiated change; leadership; resource availability; and fair governance. Van Loon, Driessen, 
Kolhoff and Runhaar (2010) divide the capacity of IA into six capacities: institutional, 
organizational, human, scientific, technical, and resource. Kolhoff, Driessen and Runhaar (2018) 
applied this same division of capacities to IA organizations in the context of low and middle 
income countries (LMICs). Wu, Ramesh, and Howlett (2015) provide a conceptual framework that 
addresses the analysis and measurement of policy capacity, describing a nested model of policy 
capacity that includes political capacity, analytical capacity, and operational capacity. These various 
frameworks all identify multiple types of capacity that interact and build off of one another, but 
often use different terminology to describe similar concepts.  
Interacting Capacities 
The classification of capacity into different types is one source of confusion that is not easily 
remedied as the terms tend to have definitions that overlap and interact, either as distinct types of 
capacity or as foundations for larger capacities. Fischer and McKee (2017) examine linkages 
between organizational, infrastructural and personal capacities, finding that community capacities 
and capitals interact; are key to understanding community situations; are understudied; can be 
negative, if not destructive, presenting obstacles to overcome; and are heavily impacted by local 
engagement. Kolhoff, Driessen and Runhaar (2018) connect IA performance and capacity 
development, focusing on the assessment of key capacities for IA processes, including 
organizational, human, scientific, technical, and resource capacities. Van Loon, Driessen, Kolhoff 
and Runhaar (2010) build on concepts outlined in both Potter and Brough (2004) and Kirchhoff 
(2006) to establish a model of interacting ‘sub-capacities’ and discuss the potential effect of 
uncoordinated development of these capacities within an organization. They consider capacities 
in a hierarchical structure, where sub-capacities, such as research capacity, are foundational to the 
development of more complex capacities, such as governance capacity. This same breakdown of 
capacities was used by Kolhoff, Driessen and Runhaar (2018) to develop an assessment tool 
specifically for the IA process in low and middle income countries.  
In the context of IA in Yukon, the capacities at play generally include adaptive, community, 
governance, policy, research, and institutional capacities (Figure 1). Definitions for each of these 
are explored further in Table 2. Adaptive capacity, or the ability of a community to respond to 
stress, has gained attention as concerns around the impacts of climate change become increasingly 
important to community sustainability. Community and governance capacities interact to enable 
collective decision-making for large groups, which rely on the ability to gather and process 
information; the ability to make and implement policy; and the ability to synthesize information or 
knowledge into multi-organizational collaboration, or research capacity, policy capacity, and 
institutional capacity respectively. As a contributing capacity, research capacity is an important 
foundation upon which other capacities often depend. IA sees the interaction of community and 
governance capacities, while performing the function of research capacity, providing 
recommendations after assessing available science, local and traditional knowledges.  
For the purposes of this paper, research capacity, captured by various terms in the  frameworks 
previously mentioned, is defined as the ability of an actor, organization or network to engage, 
produce, maintain and use knowledge through individual and collective development (Cooke, 
2005; Kaseje, Edwards & Mortley, 2016; Trostle, 1992). As a distinct concept, research capacity 
has become an important economic and social consideration for the development of governance 
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and community capacities, including the empowerment of communities and the health and 
diversity of their economies (Andrews et al., 2011; Chan, Kirsop & Arunachalam, 2005; Cooke, 
2005; Lansang & Dennis, 2004; Velho, 2004). 
 
 
Figure 2. Interaction between six types of capacities involved in impact assessment. 
Research capacity has also been seen as necessary for the development of other larger capacities 
alongside policy and institutional capacities, contributing to community, adaptive and governance 
capacities (Howlett & Ramesh, 2015; Lalor & Hickey, 2014; Riddell, 2007). One strength of IA 
processes depends on availability and access to viable and pertinent knowledge and the abilities of 
participants to utilize that knowledge (Greig & Duinker, 2011). The connection between 
community, governance and research capacities is highlighted in the IA context, where community 
and public participation in the IA process generally improves assessments through the inclusion 
of more knowledge, as long as these groups have the means to do so. Calls for increased northern 
capacity, meant to provide an impetus for addressing capacity needs, often lack specificity with 
regards to the types of capacity needed. The importance of research capacity for the effective 
implementation of the IA process and for the development of larger capacities therefore deserves 
further exploration. 
Avenues for Future Research 
The Canadian IA process has evolved through three distinct phases: 1) the direct application of 
science to assess potential impact; 2) the inclusion of community consultation within the IA 
process; and 3) a movement towards community-based and participatory research. Movement into 
a fourth phase could be explored, where the development of research capacity and community 
capacity concurrently becomes a focus, allowing the community to set their own research agenda, 
then use the results of that agenda to more effectively engage in the IA process, and associated 
decision-making. Recently, there has been a general acknowledgement that northern researchers 
should, where appropriate, be consulting communities in how certain research is done and in co-
designing the research agenda itself (Brunet, Hickey & Humphries, 2014). The development of a 
community’s research capacity has the potential to benefit both local and research communities 
through a critical reflection on the roles and responsibilities in the research process. Likewise, the 
ability of IA processes to incorporate, interpret and apply traditional ecological knowledge to 
assessments is also a form of research capacity and represents an important component of the 
assessment process (Paci, Tobin & Robb, 2002). The fluidity of the concept of northern capacity 
needs to be carefully managed in the development of IA in Yukon Territory to more fully 
appreciate the stresses that prompt local appeals for increased capacity and minimize confusion in 
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the future (Black, 2015; Brinkerhoff & Morgan, 2010; Condell & Begley, 2007; S Louafi, 2016; 
Simmons, Reynolds & Swinburn, 2011). 
More generally, the role of policy capacity in governance and community capacities has been well 
developed and there hints at the role of research capacity in larger governance processes (Howlett 
& Ramesh, 2015; Marsh & Smith, 2000). However, further exploration into the relationships 
between research capacity and policy, institutional, governance and community capacities in the 
context of IA would be helpful. Potentially fruitful areas for future research include: 1) identifying 
the different dimensions of northern research capacity and their relation to IA-related policy, 
institutional, governance, and community capacities; and 2) examining the role of research capacity 
in the governance of Yukon Territory, where institutions and organizations have often been 
legislated, without adequate consideration of human, scientific and resource capacities to deliver. 
In order to achieve this, a better understanding of the different dimensions of research capacity, 
and how it interacts with other functions and capacities within a system, such as network 
governance, needs to be developed. Such an understanding would also help respond to wider calls 
for increased northern research capacity (Graham, 2016; Irlbacher-Fox & Gibson, 2010; Simon, 
2017); the need for concrete assessments of the impacts of capacity building activities on northern 
natural resource governance (Angell & Parkins, 2011; Carlson, 2016; Noble & Hanna, 2015); and 
for enhancing the effectiveness of IA for sustainable development in the Yukon. 
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Notes 
1. Network governance: Collaborative decision-making engaging different groups with 
different expertise, agendas and values that engage in problem-solving for complex 
problems, including environmental and development issues (Klijn, 2010; Kooiman, 1993). 
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Table 2. Specification of defining characteristics for various types of capacity that appear in the wider literature. 
Capacity 
Defining characteristics 
The ability to: Sources 
Adaptive 
- Collective ability to respond to environmental, economic, and social 
stress  
- Collective community resources and skills 
- Directly related to vulnerability and resilience 
Brooks and Adger (2005), Gallopín (2006), Smit and Wandel 
(2006), Magis (2010), Wesche and Armitage (2010), Wamsler 
and Brink (2015) 
Community 
- Sustained collective ability to collaborate, problem-solve and 
function 
- Commitment, resources and skills for community engagement and 
the maintenance of community well-being 
- Empowerment and identity 
Labonte and Laverack (2001), Chaskin (2001), Kwan, 
Frankish, Quantz, and Flores (2003), Smith, Littlejohns, and 
Roy (2003), Craig (2007), MacLellan-Wright et al. (2007), 
Merino and de los Ríos Carmenado (2012), Matarrita-
Cascante, Trejos, Qin, Joo and Debner (2016) 
Governance 
- Collective ability to make decisions and manage relationships 
- Includes political, economic, financial, technical, and managerial or 
organizational aspects 
Woodhill (2010), Araral, Pelizzo, Burkhanov, Chen, Janenova 
and Collins (2015), Ramesh, Saguin, Howlett and Wu (2016) 
Institutional 
- Ability to use, appraise, and synthesize evidence towards 
policymaking 
- Range, density, and collaborative ability of a network of 
organizations 
Healey (1998), Phelps and Tewdwr-Jones (2000), Shroff, 
Javadi, Gilson, Kang, and Ghaffar (2017) 
Policy 
- Ability to assess and make collective choices 
- Perform policy functions including knowledge acquisition, 
utilization, and implementation 
- Includes analytical, operational/managerial, and political capacities 
Bakvis (2000), Riddell (2007), Howlett and Ramesh (2015), 
Angel (2015), Howlett and Ramesh (2015), Wu, Ramesh, and 
Howlett (2015), Ramesh, Saguin, Howlett, and Wu (2016) 
Research 
- Ability to undertake high-quality research and produce, use, maintain 
and disseminate results and knowledge 
- Includes policy, resource, and program management 
Crisp, Swerissen, and Duckett (2000), Albert and Mickan 
(2003), Lansang and Dennis (2004), Velho (2004), Segrott, 
McIvor, and Green (2006), Condell and Begley (2007), Leitch 
(2009), Gadsby (2011), Kahwa, Edwards, and Mortley (2016), 
(Fellesson & Mählck, 2017) 
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This article answers the research question of how entrepreneurship projects in Higher Education (HE) in the Arctic can 
incorporate the Sustainable Development Goals. Students can play a significant role as driving force for sustainable development 
in the Arctic. Their unique combination of highly specialized skills, innovative thinking and strong entrepreneurial spirit can 
make a substantial contribution to the development of the Arctic region. Many students are intrinsically motivated towards 
engaging themselves in sustainable change. It is a well-documented attitude among the so-called “millennial generation” that 
they are looking beyond profit and strive to make a difference in their communities and to make an impact on pertinent social 
and environmental issues. The article analyses a project called “Promoting sustainable student entrepreneurship in the Arctic”, 
which seeks to support the entrepreneurial potential among students to the benefit of the sustainable development of Arctic 
societies. In terms of sustainability thinking, the project builds on two key frameworks: 1) The UN Sustainable Development 
Goals, and 2) The Abundance Cycle framework. By incorporating social, environmental as well as financial aspects, the 
internationally recognised Abundance Cycle framework provides an operational approach for working with sustainable 
entrepreneurship and a toolkit for incorporating sustainability thinking into teaching and entrepreneurial projects in Higher 
Education in the Arctic. The project highlighted that experiences and methods from outside the Arctic can be translated and 
implemented if adapted to specific Arctic needs and experiences, and furthermore that the partners from outside the Arctic 
context learn something new about innovation and entrepreneurship processes. 
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Introduction 
How can entrepreneurship projects in Higher Education (HE) in the Arctic incorporate the 
Sustainable Development Goals? We provide a project-based answer to this question. The 
question (and project) is relevant, because of several overlapping trends. First, we observe a general 
trend that both public and private actors demand more focus on entrepreneurial skills and mind-
set being included in HE curricula and courses. North American universities like MIT and Stanford 
have since the late 1990s been highlighted as frontrunners of “the entrepreneurial university” 
(Trencher et al, 2014). In a European Commission report on entrepreneurship in HE from 2008, 
it is concluded that in most EU-countries “entrepreneurship in non-business studies is a very new 
issue. In general terms, entrepreneurship is not yet sufficiently integrated into the curriculum of 
higher education institutions” (European Commission, 2008: 15). Ten years later, programmes, 
courses, conferences, projects, and camps are too numerous to count.  
Secondly, the focus has widened from a belief that an entrepreneurial mind-set and skills would 
lead to new jobs and economic growth in countries struggling after the financial crisis. Today, 
entrepreneurship is included in all kinds of courses and thinking across the disciplines from the 
natural sciences to humanities spanning the traditional business focus to entrepreneurship and 
innovation in the public sector and socio-economic or environmental projects with non-economic 
purposes (Chiu, 2012; Reffstrup & Christiansen, 2017). The focus has also deepened as universities 
are increasingly going beyond their third mission or engagement with society by adding a fourth 
mission of “co-creation of sustainability”.1 Innovation and entrepreneurship has been a natural 
way of increasing and experimenting with new triple or quadruple helix projects, but also moving 
from economic to non-economic purposes (Rosenlund, Rosell & Hogland, 2017; Trencher et al, 
2014). As Richard Chiu writes in an analysis of entrepreneurship education in the Nordic countries: 
It has been long understood that entrepreneurship is a key driver of economic growth, 
employment, innovation and productivity. Entrepreneurship could also contribute to social and 
environmental development (2012: 4). 
Third, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) or the global goals running from 2015-2030 
are for all, also for the Arctic. There are 17 SDGs with 169 targets.2 They all include the three 
dimensions of sustainable development, namely the social, economic, and environmental 
dimensions, and focus on five areas: People, Planet, Prosperity, Peace, and Partnerships (United 
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, n.d.). The SDGs are not specifically targeted 
at developing countries like the predecessor the Millennium Development Goals (United Nations, 
n.d.). Moreover, although the SDGs are from the United Nations, everyone is invited to take 
ownership and work with the SDGs. With increasing global attention given to the Arctic, it should 
come as no surprise that the SDGs have also found their way to the Arctic. The peoples, 
communities, and countries of the Arctic have long been focused on sustainable development, 
which is also at the core of the work of the Arctic Council (AC) since its inception in 1996, 
especially in the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG). The current Finnish 
Chairmanship of the AC has placed the SDGs as its guideposts. It is illustrated by recent events 
such as the Rovaniemi Arctic Spirit Conference 14-16 November 2017 with SDG implementation 
as the main theme (Rovaniemi Arctic Spirit, n.d.). 1 December 2017, the Kingdom of Denmark in 
partnership with the Arctic Economic Council hosted an international high-level conference on 
the “SDGs in the Arctic: Local and Global Perspectives” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 
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2017). From October 2017, UK based think-tank, Polar Research and Policy Initiative (PRPI) has 
held ten “High-Level Dialogue on SDGs in the Arctic” events in Iceland, Finland, Canada, UK, 
US, Norway, and the Faroe Islands, and even as far away as India and Australia. In Australia, the 
event was co-hosted with the Australian Institute of International Affairs3 (PRPI, n.d.). At this 
roundtable, it was discussed: 
how Australia can contribute to the United Nations’ 2030 Sustainable Development Goals, both 
domestically and in the Arctic region, and [the session] drew parallels between the experiences of 
Australia and New Zealand’s Indigenous communities and those in the Arctic (AIIA, 2018). 
Finally, we observe an increase in research and university collaboration across the Arctic as 
evidenced by e.g. University of the Arctic activities and thematic networks, the Fulbright Arctic 
Initiative (Virginia et al, 2016), a network like the China-Nordic Arctic Research Centre, the work 
and partnerships of PRPI, and finally, the Arctic Council’s latest legally binding “Agreement on 
Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation” (Arctic Council, 2017).4 All these activities 
and focus on SDGs in the Arctic suggest real commitment and coordinated efforts. Responding 
to these observations, this article analyses early findings from a new HE project called “Promoting 
sustainable student entrepreneurship in the Arctic”. We present the project and findings over the 
next sections including how the project works on two parallel tracks: one about needs and 
experiences of the universities where the project is implemented, and one about translation of the 
transferable skills and mind set training from the experienced partner universities to the Faroe 
Islands and Greenland.  
Promoting Sustainable Student Entrepreneurship in the Arctic 
Since early 2017, five universities across the North Atlantic Arctic have been working on the 
project “Promoting sustainable student entrepreneurship in the Arctic”. Our universities educate 
students in disciplines ranging from natural/technical to social sciences, and the project has been 
funded by the Nordic Council of Ministers, the Bank of Greenland Fund, and the Knud Højgaards 
Fund. The partners in the project are Ilisimatusarfik – University of Greenland (Nuuk), Arctic 
Technology Center, Sisimiut (Greenland), Fróðskaparsetur Føroya – University of the Faroe 
Islands (Tórshavn), Háskólinn á Akureyri – University of Akureyri5 (northern Iceland), DTU – 
Technical University of Denmark, as well as the College of the Atlantic (Maine, USA) which has 
contributed with the Abundance Cycle method explained further below. The project has a total 
duration of three years and is going on its second year. The geographical focus on the West Nordic 
region has created good conditions for cooperation and a common need-driven approach to 
entrepreneurship in HE. Likewise, the West Nordic universities in Greenland, Iceland, and the 
Faroe Islands are presented with the same challenges of small communities with limited capacity 
in terms of entrepreneurial skills at HE levels and support for start-ups. However, the intention is 
to disseminate the project findings to a broader circle of Arctic universities via workshops at Arctic 
assemblies and by making the results and entrepreneurial methods public to other universities. 
Needs and Experiences 
Implementing any new project from one context to another is always a challenge. Simply put, the 
project transfers existing knowledge and experience from two universities, Technical University of 
Denmark (DTU) and College of the Atlantic (COA), initially to the University of the Faroe Islands 
and the University of Greenland. DTU and COA are very resourceful universities with long 
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traditions of innovation and entrepreneurship training. Furthermore, DTU is a large university 
operating in a North European context of a highly developed welfare system, highly functioning 
educational system with a critical mass of researchers and students, and a strong, diverse, and 
international business community supportive of the university. The Faroe Islands and Greenland, 
like many other countries and places in the Arctic, are not near this level of development and 
supporting circumstances found in the capital region of Denmark. This, of course, provides some 
barriers, but there are some opportunities of being small. Furthermore, Greenland is characterised 
by many small towns and settlements scattered across huge distances connected only by ocean and 
air travel, when weather conditions allow for it; whereas the Faroe Islands is rather small with a 
tight-knit society. The general educational level in Greenland is lower than in the Faroe Islands. In 
terms of economy and culture, both countries are still connected to fisheries, hunting, herding, 
and shipping. The populations are small; 51,000 for the Faroe Islands and 56,000 for Greenland 
compared to DTU’s 11,200 active students and about 6,000 staff (DTU, n.d.). A main difference 
between Denmark, Faroe Islands, and Greenland is the degree of the national economy’s diversity 
with Faroese and Greenlandic economies more dependent on the public sector for jobs and 
development than Denmark. Overall, to translate experiences and knowledge from DTU, we have 
identified a need for both scaling down DTU experiences and activity levels and focusing more on 
questions of public sector and social innovation than private sector and for-profit activities. We 
also sought to identify existing experiences from courses and other activities in Greenland and the 
Faroes that could be of inspiration. 
Technical University of Denmark (DTU) 
One of the core strategic missions of DTU is to disseminate research-based knowledge and 
technologies to society through cooperation with industry and the public sector. Innovation is an 
integrated part of the educational programmes and via traineeships and joint research projects, the 
student’s knowledge and good ideas are put to the disposal of the companies, often resulting in 
start-ups. In 2017, DTU registered 60 start-ups and 50 student start-ups. The tradition of 
innovation and entrepreneurship combined with over 100 years of research in the Arctic has 
provided a strong basis for engaging in cooperation with Arctic HE institutions to develop student 
entrepreneurship adapted for the Arctic societies. At the same time, DTU works with the SDGs 
at a strategic level and uses them as the basis for research and education. In many of the SDGs, 
technology plays an important role in the solutions of the articulated problems, and future 
generations of candidates will be increasingly concerned with sustainability. Thus, DTU’s research 
and educational activities are supporting the realisation of the SDGs in the Arctic.  
Experiences from DTU’s Arctic Engagement 
Arctic Technology Center (ARTEK) DTU has educated 100 Arctic engineers up to 2018; most of 
them are now employed in Greenlandic companies. DTU has student trainee programmes with 
Arctic companies and many of the students write their thesis based on this cooperation. This 
provides the students with direct knowledge of the opportunities as well as challenges of running 
a business in the Arctic.   
DTU has been engaged in international research concerning climate, mining, fisheries, 
oceanography, telecommunications, environment, and much more contributing to the knowledge 
of how to create sustainable development in the Arctic. Among other things, DTU has analysed 
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the potential of business and societal development if a space-based infrastructure with satellites 
combined with drones and autonomous systems were at the disposal of Arctic societies. In the 
international Joint Nordic Master’s programme, called Cold Climate Engineering, three tracks are 
offered: 1) Space including earth observation techniques, mapping and navigation, 2) Land including 
design and operations of Arctic infrastructure, and 3) Coast including Arctic ships and offshore 
infrastructure and operations. Students are of various nationalities, and thus, knowledge of Arctic 
engineering is actively disseminated across countries. Likewise, new educational programmes are 
being developed based in Greenland: A Bachelor’s programme in fisheries technology together 
with the self-rule government of Greenland, and an international Master’s programme in Arctic 
Mineral Resources under the EU Knowledge and Innovation Community called EIT Raw 
Materials.6 
DTU Skylab 
DTU Skylab7 is the hub for technology-based innovation and entrepreneurship at the university. 
The hub is a meeting point between all kinds of stakeholders within the ecosystem including 
universities, industries, public sectors, and investors. Through various programmes, facilities, and 
other offers, DTU Skylab supports three types of innovation: 1) Start-up projects from idea to 
mature projects can get help on business development, fundraising, company creation, team, 
internationalisation, and communication; 2) Courses from DTU are hosted, co-created, and 
mentored with involvement of DTU Skylab; 3) Public and private engagements with students and 
researchers happen through case competitions, hackathons, sprints, and innovation projects. The 
physical space covers 2,000m2 and offers highly accessible interdisciplinary prototyping workshops 
and labs, teaching facilities, incubation and office space, as well as flexible co-working and event 
space. Until recently, the hub was focused on student innovation, but with a new large grant from 
the A.P. Møller Foundation, an additional 3,000m2 of facilities will be added, building up to an 
even more significant inclusion of researchers and industry. DTU Skylab is largely built around 
international partnerships where joint programmes and exchanges happen in relation to e.g. 
EuroTech8, Nordic Five Tech9, EUXCEL10, and Nordic Entrepreneurship Hubs. This pushes 
DTU Skylab to a position as an internationally leading hub, and is a popular destination for visiting 
delegations (100 in 2017, half of them international from 18 countries). 
The numbers from 2017 speak to the size and experience from DTU Skylab: 152 student start-ups 
and pre-start-ups used DTU Skylab services. DTU students registered 50 new companies during 
the year. Forty-three teams of students joined the hub’s various start-up acceleration programmes 
like Skylab Ignite11 and European Venture Programme12 and 27 start-ups got soft funding of up 
to 20,000 EUR through Skylab Funding.13 On corporate collaboration, numerous spinoff cases 
with student teams working on corporate IP were created in the course Hardtech 
Entrepreneurship14 and the hub facilitated four major hackathons, e.g. the in-house bi-yearly 
hackathon Open Innovation X15, based on corporate/organizational challenges. There has also 
been an increased focus on social innovation. DTU is a Danish partner university and DTU Skylab 
joined the facilitating team in the UNLEASH event,16 which focuses on co-creation and problem 
solving for the SDGs. Moreover, DTU Skylab designed and hosted the student case competition 
“Better Food for More People” at the World Food Summit in Copenhagen, and held two “Let’s 
Act Together” events for students on social innovation. These activities involved more than 260 
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students. Additionally, a new student-driven SDG-ambassador team counting 45 students was 
launched. (DTU Skylab, 2018). 
College of the Atlantic and the Abundance Cycle Framework 
Located in Bar Harbor, Maine, the College of the Atlantic enriches the liberal arts tradition through 
a distinctive educational philosophy called human ecology. A human ecological perspective 
integrates knowledge from all academic disciplines and from personal experience to investigate, 
and ultimately improve, the relationships between human beings and our social and natural 
communities. The human ecological perspective guides all aspects of education, research, activism, 
and interactions among the college’s students, faculty, staff, and trustees. The COA community 
encourages, prepares, and expects students to gain expertise, breadth, values, and practical 
experience necessary to achieve individual fulfilment and to help solve problems that challenge 
communities everywhere.  
Although most people feel that supporting sustainable development is important, entrepreneurs 
may encounter difficulties translating sustainability into business strategies and tactics for new 
ventures. The framework called Abundance Cycle, developed by Professor Jay Friedlander, 
Sharpe-McNally Chair of Green and Socially Responsible Business at College of the Atlantic, 
bridges this gap between sustainability and business (Friedlander, 2016). The Abundance Cycle 
framework is tailor-made for leveraging sustainable business models to launch enterprises, remake 
existing companies and provide pathways for Arctic entrepreneurs to simultaneously build 
economic value and fulfil SDGs. The three central perspectives in the Abundance Cycle 
framework – people, planet, profit – are derived from the concept of “the triple bottom line” 
(TBL). TBL refers to the notion that the performance of companies should be measured only by 
the traditional measure of financial profit, but by three different bottom lines: 
• The profit and loss account; the traditional measure of corporate profit. 
• The organization’s “people account”; a measure of how socially responsible the organization 
has been in its operations.  
• The company’s “planet” account; a measure of how environmentally responsible it has been. 
 
Rather than viewing these areas as trade-offs or separate, the Abundance Cycle inextricably links 
these areas and seeks solutions that build a virtuous cycle simultaneously strengthening each 
bottom line (see Figure 1). Finding a new perspective is at the heart of innovation and by building 
on the TBL line of thinking the Abundance Cycle framework can help operationalize the concept 
of sustainability for the coming generations of Arctic entrepreneurs. 
The Abundance Cycle also goes further by tying together strategy and sustainability. It expands 
the value chain to seamlessly incorporate each aspect of the TBL into the main activities of an 
enterprise (see Figure 2). Doing so both de-risks sustainability and allows enterprises to link 
sustainability and competitive advantage, fundamentally tying value creation and sustainability 
together.  
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Figure 1: Abundance Cycle Framework’s Basic Components 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The Abundance Cycle links to strategy by incorporating TBL across the enterprise. 
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Experiences from The University of the Faroe Islands 
Between September 2014 and January 2018, as part of the Master’s in West Nordic Studies, 
Governance and Sustainable Management at The University of the Faroe Islands, we developed 
and taught a two-year international Master’s Programme with more than 10 Master’s and PhD 
courses relating to sustainability and included innovative teaching and learning methods. 
Student numbers for each course were between five and fifteen. Our overall experience including 
student feedback of this (new) way of teaching is that students – if they read the course literature 
and participate in all elements of the courses – reach a qualitatively higher level of knowing 
compared to students following traditional classroom based courses. Our understanding of levels 
of knowing follow Bent Flyvbjerg’s application of Aristotle’s idea of phronesis (also known as 
practice and master learning) coupled with Dreyfus and Dreyfus’ five stage model of skill 
acquisition. We have further applied Andrew Van de Ven’s (2007) Engaged Scholarship approach 
in both research and teaching; an approach that situates the research and learning experience in a 
dialogic setting with relevant stakeholders. 
We developed three types of courses that implicitly contained innovation and entrepreneurship, 
but mostly theorised these elements through the lens of transdisciplinarity.17 The first type uses a 
teaching and learning approach with three elements in a 50-25-25% division:  
1) Traditional classroom teaching and dialogue between teacher and students about academic 
literature and empirical examples. This element accounts for 50% of the time and will 
introduce different topics, theories, and concepts, which will be used to reflect upon, analyse, 
and discuss the other activities.  
2) Dialogue meetings with stakeholders relevant to the course topics accounting for 25% of the 
time. Students help prepare the dialogue meetings.  
3) Students’ own communication projects about a course topic communicated to a non-academic 
audience accounting for 25% of the time. Students are free to work in groups or individually 
and select form, medium, and audience. Examples of projects include writing a blog, writing 
newspaper articles, making videos, podcasts, posters, public speaking, a radio programme, 
teaching elementary school pupils, or art exhibitions. Students are supervised throughout the 
process from project formulation to implementation to make sure projects fit with the course 
content and learning outcomes. 
The second type of courses, projects on transition to a sustainable society, was developed as part 
of a larger project developing an old city house from the 1960s, which the University of the Faroe 
Islands inherited and uses (as per the testament) as a dormitory and guest house for foreign 
researchers. We call the house ‘The Green Student-House’, and have re-imagined it as a living 
learning lab. The larger project and vision is to develop the house into an example of how to 
retrofit and re-model a typical Faroese city house to a sustainable house, perhaps energy-neutral 
or energy+ house, through a pilot project of zero-emissions building. We work together with other 
schools, the municipality, architects, companies, and the neighbours and local community take part 
as well. All activities are documented on our websites.18 Examples of student projects include an 
aquaponics system, a self-composting composter, growing vegetables and mushrooms, and 
upcycling trash to garden furniture. Students are supervised throughout the process from project 
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formulation, literature search, website communication, and implementation to make sure projects 
fit with the course content and learning outcomes. 
The third type applies an Engaged Scholarship approach coupled with Narrative Governance 
theory in practice. Whenever possible we would bring students to workshops and conferences 
with stakeholders, and encourage them to become green change agents in their local communities. 
One course was a combination of these elements; a combined Master’s and PhD course on Arctic 
Science Diplomacy in Practice with a one-day intensive course prior to participating in the three-
day Arctic Circle conference. Other courses were in connection with a network called Green 
Growth Dialogue and its different conferences.19 
The Project Progression and Lessons Learned 
The first year of the project: “Promoting sustainable student entrepreneurship in the Arctic” has 
mapped the needs and challenges of introducing innovation and entrepreneurship as an integrated 
part of the educational programmes offered by the partner universities. Through group discussions 
of the very diverse needs and experiences identified, we found it important to work on two parallel 
tracks. On the one hand identifying and working with the specific needs of the places of 
implementation and experiences of the universities there. On the other hand identifying and 
translating the transferable skills and mind-set from the experienced partners to the new partners 
(e.g. from DTU and COA to West Nordic universities). Working with the SDGs and the 
Abundance Cycle framework is more or less the same across settings; however, developing and 
implementing new courses in Greenland and the Faroes is at this stage an experience of scaling 
down, focusing more on the social and environmental aspects and less on creating start-ups. 
Furthermore, it is about letting the students define and act out what is possible given the 
universities’ very limited resources.  
The main operational goal in the first year has been to train teachers at Arctic HE institutions 
based on the Abundance Cycle framework and the SDGs to be able to teach, train, and cultivate 
entrepreneurial mind-sets and competencies among students. Intensive workshops have been held 
at the partner universities for both faculty, senior students, and professional innovation facilitators, 
and business incubators. In combination with the training of teachers, the project has focused on 
the development and implementation of courses for students in sustainable entrepreneurship. The 
project has been presented to Arctic stakeholders: other universities, policy makers, and business 
sectors at the Arctic Circle Assembly in Reykjavik, 13-15 October 2017 and 19-21 October 2018, 
and at the Arctic Circle Forum in the Faroe Islands, 8-9 May 2018. The project has created 
awareness of the possibilities of integrating entrepreneurship thinking into the traditional HE 
systems.  
In the next phase, developing, implementing and evaluating pilot curricular courses at the 
participating universities will continue – the key parameters for success being to complete at least 
four pilot student courses. The project will also continue to disseminate the knowledge and results 
to a broader range of Nordic and Arctic stakeholders at the Arctic Circle Assembly and Forum as 
well as putting the method and the experiences learned at the disposal of other Arctic universities. 
In numbers, the project aims at educating 10 faculty to be able to integrate the Abundance Cycle 
framework in their teaching, thus supporting the education of around 100 new Arctic 
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entrepreneurs spread across the West Nordic countries, and finally to present the project concept 
and results at a minimum of four international workshops. 
Abundance Cycle Workshop – Train the Teachers 
In December 2017, the first course in the Abundance Cycle Framework was held at DTU by 
Professor Jay Friedlander. Participants came from the universities of Greenland, the Faroe Islands, 
Aarhus University, and DTU. Studies have shown that people believe in sustainable development, 
but are often unclear as to how to achieve these goals. As a result, sustainability efforts happen in 
an ad hoc fashion rather than a systemic approach – reducing impact and wasting valuable resources. 
Furthermore, plenty of evidence from books like Conscious Capitalism to Harvard Business 
Review articles and academic studies tracking stock market performance show that sustainability 
focused enterprises outperform their peers. The objective of the workshop was to teach 
participants how to break down constructs, utilize proven tactics and use the Abundance Cycle to 
plan, analyse, and maximise sustainable development impact from across the curriculum. 
Throughout the two workshop days, the participants shared experiences described above and 
explored how to use the model and learn from others who are already creating abundance. Based 
on the SDGs and knowledge of context and local needs in Greenland and the Faroe Islands, the 
participants came up with sustainable business ideas and developed the business models by 
applying the Abundance Cycle Canvas (see figure 3) and the Abundancy Cycle Tactics. As tools, 
the Canvas and Tactics helped break down the businesses into their core activities in order to 
understand their competitive strengths. One of the ideas spurred a new project on sustainable 
Arctic container farming, which DTU students have been engaged in developing further. The 
participants left the workshop with a toolkit for incorporating abundance into their teaching and 
projects. The next section describes how this was done at the University of Greenland the 
following semester. 
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Figure 3: The Abundance Cycle Canvas allows enterprises to chart out their strategy and sustainability 
together. 
Bringing the Arctic to DTU Skylab 
In the 2018 Spring semester, at the DTU course Hardtech Entrepreneurship taking place at DTU 
Skylab, the Abundance Cycle platform facilitated the start-up business Arctic Grow reusing shipping 
containers for growing crops in the Arctic. Arctic Grow was started by students from Denmark 
and the Faroe Islands and is reaching out to Greenland to spread the concept further North. 
Inspired by SDG number two, Zero Hunger, students at DTU Skylab decided to focus on issues 
of food security and food production in the Arctic. During the course, students battled with the 
many practical issues of locally grown produce in the Arctic, like the not uncommon lack of 
available goods due to weather conditions. They quickly discovered that food as a theme is related 
to other SDGs and sustainability within the Arctic in a myriad of ways: CO2 emissions from 
imports (e.g. SDG13 on Climate Action); accumulation of plastics and garbage (e.g. SDG14 on 
Life Below Water); spoilage and waste due to harsh climates and distances, high prices and their 
socio-economic impact on, often, low-income consumers, and, adverse effects on health such as 
diabetes and obesity due to the consumption of highly processed and low quality foods (e.g. SDG3 
on Good Health and Well-Being) (Jørgensen, 2010). While working on Arctic Grow, a self-
contained food production unit fitted within a repurposed shipping-container, the reality of scale 
of the problem became apparent to them. Not only did they realise how difficult such a solution 
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would be on a purely technical and financial level, but more importantly, how far-reaching the 
developmental implications of solving sustainable local food production in the Arctic can be. 
Two Courses at University of Greenland 
Based on the above, University of Greenland developed and taught two interdisciplinary courses 
in the Spring semester 2018. Both courses were offered to both Bachelor’s and Master’s level 
students. The first course, Sustainable Entrepreneurship I, ran from 5 February to 23 March, and 
the second course, Sustainable Entrepreneurship II, ran from 3 April to 18 June. The overall aim 
of the first course was that the students gain theoretical insight as well as hands-on experience with 
the pre-idea phase and planning for sustainable entrepreneurship (Marshall, Coleman & Reason, 
2017; Bastien & Holmarsdottir, 2017). The second course builds on this and aims for planning, 
executing, and evaluating sustainable development projects in an iterative way in close relations 
with stakeholders (Berzin & Pitt-Catsouphes, 2015; Foley & O’Connor, 2013; Gibson-Graham & 
Roelvink, 2014; Godoy et al, 2005). The two courses individually and together form an action 
research process (Marshall, Coleman & Reason, 2017): After an introduction to the core theories, 
concepts, and methodology in the first course, the students form interdisciplinary teams based on 
interests, previous experiences, preferences, mixing bachelor’s and master’s students, etc. After the 
team formation, groups go on a field trip to a socio-geographical setting and context of which the 
groups are working. Here the students will perform ethnographic research (interviews, 
observations, etc.) and improve the project together with the stakeholders.  
After the completed fieldwork, the groups analyse the data and embark on a creative process 
including divergent and convergent thinking. The Abundance Cycle Canvas will inspire, guide, and 
structure the creation of sustainable entrepreneurial opportunities. There have been eight students 
enrolled in both courses forming five teams, and at the time of writing, experiences are very 
positive.20 The students have gained a better understanding of innovative processes in theory and 
practice as well as understanding of the importance of connections to and inclusion of relevant 
local stakeholders both to create viable, successful projects, and to validate the assumptions, 
implementation process, and results of the projects. It was easy for teachers and students to work 
with the Sustainable Development Goals and the Abundance Cycle framework. Another positive 
experience of the project has been the strengthened relations between the local communities and 
the university, which can be a starting point for collaboration on future projects.  
A New Course on Innovation at the University of the Faroe Islands 
Starting in the Autumn of 2018, the University of the Faroe Islands will run an experimental new 
course on innovation. The course will be a 10 ECTS, semester-long academic and practical elective 
course open to all university students (Bachelor’s, Master’s, and PhD level) and external 
participants. Based on the core values and reading lists of the two courses offered at the University 
of Greenland, it will make use of the Sustainable Development Goals as a framing device and the 
Abundance Cycle framework as two of its key guiding principles. While the University of the Faroe 
Islands does not offer courses on entrepreneurship or innovation at the time of writing, since 
2015, initial experimental attempts to engage students utilising a combination of theoretical and 
practical work focusing on issues of local issues of sustainability have surpassed expectations. 
Furthermore, this built-up knowledge and experiences are combined with theoretical and practical 
training from the project workshop described above. The course will see students meet with local 
stakeholders from government, industry, civil society, and incubators in an effort to maximize the 
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impact of their chosen projects. While students will not be required to work on commercial 
ventures, their projects must take into account the triple-bottom-line outlined within the 
Abundance Cycle framework – and will be required to present their work to a panel of stakeholders 
they have encountered throughout the semester. 
Conclusion 
In this article, we have provided a project-based answer to the research question: How can 
entrepreneurship projects in Higher Education (HE) in the Arctic incorporate the Sustainable 
Development Goals? We argued that several trends are overlapping making this question and 
project relevant: Not only is HE in general experiencing more focus on innovation and 
entrepreneurship mind-set and transferable skills development, this is increasingly coupled with 
sustainability purposes and the SDGs widening and deepening the application of innovation and 
entrepreneurship. Furthermore, we observe the same trends in the Arctic: an increase in research 
and HE collaboration, more focus on innovation and entrepreneurship, and more focus on the 
SDGs; however, their combination in theory and practice is underdeveloped and understudied. 
This article has presented preliminary findings from the project: “Promoting sustainable student 
entrepreneurship in the Arctic”.  
The overall conclusion is that it is possible to incorporate the SDGs in HE in the Arctic, in our 
cases the Faroe Islands and Greenland, and bring SDGs and the Arctic into HE outside the Arctic, 
in our case Denmark. Based on a “train the teachers” workshop and many more meetings and 
workshops, two courses in Greenland implemented and demonstrated that the Abundance Cycle 
framework is a suitable theoretical and practical approach. It is easy to work with for teachers and 
students to include the SDGs in many different settings. It allowed us to bridge the gap between 
two diverse realities; to translate knowledge and experience from the resourceful and big-scale 
non-Arctic universities and reality to the less resourceful and small-scale Arctic universities and 
reality. Another finding from our project is that the existing courses and teaching approaches in 
the Faroe Islands and the new courses in Greenland have been able to demonstrate that students, 
if given the opportunity to lead, can drive projects quite far despite the universities’ lack of 
resources utilising e.g. own social capital and goodwill from society. Thus, it seems obvious, that 
with a more focused approach on innovation and entrepreneurship coupled with the SDGs in HE 
in the Arctic, applying a clear framework like the Abundance Cycle, and with better trained teachers 
and new experiences, Arctic universities and not least the students can take SDG projects even 
further as we get closer to 2030. 
 
Notes 
1. First and second being research and teaching.  
2. For a full list and description see https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs. 
3. An independent institute and forum for debate in Australia (similar to Chatham House).  
4. It is beyond the scope of this article to cover all the HE actors working on SDGs in the 
Arctic. 
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5. University of Akureyri joined the project later in 2018 and activities there are not covered 
in this article. 
6. See also www.coldclimate-master.org; www.eitrawmaterials.eu 
7. See www.skylab.dtu.dk  
8. See http://eurotech-universities.eu/  
9. See http://www.nordicfivetech.org/  
10. See http://euxcel.eu/  
11. See www.skylab.dtu.dk/programmes/ignite  
12. See www.europeanventureprogramme.com   
13. See http://www.skylab.dtu.dk/programmes/funding  
14. See http://hardtechentrepreneurship.dk/  
15. See http://www.oi-x.dtu.dk/  
16. See www.unleash.org 
17. See appendix for list of courses. 
18. www.lindbergshus.fo and www.greenstudenthouse.com 
19. See also www.greengrowthdialogue.com 
20. The courses have not been formally evaluated yet. 
21. A PhD course was offered, but no PhD students signed up. 
22. No courses were offered because of a lack of teaching resources, but the conference is 
part of one student’s master’s thesis on tourism in the Faroe Islands. 
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Appendix 
 
Name of course ECTS Where When / student 
no. 
Political Sociology of Governance and 
Sustainable Management in the West Nordic 
Region 
10 Uni. Faroe 
Islands 
Autumn 2015 / 5 
Autumn 2017 / 
10 
Science, Economics and Politics of 
Sustainability, Climate, and Environment 
10 Uni. Faroe 
Islands 
Autumn 2015 / 5 
Autumn 2017 / 
10 
West Nordic Geopolitics from a Faroese 
Perspective 
10 Uni. Faroe 
Islands 
Autumn 2016 / 
10 
Governance and Sustainable Management in 
the Faroe Islands 
10 Uni. Faroe 
Islands 
Autumn 2016 / 
10 
Table 1. Overview of 50-25-25% courses (Master’s level) 
 
 
 
 
Project  ECTS When Student no 
Aquaponics system and food security in the 
Faroe Islands 
10 Autumn 2016 2 (and 1 teacher) 
Mushroom growing and food security in the 
Faroe Islands 
10 Autumn 2016 2 
Composting, community building, and food 
security in the Faroe Islands 
10 Autumn 2016 2 
Potato planting, youth action, SDGs, and 
food security in the Faroe Islands 
5 Spring 2017 1 
5R guidelines for sustainable living 10 Autumn 2017 1 
Window plants in homemade recycled glass 
pots 
10 Autumn 2017 1 
Garden makeover, community-building, and 
upcycling 
10 Autumn 2017 1 
History of Lindberg and Lindberg’s House 15 Spring 2018 1 
Table 2. Overview of Green Student-House projects, University of the Faroe Islands (Master’s level) 
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Name of course Level ECTS Where When /  
student no. 
Focus 
Green Growth 
Dialogue 
Master  0 Reykjavik, 
Iceland 
3 days, 
August 2015 
/ 15 
Green Diplomacy; 
Renewable Energy 
Green Growth 
Dialogue 
Master  5 Nuuk, 
Greenland 
 
3 days, May 
2016 / 10 
 
Sustainable Shipping; 
Indigenous peoples 
climate action 
Green Growth 
Dialogue 
Master21 5 Sandoy, 
Faroe 
Islands 
5 days, June 
2017 / 10 
Sustainable 
Agriculture; 
Aquaponics and 
Hydroponics in the 
Arctic 
Green Growth 
Dialogue 
Master22 30 Tórshavn, 
Faroe 
Islands 
3 days, May 
2018 / 1 
Responsible Tourism 
Arctic Science 
Diplomacy in 
Practice 
Master 
and PhD 
5 Reykjavik, 
Iceland 
4 days, 
October 
2017 / 15 
students 
Science Diplomacy in 
theory and practice. 
Participation in Arctic 
Circle  
Table 3. Overview of Engaged Scholarship courses offered by the University of the Faroe Islands 
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Coherence in the Greenlandic Education System? 
Educational Planning & Evaluation in Greenland 
from a Complexity Theory Perspective 
 
Mîtdlârak Lennert 
 
A solid primary school is an important part of the foundation for creating a strong and sustainable society. Almost every 
country has undertaken school system reforms during the past two decades, but very few have succeeded in improving their 
systems from poor to fair to good to great to excellent (Mourshed et al., 2010). History, culture, and context matter for 
understanding applicability, if any, of one educational innovation over another. This can be said to have been the case in 
Greenland. One of the fundamental objectives after the introduction of Home Rule in 1979 was to adapt the Danish structures 
and systems to the Greenlandic conditions and culture. This article aims to analyze the Greenlandic education governance 
system and how the central level design, organizes and steers education systems across complex multilevel governance 
arrangements. In governing educational systems, how the central and the decentralized levels interact and communicate and how 
this affects trust, cooperation and negotiation of conflicts, and ultimately the outcomes of reform, will be discussed. 
 
 
Introduction  
This article is a case study analysis of the Greenland education governance system through the lens 
of complexity theory. It examines the governance approach with an emphasis on the primary and 
lower secondary school system (grades 1-10, ages 6-16). Coherence in education systems is defined 
by Fullan and Quinn (2016) as the shared depth of understanding about the purpose and nature of the work 
across governance levels. In terms of enabling better teaching and greater outcomes for students, 
the focus of this article is on how the governance system coordinates and evaluates the strategies 
around these efforts.  
Unlike other former colonized and Indigenous peoples around the Arctic, the Greenlanders 
constitute the majority of the population, and also have full law-related decision-making powers 
in many areas, including education (Darnell & Hoem, 1996). This makes education in Greenland 
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unique as to the postcolonial context and society; the policies, perspectives and content of 
education affect not only the educational situation, but the opportunities for change and 
development in the society as well. However, the challenges in education that other Indigenous 
peoples in the Arctic face, can largely be found in Greenland as well. With only 56,000 people, the 
small and geographically dispersed population poses many political and economic challenges. 
While the education level within the population of Greenland is increasing,1 60% of the workforce 
has no education beyond primary and secondary school (Statistics Greenland, 2018). 
The formal education system and the culture of education in Greenland is still young and with 
varying specific national and regional challenges. One of the fundamental objectives after the 
introduction of Home Rule was to adapt the educational systems to Greenlandic conditions and 
culture. The cultural and economic transformation during the 1950s throughout the introduction 
of Home Rule resulted in significant challenges in the attempt of adapting frameworks, content 
and context to the educational system in Greenland.  
Greenland is facing the same challenges as education systems outside the Arctic, namely the 
pressure for better results and an increasing level of education in the population. However, in 
addressing these challenges, Greenland has a different starting point than most developed 
countries, and therefore has different opportunities and options available. Exploring developments 
in the Greenland context highlights what may be crucial to develop policies that both address and 
reveals some of the challenging cultural, geographic, political, and economic realities. This article 
examines these differences and opportunities, but also the similarities that cut across nations when 
it comes to effective education governance. 
Literature Review: Education Governance & Complexity Theory Framework 
There is a growing body of evidence on the different factors that contribute to education improve-
ment. A number of international reports have reviewed the factors that contribute to quality 
education (See for example Fullan, 2015; Fullan & Quinn, 2016; Levin, 2010; Hargreaves & Shirley, 
2012; Barber & Mourshed, 2007; Mourshed et al., 2010; Schleicher, 2012; Elmore, 2004; OECD, 
2015). The takeaways being that to guide reform efforts, education systems rely on evaluation and 
assessment, and ensuring capacity at the local level to successfully implement reforms.  
Currently, many educational philosophers and researchers are focusing on the complex nature of 
education and offer complexity theory as a useful research paradigm, and a necessary mean for 
understanding change within complex social systems (e.g. Snyder, 2013, Johnson, 2008). The 
theory of complexity offers a means to analyze emerging patterns and trends to illuminate how the 
disparate system parts are, or are not, working together (McQuillan, 2008: 1773). A central concern 
of complexity theory is thus with the relationships among the elements or agents that constitute a 
particular and sufficiently complex environment or system (Mason, 2008: 33). The concepts 
behind complexity theory give rise to analyze the reform processes retrospectively, as a way to 
learn more about the elements, power structures and relationships in the complex system, but also 
as a framework to navigate current reform processes. The successful implementation of a centrally 
designed reform depends largely on the capacity and the resources on the local level to fulfill the 
reform goals and put them into practice, as the amount and quality of connections between system 
elements likewise impact a system’s ability to adapt (Trombly, 2014). A key challenge for countries 
is assuring alignment and consistency in governance approaches to guide their entire systems 
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towards improving outcomes. Fullan and Quinn (2016) defines coherence making in education as a 
continuous process of making and remaking meaning in your own mind and in your culture, 
resulting in consistency and specificity and clarity of action across schools and across governance 
levels, as a way to create consistency and alignment.  
Understanding the origins of the dynamics of educational systems from a complexity lens opens 
up a fresh perspective for thinking about and managing these systems. As according to Trombly 
(2014: 48), complex systems whose agents and elements are isolated from one another are both 
slower to adapt and less likely to achieve genuine learning; while those whose agents and elements 
regularly engage and coordinate with one another are far more capable to learn and thrive (Trombly, 
2014: 48). In complex systems, by not rather than assuming such predictable and linear interactions 
among discrete elements in an educational system, complexity theory instead draws attention to the 
evolving inter-relationships among system elements at various levels of the system (McQuillan, 
2008: 1773). This focus on interrelationships is especially important in the Greenlandic multilevel 
educational governance setting, as coherence between stakeholders in various levels of the 
governance layers is decisive for planning in implementation. The assumptions that lead to stability 
of educational systems are deeply rooted in the overlapping structures that comprise the system 
(Model 1 is an example of a complexity model of the Greenlandic primary and lower secondary 
school) and indeed, within the social and cultural context in which they operate. It is essential to 
understand the micro-structural relationships that shape the macro behavior of the system if 
change efforts are to be successful.  
 
Model 1. A complexity model of the Greenland primary and secondary school system 
 
The figure illustrates how groups and organizations affect the everyday life of the school in 
question, but also how they affect each other.2 Schools and education systems are self-organized 
in that their structure and function often spontaneously shift as the actions and reactions of 
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autonomous agents become interlinked. Schools and education systems are also emergent in that, as 
the continual evolution and communication between actors transcends the sum of the component parts 
(Johnson, 2008), while, however, the communication that takes place between actors within 
schools and the education systems is often dependent on the coherence of the short-range 
relationships and constructive communication within the system. 
Research Problem 
According to Fazekas and Burns (2012) policy making needs to be aligned to its governance 
structure and take into account the respective responsibilities of different actors. This article 
analyzes how Greenland addresses the challenges and opportunities to the educational system, and 
how stakeholders work for system improvement. How do the different primary stakeholders 
implement education policies in a complex environment and how are they supported in this 
process? The role of national government versus local government and school boards in 
countering the quality of teaching provided is examined.  
Methodology 
The research design, inspired by the Governing Complex Education Systems case study structure 
(Burns & Köster, 2016), emphasizes the analyzing of reform processes with a focus on planning, 
evaluation and coherence between the different actors. The present study takes a qualitative case 
study approach to analyze the Greenland primary and lower secondary school governance system.  
Case study data collection provides the opportunity to employ multiple sources of evidence. As 
such, rich and descriptive data reveals the complexity involved within the selected case site. 
Qualitative methodology encourages detailed description and fits the objectives to document the 
circumstances surrounding educational policies and practices in Greenland. Practice, or the way of 
doing things, is defined by Bennett and Checkel (2014: 241) as socially meaningful and organized 
patterns of activities. As practice can differ from policy intentions, inquiries into ‘the way of doing 
things’ among the different actors in the governance system provides important information for 
understanding the context of the reform processes in the education system in Greenland.  
Data Collection and Analysis 
Yin (1982) considers three research methods particularly suited for examining public policies: (1) 
non-structured interviews; (2) documentation study; and (3) participatory observation. Empirical 
data were collected using in-depth interviews (n=17), informal interviews (n=10), documentary 
analysis and field observation (over 2 years). Observations at key meetings and interviews with 
primary stakeholders in different levels of government about their experiences and understandings 
of roles were conducted. The observation notes and interviews were transcribed and analyzed 
using the Nvivo software. The interview excerpts were translated by the author.  
Limitations 
This study applies an empirical–analytical approach rather than a theoretical–conceptual one. I 
have chosen not to focus on pedagogy or curricula, however important these subjects might be in 
themselves, as there is much less focus on the school ‘system’ itself – the critical infrastructure that 
underpins performance – and how it creates conditions for great education for every child.  
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Table 1. Overview of research techniques and collected data  
Research technique Data 
Text analysis of relevant primary documents Parliamentary/governmental documents and documents 
produced at local level 
Secondary analysis Internal and external evaluations of policy 
Semi-structured elite interviews with key 
stakeholders 
Policy makers 
Representatives of school boards 
Heads of schools 
Teachers  
Observation of key meetings between 
governance levels 
Observation notes 
 
The Educational Context of Greenland 
Greenland is a self-governing country within the Kingdom of Denmark. An education system 
strongly rooted in the Danish system was inherited when the Greenland Home Rule assumed 
responsibility for the education sector in 1980. In accordance with changing policies over the years 
the education system in Greenland has gone through an evolutionary process. With the basic 
political consensus being a need for higher levels of education among the population, planning in 
the education policy front has been the subject of demands for quick results; partly to minimize 
imported foreign labor, and later, to achieve more autonomy and independence. 
Given that the education system was based on the Danish education system, the reality was, and 
still is today, that for Greenlandic students to continue studying after primary and lower secondary 
school it is a prerequisite that they have a working knowledge of the Danish and English language. 
Greenland has one university, Ilisimatusarfik, which offers 11 university degrees. Many Greenlandic 
students therefore obtain undergraduate and graduate degrees, free of tuition, in Denmark.     
Today, the modern public primary and lower secondary school system, which is the focus of this 
research, has just about 8,000 students in 87 schools along the 4,700 kilometer habitable coast line, 
from Qaanaaq and Siorapaluk in the far north to Nanortalik and Narsaq Kujalleq in the south, to 
Ittoqqortoormiit in the East. 2017 statistics from the Ministry of Education show that 40% of the 
children that complete primary and lower secondary schooling do not directly continue in further 
schooling. The primary and lower secondary school is one unit. 
Background and Outcome of the 2002 Atuarfitsialak3 Reform 
Your starting point in a school reform often has a big impact on where you end up. The work with 
Atuarfitsialak (The Good School in Greenlandic) had shown the necessity that the entire primary 
and lower secondary school should be redefined from being a copy of another system into an 
international school based on Greenlandic culture and values. A key person in the reform process 
wrote: 
We had to tear everything down to build it up again. It is to be a Greenlandic school, which should 
be competitive, international, and based on research. That has been the task here in Greenland, 
where there has not been much research. (Hindby in Folkeskolen, 2003, author’s translation). 
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The purpose of Atuarfitsialak-reform was to improve primary and lower secondary school 
education. The teaching method was changed, as it departed from the traditional hourly teaching, 
which was based on one classroom, one teacher and one lesson, and towards a more project-
oriented teaching method with the individual student at the center (Greenland Parliament Debates, 
Agenda 29, 2002). A major prerequisite for the anticipated success of Atuarfitsialak objectives was 
to significantly improve the physical frameworks of the schools, and more bilingual teachers to lift 
the task (Greenland Parliament Debates, Agenda 29, 2002). 
After the preparatory phase of experience gathering, preparation of a status description, and a 
nationwide survey of students’ wishes and attitudes towards the school, a conference was held in 
September 1999. The conference expressed a number of recommendations for further reform. 
The result was a proposal for a legislation, which for the first time in the Greenlandic history 
included the socio-cultural perspective of education. As something completely new, a 10-year 
compulsory program was laid out, divided into three clearly defined stages, each with description 
of purpose and educational profile (Greenland Primary and Lower Secondary School Act, 2002). 
The school was to be grounded in the Greenlandic culture, values, traditions and facts, but also 
have an international outlook. 
A ‘Study of Readiness’ conducted by the Agency of Education (Inerisaavik, 2004), a subdivision 
under the Ministry of Education, was completed at the end of 2003 (same year as the start of 
implementation). The key results were that 10% of the teachers reported that they had detailed 
knowledge of formal elements in the reform and teachers reported lack of capacity building, 
information, teaching materials, cooperation and trained teachers as barriers for implementation.  
In 2015 the primary and lower secondary school was evaluated by an external consultancy (EVA, 
2015). The evaluation concluded that the municipal school authorities, including school leaders, 
have not been able to create or support intended changes in leadership, teaching and practice that 
are needed to create the educational environments that support the demands of modern society 
on the professional and human competencies of our children. Conclusions from the ‘readiness 
study’ (Inerisaavik, 2004) and the external evaluation (EVA, 2015) conducted 12 years later indicate 
that the necessary clarity and capacity to implement the intentions behind the reform has not been 
sufficient.  
Steering from the Centre in Greenland: Governance Gaps, Roles and 
Responsibilities  
The educational system in Greenland is, like many other countries, characterized by a decentralized 
multi-level governance system (e.g. Wilkoszewski & Sundby, 2014; Blanchenay, Burns & Köster, 
2016). This decentralization has contributed to the fact that more decision-makers and more 
stakeholders have become more involved in primary and lower secondary schools. The many layers 
of administration make relationships complex, as the responsibility for a good primary and lower 
secondary school is shared between decision makers across the governance system (see also Table 
2). A main challenge in multi-level systems is the question of who retains the responsibility for 
oversight and steering. This is particularly true for the education sector, as there is a general trend 
towards more comparability and compatibility of curricula and education outcomes across regions 
and countries: even in very decentralized systems the central level will need to retain some steering 
capacity, if national or international standards are to be monitored and met (Burns & 
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Wilkoszewski, 2013). Hence, the inherent asymmetry between the various governance levels in 
multi-level contexts persists. This asymmetry leads to governance gaps in seven areas: information, 
capacity, fiscality, policy, administrative, objectives and accountability (Charbit, 2011; Charbit & 
Michalun, 2009). 
The seven governance gaps are explored in the context of Greenland in the following sections.  
Schools are per force highly decentralized as the Greenlandic people live in small towns and 
settlements along the coastline. To be effective, reforms have to reach into even the most distant 
classrooms, which mean they may have to go through multiple levels of administrative hierarchy, 
including provincial, municipal, and school-level directors any of whom can delay, dilute, or distort 
reforms (Bruns & Schneider, 2016).  
Table 2. Governance gaps in multi-level education governance systems 
Governance gap Description 
Information gap Asymmetries of information (quantity, quality, type) between different 
stakeholders, either voluntary or not. The central governance level often has 
better access to quality information (e.g., comparative data on school 
performance) than the local level. Also, the central level usually has better 
capacity to use this information. At the same time, the local level has direct 
access to information on how policy reforms affect schools – data that the 
central level first needs to gather. This information asymmetry on both sides 
can hinder the successful implementation of educational policies. 
Capacity gap Insufficient scientific, technical, infrastructural capacity of local actors, in 
particular for designing appropriate strategies. This gap occurs when there is a 
lack of human capital and financial resources between levels of government.  
Fiscal/funding gap Unstable or insufficient revenues undermining effective implementation of 
responsibilities at sub-national level or for crossing policies. Sub-national 
governments’ own revenues (taxes and fees) often exceed their expenditure 
responsibilities in education, while the lower levels in the system suffer from 
too few financial means.  
Policy gap This gap results from the incoherence between sub-national policy needs and 
national level policy initiatives. It can occur when ministries take a purely 
vertical approach to policy issues that are inherently cross-sectoral.  
Administrative gap This gap occurs when the administrative scale for policy making, in terms of 
spending as well as strategic planning, is not in line with functional relevant 
areas. A very common case concerns municipal fragmentation which can lead 
jurisdictions to set ineffective public action by not benefitting from economies 
of scale.  
Objective gap A gap in objective can emerge, when the various levels do not coordinate their 
aims to make them coherent across policy areas. This is particularly the case 
when objectives are prioritized asynchronously: a national education ministry 
might look for strong accountability measures to foster international 
competitiveness of the system, whereas municipalities might first look for 
necessary infrastructure and capacity building.  
Accountability gap Difficulty to ensure the transparency of practices across the different 
constituencies. This gap occurs when the necessary institutional quality 
measurement mechanisms for each governance level are lacking or misplaced.  
 
Source: Classification of Charbit (2011). 
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The primary and lower secondary schools in Greenland are a municipal responsibility, and neither 
the Agency for Education (a subdivision under the Ministry of Education) nor the Ministry of 
Education have any enforcement authority. Inatsisartut (the national parliament) sets the legal and 
governance framework for the primary and lower secondary school, while the detailed provisions 
are laid down by Naalakkersuisut (the national government). In the municipalities, the municipal 
council determines the goals and frameworks for schools’ activities with by-laws. At each school, 
there are school boards, which - within the goals and limits set by the municipal council - lay down 
principles for activities of the school. The administrative and pedagogical management of the 
municipal school system is regulated locally by the individual municipality.  
 
Table 3. Overview of key roles, interests and interventions 
 
Stakeholders Role/interest Intervention repertoire 
Central level: 
Ministry of Education 
and The 
Agency of Education 
-Responsible for the overall quality 
of teaching in primary and secondary 
schools 
-Professional consultancy service  
-Development of teaching materials  
-Evaluation of primary and 
secondary school activities 
-Provider of teacher professional 
development courses  
-Overall supervision/monitoring of 
primary and secondary schools 
-Development of national policy 
-Development of quality norms 
-Supervision of quality of teaching 
-Can establish requirements and 
criteria in the form of accreditation 
models for achieving the purpose 
and foundation of the primary 
school 
- Issues curricula, learning 
objectives and standardized tests 
-Appoints external examiners 
Regional level: 
(Municipal Council and 
administration) 
-Owner of school buildings and 
responsible for their maintenance 
-The municipal council regularly 
supervises/monitors the activities of 
the schools 
-By-laws 
-Hiring and  
-Supervision of quality of teaching 
-Establishes goals and frameworks 
for the school's activities 
Local level: 
Parent School Council 
-The school board carries out its 
activities within the goals and limits 
laid down by the municipal board, 
and supervises the activities of the 
school. 
-The school board sets objectives 
for the school's teaching and other 
activities. 
-Approves the school's teaching 
plan for each school year. 
-Supervision of quality of teaching 
 
 
School principal -Manages and is responsible for the 
day to day operation in the school 
 
-Internal quality monitoring  
-Prepares proposals for the school 
board regarding the school's 
teaching plan for each school year 
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and guidelines for other school 
activities 
Teacher -Responsible for the quality of 
teaching 
in the classroom 
 
-Make changes in the classroom 
-Contact with parents 
-Motivating the students 
Parents and students -Client of the education system, 
some formally part of local school 
council 
-Participate actively in the school 
-Assist with day-to-day activities 
Source: Greenland Primary and Lower Secondary School Act 2017, Government of Greenland. Author’s translation 
Decentralization has allowed local authorities and schools a greater degree of freedom to respond 
to diverse and local demands. Individual schools can formulate programs and school visions, 
missions and values with a high degree of autonomy. There are no requirements from the central 
or decentralized level to the existence or content of these, other than they must fit within the 
overall intentions of the Education Act and the municipal by-laws. Given the multilevel 
governance structure in the education system, the division of roles and responsibilities is a 
continuous matter of debate. Tension exists between steering and control on outcomes by the 
national government on the one hand, and the autonomy of the municipalities and schools 
regarding the delivery of education on the other. The central government acts as regulator for the 
education system, setting the legal framework and rules within which increasingly autonomous 
schools must operate. Alignment in multi-level systems is a major challenge, particularly in those 
most decentralized systems (Hopfenbeck et al., 2013; Blanchenay, Burns & Köster, 2016). Apart 
from the increased role for schools and local administrations, there is a host of other stakeholders 
(including teacher unions, teachers, parents, the media and students themselves, see also Model 1) 
that play a significant role. When it comes to setting a national education strategy, negotiation and 
dialogue have therefore become important governance mechanisms. 
The central level is required by law to carry out evaluations, collect and disseminate knowledge in 
order to strengthen the efforts of the municipal council in the field of primary school and lower 
secondary school to maximize resource utilization. In practice, due to an expressed lack of 
resources and capacity by the Agency of Education, this is limited to the collection and validation 
of data in the form of reports, standardized test results and final examination results. As shown in 
Table 3 and 4, the central, regional and local level of the governance system all have supervisory 
obligations. These obligations, however, are not specified in content nor frequency, other than 
what is stated written in the Greenland Primary and Lower Secondary School Act 2017. These 
obligations are summarized in Table 3.   
Table 4. Supervisory obligations between governance levels  
Central level (Ministry and 
Agency of Education) 
Regional level (Municipal 
administration and Board) 
Local level (School board, 
consisting of parent 
representatives) 
§ 37. The Greenland 
Government supervises the 
municipality administration of 
§ 43. The municipality council 
has the overall responsibility for 
the municipal school and ensure 
§ 47. The school board carries 
out its activities within the goals 
and framework set out by the 
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this Act. Sub-section. 2. The 
Government of Greenland may 
require municipal information 
deemed necessary to carry out 
its duties under this Act. 
that all children of school age in 
the municipality are enrolled in 
public school or receive an 
education commensurate with 
what is usually required in 
primary and lower secondary 
school. The municipal council 
sets goals and frameworks for 
the school's activities. The 
municipality council regularly 
supervises the activities of the 
schools, including in relation to 
the school’s compliance with the 
provisions of the education act. 
municipality council, and shall 
moreover supervise the 
activities of the school. 
Source: Greenland Primary and Lower Secondary School Act 2017, author’s translation 
The regulation and supervision structure of the Greenland education system reflects the traditional 
forms of education regulation elsewhere, known as the bureaucratic-professional model,4 which is 
based on arrangements such as control of conformity to rules, the socialization and autonomy of 
the teaching professionals and the joint regulation regarding questions of employment or 
curriculum.  
The supervisory obligations by the central level is hampered by the fact that the Agency of 
Education is on one hand obligated to supervise the quality of teaching and on the other have the 
responsibility for capacity development and professional learning of the teachers and schools. This 
construction in practice, results in the entire management and supervision of the school system 
resting on reports by the local school board and statistics without a professional, external authority 
to question the quality and validity of this information. Nor are there formulated any follow-up or 
support mechanisms following the results of a supervision in a school with ‘underperformance’, 
or formulated any threshold for when a school underperforms. Apart from the formal supervision, 
centrally appointed examiners perform indirect supervision. 
According to the Greenland Primary and Lower Secondary School Act (2017), local school boards, 
consisting of parent representatives, carry a significant role and responsibility, when it comes to 
the management and supervision of primary and lower secondary schools.  
There are probably some things about the board work as in which the board is given quite much 
power in relation to the regulation and such. But where the boards do not really manage to take that 
power. So, if a board wanted something, really wanted, then there are really many options for the 
board (Interview, Chairman of School Board, School X). 
The local school council, a construction introduced in 1997, are to present an annual report to the 
municipality council. The purpose of the annual report is to strengthen the ability of the 
municipality council to carry out their supervisory obligation. The annual report documents the 
municipality school system and shall give the municipality council the foundation for assessing the 
academic level at the municipality primary and lower secondary schools and the opportunity to 
intervene if necessary (Qeqqata Municipality, by-laws, author’s translation).  
The only kind of supervision we perform, is actually based on information from the school 
management. And we have not taken the initiative to come and observe anything, so it has been 
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driven exclusively through the information we receive from the management on how it goes. 
(Interview, Chairman of School Board, School X)  
They (the school board) are in lack of both insight and skills to assess almost all the details of a 
school leader’s tasks. And that is on a regular day. On difficult issues or assignments, e.g. follow up 
on municipal guidelines, there is no help for them. Finally, they’re in no position to question any 
disposition from either school leadership or municipal direction. That’s bad! (Interview, School 
leader, School Y) 
The above interview excerpts illustrates an international trend; in countries where school 
decentralization reforms have granted significant power to school level councils including parent 
representation, researchers have found that parents often do not feel empowered to challenge the 
views of school directors and teachers, given income and class disparities (Bruns & Schneider, 
2016). 
The school principal is responsible for the day to day operation in the school and internal quality 
monitoring, and according to above interview excerpts, provides all material and information for 
which the supervision structure rests upon. One school leader has experienced a significant lack 
of assistance from the authorities: 
Supervision as a concept is completely absent in our line of work. If, as a school leader, you ask for 
advice, counsel or guidance you will likely get a non-answer or a reminder on municipal goals. The 
idea of dialogue on a specific difficult matter seems not to exist. You’re on your own! I have not 
experienced anyone perform supervision on a leadership basis. Nobody seems to want to know or 
learn what is actually going on at the schools, much less in the classrooms. Once the guidelines have 
been formulated the general perception seems to be that they’re already in effect. Well, it doesn’t 
work like that!  (Interview, School leader, School Y) 
Summary of Governance Structure 
Practice and governance structure are defined partly by the interrelationships (see also Model 1) in 
the governance system and society as a whole. The decisions and practice are influenced by the 
networks and context the stakeholders find themselves in. Every vital part of the system – school, 
community, municipality, and government – contributes individually to the system as a whole to 
drive improvement and success.  
According to Fazekas and Burns (2012) policy making needs to be aligned to its governance 
structure and take into account the respective responsibilities of different agents. When 
reorganizing decision making and strengthening local capacity, education systems should have 
capacity at the ministry level, and support at regional and local levels to drive large-scale 
improvements (OECD, 2015). One can discuss if that is the case in Greenland. The governance 
structure seems to have been designed for a bigger society, and so will require a greater level of 
capacity at all governance levels. The respective responsibilities throughout the system is 
distributed between governance levels and offers a high degree of autonomy. However, this high 
degree of autonomy needs to be accompanied with the required capacity, support mechanisms and 
knowledge to fulfill the intentions of policy. Due to the composition and capacity of the local 
parent school boards to carry out the responsibility, the foundation of which the supervision of 
quality assurance rests upon should therefore be questioned. 
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The legislation has not looked at practical possibilities and does not fit into the Greenlandic 
conditions. It is not adapted to everyday life (Governance meeting observation November 2016, 
comment by Kujalleq Municipality).  
Capacity, both in the form of staff and funding, varies greatly among the five municipalities, as the 
municipalities with the lowest populations also have the highest numbers of settlement schools.5  
Drivers For Change – How Does Greenland Work for System Improvement? 
In the previous section the focus was the governance structure, the roles and responsibilities of 
agents at the various levels of the education system. In this section, the analysis focuses on how 
the various stakeholders address quality and what types of strategies for planning and 
implementation have been used to set a direction, to ensure capacity and ownership at local level, 
and lastly how these efforts are monitored and evaluated.  
Fullan (2011) defines drivers as policy and strategy levers that have the least and best chance of 
driving successful reform. A right driver is identified as a policy or initiative that ends up achieving 
better measurable results for students, while a wrong driver is identified as a deliberate policy that 
has little chance of changing status quo and achieving the desired result. The right drivers are effective 
because they work directly on changing the culture and practice. Fullan (2011) further states 
intrinsic motivation, instructional improvement, teamwork, ‘allness’ as the crucial elements for 
whole system reform and aligning the goals of reform.  
According to McQuillan (2008: 1781), all education reforms assume that some system, be it a 
classroom, school, district or nation, is ineffective. The root cause of the ineffectiveness, 
depending on where in the hierarchy one sits, seem to be a matter of how one should frame the 
discussion – in terms of people or numbers.  As expressed by a school teacher: 
I do not believe that the political ambitions are compatible with the reality of the school. I think 
those politicians should try to get out and experience what a public school is! And it does not matter 
if we speak the highest political level or the municipal level. They set some goals, but they never 
come out and see the reality. It quickly becomes a matter of numbers and percentages, and the 
numbers they should preferably be black on the bottom line (Interview, School teacher, School C). 
The following sections look at what lead drivers and underlying theory of action has been 
employed over the last 15 years of education policy in Greenland.  
Objectives, Accountability Structures and Evaluative Thinking 
According to the OECD (2015) the key to guide education policy improvement is to establish a 
small number of clear, prioritized and measurable goals that can drive the system for all those 
involved. Fullan and Quinn (2016) likewise identify accountability as a driver for system 
improvement, however for that to work, there needs to be a culture of evaluation in the system. It 
must make sense to evaluate. To evaluate, objectives must be formulated. So, what types of 
objectives are being set, what is being monitored and for what purpose? Evaluation culture and an 
intent to pursue overall strategies is expressed as a requirement by the central level in the below 
excerpt, but there is no further information on how this should be done. 
Resources allocated to education must be exploited optimally to consistently pursue overall 
strategies. This requires a strong evaluation culture that can continuously inform the administrative 
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and political level of the impact of the efforts (Ministry Education Strategy, 2015, author’s 
translation). 
An interim evaluation report (2010) for the 2002 Atuarfitsialak reform revealed that there is much 
data that describes public schools from many perspectives, however, that data was either difficult 
to access, often not on a digitalized form, or presented in such a way that makes it difficult for 
policy makers to analyze the numbers and make decisions (Inerisaavik, 2011). 
Specification of policy objectives and means is one of the factors influencing successful 
implementation (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983; Blackmore, 2001). The Ministry of Education has 
since 2005 developed education strategies and plans on system and national level. A direction is 
set from the central level with a framework legislation and an overall education strategy. However, 
this direction is not defined or clarified further. A review of 30 years of education policy in 
Greenland suggests that educational reform work has lacked objectives and strategies to guide the 
changes and implementation forward in the system (Lennert, 2014). As a result, there has been no 
national monitoring of the education system prior to the 2005 Education Plan. The only current 
system-level monitored objectives for the primary and lower secondary school consists of 
quantitative output targets, e.g. proportion of cohorts continuing directly in the education system 
and the proportion of trained teachers. A wish for more elaboration on the centrally set direction 
and goals was expressed by a municipal board member, as there is no clarification of what is meant 
by quality, and therefore makes the concept subjective.  
What is behind the statistics and numbers? What is it that we need to work on? We all have the same 
overall goal, that is better outcomes for our kids. But how we reach our goals, is the question. We all 
have goals, but we need to have a closer look at the implications of these goals and how to reach 
them (Interview, Municipal Board Member). 
Naalakkersuisut (the national government) states in their Education Strategy (2015) that it is their 
intention to strive for more people completing an education and therefore better able to support 
themselves and their families. In addition, education in Greenland is seen as a means of a self-
sustaining economy and independence; the overall objective of the education system is “for 
cohorts who complete primary and lower secondary school by 2015, 70% shall obtain 
training/education leading to a vocational or professional qualification before the age of 35” 
(Ministry Education Strategy, 2015: 8). 
The stated theory of action can be said to position the rationale of education for the sake of society, 
not the individual. This contradicts on some level the 21st century knowledge and information 
society Greenland is situated in and the value of knowledge (especially Indigenous knowledge6) in 
itself.  
The Education Strategy (2015) forms the basis for Greenland’s cooperation with the EU through 
the Partnership Agreement (European Commission, 2014).7 The Partnership Agreement provides 
a responsibility to ensure that the level of education is raised, that this is done effectively and that 
the efforts are continuously evaluated. The agreement has meant that the Self-Government of 
Greenland has focused even more on results and progress in education, as the Partnership 
Agreement has a reporting obligation on a set of indicators. Interviews with municipal staff and 
board members indicated a lack of inclusion in the construction of the indicators and a wish for 
better consultation processes. 
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Better consultation processes are needed. We would like to be consulted on how we’d like to govern 
our schools, because we are the ones in charge of the operation, the implementation and supervision. 
Maybe, if they listened more to our needs we would all end up with a solution that we were satisfied 
with. If they listened more carefully and asked for what information we have and used that in their 
planning. Better cooperation on top-down and bottom-up approaches. From the politicians to the 
ones who carry out the change in the field and vice versa. That connection needs to be better 
(Interview, Municipal Board Member). 
In Europe the traditional form of education regulation through rule-governed processes, 
centralized legal frameworks and shared assumptions has been shifting to and been replaced by 
goal-governed steering of outputs and outcomes, accompanied by the monitoring of targets 
(Maroy, 2008). The 2002 Atuarfitsialak reform introduced standardized national tests in the 
subjects Greenlandic, Danish, English and Math, and School Quality Reports to monitor the 
quality of schooling. At the same time, key objectives on outcomes related to the standardized 
tests were not specified, and the central or municipal level have not established follow-up 
mechanisms, like high-stakes incentives or mechanisms to support struggling schools, that are 
characteristic of accountability policies. As a consequence, one could argue that Greenland has 
only moved ‘‘half-way’’ toward accountability.  
The intentions with standardized tests, differentiated teaching and ongoing evaluation, while 
looking good on paper, have not been fully implemented, as illustrated by a school teacher: 
I simply don’t think that we are good enough in conducting ongoing evaluation. We set up some 
pointers, some benchmarks with the standardized tests, the final examinations, and midterms, so we 
have some data there. The ongoing evaluation, however, we are not good enough at that. We are not 
good enough to state and write down the goals of an activity, and determine how we measure that 
when we are done (Interview, school teacher, School C). 
A focus on external accountability is further exemplified by an expressed wish from the central 
government to introduce international comparable tests as a means to raise the quality of education 
and teaching. 
Naalakkersuisut wishes to introduce the use of international comparable tests to ensure a high quality 
in primary and lower secondary schools. This will be an important tool for developing the primary 
and lower secondary school in the future (Ministry Education Strategy, 2015). 
However, the focus and needs of teachers are more on internal accountability and student-centered 
evaluation.  
If you go over to the municipality and ask, they will say that we must have the highest marks in the 
country. But I look at it differently, because I’d rather have a look at the starting points of the students 
and how much they have improved. I think that is more interesting, I think it’s impossible to compare 
cohorts because there are too many different factors that play into that. It’s not two pieces of wood, 
it is people we work with (Interview, School teacher, School C). 
The interview excerpts and analysis illustrate the differences in shared depth of understanding across 
the governance levels, namely between classroom, municipal and central levels of government on 
how the primary and lower secondary school system should be monitored and with what 
indicators.  
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Conclusion 
The findings illustrate what seems to be a historical lack of coordination in connection with the 
implementation processes in regards to educational reform, where there has been no tradition of 
extensive cooperation and planning across municipalities and central government, or a solid 
tradition for monitoring and conducting utilization focused evaluations. Complexity theory and 
developmental evaluation, to a large extent, focus on the constructive and evolving 
interrelationships between the key stakeholders at various levels of the education system. 
Relationships between the central administration, municipalities and school leaders have 
historically not been particularly good, but according to the data collected, there is a turnaround 
in progress. These relationships will be key in shaping a constructive policy environment and 
setting a clear and coherent framework for the school system in Greenland.  
Schools and education systems, are also structure-determined as they adapt to changes within 
social, economic, and political contexts while internalizing, learning from, and evolving from 
systemic memory inherent in the system. As mentioned in the introduction, the formal education 
system is young in Greenland, which is also illustrated by the education level in population.  
The challenges in the Greenland education governance system touches upon all seven multi-level 
governance gaps (see Table 2). The Greenlandic education system is an example of a complex 
dynamic system, whose elements are isolated from one another, and the policy making is not 
aligned to its governance structure and the respective responsibilities of different actors are not 
taken into account. The multilevel governance structure seems to complicate the constructive 
planning and steering of the primary and lower secondary school system due to a lack of clarity 
(and possibly a lack of agreement) about roles and tasks, as strategies are not consistent nor guiding 
(administrative and objective gap). Whether the planning of education reform relies on an 
evidence-based understanding of the characteristics of the Greenlandic school system and is 
constructed in such a way that reform contributes significantly to improved student achievement 
and well-being, can be questioned (policy gap). The governance structure is also fragile due to 
limited staff on all levels with great responsibilities not limited to education (administrative and 
capacity gap), with close links to the small and scattered populations in the municipalities that puts 
pressure on the funding of the school system (fiscal gap).  
The purpose of national education strategies and plans is unclear due to the simple and positivistic 
nature of monitored indicators. Existing strategies are not constructed to guide change, and there 
is no alignment between governance levels. At the system level, no theory of action or plan has 
been formulated on how to raise the quality of the primary and lower secondary school. 
Stakeholders with responsibilities in the quality of primary and lower secondary school area 
formulate their own strategies and objectives, which are not held up on a major theory of action 
or strategy. This causes mismatches and lack of coherence in the objectives, and resulting priorities, 
formulated from the central level with the rest of the system (e.g. the Teacher Training College, 
the municipalities, and the schools). The lack of alignment across a multilevel governance system 
therefore makes negotiation, cooperation, and coordination a necessary and important tool. 
Apart from the centrally set curriculum learning outcomes, no standard or objective is set on the 
level of quality of the standardized tests or final examinations. There is a lack of clarity in what is 
meant by the quality of the primary and lower secondary school, how to raise or increase quality 
and by what means. The nationally monitored objectives say nothing about quality. Whether 
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students continue directly from lower secondary schooling in the education system is often 
influenced by the limited capacity of education programs, number of available apprenticeships, 
and ultimately not the results of the final examinations. To use the proportion of trained teachers 
as a quality indicator is unfortunate, as practice is more complex, and the quality of schooling is 
influenced by a variety of factors that cannot be reduced to one indicator – trained teachers. 
Whether the current supervision structure serves its purpose should be questioned (accountability 
gap). Following the international shift toward a post-bureaucratic ‘governance by results’ model 
(Maroy, 2008), Greenland has in the past 10-15 years been increasingly focused on results in the 
monitoring of the system. This article suggests that developments in Greenlandic policies 
demonstrate the difficulties of navigating the tensions between promoting two key aspects of 
accountability—internal and external and the challenges of building capacity for both. There is a 
great focus on external accountability and results. Without a foundation on internal accountability, 
external accountability drivers have limited effects (Abelmann et al., 1999). There is a strong need 
for a focus on internal and collective accountability and an incorporation of qualitative evaluation 
initiatives in individual institutions to get indicators of what works. A dual focus on both 
performance and impacts will allow for a critical assessment of the extent to which and whether 
goals are met.  
The current situation in Greenlandic education policy is characterized by the lack of basic analyses, 
studies of developments in the field, the effects of different actions; on the other hand, a 
considerable amount of positivistic information is gathered in the form of statistics (information 
gap). This total reliance on statistics is most likely linked to lack of evaluation capacity and 
evaluation culture. The formulated objectives, and the monitored indicators, are output goals that 
assume that the foundation is well functioning. However, Greenland has an education and school 
system in strong need of development and quality improvement. A blind focus on desired output 
goals is therefore not sufficient in driving the change forward. Without evaluations that look at 
contexts and other variables such as day-to-day teaching, it is difficult to see which initiatives lead 
to what results. Supervision and monitoring only looks at intended consequences. What are some 
unintended consequences of policy?  
In 21st century complex systems there is a need for continuous innovation, assessed through co-
learning (within and across classrooms, schools and municipalities; and school to municipality to 
ministry). Structures and networks to do so in Greenland are limited. There is therefore a strong 
need for a type of data management that can track emergent and changing realities, and feeding 
back meaningful findings in real time to the practitioners. A way of thinking characteristic of 
complexity and developmental evaluation (Patton, 2011).  
Systems thinking, complexity and developmental evaluation together offer an interpretive 
framework for engaging in sense making (Patton, 2011). Sense making across governance levels 
and classrooms is identified by Fullan and Quinn (2016) as an imperative factor for successful 
implementation of education reform. One thing is the coordination and cooperation between 
governance levels, institutions and key stakeholders to secure a coherent framework and 
infrastructure. Another is implementing the wanted change in the classroom and working towards 
the desired outcomes. To create conditions for system wide development there is a need for a 
discussion between the governance levels and all relevant stakeholders on the root causes of the 
current conditions of the system and how to address them. A discussion centered on how to raise 
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the bar for all and what success and quality look like in practice. On national, municipal, school 
and classroom level. General principles, guidelines and frameworks to clarify roles, tasks and 
expectations should then be formulated in cooperation and consensus.  
 
 
Notes 
1. Looking at the population over 16 years, a development of approx. 6 percentage points 
over the past ten years. 
2. A more detailed discussion of a similar complexity model of a school can be found in 
Johnson (2008). 
3. Greenland Education Act 2002, it has since been amended (2012, 2017) with minor 
changes. The pedagogical intentions, structure and governance remain as it was. 
4. The model brings “state, bureaucratic, administrative” regulation and a “professional, 
corporative, pedagogical” regulation together (Barroso, 2000). 
5. Avannaata Kommunea, for instance, has a population of 10.600 and 26 schools (2018). At 
the same time, it is the municipality that is the most challenged by an extensive geography 
(stretching from Siorapaluk to Ilulissat) and complex infrastructure. Two settlement 
schools were closed in 2017. 
6. While acknowledging that there are ongoing debates in both academic, applied contexts 
and among Indigenous Peoples about the appropriate concept to use when discussing 
knowledge and indigeneity, the definition by Bohensky and Maru (2011) is provided: 
Indigenous Knowledge is holistic and often encompasses interrelationships between diverse phenomena, 
including social and environmental phenomena. 
7. A full description of the Partnership Agreement and monitored indicators can be read in 
the annual planning and implementation reports conducted by the Ministry of Education: 
http://naalakkersuisut.gl/~/media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Uddannelse/Engel
sk/Annual%20Work%20Plan%202017.pdf  
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We examine theoretical and practical applications of 3D technology in digital and physical preservation of Arctic and Subarctic 
Indigenous cultural heritage. A lasting legacy of colonialism in the Circumpolar North is the disconnect between local 
communities and their material heritage housed at memory institutions around the world. While collection methods varied, 
collecting activity was entrenched in colonial power relations expressed in the “researcher and the researched” paradigm. With 
diminished access to their material culture, loss of traditional knowledge ensued, which affected both local communities and 
global discourse. While postcolonial engagements have been exploring avenues for returning collections knowledge to origin 
communities, geopolitical realities of the Arctic have limited these efforts. The expenses of long-distance Arctic travel and the 
decentralized nature of communities, the lack of Indigenous-run museums, and the fact that Indigenous belongings are widely 
dispersed make it challenging to develop lasting and comprehensive approaches. Many museum objects remain unidentified or 
misinterpreted due to disengagement between Indigenous communities and ancestral possessions. Recent developments in 3D 
technologies can re-establish origin and descendant community access to collections, develop community-engaged collaborations 
and offer decolonizing approaches to collection management, acquisition, and engagement practices. Digital 3D models and 
physical replicas offer alternative modes of access and opportunities for Arctic and Subarctic communities.  Rapid development 
of digitization and replication technologies reveals a potential for empowering community heritage restoration and perpetuation 
as well as strengthen abilities of distant stewardship institutions to improve access, improve community collaborations and 
enhance their capacity for cultural preservation. 
 
Introduction  
Using new technologies to care for Indigenous collections in museums has a long-standing history 
in museology. Museum preservation, conservation, and education have all benefited from 
digitizing collections and using technological innovations to better understand and care for 
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collection pieces (Turner, 2016). Yet, using digital platforms to connect museum collections with 
origin communities based on the principle of shared curation has not yet become a part of standard 
museum practice (Brown & Nicholas, 2012: 320; Rowley, 2013: 23; Srinivasan et al., 2009). For 
this reason, community-engaged collaborations that offer decolonizing approaches to collection 
management, acquisition, and outreach need further discussion to succeed in translating theory 
into practice.   
3D technologies offer great promise to bridge the disconnect between museum collections and 
origin or descendant communities. Moreover, the separation between Indigenous collection pieces 
housed at memory institutions (Stainforth, 2016) and their ancestral communities results in a 
rupture between the tangible and intangible aspects of Indigenous cultural heritage. Strategically 
using 3D technologies can assist in narrowing, or even eliminating, this divide. On the most basic 
level, using 3D technologies in heritage preservation consists of creating digital models and 
printing replicas from those models. When 3D is incorporated into a comprehensive heritage 
preservation plan that places collaborating with Indigenous communities into its center, 3D 
technologies can engender, support, and complement physical repatriation. In this context, using 
3D technologies does not replace physical repatriation, rather, it serves as one aspect of the 
repatriation process providing access to ancestral possessions and by extension, to traditional 
knowledge.  
In Arctic and Subarctic Indigenous communities, physical distance and high travel costs limit 
meaningful physical access to collections and memory institutions. In the past decades, institutions 
often solved these problems through seeking tribal partnerships and providing access to select 
groups of Elders and knowledge bearers who traveled from remote areas of the Arctic to spend a 
few days with the collections (Crowell et al., 2010). The increased interest in developing 
partnership with Indigenous communities was spurred in the United States by federal repatriation 
legislation requiring museums to inventory their holdings, consult with tribes and repatriate 
specific types of collections to federally recognized Native communities, including those in Alaska. 
Those community members visiting the ancestral possessions carried knowledge about them back 
to their communities as information about the existence of Arctic collections became available. In 
the past decade, with growing assertion of Indigenous self-determination in Arctic and Subarctic 
regions, Indigenous artists and historians, tribal organizations, and Indigenous communities took 
matters into their own hands and systematically explored well-known collections. As knowledge 
of these collections spread from community to community, specifics on what these collections 
contained was also shared. Bringing representatives to museums was a novel approach to 
addressing the acute problem of disenfranchised collections and imbuing them with cultural 
knowledge. At the same time, travelling to collections was still limited to a few participants and 
entailed a limited experience. As we discuss below, 3D technology provides alternative heritage 
preservation practices that allow more community members to have a personal engagement with 
the pieces with less gatekeeping or without a limited selection process. Moreover, 3D allows for 
the presentation of Arctic Indigenous material heritage in culturally appropriate contexts that are 
governed by community specific understanding and interpretations.    
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Colonialism as Arctic Legacy 
Colonialism affected Indigenous peoples and cultures around the world including the Arctic and 
Subarctic. As communities continue to grapple with the lasting legacies of postcolonialism that are 
both overarching in general effects and idiosyncratic to the location, they draw on their own 
culturally specific coping mechanisms and strategies. In Arctic and Subarctic Indigenous 
communities, the process of reconnecting and meaningfully reincorporating traditional items now 
housed at museum collections is complex and fraught with challenges that are rooted in the 
colonial history of the Arctic. As in most colonial encounters, travelers, the military, missionaries, 
collectors, and members of the colonial administration removed material culture from Indigenous 
communities across the Arctic. Some of these removals were negotiated and obtained legally, but 
many of them were not (Cole, 1985; Killion & Bray 1994; Pullar, 1995). Whether it was taking 
items from graves and ceremonial places, trading them below value through local people who had 
no authority to sell them, as for instance in the case of clan ownership; or collecting items that 
were destined to be destroyed according to local conceptualization of these items’ role in the 
universe, the outmigration of culturally significant material culture from the Arctic and Subarctic 
was relentless and pervasive (Cole, 1985; Lindsay, 1993).    
Both ethnographic and archaeological pieces were removed from Arctic communities and 
assembled as collections in museums and heritage institutions. Most of these memory institutions 
were located in non-Arctic regions of the world, often in different nation states and on different 
continents than the origin communities. While knowledge about the existence of these collections 
was preserved in the memory institutions where curators, researchers, and museum personnel 
cared for these Arctic Indigenous items, the connection to the origin community was often lost. 
The detachment from the origin communities was further exacerbated by the practice of inter-
museum trade that aimed at diversifying collections to have a fuller representation of the World’s 
cultures. As the cultural knowledge about a specific piece or a group of items was lost, pieces that 
formed a cohesive intellectual unit based on Indigenous epistemology were separated and 
dispersed around the world. The detachment from the communities that produced and 
meaningfully interpreted these items created knowledge loss on both local and global scales. Local 
communities no longer knew about the existence of the material heritage of their ancestors, 
whereas heritage institutions were no longer cognizant of the intangible heritage attached to their 
collection pieces they were caring for.  
As with all aspects of post-colonialism, national and international legislation and agreements aimed 
to address and ameliorate harm caused by past collection practices helped, but did not fully rectify 
the lasting legacy of cultural loss on the local scale. U.S. Federal repatriation legislation (1989’s 
NMAI Act and 1990’s NAGPRA) and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP Articles 12 & 31) of 2007 addressed issues of Indigenous material 
cultural heritage including preservation and repatriation (Hollinger et al., in press). Although, with 
the exception of rare cross-border cases, U.S. laws do not affect international collections, 
UNDRIP is not a legally binding international agreement, and Canada lacks national repatriation 
legislation, repatriation of certain material Arctic Indigenous heritage can still take place (e.g. 
Grande 2017: 270-273; Mullen, 2003). Under U.S. legislation, only items in specifically defined 
categories are eligible for repatriation. These include human remains, funerary objects, sacred 
objects and objects of cultural patrimony and only those items shown to have been illegally 
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alienated must be returned. While physical repatriation is an important step in reuniting the once 
removed material heritage with its origin or descendant communities, in the Arctic and Subarctic 
regions the situation is complicated by the challenges of Arctic realities. 
Items that are physically returned to Arctic regions and into the custody of the legally designated 
representative of an Indigenous origin or descendant community may still never be reunited with 
the members of the said community (Csoba DeHass & Taitt, 2018). Many Indigenous 
communities in the Arctic are decentralized in terms of geographical and political autonomy. 
Villages within a cultural region may spread over thousands of miles and legal representation in 
NAGPRA affairs can lie with several different organizations and appointees. As there are very few 
local museums and repositories in villages and rural, off-the-road Alaska Native communities that 
are equipped to care for repatriated items, these pieces often end up in larger museums, 
repositories, and memory institutions in Anchorage or in regional hubs.    
The cost of travel in the Arctic is exorbitant and continually rising. Large distances, limited travel 
options, high price of fuel, and the culturally specific tendency for travelling in groups can all pose 
challenges, and as such, make it difficult to access repatriated collections that are deposited at 
centrally located facilities (Csoba DeHass & Taitt, 2017a). While “centrally-located” may imply 
easy-access by most stakeholders, in the Arctic, it often translates to the opposite. When people 
travel from rural communities to hubs, they often do so for a specific reason such as shopping, 
medical appointments, board meetings, or specific events. While these trips can accommodate 
meeting with family, travelers usually have very little free time. If people do make it to a heritage 
institution, they do not have more than a couple hours to spend with the repatriated pieces. As a 
result, most community members are either unaware of or have never connected with the 
repatriated items. In essence, community members often do not have easy and sustained access to 
these repatriated collections. While repatriated items are legally in the possession of the 
descendants, there is no meaningful engagement that allows for the continued reinternalization of 
the items as a community. This lack of repatriation to the cultural context detracts from the 
practical utilization of intangible cultural heritage as a source of traditional knowledge that informs 
contemporary Indigenous self-determination in the Arctic.  
A reality of the legal and administrative organization of Alaska Native entities, including regional 
associations, village councils, and corporations, is partially due to the Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act (ANCSA) of 1971 and Federal Indian policy. Just over 40% of the 562 federally 
recognized tribes of the United States are located in Alaska (Williams, 2009: 2). In terms of heritage 
preservation, this translates to a great deal of autonomy from other tribal entities when it comes 
to decisions regarding material heritage. As there is no overarching policy either in Alaska or, on a 
more general level, in Artic regions that are jointly created and adopted by most Indigenous 
organizations and entities, there are significant differences in terms of access, involvement, and 
input when it comes to working with collections at memory institutions. 
Museum Practices Preceding 3D Technology 
Community outreach and museum programming to collaborate with origin and descendant 
communities predates digitization and digital technologies used for preservation. Cultural 
revitalization has been a major driving force behind forging partnerships between Indigenous 
communities and memory institutions (Fienup-Riordan, 2005). Printed catalogues of 2D images 
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were often widely shared with communities in the hopes of creating long-lasting connections, 
despite the fact that the cost of printing high resolution color photographs seriously limited the 
number of copies that could be produced.  
The reburial movement of the 1970s and 1980s that culminated with the passage of federal 
repatriation legislation in the form of the National Museum of the American Indian Act in 1989 
and the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act in 1990 brought a paradigm 
shift to museums with the idea of physical repatriation that is not merely a possibility but a 
requirement (Hollinger et al. in press). Museums were obligated to inventory and share information 
about their collections with communities. Collection doors gradually opened to origin and 
descendant communities (Eaton, 2009) to work directly with collection pieces. As communities 
started to come to terms with the idea of their ancestral heritage being returned as well as learning 
about the everyday museum reality where material heritage is scattered around the world in various 
collections, the key concept of access emerged (Haakanson, 2015).  
Knowing what is in a collection is challenging for both Indigenous communities and curators alike, 
although for different reasons. The former does not know where their heritage pieces may be 
located, while the latter may not fully be aware of what they have in their collections. For this 
reason, it is easy to see the appeal of digitizing basic catalog information that can be made available 
to the greater public online. Having relatively easy access to the basic collection information has 
the potential to greatly increase access, yet it is very unlikely to happen when such databases are 
not curated. Internet-based database search is a learned skill that most end users need to develop. 
Curated digital exhibits and digital humanities projects, regardless of their level of interactivity, can 
offer guidance on the nature of collections while drawing attention to certain items. The growing 
interest in curated digital projects are centered on harnessing the power of easy access and wide-
reach that can yield rich network and metanetwork connections (Glass & Hennessy, in press). Yet, 
with Indigenous collections, culturally inappropriate access to material heritage remains in the 
center of the discourse (Anderson et al., 2018: 23; Christen, 2009; Hennessy, 2009; Were, 2014). 
The challenge of balancing knowledge-sharing, digital preservation, and culturally appropriate 
access is far from being resolved, partially, due to rapid developments in technology that require 
constant re-interpretation of previous agreements and best practices.           
The widespread availability of using 3D technology for heritage preservation is largely possible due 
to the lucrativeness of the video gaming industry that continues to be the push behind ongoing, 
rapid technological development and making hardware and software affordable to the mass 
market. In heritage preservation, 3D technology can cover a variety of applications. It has been 
used for creating digital models of buildings and landscapes that were threatened by sociopolitical 
realities (Zamani project, 2015). In addition to preservation it can also digitally reconstruct 
historical structures (Hess, 2013; Neumann, 2013; Younes et al., 2017) and virtually bring 
information to users about historical structures from around the world (Levy & Dawson, 2006). 
Archaeology has been using 3D for both site and artifact documentation for decades. 3D laser 
scanning is particularly amenable to the hard-surface material archaeological excavations produce 
and has been used to document entire collections. Unlike archaeological collections, ethnographic 
collections that often consist of soft material and composite pieces are more of a challenge. Digital 
3D models, particularly when combined with augmented reality, allow for cultural 
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contextualization and can offer new opportunities for collaborations that bring together culturally 
appropriate outreach, preservation, and place-based education.  
In addition to creating 3D digital models in origin communities or in collections, printing has also 
been used as part of a community engaged heritage preservation strategy. With permission from 
origin and descendant communities, physical repatriation of material heritage can occur alongside 
digital 3D preservation and printing replicas of the original items (Hollinger et al., 2013; Hollinger 
& Partridge, 2017). While a replica can remain with the memory institutions and be used to support 
institutional mission, original pieces return to their communities. The practical applications of 3D 
printing in a heritage preservation context suggest a broader impact as each Indigenous community 
internalize the concepts of 3D printed replicas through their cultural logic and decide on their 
appropriate use.      
3D Digitization and Replication Technologies  
3D digitization and replication technologies offer new and wider opportunities for addressing 
cultural heritage preservation and perpetuation issues. 3D digitization adds to the positive 
attributes of 2D digitization by making objects more informative then merely a collection of 2D 
images. In the past, viewers would have to flip from still image to image on a CD or other media 
to experience different perspectives and angles on a single object. Photos taken for documentation 
of an object or for use in a publication often omitted details that were significant for origin 
community members (Csoba DeHass & Taitt, 2017b). The inside of a hat, the weave used to finish 
off the rim of a basket, or the carving marks on the back of a mask carry important cultural 
information that are difficult to access through 2D images. With 3D digital models the user can 
turn and spin an item and experience the changing light and shadow of different views as if the 
object were in their hands. The model can also be enhanced and manipulated to highlight or bring 
out features that are difficult to see even on an in-hand original. Multiple viewers can experience 
an object simultaneously thousands of miles from one another and can remotely offer comments 
and correction to the record of the item.  In the case of models produced using CT-scans, even 
the interiors of objects, invisible by any other means, can be made accessible to the viewer revealing 
information critical to understanding its manufacture or use (Hollinger, in press).  
In addition to narrowing the distance problem, digital 3D models offer the ability to access items 
that may be problematic for handling. Fragile items at risk if moved, or items that require climate 
controlled or high security conditions, can be examined in a 3D model form repeatedly without 
further risk to the object.  In some cases, the objects themselves may pose a health hazard to those 
handling them because of pesticide treatments or hazardous substances applied during their 
original manufacture.  For instance, the bright red paint seen on many objects from the North 
West Coast is cinnabar-based, mercury sulfide, which poses health risks for handling. Still other 
items may have an issue when direct physical contact or proximity to an item poses spiritual 
hazards. Access to 3D digital models offers options for experiencing the items without 
compounding the risks to the objects or to the handlers. 
The use of 3D digitization and replication can also be used to supplement the repatriation process.  
At its most basic level, the term ‘repatriation’ means the return to the country of origin and it has 
been used to refer to spies, illegal immigrants, POWs, and stolen artworks. In the context of 
cultural heritage, it has usually been reserved for the tangible human remains and objects being 
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returned through a legal means for reburial, use in ceremonies, or other purposes of the descendant 
community whose rights are restored in the process. These returns are complete transfers of 
ownership and control of material items and remains and anything short of that complete control 
is viewed by some as something less than repatriation (Enote, 2013). 
But the term ‘repatriation’ has also been applied to processes of returning copies of archival 
records and photographs (Christen, 2011; Krupnik, 2000) or 2D digital images of collections and 
records (Bell et al., 2013).  These forms of information sharing by museums have all increased with 
the aid of digital technologies, and although they do not usually entail full restoration of ownership 
and control, they may still be best viewed as forms of digital repatriation. 3D digital files, as 
surrogates of physical items, can also be grouped in this approach.  
In addition to the opportunity of being part of the repatriation process, Indigenous communities 
also see the benefit of 3D modeling. Repatriated items that are entrusted to a repository outside 
of the origin community due to lack of appropriate local facility and collection care can be 3D 
modeled and shared with community members. Engaging with a 3D model or printed replica 
provides personal access to ancestral heritage embedded in the original piece. When discussed 
within the community, the series of personal experiences can lead to a collective interpretation of 
the repatriated piece. Through these processes, the repatriated items can be reintegrated into the 
cultural reality of the community, despite fact that they are stored at a remote location.   
In all its forms, digital repatriation complements and has the potential to go beyond physical 
repatriation to increase community access and aid in cultural heritage preservation. It facilitates 
access across great distances which are always an inhibiting factor in the Arctic and Subarctic. As 
access to computing technology and the internet has expanded, so has the capacity for digital 
communication of cultural heritage information. Indigenous communities and curating institutions 
have made use of the technology to increase community engagement with distant collections and 
archival records leading to a number of collaborations aimed at cultural heritage preservation. 
Digital 3D Models 
Digital 3D models serve multiple purposes in heritage preservation. Due to the relative newness 
and rapid development of the technology, we probably have not had an opportunity to explore all 
possible areas and applications of heritage work that can benefit from using 3D. Furthermore, as 
all aspects of 3D technology are tools that can be used to solve issues and offer up innovations, 
they are highly adaptable to cultural context and specific project goals.  
In general, 3D models have two main parts. The first is the 3D point cloud that serves as the 
structure of the model. This data set carries the information needed to print replicas, to complete 
measurements, to run programs that can synthesize a large amount of information such as 
similarities, to edit the model, or to use the model to reconstruct pieces missing from the physical 
item. The second part is the 3D model that has a structure and a surface, which makes it closely 
resemble its physical counterpart. The 3D model can be displayed in a viewer, embedded into a 
variety of content management software, or uploaded to an online publishing platform such as 
Sketchfab (2018). Displaying the 3D model does not give access to the point cloud, and as such, 
does not make it possible to reproduce the item. This is a crucial element of working with 3D 
models in heritage preservation, as currently there are no best practices developed for 3D 
technology and Indigenous material heritage.  The lack of regulations, guidelines, and widely-
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shared best practices regarding 3D modeling of Indigenous heritage makes it one of the most 
important roles of researchers to thoroughly explain the nature of 3D models and the possible 
dangers of misuse and misappropriation to the collaborating communities.   
The most basic way to experiment with digital 3D models is to use an application, such as Qlone, 
that renders the model within a few seconds. Many 3D modeling applications use a structure-
from-motion algorithm to render the model, but there are also applications, such as Skanect, that 
pair a scanner with a mobile device. Using mobile applications to create 3D models can limit the 
size of the item being modeled and the applications may also have limited editing capabilities. 
Moreover, the geometric accuracy of the models produced with such applications are generally 
lower than those produced with photogrammetric software or high-quality laser scanners. Yet, the 
possibility of producing models quickly even by first-time users of the applications makes up for 
these limitations. 3D modeling applications usually work on smart phones or tablets using the 
built-in camera to view the physical item. Because 3D apps are highly mobile and can be easily 
deployed in origin communities, rural areas, in collections, or in the field, they can be an ideal tool 
to use as the first level of documentation. Some apps do not require cell-phone coverage or even 
internet to capture the data, which then can be stored on the device and shared via the internet at 
a later date. In the Arctic, where internet access and finding good quality internet connections are 
a constant struggle, using a simple 3D app is a good option for community engagement through 
citizen science, capacity building in origin communities, and supporting community-driven self-
representation.  
3D scanning, again, is a different type of technology that is particularly well-suited for documenting 
archaeological and hard-surface objects. Scanners can provide excellent quality when calibrated 
and used correctly, but their cost can be prohibitive. Learning to use scanners also requires some 
training, but investing in a scanner and a workshop that teaches several community members how 
to create digital 3D models can foster further interest in using 3D technology locally. The challenge 
of 3D scanning is twofold. First, scanning, similarly to most 3D technology, develops so quickly 
that the required hardware, in this case the scanner itself, can become obsolete within a few years. 
Replacing the unit and re-training local users may be possible but requires financial investment 
that may or may not be available. Secondly, 3D scanning does not work very well with soft material, 
many of which are staples of Arctic Indigenous material culture. Skin, gut, feather, fur, sinew, 
among others, are all difficult to 3D scan and producing a workable digital model by scanning is 
nearly impossible.  
The third method to producing digital 3D models is using a photogrammetry software such as 
Agisoft PhotoScan (2018) or 3DF Zephyr (2018). These programs use a series of two-dimensional 
digital photos aligned through a Structure-From-Motion (SFM) algorithm to create the digital 
structure. Photogrammetry is particularly useful when working with Arctic and Subarctic 
collections as it can produce clear models of ethnographic and composite pieces that combine soft 
materials and hard surfaces. On the one hand, photogrammetry also has its drawbacks. For 
instance, modeling very small items such as beads or needles, elongated items such as atlatls or 
spears, and shiny items such as ivory or baleen requires a lot of patience and the ability to accept 
unpredictable results (Csoba DeHass et. al., 2017: 27). On the other hand, photogrammetry does 
not require specialized hardware and uses only a digital camera at its most basic application. Many 
origin communities have access to digital cameras and photogrammetry software can be quite 
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affordable. The challenge of using it for an extensive outreach and capacity building stems from 
the fact that using photogrammetry software and taking photos appropriate for 3D modeling has 
a sharp learning curve that is difficult to master in a day-long workshop. For this reason, active 
collaboration in project design is a must when creating 3D models of Indigenous heritage. 
Moreover, articulating clear expectations of the level and frequency of 3D modeling training 
provided to origin community members needs to be a part of all projects using 3D technology.       
Finally, the question of ownership, archiving, access, and use-rights of 3D models and their 
corresponding point clouds are still a murky territory lacking guidelines and regulations. When 
working with Indigenous material culture, the question of cultural property rights, the rights of the 
person creating the 3D model, as well as the Principal Investigator (PI) of the project need to be 
carefully negotiated. Because point clouds carry the information needed to replicate an object, they 
carry culturally specific information that needs clearly laid-out protection. Sustainable and secure 
archiving of the digital files is perhaps the greatest challenge for the future of cultural heritage 
digitization, one that needs collaborative decisions and the flexibility to accommodate the cultural 
conceptualizations of the digitized items according to the origin and descendant communities. For 
this reason, archiving, control, access, and future use of point clouds should be negotiated and 
carefully laid out as part of the collaborative process. For the same reason, archiving in public 
digital repositories that provide free access to all end-users is not an appropriate option for digital 
3D models of Indigenous material heritage. While a community may wish to use 3D technology 
to digitally document and preserve information about items located in their possession or in 
museum collections, they may also decide to restrict access to the model in order to comply with 
culturally specific restrictions. Other communities may decide that the 3D model does not carry 
the same cultural meaning as their physical counterpart and subsequently make the models 
available to the greater public. While the theoretical implications of digital 3D models in the 
preservation of Arctic Indigenous heritage is still unexplored, the usefulness of the technology that 
can be deployed to produce digital models in communities and in collections alike is manifold. 
Consequently, digital 3D models contribute to the development of local heritage preservation 
practices while also provide information that can be shared across the Arctic.     
3D Physical Replicas  
While the use of digital models for cultural heritage preservation and perpetuation continues to 
grow at a rapid pace, the addition of 3D physical replicas is emerging as a new domain and adding 
to the benefits and challenges of the digital. Once a cultural object has been digitized it is possible 
to use those files to return back to the physical world using 3D printing and/or 3D milling 
technology. A physical object, even a replica, has the power to convey a level of realness that a 
digital model cannot. Therefore, there are many contexts in which a physical object may be 
preferable for educational and even for ceremonial purposes.   
The Repatriation Office of the Smithsonian’s National Museum of Natural History (NMNH) in 
the United States has undertaken a number of collaborations with Native American tribes and 
Alaska Native villages and organizations to employ 3D replication technology for cultural 
purposes.  In some cases, tribes are asking for 3D prints or milled objects to be produced so they 
can retain a physical copy of a funerary object which they intend to rebury (Hollinger et al., 2013).  
Having a physical object is preferable to photographs for handling and teaching about past material 
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culture and artistic attributes.  Items from shaman’s graves around the village of Hoonah, Alaska, 
which were repatriated as funerary objects by the NMNH, had multiple reasons why the 
community wanted them to be digitally documented and replicated. In addition to being very 
fragile, many were painted with mercury based red paint which posed a physical hazard to the 
handler.  However, they also posed a spiritual hazard on that many Tlingit consider shamanic items 
untouchable because they may possess dangerous spirits. Printed and milled 3D replicas allow the 
community to handle and study their ancestral objects with much less risk to themselves as well as 
to the original objects.   
Printed objects can be made in a variety of materials with different strengths and colors. Some 
prints can reproduce the color of paints on objects with great accuracy. They can also reproduce 
movable parts and complex spaces.  In the Hoonah collaboration, the Smithsonian printed rattles 
with the beads still inside them using ct-scan files. In another collaboration with the Central 
Council Tlingit and Haida Indian Tribes of Alaska, the NMNH digitized two rare spear throwers 
(Shee aan in Tlingit) and then had them printed in a high strength nylon so the prints could be used 
to throw actual spears or darts.  There had been questions as to whether the Shee aan were 
functional or ritual shamanic objects and the approach demonstrated that the throwers were likely 
functional hunting weapons. The prints were then taken to a clan conference in Sitka, Alaska, 
where Tlingit students and clan leaders experienced using them first hand.  Printed throwers will 
now be available for use in Tlingit classrooms and culture camps and carvers can study them to 
revive their manufacture and use. Although not a true repatriation, it is a form of cultural 
restoration using 3D technology. 
The prints can also be painted by hand, with attachments of hair, leather, shell, etc. applied by 
traditional methods. In the Hoonah/Smithsonian collaboration, dozens of milled and printed 
objects will be finished with painting and attachments by a team of Tlingit artists from Hoonah. 
This approach combines the high tech with the traditional arts and techniques and enhances 
community engagement and control. The project is producing two sets of the replicas, one for the 
Hoonah Indian Association to display and use for education in Hoonah and one for the NMNH 
to retain at the Smithsonian for research and education. Showing that the replica production 
process is not exclusive to large institutions, some of the objects are being milled in village of 
Hoonah using milling equipment already in the community. Milling replicas can be done using a 
range of materials including metal and foam, but being able to mill them from the same material 
as the originals, as can be done with wooden objects, offers the benefit of more closely matching 
the originals since they might even smell the same. Working with the Tlingit Dakl’aweidí clan, the 
Smithsonian used a laser scanner and photogrammetry to digitize a clan crest hat in the form of a 
killer whale, which had been repatriated to the clan years earlier as a sacred object and object of 
cultural patrimony (Hollinger & Jacobs, 2015).  The digital files were archived as a form of security 
in case anything happened to the original, but the clan leader also authorized the Smithsonian to 
mill an exact replica for exhibit at the museum. Working in close consultation with the clan at 
every step, the hat was milled from alder, reproducing even the knife marks from the original, and 
then inlaid with abalone shell, and painted by hand.  The replica hat was danced together with the 
original by clan members in Sitka and later at the NMNH. Although accessioned and on exhibit at 
the NMNH, an agreement with the clan allows for the replica to be checked off exhibit to be 
danced as regalia, but it is not considered a ceremonial crest object because it has not undergone 
a ceremonial dedication process. The 3D models are also viewable on the Smithsonian’s 3D 
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viewer, but the clan leader, to protect their cultural property rights, asked that the models not be 
easily printable. 
Tlingit caretakers of clan crest objects now recognize the potential for 3D digital files to serve as 
a backup which can be called upon to aid in replacing or repairing their precious ancestral objects 
(Hollinger, in press; Hollinger et al., 2013). They now frequently request the Smithsonian’s 
assistance with digitizing their objects and archiving the files. In addition to being used in printing 
and milling, the 3D models themselves can serve as an aid for traditional carvers who were 
previously limited to 2D photos when called upon to replace an object. The digital files can also 
be used to recover exact measurements that can be critical in carving an accurate copy. The 
NMNH recently entered an MOU with the Tlingit Kiks.adi clan to scan and then digitally repair a 
broken hat in the Smithsonian collection and then use the files to mill a new intact hat to replace 
the original. Again, although not a true repatriation, this is an example of a cultural restoration that 
is made possible by the application of 3D digitization and replication technology to repair and 
remake a cultural object which will be formally brought out in ceremony to fully replace the 
original. 
These examples illustrate the great potential for application of 3D technology in the service of 
Indigenous communities and caretaker institutions that would have been difficult to imagine just 
a few years ago.  As more communities and caretakers come to understand the capabilities of the 
technology, we are likely to see a boom in the adoption of these tools to aid in preservation and 
perpetuation challenges. Objects not subject to repatriation laws, whether because they are in 
private collections, or because they do not fit a repatriation category, may be replicated using this 
technology.  This option might convince private collectors to return the original if they can retain 
a 3D replica. Similarly, if deemed appropriate by the community, a replica may be made to replace 
an object that cannot leave a museum. Items too fragile to be loaned by a museum for exhibition 
could be digitized and even repaired digitally, and then remade for exhibition.   
Conclusions  
In our discussion we highlighted key concepts and issues pertaining to the role of 3D technologies 
in the preservation of Arctic and Subarctic Indigenous heritage. It is important to recognize that 
we are at the very beginning of understanding how each Indigenous community will use these 
technologies for their locally driven strategic development. Researchers, museum personnel, and 
origin community members interpret the significance of 3D technologies from their own 
perspectives. Yet, the goal of reconnecting Arctic Indigenous communities with their ancestral 
possessions brings all stakeholders together in their shared task to support community-based 
development and capacity building. 3D technology has the potential to empower communities and 
support their own decisions of what should be modeled, preserved, printed, and interpreted as a 
heritage piece. 3D technology also has the potential to deconstruct the researcher-researched 
paradigm (Isaac, 2015) and place origin communities in the driver’s seat in deciding what can be 
physically or digitally replicated or removed from their communities.  
For these reasons, 3D technology should be part of a comprehensive approach to heritage 
preservation of both archaeological and ethnographic collections. To support the wide use of 3D 
technologies, it is necessary to develop best practices that are informed by collaboration and 
community input from a variety of Indigenous stakeholders across the Arctic. By providing a guide 
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on how to best assist communities in understanding choices available to them through 3D 
technology, we can also inform policy on the creation and handling of 3D digital models and 
printed replicas in a way that takes Arctic realities into consideration. It is also necessary to outline 
the intellectual property and cultural rights regarding 3D points, 3D prints, the manner of creating 
and processing digital Indigenous heritage material, the way we engage with them as researchers 
and end-users, and the type of access local communities permit (Magnani et al., in press). Creating 
culturally responsible collaborative data sharing and curation practices that are developed from 
local epistemologies will support community well-being through reuniting tangible and intangible 
aspects of Indigenous heritage. 3D technologies can provide a sustainable heritage preservation 
network that help better understand cultural connections in Arctic regions while supporting 
Indigenous rights of self-representation.  
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Enhancing Well-Being Among Older People in 
Greenland through Partnerships of Research, Practice 
and Civil Society 
 
Kamilla Nørtoft, Sidse Carroll, Anu Siren, Peter Bjerregaard, Christina Viskum Lytken Larsen, 
Merete Brædder, Lise Hounsgaard & Tenna Jensen 
 
This article focuses on the methodology of the project Ageing in the Arctic (AgeArc) – Wellbeing, Quality of Life and Health 
Promotion among Older People in Greenland, and how the use of a collaborative approach aims at integrating ageing research, 
practices and policies to the benefit of the Greenlandic society. Thus, the aim of the article is to discuss how collaboration between 
research and practice can be an important factor in sustainable development of welfare solutions for older people in Greenland. 
In the project we study ageing policy, homecare, institutions, professional practices and municipal administration of these as well 
as older people’s health, well-being, everyday life and historical perceptions of the roles of older people in Greenland. Moreover, 
researchers and municipalities collaborate on developing policies, initiatives within municipalities and civil society as well as 
creating network across the municipalities and between municipal administrations and civil society. In addition to this, we 
develop educational material for healthcare workers and professionals and work to create more public awareness about ageing 
in Greenland. We present three examples of our collaborative methods and discuss how the approach influences development 
and implementation of specific co-creation projects involving researchers, professionals and citizens on equal terms. 
 
 
Introduction 
For centuries the governance of Greenland has been developed and managed by the Danish state. 
In recent years Greenland has become increasingly independent and succeeded in establishing 
national and municipal political and administrative structures. However, the past still influences 
political structures and practices of the Greenlandic welfare state, as it is still, to some extent, 
modelled after the Danish welfare state (Sørensen, 1995; Høiris & Marquardt, 2012). In Greenland, 
healthcare and education is public and free for all. Responsibilities for welfare services are shared 
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by the national and the municipal authorities. Welfare services for older people include free 
healthcare in hospitals and health clinics, public pension, practical help in the home if the older 
person fulfills certain criteria, apartments suited for older people and nursing homes. The scarce 
and geographically dispersed Greenlandic population and the isolation of towns and settlements 
make it necessary to place welfare institutions such as hospitals and educational facilities in selected 
larger towns. The fundamental logistical challenges created by the geographical realities challenge 
both the political ambitions for provision of welfare and the municipal economy as well as the 
everyday lives of the population who must be mobile and travel long distances to obtain healthcare, 
education and jobs. This is also the case for the older parts of the population who often need to 
make life changing decisions about how and where to move, if they become dependent on regular 
healthcare and practical help to manage their daily lives. 
The aim of this article is to discuss how collaboration between research and practice can become 
an important factor in sustainable development of local communities, welfare state benefits and 
meaningful and health promoting strategies with the aim to improve the everyday lives of older 
people in Greenland. It does so by presenting the collaborative methodologies used in the project 
Ageing in the Arctic (AgeArc) – Wellbeing, Quality of Life and Health Promotion among Older People in 
Greenland, and discussing how the project uses a collaborative project design to integrate ageing 
research, practices and policies to the benefit of the Greenlandic society in an ongoing dialogue 
between the project partners and participants. Since the project is only half way through its life 
span, we focus on the process rather than final results and products developed in the project. We 
will present some of the methodological activities of the project to show how AgeArc has 
embraced the research-practice collaboration from its initial explorative workshops to a specific 
co-created development project in a bigger town. The examples are followed by a discussion of 
the usefulness of this type of collaborative design, its implications and how we deal with some of 
the challenges that are often discussed regarding community research and projects using 
participatory methodologies.   
Background: The Health and Everyday Lives of Older People in Greenland: Key 
Challenges, Knowledge Gaps and On-Going Initiatives 
In 2004, the Greenlandic public health report singled out older people as a particularly vulnerable 
demographic group, because they suffer from surprisingly high disease rates, including a high 
prevalence of lifestyle diseases. At present, 12.6% of the Greenlandic population is over the age 
of 60, a number which is expected to increase to 17.9% by 2035 (Bjerregaard, 2004). It is expected 
that the number of people over 65 years of age will be almost doubled by 2040 (Grønlands Statistik, 
2017). This rise, combined with the high disease rates, presents the municipalities with growing 
financial and logistic challenges. This calls for the establishment and improvement of welfare 
structures and solutions to improve the state of health and independence of older people in 
Greenland. In spite of high disease rates and economical concerns about the increasing number 
of older people, their well-being, lifestyle and health have only played a minor role in recent 
Greenlandic public health and ageing polices (Nørtoft & Jensen, 2017a; Inuuneritta II, 2012; 
Ældrepolitik, 2014). In this project the definition of old age depends on the specific context in 
each sub study and development project. When we do policy analysis, old age is defined by 
politically decided definitions based on chronological age - typically counting people of 60 years 
and older. When we do ethnographic fieldwork in older people’s associations, nursing homes and 
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social housing for older people, we include all residents and members of the association regardless 
of their chronological age. When we do historical research, we define old age according to the 
archival material we analyze whether they are policy documents, personal journals, church books 
registering births, deaths, weddings etc. 
Older people in Greenland have lived in a time of constant social change, and a society which is 
influenced by a mixture of Inuit and Danish values, identity, habits and traditions (Høiris & 
Marquardt, 2012). Moreover, regional and local differences in perceptions of health and ageing 
influences both local municipal planning, implementation and use of health initiatives, and 
individual lifestyle and health practices (Aagaard, 2015; Buchignani & Armstrong-Esther, 1999). 
Development of future policies, solutions and initiatives therefore necessitate locally specific 
knowledge, not only about the well-being, lifestyle and health of older Greenlanders, but also about 
culture and national, regional and local welfare benefits and political and care practices. 
While the research literature on welfare policies and health care practices aimed at older people is 
scarce, there are, however, new local political initiatives that address the challenges of and among 
the older parts of the population in the five municipalities. The municipalities also engage in 
general health promotion and prevention of lifestyle and age-related diseases. A recent study of 
policy documents has found that these efforts include focus on dementia, which is a relatively new 
and growing challenge in Greenland caused by increased life expectancy, loneliness, and keeping 
older people longer in the labour market to encourage on-going personal development, health 
maintenance and financially sustainable solutions. Some municipalities are very specific about 
culture’s relation to individual well-being, especially the interplay between traditions and everyday 
life (Nørtoft & Jensen, 2017a).1 
At present, however, no systematic overview or exchange of initiatives and practice exist, and 
knowledge about the importance of including local and regional differences and similarities in 
solutions aiming to meet the needs of older people is insufficient. Sharing of local experiences with 
older people and institutional practices in political and developmental processes are vital if such 
ventures are to be valuable, both for older people and for health and care professionals. 
Older People’s Perceptions of Health, Life Quality and Welfare Needs? 
One of the fundamental challenges for the municipal development of ageing policies, initiatives 
and solutions is that the health, everyday practices, well-being, and quality of life of older people 
in Greenland and their relationship to the welfare state’s different benefits and institutions is only 
sparsely researched (Laursen, 2003) compared to other socio-cultural related health challenges 
(Aagaard, 2015; Lynge, 2000; Curtis et al., 2002; Niclasen, 2015; Larsen, 2014; Pedersen & 
Bjerregaard, 2012; Bjerregaard & Larsen, 2015; Curtis et al., 1997; Niclasen et al., 2007). Until now, 
the conditions of older people in Greenland has mainly been studied in the context of general 
population studies and reports (Bjerregaard, 2004; Bjerregaard & Dahl-Petersen, 2008; Dahl 
Petersen et al., 2015) or in the context of geriatric research (Olsen et al., 2010; Jakobsen et al., 
2013; Lassen et al., 2013; Andersen et al., 2005).  
In AgeArc, we explore healthy aging from many angles; we look at public policy and welfare 
benefits regarding older citizens and ask what works as well as what is challenging from an 
administrational and healthcare professional perspective. We also ask older people what is 
important in their everyday lives in order for the individual to experience general wellbeing. Which 
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factors and elements are important to experience good life quality and how is it possible to have 
or to get those factors and elements into the individual’s daily life? 
Previously ethnological and anthropological research about older people in the Arctic has primarily 
revolved around the perceptions of old age and cultural values of older people in Inuit societies 
(Collings, 2001) rather than on the everyday life, well-being, health and quality of life of older 
people in the 20th and 21st century welfare state. This focus stands in contrast to cultural analytical 
research on ageing conducted in Denmark from the 1980s onwards, where research into the 
cultural and social aspects of the lives of older people in and with the Danish welfare state gained 
momentum. This research resulted in a range of books and reports on various socio-cultural 
aspects of the interplay between the everyday lives and perceptions of older people and welfare 
state structures (Platz, 1987; Hansen & Platz, 1995; Blaakilde et al., 1991; Blaakilde, 1998; Andersen 
& Appeldorn, 1995; Swane, 1991). Moreover several recently established research initiatives study 
cultural aspects of ageing, the everyday life and lifestyle of older individuals, and their experiences 
with and of welfare state benefits, and integrate their findings into health studies, public initiatives 
and practice in order to improve health and well-being of older people, and to ensure the relevance 
of public benefits (Kofod, 2009; Nørtoft, 2017; Tomasen, 2009; Algreen-Petersen, 2011; Lassen, 
2014; Nørtoft, 2013). AgeArc follows this tradition, but is in terms of its size, its inclusive focus 
and collaborative approach the first project of its kind in a Greenlandic context. Past and present 
municipal practices, policies and their interplay with the lives, wellbeing and health of individuals 
are both the starting and end point of the research, development and implementation activities 
inherent in the project. Resultantly, the collaborative approach necessitates an open research 
agenda that allows for the inclusion of themes throughout the lifespan of the project. Active 
engagement and integration of practice, research partners and older people are therefore key to 
the success of the project.  
Collaborative Project Design and Research Methods 
AgeArc runs from 2017-2020 and combines research with development of welfare initiatives in a 
partnership between municipalities and researchers from a range of research and educational 
institutions. Both researchers and practitioners influence the project’s research activities and the 
outputs and formats of the initiatives developed throughout the lifespan of the project. 
The design of AgeArc is inspired by the knowledge-to-action process (Figure 1, Graham et al., 
2006: 19), which emphasizes the need for continuous involvement and exchange between research 
and practice for the development of successful solutions for use in practice settings. In our case 
this means that a) the combination of fieldwork, analyses and development and implementation 
of practical solutions depend on active involvement of all the projects partners, and b) the design 
must facilitate optimal conditions for collaboration on the design of both the research conducted 
throughout the project and of the practical testing and implementation of the developed solutions 
Research Methods 
AgeArc is a mixed method collaboration project that unites municipal administrations and care 
personnel with researchers in public health, history, ethnology and sociology and older people. 
Thus, a multitude of methodologies and approaches co-exist within AgeArc. 
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Figure 1: The Knowledge-to-action-process (Graham et al., 2006: 19). 
 
The research part of the project combines studies of municipal ageing policies and practices (e.g., 
homecare, institutions, professional practices and municipal administration) and studies of the 
everyday life and historical perceptions of the roles of older people in Greenland with data on 
health status and health behavior.  The aim of these studies is to gain knowledge about the health 
and well-being of older people and to develop policies, initiatives within municipalities and civil 
society as well as to create network across the municipalities and between municipal 
administrations and civil society. In addition to this we develop educational material for healthcare 
workers and professionals and work to create more public awareness about ageing in Greenland. 
The project involves different research methods in order to gain broad knowledge about older 
people’s physical health and general living conditions. Thus, AgeArc includes quantitative 
population surveys and anthropometry of Greenlandic and Danish older people. These are 
conducted by The Greenland Health Survey (NIPH) and by VIVE. The purpose is to gain essential 
background knowledge and to ensure that the proposed welfare solutions take existing general and 
regional health and social concerns into account. Thus, we create a unique combination of 
quantitative data on the health and well-being of older people within the Danish realm. 
A large part of the research in AgeArc is ethnographic and historical studies with various foci. The 
purpose is to gain knowledge about the ways in which older people in Greenland relate to the 
welfare state, and of how health and ageing practices and policies affect the lives and health of 
older people in the past and present. To ensure the relevance of the research for the local 
healthcare practices, the specific field sites and focus areas are continuously discussed and selected 
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by researchers and municipal practitioners. This part of the research uses ethnographic and 
historical methodologies and incorporates semi-structured interviews (Hastrup et al., 2012; Clarke 
& Warren, 2007), focus groups (Halkier, 2010), workshops and visual participatory methods 
(Clark-Ibañez, 2004; Mitchell, 2008; Pink, 2009), document studies (Lynggaard, 2010) and 
participant observation (Hillersdal & Nørtoft, 2015; Tonkin, 1989; Spradley, 1979) in municipal 
institutions, local associations, public spaces and in people’s homes. 
The insights gained through the research activities are continuously shared and discussed with the 
municipal partners of AgeArc. This ensures the continuous collaboration and dialogue between 
the project partners, which is crucial for the early development and testing of both small and large 
initiatives developed in the project. The outcomes range from small information flyers to citizens 
and practitioners, reports for administrative and political use and media stories about older people 
and care workers to development of educational material, the planning of a national conference 
and building projects for older people to get access to nature even with limited mobility. 
Co-Creation and Participation 
The collaborative approach and design inscribes AgeArc in the field of co-creation (Brandsen & 
Pestoff, 2006). The overall aim of AgeArc is too broad for all parts of the projects to co-exist and 
be involved in a single co-creation process. However, AgeArc has turned out to be an ideal 
platform for smaller and more narrowly defined co-creation projects that all fit into the overall 
scope of AgeArc. Hence the collaborative approach of the overall project fertilizes the ground for 
specific co-creation projects in the part of AgeArc focusing on developing, testing and 
implementing new welfare solutions. In some ways, the collaborative approach in AgeArc overlaps 
with Participatory Action Research (PAR) in which elements such as community research 
(Wallerstein & Duran, 2010; Robinson, 1996), the use of citizens as co-researchers (Moller et al., 
2010; Hoare, Levy & Robinson, 1993) and Indigenous ways of knowing are emphasized (ibid., 
Cochran et al., 2008). However, AgeArc has not been planned as a PAR project and does not quite 
live up to those points of emphasis. In AgeArc, the research is conducted by academically trained 
researchers – even when focus points of the research are decided in dialogue between researchers 
and practitioners. The researchers explore ageing, wellbeing and professional practices and 
challenges from various perspectives. Rather than presenting Indigenous ways of knowing, the 
data are translated and synthetized into academic ways of understanding as well as into formats 
that are understandable and useful to policy makers, municipal practitioners and healthcare 
workers in the field. The level of community participation varies from one development project 
to the next depending on the character of the project and level of engagement from community 
members. In practice this means that one municipality has requested a qualitative study among 
older citizens focusing on a number of topics and resulting in a report written by the researchers. 
Other municipalities are engaging in ongoing dialogues about possible development projects 
resulting in a range of activities and products developed in collaboration between planners, 
researchers, practitioners and citizens depending on the specific process surrounding each project.  
The term co-creation designates forms of collaboration between different actors in a process 
creating welfare (Brandsen & Pestoff, 2006). Some researchers define it as a process where citizens 
are involved “in the initiation and/or design of public services to develop a beneficial outcome” 
(Voorberg et al., 2015: 1347). In a Danish context the volunteer council (Frivilligrådet, 2013) has 
pointed out 6 principles for co-creation. The principles describe what co-creation is and what it 
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implies: 1) the purpose of co-creation is to create new welfare in a local context. The involved 
parties should experience added value of the co-creation; 2) the center of the co-creation is the 
target group experiencing a problem. Various actors combine their resources and competences, 
thereby shedding new light on the problem and on possible solutions. Gradually the target group 
takes ownership of the problem and the other actors shift from being helpers to being 
collaboration partners; 3) it is crucial that the problem and actions taken are defined through a 
dialogue-based process between the involved actors. The problem and actions/solutions are 
continuously negotiable; 4) in co-creation everyone who is potentially relevant to the solution to a 
given problem can participate. Everyone can initiate a co-creation process, and everyone 
participates on equal terms; 5) the participating actors must be aware that the process implies 
acknowledgement and mutual respect, responsibility and dependency; 6) it is important that the 
actors in the co-creation process acknowledge their own limitations, dares to be open about them 
and show willingness to take risks and be open to other actors’ input and development of ideas. 
The good collaboration has to be democratic and fruitful for all (Pagter, 2006). All parties get 
insights into each other’s methods whereby they reach to an understanding of each other’s 
strengths and limitations. This makes it possible to see how best to combine the resources to solve 
the commonly defined problem. 
There is a great potential for learning in co-creation processes where participants depend on each 
other and where learning is understood as a social process during which problems and solutions 
are shared and beliefs are continuously updated. However, the degree of successful 
implementation and policy change resulting from a co-creation process seems to depend heavily 
on local context e.g. organizational structures and traditions. Hence strongly regulated and rule 
bound political contexts apparently makes policy change and implementation harder than less 
regulated contexts (Voorberg et al., 2017). Research on the success of collaborative approaches in 
innovation and development initiatives within public welfare points out that the involvement of 
professionals and attention to their agency is important. It is suggested that professionals act as 
individuals rather than representatives of their organization when engaging in these processes. This 
calls for an understanding of professionals as learning, emotional and cognitive subjects with their 
own histories and experiences. According to the literature the professionals need to identify with 
the purpose of the co-creation process to be engaged in it, rather than relate to a grand narrative 
decided by the organization (Andersen, 2015). It is not unusual to see resistance on different levels 
in co-creation processes, depending on the specific approach and level of voluntary participation 
of the involved actors. However, not all resistance is destructive for a co-creation process, since 
resistance can lead to fruitful discussions and new insights and change throughout the co-creation 
process (Nilsen et al., 2016).  
Selected Activities of the Collaborative Design and Work in AgeArc 
In the following we provide examples of the collaborative methods and activities we use in the 
project.  
The two first activities we present were initiated by the research partners, while the third example 
was initiated by municipal partners. The examples are described from the AgeArc research 
partners’ point of view as they are responsible for the various forms of academic presentations of 
the project. However, all project partners can present and publish insights, experiences and results 
from the project in ways that they find most useful.  
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Start-Up Workshops 
In the Spring of 2017, we organized five workshops in Copenhagen, Ilulissat, Sisimiut, Nuuk and 
Qaqortoq: one with representatives from the involved research and educational institutions and 
one with various representatives from each of the four municipalities.2 Each of the municipalities 
decided who should be invited to the workshop. Resultantly the participants varied in between the 
municipalities. The majority of the participants were administrative staff working with or 
responsible for the area of services to older citizens or representatives from nursing homes and 
homecare units. In some municipalities, members of local old age societies and local older people’s 
councils also participated. 
Besides performing a meet and greet function, the workshops had two purposes. One was to 
identify and discuss which specific topics within ageing the different partners prioritized. Another 
was to start a collection of systematic cultural analytical knowledge on perceptions and practices 
of old age and the everyday life of older people in different life stages and circumstances. 
During these workshops the participants were presented with two exercises. The first was an 
individual exercise. During the exercise each participant had to place selected photos on an empty 
poster. The pictures had to represent elements or concepts that he/she perceived to be of 
importance to old age or ageing. All participants received identical sets of approximately 30 small 
photos displaying Greenlandic scenes of food, nature, transport, exercise equipment, buildings, 
advanced hospital equipment, sailing, hunting etc., and were also given blank cards to fill in if a 
certain subject or theme was missing.  After selecting and placing the photos, everyone took turns 
telling about their poster.  
Following this exercise, the participants were presented with a group exercise.  Each group had to 
think of situations, events or projects concerning older people and/or ageing within the 
municipality that had been more or less successful. Each group then had to map the different 
actors involved in the chosen situation, event or project and discuss how they made use of each 
other, or how they potentially could make use of each other in the future. 
The workshops ended with a session where the participants could comment on the workshop 
format and exercises and ask questions about the outcomes and the continuation of the process. 
Figure 2: The posters produced during one of the municipal workshops in May 2017. 
 
After the workshops the researchers analyzed the materials produced and wrote a short report for 
each municipality containing a description of the discussed themes. The municipalities were then 
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asked to prioritize the themes and state which they wished AgeArc researchers to investigate 
(Nørtoft & Jensen, 2017b). 
The workshop with researchers and staff from educational institutions had the same format as the 
municipal workshops.  
Focus Groups on Activity 
The first series of workshops both became the starting point for a collaborative dialogue between 
the research and practice partners and informed the ethnographic fieldwork as well as the specific 
questions in The Greenland Health Survey mentioned earlier. 
One of the themes to emerge from the workshops was activities for and among older people living 
on their own or in municipal care homes. One of the ways in which AgeArc has continued to work 
with this theme has been through the use of focus groups with older people. Between February 
and April 2018 seven focus groups were conducted in three different towns. For four of the focus 
groups, municipal staff helped recruit participants and for three focus groups, participants were 
recruited by the researcher in the local association for older people. Five of the focus groups were 
conducted with the help of an interpreter who was either a care worker or a consultant from the 
municipality. The remaining two focus groups were conducted with participants translating for 
each other and the researcher.3  
The participants were asked to use photos, words or drawings to show which activities they take 
part in or wish to take part in in their daily lives. After telling about their current activities, the 
participants were asked to talk about which structures/persons/items they found would help make 
other types of desired activities possible. The participants were happy to share their ideas, 
experiences and wishes, and the format of the focus group allowed for both sharing of memories 
and conversations about how to make wishes come true. 
The focus groups provided insights into the activities older people do, and into which kinds of 
activities they wish to engage in as part of a more active daily life. The focus groups also gave the 
participants a possibility to discuss possible ways to deal with practical, structural and social 
obstacles for some types of activities. In the focus groups that were conducted in collaboration 
with a member of the municipal staff, he or she expressed that the focus groups gave them an 
opportunity for participating in user involvement in a way they had not tried before, and they were 
very interested in the format and how the use of simple tools enabled conversations about daily 
matters such as activity in new ways. The staff members also noted that the focus groups facilitated 
the generation of new ideas for activities and suggestions for doable solutions to minor obstacles.  
Creation of a Specific Outdoor Area 
The third and final example of activities in AgeArc shows how we use co-creation in a specific 
development project which aims to design an accessible outdoor area outside a municipal social 
housing area for older people. The homecare management expressed a desire for some kind of 
ramp that could provide residents with restricted mobility access to the mountain area right next 
to the buildings. Simultaneously, they had initiated conversations about the idea with an 
administrative staff member in the municipality. 
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The preliminary results of the ethnographic fieldwork confirmed the needs for older people to be 
in nature, since experiences and activities related to nature is of great importance to their quality 
of life (Nørtoft & Jensen, 2017b). When the municipal partners decided to take action on the idea, 
the researchers provided background knowledge for the initial application for funds to begin the 
project.  
After raising funds to begin the project, the design process was planned and conducted. The 
process consisted of three workshops and a presentation of the final designed and selected idea. 
The workshops were planned, arranged and facilitated in collaboration between an AgeArc 
researcher and a collaborating APEN4 researcher and architect, the homecare management and 
staff members of the municipal administration. 
The workshops were conducted in June 2018. The purpose of the design exercises was to learn 
what made an area suitable as a recreational outdoor area for the target group. Thus the exercises 
consisted of mapping and discussing current needs, good and bad experiences of and with different 
areas, which outdoor functions the older people were interested in as well as identifying the most 
suitable location by collectively studying existing outdoor spaces on site. 
The design of the outdoor space was finalized in June and additional funding for the construction 
of the ramp was applied for and granted by Qeqqata Municipality’s local development fund. When 
the construction is built, AgeArc will fund additional equipment for activities in the area such as 
places to sit, a fireplace for outdoor cooking, a stand for drying fish etc. In the late Summer of 
2018 some of the ideas from the workshops that are less costly had been implemented in the 
apartment complex’s existing outdoor area. The homecare management arranged a workshop with 
the residents making use of some of the same tools as was used in the previous co-design process. 
During the workshop it was discussed how the area could be more useful with places to sit and to 
do planting activities. 
An AgeArc researcher has conducted follow up interviews with the participating staff from the 
homecare management and the municipal administration about the co-design process. A follow 
up study on participants’ involvement in the design process, the implementation of smaller 
installations in the existing outdoor space and on the use of the new outdoor area will be conducted 
in the Summer of 2019 when the construction has been in use. 
Moreover the experiences from the collaboration and participation of all involved in the design 
process will be gathered in a set of guidelines for citizen involvement. These guidelines will be 
shared across the municipalities and can be used in a variety of ways not only in new construction 
projects, but also in other types of projects and processes where municipalities and local 
organizations wish to involve citizens and gather knowledge for development of welfare solutions. 
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Figures 3-5. Workshop process posters, created by Sidse Carroll
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One of the tools in the design process was to make a process poster after each workshop. The 
posters were made immediately after the workshop and displayed in two central locations to create 
awareness about the project among the residents. The aim was that everyone should be able to 
follow the process and feel welcome to join any of the workshops, even if they could or would not 
participate in all three workshops. The three process posters are made by Sidse Carrol. 
Discussion  
The descriptions of some of the activities in AgeArc highlight the interlinkages between the 
fieldwork activities of researchers and the goals and perceptions of municipal staff and civil society 
and how the oscillations between research and practice continuously broaden and enrich the 
outcomes of the project in both research and development projects. These interlinkages ensure 
that the research and municipal partners have an equal interest in the establishment of the networks 
and contacts that are necessary to the fieldwork and ensures that the conducted research includes 
the interests of the municipalities. They also involve municipal staff and civil society directly in the 
project’s ethnographic fieldwork and methodological reflections and work with collaboration and 
co-design. However, the success of the project is to a large extent dependent on the personal 
relations between researchers and municipal key persons. Hence, the local development initiatives 
are more likely to be successful and have a lasting effect in municipalities where staff members 
become genuinely interested and involved in the project. 
Implication for Practice 
In projects with collaboration between researchers and community members, it has been discussed 
who should make the decisions about the research. In some projects, researchers train community 
members to do research (Hoare, Levy & Robinson, 1993). In other projects Indigenous ways of 
knowing are emphasized giving community members authority to define (parts of) the research 
(Moller et al., 2009; Cochran et al., 2009). 
In AgeArc, decisions about the research are made in collaboration between practice and research 
partners. Practice partners point out relevant topics and directions for the research, and the 
researchers do fieldwork and analyse the data. All partners influence the research making sure that 
it is of relevance for practice (cf. Moller et al., 2009) as well as research. No partners have the final 
authority to make the decisions without the others.  
Another challenge in community projects with a strong participatory element is the question of 
ownership of the research data (Robinson, 1996; Hoare, Levy & Robinson, 1993). In AgeArc, data 
are owned by the project. Results and insights from the research are continuously shared with 
practice partners and forms the base of the decisions made regarding the development projects in 
AgeArc. All partners are allowed to present the project in ways that are relevant for them as long 
as it lives up to the ethical guidelines of the project. It has not yet been relevant for any of our 
practice partners to write academic articles, but it is for the researchers. The practice partners have 
requested reports from the researchers. In such cases the researchers write the report and send it 
to the relevant practice partner for comments and changes before the report is made public. In 
those cases, a report written by researchers is then used as a tool by the practice partners to address 
a specific challenge to their administrations or local politicians. Both practice partners and 
researchers have presented the project in local and national media. In these cases, press releases 
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are sent to and edited by involved partners to make sure that everyone’s experiences are 
represented correctly (cf. Robinson, 1996).  
In research there is often room to experiment and test initiatives that might not turn out to work 
as expected. In practice there are often more focus on investment leading to measurable results – 
very often economically measurable results. So how do we make sure that the projects in AgeArc 
are efficient? First of all, AgeArc is funded by a private foundation covering the salary of the 
researchers and research activities. In addition there is money set aside for smaller development 
projects. This means that the municipalities invest in AgeArc with their engagement and by letting 
some of their employees participate in meetings, workshops etc. regarding AgeArc. Since the 
municipal partners are part of deciding the directions of the project, we work on themes, 
development projects and solutions, which they would have to work on in their daily practice 
anyway. We hope that working together in this way across research and practice leaves lasting 
impressions in the municipalities. Some of these impressions will be ideas, discussions and ways 
of working that are taken forward by practice partners without the researchers. Other impressions 
can be physical products such as the ramp described in this paper, information flyers for citizens, 
tools for dementia care such as e.g. a book designed for conversation between staff/relatives and 
people with dementia etc. Besides the specific products and ideas we leave, we will also do follow 
up activities to evaluate how the products and ideas are being used and developed, when the 
researchers are not around. 
Findings 
When new insights and ideas are developed in collaboration, all partners discuss how they can be 
translated into tools that can be used in practice. While the researchers might be the experts of 
synthesising insights from large data sets according to academic standards, the municipal partners 
are experts in practice and know what formats they can use to spread knowledge and ideas to 
politicians, colleagues and citizens. The ongoing dialogue between researchers from different 
disciplines and municipal staff means that knowledge can quickly be transformed into practice 
tools for various purposes. The close collaboration and mutual interdependence have incited 
researchers to present preliminary results and findings in the project group and practitioners and 
planners to share their experiences, knowhow and networks. At the same time the organizational 
structure is relatively loose making implementation easier than in a more rule bound and regulated 
society (Voorberg et al., 2017). 
Besides developing a solution to an everyday life challenge, the described co-design process with 
the older participants was a learning arena for the participating municipal staff (cf. ibid.). In the 
process they learned and experimented with new methods for citizen involvement. This means 
that the four participating staff members got new experiences with and tools for working with 
citizens.  
The co-design process could, however, not have taken place without the activities described in the 
two other activities described above. The personal connections made during the start-up 
workshops and the focus groups has not only established relations between the project partners, 
but also succeeded in involving older people, thus creating an interest for participating in and 
contributing to the design workshops. In this way the overall collaborative approach of AgeArc 
has proven to be a fruitful platform for specific co-created initiatives. The collaborative approach 
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and the open dialogues create a community in which it is safe and rewarding to share ideas, 
participating in discussions and create new initiatives. If anyone has an idea for a welfare solution 
with older people as the target group, AgeArc is a platform with various resources, competences, 
expertise and local networks that can be combined and activated to solve the specific problem in 
question. The collaboration between municipal staff and researchers also prevents various kinds 
of resistance from the professionals as seen in other co-creation projects (cf. Nilsen et al., 2016). 
The projects are as much the professionals’ own project as it is the municipal administration’s or 
the researchers’ project. The project is not only a grand narrative that participants are forced into. 
Rather they identify personally with the project, their participation and the results, thereby giving 
the project the best possible preconditions for success (cf. Andersen, 2015). In times of lacking 
engagement from specific municipal partners, the project ‘takes a break’ because it can only be 
ongoing with engagement of both practice and research partners.5 In such situations, project 
activities are put into other sub projects, where all partners are engaged. For as long as the project 
is going on, any partners who ‘had a break’ are welcome to re-engage in the project. 
Recommendations for Research and Practice 
If other researchers, practitioners and/or administrative should want to engage in collaborative 
projects as equal partners, we offer the following recommendations: 
1) Openness and acknowledgement of each other’s competences and resources as well as the 
partners’ own lack of expertise in specific areas are crucial attitudes for an equal 
partnership. Any project will have a better chance of success if the partners’ resources are 
accumulated for the good of the project. Acknowledgement of the partners’ 
interdependence and different expertise areas will be likely to lead to all partners 
experiencing that they gain more from working together that if they worked without the 
others (cf. Pagter, 2006). 
2) An open and flexible research agenda is important if the research should have direct 
relevance for the practice partners (cf. Robinson, 2006; Cochran et al. 2008; Moller et al., 
2009). It is important with dialogue about focus areas so the researchers’ interference in 
practice is experienced as a relevant contribution rather than a burden and a hindrance for 
the execution of daily tasks. Researchers need to be open for the fact that their ideas may 
be rejected, or that practice partners might want to bring ideas forward without the 
researchers. Practice partners must be open to researchers’ possible rejection of their ideas, 
if these ideas are outside the scope of the externally funded project. 
3) Transparent communication about results, insights, directions and progression of the 
project is important. It is necessary for the fruitful dialogue between the partners and it is 
crucial for the relationship between the partners who need to trust in each other to be able 
to contribute with ideas and competences (cf. Wallerstein & Duran, 2010). All partners 
should be able to follow the process and progress. When some partners are not engaged, 
the project will not be likely to move very much forward, in those specific areas. 
Conclusion 
The aim of this article was to discuss how collaboration between research and practice can become 
an important factor in sustainable development of local communities, welfare state benefits and 
meaningful and health promoting strategies aiming to improve the everyday lives of older people 
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in Greenland. We have presented the methodology of the research and development project 
Ageing in the Arctic (AgeArc) and shown how use of a collaborative project design succeeds at 
integrating ageing research, practices and policies to the benefit of the Greenlandic society in an 
ongoing dialogue between the project partners and participants.  
Start-up workshops made it possible for representatives from both research partners, practice 
partners and civil society to influence the point of departure for the research in the project. The 
workshops also worked as arenas for establishing personal relations between project partners as 
well as informing municipal practitioners and local associations of older people about the project. 
Focus groups about activity with older people and with the assistance of municipal healthcare 
workers was part of the ethnographic fieldwork. Besides from generating knowledge about the 
participant’s preferred activities and their possibilities for engaging in them, the focus groups 
taught the participating municipal staff new methods of user involvement. 
Knowledge from both start-up workshops and focus groups supported an idea from the homecare 
management to create access for people with restricted mobility to an age-friendly outdoor area 
close to a municipal apartment complex for older people. The personal relations and the sharing 
of knowledge and experiences between researchers and practitioners fueled a co-creation process 
that is still ongoing. In this process an architectural researcher was invited to help with a co-design 
process where all residents in an apartment complex was invited to contribute to the design 
process. While everybody participating learns more about older people’s specific experiences, 
needs and wishes for outdoor spaces, the municipal staff taking part has experienced methods of 
user involvement that can be used in other projects in the future. The experiences and methods 
are shared with all partners of AgeArc in order for all municipalities to have access to and 
knowledge about this approach. 
The collaborative work in AgeArc has shown that the Greenlandic context is very fruitful for 
collaboration, development and implementation of new initiatives, when personal relations and 
partnerships are continuously maintained through dialogue between research and practice. 
However, the importance of personalized relations and the limited number of municipal 
employees makes development and implementation of new initiatives vulnerable. 
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Notes 
1. In the late summer and autumn of 2018, fieldwork focused on dementia is taking place 
within the larger AgeArc project. 
2. At the time there was four municipalities in Greenland. By January 1st 2018 Qaasuitsup 
Kommunia split into two new municipalities, Avaanaata Kommunia and Kommune 
Qeqertalik. 
3. In Greenland, Danish has been, and still partly is, the language used in national and 
municipal administrations, and many, especially the older parts of the population, are fluent 
in Danish. Since many employees in administrations and health services and some owners 
of private businesses are Danish, official messages from authorities are often in both 
Greenlandic and Danish. Hence it is not unusual for older people to be in situations, where 
translation between Greenlandic and Danish takes place and the translation was not an 
obstacle for the conduction of the focus groups. 
4. APEN, Activity and health enhancing Physical Environment Network is a research 
network hosted at KADK, Royal Danish Academy of fine arts, schools of architecture, 
design and conservation. 
5. Some municipalities have a high degree of turn-over in administrative and practice 
positions meaning that contact persons for the project change often. Some municipalities 
are (re)structuring their organization meaning that they cannot focus on AgeArc for four 
years without breaks. 
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This section of the Arctic Yearbook has its roots in a network established with the support of the 
UK Arts and Humanities Research Council: The Science Based Governance and Regulation of 
Arctic Energy Installations Network (SciBAr Installations) (www.scibarinstallations.org.uk).  The 
network and this section of the Yearbook are designed to develop an overview of the potential 
risks and impacts associated with the construction and operation of offshore installations in the 
Arctic drawing on expertise from a range of disciplines. Thus we have contributions from law 
(Basaran, Vinogradov & Azubuike, and Kirk & Miller), environmental science (Kirk & Miller) 
management (Andræsen, Borch & Ikonen) and politics (Poppel). 
The papers give some indication of the range of relevant disciplines and issues to be addressed if 
we are to ensure a 360 degree review of the regulation of offshore energy installations in the Arctic.  
Thus Vinogradov & Azubuike take a traditional legal approach in assessing the current global and 
regional regulations relating to pollution from offshore petroleum operations in the Arctic and 
propose solutions to identified gaps in the existing Arctic regime in the form of a regional 
intergovernmental framework or an industry-wide compensation scheme.  Kirk & Miller provide 
an interdisciplinary analysis of the ways in which gaps in scientific understanding of the potential 
impacts from oil and gas installations on the marine environment may raise legal questions such 
as what “significant transboundary pollution” means in the Arctic context. Poppel’s paper also 
directly links to oil and gas activities, but focuses more on the impacts or potential impacts on the 
political discourse in Greenland.  
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Two of the papers range slightly more widely, in that they address topics which encompass issues 
pertaining to Arctic offshore energy installations as well as broader issues. Thus Basaran’s paper 
on civil liability for oil pollution has potential implications for the transit passage of oil tankers as 
well as pollution from shipping transporting oil from Arctic installations. Similarly, Andræsen, 
Borch & Ikonen’s analysis of Arctic marine emergency response draws out how Arctic operational 
conditions add to inter-organizational coordination challenges in delivering emergency response 
to all maritime operations, not just those relating to offshore energy installations.    
In this collection of papers we begin then to demonstrate the breadth and depth of research needed 
if we are to fully understand the issues that regulators must address if we are to attend to all threats 
and impacts from and to offshore installations in the Arctic. As the papers demonstrate these 
range from socio-political impacts, to impacts on human health and safety, to impacts on the 
marine environment. The responses required range from the development of monitoring and 
management techniques, to changes in law. 
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Offshore Oil & Gas Installations in the Arctic: 
Responding to Uncertainty through Science and Law 
 
Elizabeth A. Kirk & Raeanne G. Miller 
 
 
The Arctic Ocean’s physical environments and ecosystems are some of the most fragile and least well understood on Earth. 
They are characterised by extreme light and dark cycles, shortened food chains, and slow ecosystem recovery from disturbance. 
The Arctic seabed also holds promise of lucrative oil and gas resources, whose future exploitation could have substantial 
environmental impacts. Arctic jurisdictions must weigh environmental conservation and global agreements to reduce carbon 
emissions against the social implications and potential economic gain of offshore oil and gas projects in the Arctic, and must do 
so in the face of substantial scientific uncertainty around the impacts of climate and environmental change in the Arctic. We 
know, however, that major projects such as oil and gas projects have the potential to lead to transboundary environmental harm. 
We have some understanding of how any pollution may be carried by sea ice or on the ocean currents which flow around the 
Arctic Ocean. Even so, we have little understanding of how such pollutants might affect the Arctic ecosystem. Substantial gaps 
remain in scientific understanding of Arctic ecosystem functioning, particularly as it changes rapidly with the advent of climate 
change. These gaps in scientific understanding raise legal questions about how, for example, the law’s obligation not to cause 
significant transboundary environmental harm applies in the Arctic. In particular one may ask what actions are required by 
a state to show that they have acted with due diligence. Is it sufficient, for example, to show that they have complied with 
existing international treaties?   
This paper draws out key legal and scientific issues on which greater understanding is required. In essence it presents a roadmap 
for further research and negotiation. 
 
Introduction 
Some of the largest remaining petroleum reserves worldwide are located in the Arctic. Since 
exploratory drilling began in the 1970’s there has been consistent interest in exploiting these 
resources (AMAP, 2007), although to date few fields have entered into production, owing to: low 
oil prices; the technological and logistical challenges of operating in extremely cold and remote 
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environments; national commitments to climate agreements; and the risk of environmental impact 
that could result from a large oil spill or other serious event (Gulas et al., 2017). Even so, Norway 
has been active in offshore petroleum exploration in the Arctic since the Snøhvit field was 
discovered in 1984 (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2018) and there is potential for further 
activity.   
Should offshore oil and gas activity increase in the Arctic, so does the risk of harm to the marine 
environment. AMAP (2010) highlighted a number of key risks to the Arctic environment 
associated with oil and gas extraction, including: spills of hydrocarbons and other pollutants from 
offshore drilling activities, blowouts, rig accidents and shipping disasters; operational pollution 
from exploratory drilling; increasing volumes of rubbish and sewage; an influx of people to the 
Arctic; increased air pollution; noise pollution to the marine environment; increased emissions 
from burning fossil fuels; light pollution; and cumulative impacts stemming from multiple 
installations and human activities. Of these, this paper will focus on certain impacts directly 
associated with offshore oil and gas development: hydrocarbon spills, pollutants, underwater noise 
pollution, and the impact of cumulative development. While the remaining effects are important, 
they are also associated with wider human activity in the Arctic (mining, tourism, shipping, etc.) 
and so draw in broader considerations we do not have space to address here.  
The Arctic Ocean itself is a remote and challenging environment, but also one which is inherently 
vulnerable to environmental change, and about which we know very little. Of the eight Arctic 
nations, five have exclusive economic zones within the Arctic circle (Canada, USA, Russia, 
Denmark, Norway). For the purposes of this paper, we consider ‘the Arctic’ to be the region 
defined by the Arctic Circle. More specifically, this includes the Arctic Ocean, as defined by the 
ocean north of the latitude 66˚34’, and the states whose coastlines border it. This definition is 
environmentally relevant, as it includes not only areas of sea ice cover, but also the ‘subarctic 
marine’ regions between Norway and Greenland, through which most of the water entering and 
exiting the Arctic Ocean flows (Jones, 2001). This boundary is also politically relevant: the five 
aforementioned states have indicated their intention to collaborate, as communicated in the 
Ilulissat Declaration of 2008, and as illustrated in more recent agreements such as the 2017 
moratorium on fisheries activity in the central Arctic Ocean. 
Although separate in legal terms, the territorial waters of each nation bordering the Arctic are 
linked by ocean circulation, sea ice drift, and species migration, all of which can transport resources 
and impacts such as pollutants between them. It is an inherently connected environment. These 
characteristics mean that, for example, the risk of harm being caused to other states or to the 
environment beyond national jurisdiction may be higher in the Arctic than elsewhere even where 
pollution would normally be regarded as small scale.  Similarly, recent advances in oceanography 
suggest that in some cases (e.g. pollutant spills in ice, Blanken et al., 2017) it may be possible to 
demonstrate causation linking operational pollution to significant transboundary harm.   
Thus we highlight key legal and scientific questions that are linked to the specific impacts noted 
above and draw out how these impacts and the legal and scientific questions attached to them may 
differ in the Arctic to other oceans.  The main discussion is focused upon what may be termed 
“flaws” in the legal framework and draws out the legal and scientific questions that need 
addressing.  It thus sets an agenda for research in relation to offshore installations in the Arctic. 
Arctic Yearbook 2018 
Kirk & Miller 
258 
Flaws in the Framework and New Questions 
The Potential for Significant Transboundary Harm 
Coastal states have sovereignty over their terrirorial waters and sovereign rights to the hydrocarbon 
and mineral desposits in their continental shelf and to exploit renewable energy in their exclusive 
economic zones (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS), Articles 2, 56 and 77). 
These rights underpin the exploitation of oil, gas and renewable energy sources in the oceans. 
While the rights give states considerable freedom to exploit resources, they do bring with them 
obligations. These obligations largely reiterate and expand upon customary international law 
obligations to protect and prevent harm to the marine environment, (Article 192) to prevent 
transboundary harm (Article 194(2)) and to harmonize their measures to prevent and reduce 
marine environmental harm (Article 194(1)). In addition, specific obligations to control pollution 
from offshore installations and to enforce those obligations are found in Articles 208, 210, 215 
and  216. Obligations to control pollution from shipping found in Articles 211 and 217 to 221 are 
also relevant where ships are used to service and support offshore energy activities.  
To meet these obligations in the context of potential transboundary harm states must apply the 
prevention principle (Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (ICJ 
1996)).  The prevention principle requires states to prevent “significant” transboundary harm and 
to do so by acting with due diligence. The problem with these obligations in the context of 
potential oil and gas activities in the Arctic is that what is meant by “significant” is not clear, nor 
is it clear what acting with due diligence requires.   
What is regarded as significant has to be decided in the context of the particular issue. We know 
that “significant” means more than simply the harm is detectable, and that it need not require the 
harm to be substantial in nature. But in the context of the Arctic Ocean, where a relatively minor 
oil spill may linger longer than in temperate waters (Leahy & Colwell, 1990; Atlas et al., 1978), 
causing lasting damage to the environment, we have yet to fully understand what scale of pollution 
would count as significant. Would, for example, operational pollution which may accumulate 
across time amount to significant pollution? Some authors have suggested that incremental 
accumulation of impacts may not be captured by the term “significant harm” and so would not 
give rise to potential liability (Duvic-Paoli & Viñuales, 2015). Yet in the context of the Arctic a 
failure to address operational pollution could have significant (but unforeseen) impacts. 
Although there is a substantial amount of information available on the environmental effects of 
hydrocarbons in the marine environment, relatively few impact studies have been carried out on 
truly Arctic species (but see Rice et al., 1978). Instead, the majority of research investigating the 
impacts of oil spills on marine species have focused on temperate waters. It is therefore difficult 
to predict how well these findings might be applied to the Arctic environment (AMAP, 2010) and 
while, for example, the Arctic Council takes a leading role in promoting the development of 
scientific understanding on these and other Arctic issues, significant gaps in understanding remain. 
With this in mind, existing international agreements on pollution and the marine environment (e.g. 
UNCLOS, OSPAR convention) may not fully encapsulate what is truly required to protect the 
Arctic Ocean.  
The recovery rate of the Arctic marine environment in response to disturbance is likely to be slow, 
whether as a result of reduced species diversity, the slow-growing nature of many cold-water 
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species, or the reproductive importance of the region for many species, for example nesting 
seabirds (Forsgren et al. 2009). Combined with the fact that Arctic food chains are comparatively 
short and dependent on key species (Kaiser et al., 2011), pollution, even comparatively low level 
operational pollution, could have severe impacts on the functioning of the Arctic ocean ecosystem.  
In addition, a number of factors could exacerbate the severity of an Arctic oil spill. At colder 
temperatures, for example, the density and viscosity of oil increases, while its degradation time is 
much slower (Leahy & Colwell, 1990; Atlas, 1981; Atlas et al. 1978). This means that spilled oil 
may linger on the seabed, under ice, or in coastal environments for longer than it otherwise would 
in temperate or tropical environments. In the case of the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska, oil is 
still detectable in the intertidal environment. It has been suggested that oil trapped in sediment 
following the 1970 Arrow spill in Chedabucto Bay, Nova Scotia, Canada, could persist for as long 
as 150 years (Vandermeulen & Gordon, 1976). Each of these spills was, however, relatively 
contained in that the spill came from an oil tanker holding a relatively small volume of oil compared 
to what might emerge from a major spill at an offshore oil development. The risks of oil, or other 
chemicals, lingering in the Arctic environment as a result of an offshore accident attached to oil 
and gas activites are, therefore, significant.  
In addition, in considering the impact of pollution in the Arctic we must consider the pollutant/ice 
interface and its impact on the marine ecosystem. The Arctic Ocean ecosystem is dominated by 
the seasonal fluctuation of sea ice. Sea ice is an important habitat for photosynthetic algae and sub-
ice phytoplankton, the primary producers that form the basis of the Arctic marine food web (Post 
et al, 2013). Each year as the seasonal sea ice thins, increasing light penetration causes these primary 
producers to rapidly increase in numbers, in turn fueling the seasonal reproduction and growth of 
zooplankton such as copepods (Darnis et al., 2012, Gosselin et al., 1997), which serve as prey to 
higher order consumers including fish and crustaceans. While sea ice algae and sub ice 
phytoplankton are major contributors to biomass in polar seas, sea ice is also a critical habitat for 
many charismatic species such as polar bears, walruses, narwhals, and many species of seabirds, 
who depend on sea ice for reproduction, food, or migration (Hoegh-Gulberg & Bruno, 2010).  
Thus any impact on zooplankton as a result of pollution has a significant impact on the food chain.  
Pollutants such as oil may remain on the surface of the sea ice as it forms, or pool beneath it (Payne 
et al., 1990). Alternatively, sub-ice oil may also move upwards through the ice via brine channels 
(Petrich et al., 2013) and fissures in the ice, to ultimately appear on the sea ice surface (Lee et al., 
2015). In so doing the oil or other pollutant may diminish light penetration or make the sub-ice 
areas no longer habitable.  The short food chains and dependence of those food chains on ice may 
open the marine Arctic to more vulnerability to pollutants than would be the case in other ocean 
areas.  Add to this the fact that 75% of sea ice volume has been lost since the 1980s (Schweiger et 
al. 2011, Overland and Want, 2013) and any further diminution of habitable ice area due to (even 
relatively low scale) pollution may have a severe impact on the Arctic marine ecosystem.  
Clearly we are still to understand the extent of these potential impacts, but at the same time these 
potential impacts raise the possibility that states conducting or permitting offshore operations may 
be more likely to find themselves in breach of the obligation not to cause significant transboundary 
harm as a result of activities in the Arctic when similar activities elsewhere would not be predicted 
to cause significant transboundary harm.  
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There is a further aspect to this in that scientific evidence points to the possibility that the 
likelihood of transboundary impacts arising may also be greater in the Arctic than in other oceans 
because of the relationship (or potential relationship) between pollutants and ice. As we noted 
above, where released pollutants (e.g., oil, chemicals) interact with sea ice, they may become 
entrained within the ice in a number of ways, for example in association with the underside of the 
ice, transportation from the underside to the surface of the ice through brine channels or leads, or 
direct integration into sea ice formation (AMAP, 1998). Once a pollutant becomes ice-associated, 
it will often move with the ice as it is transported or dispersed by prevailing winds and currents 
(Afenyo et al., 2016; Beegle-Krause et al., 2013). It may then travel hundreds of kilometres as the 
ice moves, before it is released in another location (possibly another state’s EEZ) as ice melts. For 
example, a recent study investigated the spreading trajectories of ‘worst case scenario’ oil spills in 
the Arctic, and found that the movement of sea ice had the potential to transport oil greater 
distances than ocean currents, sometimes over 4000 km, and that contamination from oil spills 
was in many cases likely to cross international boundaries (Blanken et al., 2017).   
Again this raises both legal and scientific questions. Not only does it suggest that transboundary 
impacts may be more likely, but the relationship between pollutants and ice raises the possibility 
that causation will be easier to establish. In other words, it is possible that it will be easier to trace 
the flow of ice in the Arctic Ocean back to the state of origin of the pollution and this possibility 
may be enhanced by the relative paucity of development in the Arctic. Naturally these legal issues 
point to scientific questions that should be addressed – how do pollutants interact with ice? How 
far will such pollutants be transported? How easy is it to trace the pollutant back to source as a 
result of the pollutant/ice relationship? 
States can mount a defense to any claim that they have failed to act with due diligence by showing, 
in effect, that they have acted reasonably. Due diligence, for example, requires that states take 
reasonable steps to avoid causing transboundary harm. The question of what is reasonable will be 
interpreted in light of any relevant international obligations and of the circumstances in which 
actions take place. Thus a state must show that it has acted in compliance with relevant 
international treaties or guidelines. Key obligations in this respect are those found in Articles 192 
and 194 of UNCLOS which, as discussed above, oblige states to take action to protect and  prevent 
harm to the marine environment and not to permit activities within their jurisdiction which will 
cause transboundary pollution. Other relevant agreements include global treaties, such as the 
London Dumping Convention 1972 and its 1996 Protocol which regulate dumping at sea 
(encompassing disposal of offshore installations at sea); regional treaties such as the OSPAR 
Convention 1992, Annex III of which in effect requires authorising states to regulate pollution 
from offshore installations and soft law instruments such as the Code for the Construction and 
Equipment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (IMO Resolution A.1023(26), 2 December 2009) 
which regulates the design of offshore drilling units to minimize the risk of harm to them or to 
those working on them. There is also a range of oil-based international treaties that apply to all 
areas, including the Arctic. These include the 1990 International Convention on Oil Pollution 
Preparedness, Response and Cooperation (OPRC) which requires, for example, operators to have 
an oil pollution emergency plan in place (Article 4) and states to have effective national pollution 
incident response systems in place (Article 6). The OPRC applies to any fixed or floating offshore 
structure engaged in gas or oil exploration, exploitation or production activities and so is highly 
relevant.  
Arctic Yearbook 2018 
Offshore Oil & Gas Installations in the Arctic 
261 
Compliance with these obligations is, in terms of due diligence, assessed in light of the 
circumstances. These may include factors such as the level of industrial development of the state 
and its geography. Thus, for example, a densely populated, territorially small state may be expected 
to have a very good awareness of the occurance of any oil spills on their land territory, whereas a 
more sparsly populated state with a large amount of land territory could not be expected to have 
such immediate knowledge. Such distinctions may of course diminish as remote sensing 
technology develops. In the Arctic context, however, what is key is that the environment is harsh 
and so responding to incidents may prove difficult. What might start as a minor (and in another 
location containable) spill, for example, could become a major incident before states are able to 
effectively respond. Crucially, none of the treaties or guidelines referred to above were developed 
for the Arctic specific environment and so a question arises as to whether states complying with 
these treaties, but still causing significant harm to the Arctic marine environment could be said to 
be exercising due diligence.  In other words, do the specific environmental circumstances of the 
Arctic require the coastal states to behave at a higher standard than is required under the global 
treaties? The responses of some Arctic states suggest that may be the case.   
A key response has been the adoption of some polar specific agreements and guidelines, notably 
those adopted under the auspices of or by the Arctic Council. These include the Arctic Council’s 
Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines 2009 (Arctic Guidelines) and the Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas 
Guidelines: Systems Safety Management and Safety Culture 2014. The Arctic Guidelines call, for 
example, for the application of the precautionary approach to oil and gas activities and set out 
guidance on the conduct of environmental impact assessments, monitoring, waste management 
and more. While at first glance the Guidelines appear comprehensive they do contain gaps. The 
precautionary approach is, for example, to be applied in accordance with the state’s capabilities 
and how this caveat is to be interpreted is not made clear.  
Potentially binding international law for responding to Arctic oil spills has also been adopted in 
the form of the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and Response 
in the Arctic (ACMOPPRA). However, although the Arctic states have signed this treaty, they 
have not completed all the steps necessary to bring it into force. A second agreement is the 2011 
Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, which 
came into force in January 2013. However, this Agreement focuses on protecting individuals at 
risk through accidents at sea in the Arctic, not on protecting the environment. These Arctic 
agreements are supported by the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar 
Code), which contains various technical requirements designed to ensure the safety of ships (and 
those working on them) in polar regions.   
While these agreements do go a long way to responding to oil spills, in our view compliance with 
them may not be sufficient to show that the state has acted with due diligence, nor may it be 
enough to prevent harm to the Arctic. This is largely because of the scientific information on 
which they are based.  As we have shown above, significant questions about the impact of and 
transportation of pollutants remain. As we will show shortly, questions about the ability of the 
environment to recover from any pollution damage also arise. In addition, there is evidence of 
some Arctic states adopting further national Arctic specific measures so suggesting that higher 
standards yet may be required. For example, the US has adopted the binding Arctic Drilling Rules, 
which expressly cover exploratory drilling by mobile offshore drilling units and require a higher 
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standard for drilling in the US Arctic than other areas of the US Outer Continental Shelf. The 
types of measures covered by the Arctic Drilling Rules include that operators are required to use 
equipment which can perform safely in locations that have limited infrastructrure and in extreme 
weather and ocean conditions. They are also required have the ability to track and respond to 
changing ice conditions and adverse weather. Of perhaps greater import in determining the nature 
of actions required in the Arctic was the adoption in the December 2016 of the United States-
Canada Joint Arctic Leaders’ Statement through which Canada instituted an indefinite moratorium 
on all future oil and gas activities in all Canadian Arctic waters and the USA adopted an indefinite 
moratorium on all future oil and gas activities in much of its Arctic waters. (Both moratoria are, 
however, due to be reviewed after 5 years and the US moratorium may be reversed by the current 
President, Donald Trump). 
There is a further element to demonstrating that a state is acting with due diligence: certain  
procedural obligations must be complied with. 
Procedural Obligations: EIA, and Notification and Consultation 
States are subject to the well-recognised obligation to notify and consult potentially affected states 
of a planned activity which may lead to significant harmful impacts on them (Lac Lannoux 
Arbitration, 1957). The obligation to notify and consult with states potentially harmed by an 
activity leads to the obligation to undertake an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). The EIA 
obligation applies where a state is considering authorising a project or activity that may have a 
significant adverse transboundary impact, in particular on a shared resource (Pulp Mills on the 
River Uruguay (ICJ 2010)), but also in areas beyond state jurisdiction (Advisory Opinion on 
Responsibility and Obligations of States with respect to Activities in the Area (ITLOS 2011)). The 
obligation is also found in a number of treaties, most notably the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea 1982,1 requires EIAs to be conducted “When States have reasonable grounds 
for believing that planned activities under their jurisdiction or control may cause substantial 
pollution of or significant and harmful changes to the marine environment” (Article 206). 
Guidance on how to conduct EIAs can be found in a number of guidelines including the 2009 
Arctic Guidelines and the Convention on Biological Diversity, Voluntary Guidelines on 
Biodiversity-Inclusive Impact Assessment. 
The objective of an EIA is to provide decision makers with information on the environmental 
consequences of proposed activities; enable such information to influence decisions and provide 
a mechanism for public/stakeholder participation. It must therefore take place before the activity 
or project begins and, as the Court noted in the Pulp Mills case, it places an ongoing obligation to 
monitor impacts from these same activities on states.   
EIA’s rely on the existence of or establishment of scientific data on the environmental baseline 
associated with a particular time-frame and spatial scale. This allows for natural variability to be 
accounted for within the assessment, and ensures that the spatial extent of the baseline matches 
the extent of potential effects for the impact being investigated (Wassmann et al., 2011). While the 
Arctic Council leads in the establishment of baseline information through, for example, its periodic 
Arctic Ocean review projects, a lack of ecological information in the Arctic and the impact of 
global climate change remains. This makes it challenging to set sufficiently concrete environmental 
baselines for comparison across the timescale of resource extraction within, for example, a project 
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with a potential life of 25-40 years. Despite detailed international guidelines being available (in, for 
example, the Arctic Guidelines and the CBD Guidelines), they do not provide sufficient detail to 
address this. 
For example, a project developer might record environmental parameters over five years prior to 
an installation in order to set a ‘no impact’ baseline for that installation. From the point when 
installation commences, the pre-installation measurements are used as a frame against which to 
measure any impacts from the development. However, the background environmental change in 
the Arctic is so rapid that attributing a change to the project may be problematic. Thus, 
environmental change within an impacted site could be attributed to that impact, or to ongoing 
(background) environmental change resulting from climate change and other persistent stressors, 
or a combination of the two. The current international regime on EIA provides little assistance on 
how to tackle this issue. For example, the Arctic Guidelines provide “monitoring should preferably 
be conducted so as to distinguish impacts due to oil and gas activities from other relevant sources” 
(Arctic Guidelines: 21) but although they also call for natural and other hazards to be taken into 
account in an EIA they, like other legal documents, cannot or rather do not identify how to address 
the scientific uncertainties that come with, for example, rapid climate change. In scientific terms 
this leads to the conclusion that further, extensive and ongoing environmental monitoring in the 
Arctic is required at both development sites and those free of development. In legal terms this also 
raises questions of causation.  Without robust scientific evidence based on pan-Arctic monitoring, 
states permitting offshore activities may find themselves open to claims of transboundary 
environmental harm, imputed to the offshore activity but actually caused by activities elsewhere.   
To some extent the need for further research to establish environmental baselines is being met by 
states acting individually and collectively, in particular through the Arctic Council, to develop 
understanding of the State of the Arctic Environment. Key reports such as those produced 
through the Arctic Council Working Groups on Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) 
and Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) draw together best scientific 
understanding. We suggest, however, that further support for the research undertaken by the 
Arctic Council and others is needed. 
To some extent the need to establish baseline information can also be addressed (at least in part) 
by paying attention to another element of the EIA obligation. The obligation also requires that 
indigenous peoples be given an opportunity to input into the EIA process (Johnstone, 2014: 168). 
All EIA processes provide for public participation in some form. The fact that many Indigenous 
communities rely on Arctic marine resources means that they meet any tests to be counted as 
public. In the Arctic context this is highly significant as the Indigenous communities will often 
have a far more sophisticated understanding of the part of the Arctic marine ecosystem they 
interact with than “traditional” science. At the same time, those conducting the EIA may lack the 
linguistic skills and cultural understanding to ensure that Indigenous knowledge does feed into the 
EIA process in an effective manner. Again, the Arctic Council can and does play a role in 
supporting Indigenous peoples as they feed into the reports produced by its Working Groups and 
these reports in turn may be of use in informing the EIA process, but this is only part of the story.  
Further input into EIAs conducted at the national level is also required. Thus legal and scientific 
questions of how to effectively involve Indigenous and local communities in EIA and other data 
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gathering processes arise. What procedures are required, for example, to ensure that the 
Indigenous voice is heard and understood in the EIA process?  
The next step will be then to evaluate the impact of environmental stressors resulting from a 
development. In the Arctic, however, calculating both the potential impact of an event and the 
relative costs of prevention or mitigation will prove scientifically challenging. For example, 
experience from previous oil spills suggests that predicting the long-term impacts of spills is 
associated with high uncertainty of outcomes (Lee et al., 2015). Risk assessments and predicting 
impact outcomes is even more taxing in the Arctic, as the rapidly changing environment with the 
advent of climate change adds an additional dimension of complexity (Duarte et al., 2012). In part 
this is because there has been limited opportunity to test cleanup methods in the Arctic, but the 
complex dynamics of oil/chemical sea ice interactions make it particularly difficult to track the 
spread of a spill and to predict where it will be transported and how it may begin to degrade. 
Uncertainty in this area makes it hard for those assessing risks posed by Arctic pollution to predict 
both the severity of pollution associated with any particular activity, and to plan effective 
containment and clean up strategies to mitigate environmental harm. 
In addition, in the Arctic the EIA process also raises questions in relation to cumulative impacts.  
Arguably states are required by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and other international 
agreements, to take account of cumulative impacts in marine EIAs (Oude Elferink, 2012). For 
example, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) Voluntary Guidelines on  EIA, which 
provide guidance on how to interpret and apply Article 14  of the CBD note that the assessment 
process should include evaluation of (potential) cumulative impacts. The real challenge is, however, 
in identifying, or assessing the actual impact of potential cumulative impacts in the Arctic. For 
example, the noise from one individual vessel travelling to and from offshore production facilities 
may be short-lived and localised, but the transit of multiple vessels along the same route may 
displace animal populations, or cause migrating animals to avoid the area and to experience 
increased metabolic costs in order to swim around the affected area (Moore et al., 2012 and 
references therein). These types of impacts may be felt in any ocean in which they take place, 
however, in the Arctic their impact may be compounded by the impacts of rapid climate change 
also affecting Arctic marine species and habitat.  
The substantial gaps in our baseline understanding of the Arctic Ocean are amplified by the fact 
that it is difficult to project how the ecosystem will change in the future. This suggests that 
predicting how the cumulative impacts of oil and gas developments in the Arctic are distinct from 
wider environmental change presents a significant challenge, not only to the environmental 
scientists carrying out the assessments, but also to policy- and law-makers who must develop 
adequate instruments to regulate these developments within a context of substantial environmental 
uncertainty. Must, for example, EIAs be conducted for all Arctic marine projects regardless of size 
because of the potential for significant harm as a result of cumulative impacts?  How do we address 
the fact that cumulative impacts could be exacerbated by the interaction of, for example, chemical 
or oil pollution and ice? If it is possible that operational oil spills are “captured” by the ice, 
transported hundreds of miles and “deposited” in another state’s EEZ in a single ice melt event, 
what liability might the emitting state have and what redress would be open to the receiving state? 
The possibilities these questions raise also lead one to ask if there might be a case for an Arctic 
wide strategic environmental impact assessment (SEA) to help identify potential cumulative 
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impacts. As an Arctic wide SEA it would, in line with the definition of the Arctic Ocean we use in 
this paper, cover the ocean north of the latitude 66˚34’, a wider area than the regional SEAs 
recommended in the Arctic Guidelines and the national SEAs recommended by the CBD 
Voluntary Guidelines. Adopting one might also fit with the recommendations of the Arctic 
Council Task Force on Arctic Marine Cooperation which include “extending cooperation 
throughout the entire cycle of marine stewardship: from the planning of scientific research, to … 
implementation of policy and, to monitoring and assessment of the policy’s effectiveness” (Arctic 
Council, 2017: 4-5). 
The challenges of conducting an “effective” EIA we have outlined point to the need for very full 
notification and consultation procedures with neighbouring states if a state sponsoring a 
development is to ensure that it can demonstrate that it has acted with due diligence to prevent 
transboundary environmental harm.  As we suggested above, they also point, not just to the need 
for further scientific research, but to the potential benefits of an Arctic-wide Strategic 
Environmental Assessment (SEA) to determine where activities could or should not be permitted. 
The need for an SEA is also emphasized by the problems associated with clean up and recovery 
from spills and cumulative impacts in the Arctic. 
Redress, Clean-Up and Recovery  
The final set of issues to consider in the context of transboundary pollution is the question of 
redress if one state suffers harm as a result of transboundary pollution.  Again, as we demonstrate 
the costs of and indeed possibility of clean up and recovery from pollution incidents or cumulative 
pollution may be very different in the Arctic than in other oceans and a series of legal and scientific 
questions arise.   
As we have discussed, in comparison with other marine ecosystems, relatively little is known about 
the Arctic marine ecosystem. What we do know is that there is consensus within the research 
community that Arctic species are likely to recover more slowly than temperate species following 
disturbance because many are long lived and reproduce slowly, are more susceptible to toxins than 
their temperate counterparts, and because of increased toxicity of pollutants in cold waters. 
Regardless, the magnitude of this effect is unclear (Rice et al. 1978; Suchanek, 1993).  
Ecosystem recovery rates following disturbance events may also be slower in the Arctic than in 
other marine environments. The Arctic has historically been a relatively pristine environment; 
individual and population recovery rates have only been investigated for a handful of species. 
However, it is expected that colder temperatures, reduced light levels during the winter months, a 
truncated growing season, and low nutrient availability may all reduce the recovery rates of species 
in the Arctic Ocean, extending the temporal footprint of an impact. Furthermore, biodegredation 
rates for pollutants in the Arctic Ocean are also likely to be slower relative to other marine 
environments, suggesting that contaminants such as spilled oil will persist in the environment for 
long periods of time, particularly in Arctic sea ice (Leahy & Colwell, 1990; Atlas, 1981; Atlas et al. 
1978). 
This scientific uncertainty raises a number of legal issues. Given the untested nature of cleanup 
and restoration methods in the Arctic, restitution in kind may not be possible. Equally, however, 
presenting a robust claim for compensation may prove problematic, particularly given the ruling 
by the International Court of Justice in the Costa Rica v Nicaragua case in early 2018. There the court 
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was particularly critical of Costa Rica’s methodology for calculating its claim for compensation. It 
would seem then that any uncertainty in costings might undermine a potential claim for harm 
arising from transboundary pollution.  
A potential solution might be to expand the application of, or adopt measures similar to those 
found in the Fund Convention which is financed through contributions from importers and 
exporters of oil. In this case operators or importers/exporters might contribute to a fund to 
address clean up operations resulting from pollution from offshore installations in the Arctic. An 
alternative would be to follow the model used in the Antarctic Treaty Protocol on Environmental 
Protection to the Antarctic Treaty under which a fund is maintained to reimburse the reasonable 
costs of parties to the treaty in responding to environmental emergencies where the emergency 
was not caused by actions over where they have jurisdiction (Article 12 of Annex VI to the 
Protocol). In this case the contributions to the fund are from operators which have failed to take 
remedial action and where the State Party authorising them has failed to take remedial action 
(Article 6 of Annex VI to the Protocol.)  The danger in following the Antarctic approach is, 
however, that the operators may dissolve or go bankrupt following an emergency and before 
arrangements are made for them to pay into any fund. To some degree this risk is mitigated by the 
liability under Article 6 being joint and severally owed by all operators on a project, nevertheless, 
there is a clear need to examine the most appropriate ways forward. 
International Obligations: Cooperation and the Precautionary Approach 
International Law has long recognised the obligation to cooperate. It is contained in many treaties, 
including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity 1992 and it operates at the regional level as well as between neighbouring states. States’ 
willingness to embrace the obligation to cooperate, particularly at the regional level, is seen in the 
number of regional seas treaties and programmes around the globe. The UN Environment 
Programme lists 18 regional seas, including the Arctic, and the Arctic states themselves have 
recognised the need for further cooperation in the form of an Arctic Regional Programme (Arctic 
Council, 2017). The application of the obligation to cooperate in the context of marine pollution 
was also recognised in the Mox Plant Case (MOX Plant, ITLOS (2001)) and reiterated in the Land 
Reclamation in and around the Straits of Johor Case (ITLOS (2003) and its application in the 
management of marine resources established in the Request for an Advisory Opinion submitted 
by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission to ITLOS in 2015 (Advisory Opinion by Fisheries 
Commission (ITLOS (2015)).  
As discussed above, the Arctic states have been proactive in cooperating to address pollution from 
oil and gas activities. The question that arises, however, is: does the obligation to cooperate require 
states to act when the potential impacts of an activity are still uncertain? We know from past 
experience that scientific uncertainty may be used as a reason not to enter into new agreements 
and that even where the scientific community agrees on its knowledge and understanding, political 
and economic considerations hold more weight in the development of further agreements (Kirk, 
2011). Yet in the face of uncertainty, the Arctic states have already accepted the obligation to 
cooperate and, as indicated earlier, have entered into treaties and adopted guidelines to address 
some (potential) harms in the Arctic and cooperated in relation to the production and collection 
of scientific data through, in particular, the Arctic Council. They also adopted the 2017 Agreement 
on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation. This agreement will, hopefully, go some 
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way to help address the gaps in scientific understanding of the marine Arctic. Even so, legal 
questions arise as to how far the obligation to cooperate requires the Arctic states to work together.  
Does, for example, the significant risk of harm to the environment coupled with the significant 
degree of uncertainty around the nature of any impact from oil and gas activities mean that the 
adoption of a precautionary approach to oil and gas activities is legally or scientifically necessary?  
Under the precautionary approach activities presumed to be harmful are not permitted unless they 
are known not to cause (significant) harm or unless measures have been, or will be taken to prevent 
harm to the environment. Given the challenges the precautionary approach presents to 
(international) law, it has not yet been fully accepted as a binding principle of customary 
international law (Birnie et al., 2009). One might assume therefore that a precautionary approach 
would not be required. It is, however, found in many treaties aimed at preventing and addressing 
environmental harm including the Ozone Convention and Montreal Protocol (adopted before 
there was conclusive proof that the hole in the Ozone Layer was harmful to human health, or to 
other living organisms (Benedick, 2009)) the London Dumping Convention and its 1996 Protocol, 
and the 2001 POPs Convention (Sands & Peel 2012). What many of these treaties have in common 
is that they are addressing particularly harmful activities. One might ask then if the law requires a 
precautionary approach in such circumstances.  
We suggest that these conventions provide good models for the acceptance of a more 
precautionary approach within the Arctic in relation to oil and gas activities. Alternative sources 
of oil and gas can, for example, be found elsewhere in the world. Alternative sources of energy 
such as tide, wind and solar are also becoming more economically viable. Each of these points 
then to a reason to believe that a precautionary regime to address oil and gas extraction in the 
Arctic may be a success. The same logic underpinned the success of the Ozone Convention - 
alternative chemicals existed or could be developed quickly to replace those harming the ozone 
layer (Benedick, 2009: 24). There is further reason to anticipate success. The Arctic states adopted 
an Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean, which 
adopts a precautionary approach by, in effect, placing a moratorium on high seas fishing in the 
Arctic for 16 years. In addition, and as noted earlier, the US and Canada adopted moratoria on 
future oil and gas licencing within much of their Arctic waters (all in Canada’s case). We argue that 
the same approach should be taken in respect of oil and gas activities. Adopting an Arctic Ocean 
wide moratorium on further activities (i.e., allowing existing exploitation to continue) would give 
time to conduct, for example, a thorough Strategic Impact Assessment at the Arctic Ocean level 
to better decide where such activities should take place. Given that offshore exploitation of oil and 
gas activities is already taking place in parts of the Arctic, and notwithstanding the Joint US- 
Canada “moratorium” it is likely that a moratorium on exploration and exploitation on the 
extended continental shelf and in areas beyond national jurisdiction would have a more realistic 
chance of success. Whether that would be sufficient to protect the Arctic Ocean from significant 
harm is, however, open to question. 
A precautionary approach could also be achieved in other ways. For example, the Arctic Council 
could further enhance its existing guidelines on offshore oil and gas activities to take a more 
precautionary approach, or the Arctic states could adopt a binding set of standards, perhaps 
brokered through the Arctic Council, which focus on a precautionary approach to offshore energy 
activities. These could prohibit all exploration and exploitation unless certain circumstances exist 
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or unless certain technical standards are met, in much the same way as the 1996 Protocol to the 
London Dumping Convention addresses dumping at sea. Which approach would be best in terms 
of environmental protection and in terms of being most likely to attract state compliance is a 
question for further research.    
Conclusions and Proposals 
Our discussion has shown that the potential for further oil and gas activities in the marine Arctic 
give rise to significant scientific and legal questions. These conclusions outline the questions that 
remain and while we note the important role played by the Arctic Council and other bodies in 
addressing existing gaps in knowledge and regulation, we do not here propose the location in 
which the answers to these questions should be developed: we simply set out the questions that 
remain.  
“Significant Harm” – Significant Questions 
We have demonstrated the need for further research to establish what “significant harm” looks 
like in the marine Arctic both in scientific and legal terms. In particular, we question whether the 
likely slower degradation and dispersal of, for example, oil in cold and, at times, ice covered waters 
may increase the impact of the pollutants on the Arctic ecosystem relative to temperate waters. 
Does, for example, the relative fragility of that ecosystem due to the relatively short food chain 
and the highly specialised nature of its species make it more vulnerable to pollution, thus turning 
what might be a minor pollution incident in temperate waters into a major incident in the Arctic? 
In addition we note that the interactions of pollutants with ice might also turn normally 
“insignificant” pollution into significant pollution through trapping pollutants in the ice, thus 
preventing dispersion and ultimately transporting pollutants as a single block to be deposited 
beyond the national jurisdiction of the state in which the emissions occur. These possibilities point 
to the need for better scientific understanding of the pollutant/ice interface and sea-ice drift 
patterns, as well as a need for better understanding of the role of the chain of causation in 
attributing harm under state responsibility.  These questions also raise the possibility that the 
actions required of coastal states to show that they have acted with due diligence may exceed those 
required in relevant international treaties particularly where those treaties apply globally and not 
only in the Arctic.  
The Challenges of EIA’s – Expanding the Evidence Base 
As noted earlier, states are obliged to conduct an EIA where major projects are proposed, but 
there is an urgent need to expand the Arctic scientific evidence base to ensure such EIAs are 
effective. First, more detailed baseline data on the Arctic marine environment are required if any 
such assessments are to be meaningful. Second, due to the rapidly changing environment in the 
Arctic, continuous monitoring of the Arctic marine environment is essential, in addition to 
monitoring of sites where development takes place. Without a coordinated, pan-Arctic monitoring 
programme, it will become increasingly difficulty to disentangle the direct impacts of human 
activity, for example oil and gas development, from background environmental change, 
particularly at cumulative impact scales. While Arctic wide monitoring is taking place through the 
Arctic Council Working Groups, we suggest that this programme should be built upon and 
expanded in scope, and should take a whole systems approach which places species and physical 
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processes within the wider context of a connected Arctic. This would enable those carrying out 
EIAs to better evaluate the effects of a development which may be felt across wider spatial and 
temporal scales, and provide states with a better means to predict transboundary impacts. 
International programmes such as the Multidisciplinary drifting Observatory for the Study of 
Arctic Climate (MOSAiC, www.mosaicobservatory.org) are beginning to provide such longer-term 
information.  However, while fundamental research around ocean processes, species, and the 
physical nature of the Arctic Ocean environment must continue to fill gaps in our basic 
understanding, we must also begin to apply these findings to the very real possibility of further 
industrial development in the Arctic, for example from oil and gas activities. This might take the 
form of a pan-Arctic Ocean Strategic Impact Assessment for petroleum activities. In doing so, we 
can move towards EIA processes in the Arctic, which are specific to the Arctic context, and in 
particular, which are better able to assess the cumulative impacts of development as it progresses, 
and transboundary effects occurring over time 
In addition further understanding is needed of the processes to adopt to ensure that Indigenous 
and local voices are effectively understood in EIA and other monitoring procedures. This raises 
questions for legal academics – what form of consultation or engagement is most effective in these 
circumstances? 
Clean-Up and Liability 
Finally, we raised a series of questions relating to clean-up and liability. Again we argue that further 
scientific research is needed into the possibility of and costs associated with cleaning up a pollution 
incident or cumulative pollution in the Arctic and into the feasibility of extending the existing Fund 
Convention or adopting a convention similar to it or to the provisions of Annex VI to the Anarctic 
Treaty environmental protocol to apply to Arctic offshore oil and gas activities. As we noted, 
further understanding is also needed in legal terms of how states can prove or mount a defence 
against questions of liability for transboundary environmental harm.  
The Need for Cooperation and a Precautionary Approach 
We argue that cumulatively these questions point to two things: the need for further cooperation 
between Arctic states and the need for a precautionary approach to further oil and gas activities in 
the Arctic.  We suggested a number of models to adopt to address the need for further cooperation 
and the need for a precautionary approach. The questions that these possible approaches raise are 
focussed on the legal requirements to take further steps to cooperate, the legal requirement to 
adopt a precautionary approach and the question of what an agreement to establish an oil and gas 
moratorium, or “precautionary standards” might look like. 
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Notes 
1. All Arctic states with the exception of the United States of America are party to the 1982 UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS.) For its part, the USA accepts most of the 
provisions of UNCLOS as representing customary international law. 
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Managerial Roles and Structuring Mechanisms within 
Arctic Maritime Emergency Response1 
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Emergency response operations include a range of agencies who collaborate closely together. This is especially true in the Arctic 
regions where resources may be scarce. The participants within emergency response include a range of institutions such as: 
mission coordination centers, fire and rescue services, police, coast guard and military forces, private organizations, companies, 
and volunteers. In this paper, we illustrate the managerial roles of the incident commanders who coordinate and control emergency 
response, and the organizational mechanisms supporting the incident commanders. The purpose of this paper is to explore how 
the operational conditions found in the Arctic add to the inter-organizational coordination challenges. We build upon several 
illustrative cases to demonstrate how the managerial roles are influenced by their context. The key operational challenges in the 
Arctic region include harsh weather conditions, long distances to resource bases, and limited infrastructure. We argue that role 
flexibility, re-planning capability and authority delegation are critical prerequisites for an efficient crisis response in the Arctic. 
The capability for role switching is important for all key personnel involved in the maritime incident response. Results from in-
depth case studies of maritime emergency operations in Norway are presented in this paper. 
 
 
Introduction 
Dealing with maritime operations and emergencies in the Arctic is challenging due to factors such 
as unpredictable weather that may hamper operations and reduce equipment functionality, long 
distances between the distress site and the resource bases, limited infrastructure that may increase 
mobilization time and create fatigue, and small communities with limited resources available for 
large scale operations (Marchenko et al., 2016, 2018). As a consequence, the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) has introduced the Polar Code stating that the vessels in the polar regions 
need to introduce safety equipment that will guarantee five-day survival time. Accidents like fire 
on board a vessel, collisions and grounding of larger vessels in polar waters are among the most 
difficult tasks for the emergency response systems (Borch, et al. 2016a, 2016b). 
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Large-scale maritime emergency response often includes a broad range of agencies with their own 
specializations, role structures, functions, plans and standard operating procedures. The 
participants in emergency response such as search and rescue (SAR) operations may include rescue 
coordination centers, fire and rescue services, police, coast guard and military forces, paramedics, 
private rescue organizations, as well as volunteers. Transparent management and coordination 
between several agencies is a challenging task. In a multi-faceted environment, we may also find a 
broad range of interlinked stakeholders like commercial interests, local communities, indigenous 
groups and environmentalists (Borch & Batalden, 2014).  
Large-scale emergency response, like mass rescue operations from a cruise ship, are often multi-
sectoral involving civilian and military resources as well as several ministries and agencies. These 
types of incidents are also low-probability, high-consequence events that seldom happen. These 
“black swans” may overwhelm the preparedness and response system of any country, calling for 
assistance from the neighboring countries. This is especially the case, if the incident requires special 
services like firefighting and treatment of complicated wounds, anti-terror, deactivation of 
explosives, chemical or nuclear operations, or underwater search.  
Although the basis for emergency response services in all Arctic countries is the same, the way of 
organizing the emergency response system can be different. The existing institutional framework, 
including economic systems, industry standards, as well as political and legislative framework 
influence on how crisis management is delivered. With more institutions involved in the network 
and a heterogeneous operational context, the incident commander faces significant integration 
challenges (Schmied & Borch, 2016). 
In this paper, our starting-point focuses on the multi-agency task forces with a complex web of 
various institutions, bringing their own procedures, command and control systems, competence, 
and norms and values. The purpose of this paper is to explore how the managerial roles and tasks 
at different command levels need to adapt to the complexity in the Arctic context. The study builds 
a theoretical framework from managerial roles and mechanisms for re-structuring and 
improvisation. We present four ship fire cases with maritime incident response groups assisting 
the firefighting efforts onboard ships. In the analysis chapter, we take a closer look into the roles 
of the incident commanders, the management aboard the unit in distress, and the leaders of the 
supporting units, and analyze how the structuring mechanisms may allow for a flexible and efficient 
use of heterogeneous resources. 
Theory 
Within emergency management, coordination between different actors and their incident 
coordinators may rely on factors such as agency interdependencies, and the established 
management structures and mechanisms for coordination and control. Coordination is an 
emergent process, in which different interdependent action trajectories are synchronized (Wolbers 
et al., 2017). Incident command systems facilitate leadership, coordination and information flow 
between multiple individuals and organizations (Rimstad et al., 2014). During the response process, 
incident commanders will coordinate and control the situation through specified routines 
according to their roles and procedures within the established incident command systems. In case 
of an unforeseen disaster, the response teams and emergency managers have to act as fast as 
possible to prevent additional damage. However, Isabelle et al. (2012) argue that coordination is 
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less dependent on design than on the tasks that emerge in response to coordination challenges. 
Therefore, there is a need for flexible emergency management capabilities balancing the tasks of 
the different actors (Roud et al., 2016).  
Bigley & Roberts (2001) highlight that the range of managerial tasks has to be matched by adequate 
coordination and control mechanisms in order to achieve an effective agency interplay. Command 
structures are the coordination tool for efficient direction of responsibility and authority. In 
addition, robust coordination between institutions with varied organizational systems and 
professional platforms calls for more tailor-made managerial role models and inter-organizational 
structuring tools to face these challenges (Borch & Andreassen, 2015).  
Command Systems  
Within emergency management, command and control systems are vital for fast, and coordinated 
response. When it comes to the structuring of the emergency response organizations, the 
standardized incident management systems are designed to be consistent with the general 
principles of organizational management. The coordination and decision-making is executed 
through well specified roles and functions. As an example, the standardized Incident Control 
System (ICS) was created in the 1970s to facilitate up-scaling of the emergency response without 
losing control. The ICS structure was based on experiences from the fire departments fighting 
wildfires in Southern California. The original ICS approach has been developed and revised since 
then in order to become suitable for teams across different jurisdictions. The basic ICS includes a 
standard management hierarchy.  
Managerial Roles  
Managerial roles are defined by Mintzberg (1973, 2009) as sets of actions types and responsibilities 
that are assigned for each of the managers in an organization. Mintzberg claims that managerial 
roles within an organization can be conceptually separated into three main groups: interpersonal, 
decisional and informational (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Types of managerial roles (Mintzberg (1973). 
  
The starting point for these roles is the formal authority that defines the position of the persons 
involved. Interpersonal roles include the figurehead whose role is both internally motivate and 
inspire, but also represent the organization externally to different stakeholders, for example media 
and interest groups, the leader who performs leadership duties towards subordinates, like hiring 
and training the staff, and the liaison role, which establishes contacts outside the organization. 
Informational roles include a monitor who scans the environment and receives all kind of 
information, a disseminator who passes the appropriate information to subordinates, and a 
Formal authority
Interpersonal roles
Informational roles
Decisional roles
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spokesman who sends s information to people outside the unit. Decisional roles include 
entrepreneurial action to initiate new development projects based on the information received 
from the monitor, disturbance handling, which is responding to different pressures and problems, 
resource allocation decisions, and the negotiator duties and routines (Mintzberg, 2009). Within 
emergency management, the decisional roles play a critical part in all management functions 
(Cosgrave, 1996).  
By distinguishing the roles, it is possible to better understand the varying nature of tasks inside and 
outside the units of an organization. 
Within emergency management, a specific set of managerial roles have been established. Within 
the ICS, five major management roles are pinpointed: command, planning, operations, logistics 
and finance/administration (Lindell et al., 2005). There are also sector-wise roles as a standard 
NATO structure followed in general by the police. Within aviation and the maritime domain, there 
are dedicated standards for SAR operations (the IAMSAR manual). Both the governments and the 
units have to align their operations to these rules set by the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The IAMSAR Manual identifies and 
discusses four main coordinating roles – the SAR Coordinator, the Search and Rescue Mission 
Coordinator, the On Scene Coordinator and the Aircraft Coordinator (IMO, 2016a, b). Main tasks 
and responsibilities of maritime incident response evolve around these roles. 
For the Arctic, we may find that these roles are not sufficient enough to deal with the increased 
complexity and dynamism. Tailor-made roles are thus in demand. 
Restructuring Mechanisms 
While managerial roles refer to a set of certain types of actions, the coordination mechanisms refer 
to a set of rules and practices to guide the action procedures (Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Buck et al., 
2006; Bharosa et al., 2010). An important element in high complexity environments is to avoid 
system rigidity. Bigley & Roberts (2001) refer to the structuring mechanisms that represent a set 
of procedures for assembling and reassembling various organizational elements into a variety of 
configurations. In particular, they highlight four basic processes; structure elaboration, role 
switching, authority migrating, and system resetting (Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Types of structuring mechanisms (Bigley & Roberts, 2001). 
 
 
Such techniques are required in order for an organization to cope with a serious situation not 
expected and planned for (Mitroff, 2004). In such situations, also described as “black swans” and 
in situations where the complexity of the environment may create a high degree of uncertainty, 
procedures may prove useless and persons who are qualified for one type of action may have to 
Structure elaboration
Role switching
Authority migration
System resetting
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take on other roles. Bigley & Roberts (2001) state that the system in use must be able to expand 
and contract, change strategic orientation, modify or switch tactics as an incident unfolds. Because 
of the fast-changing working conditions of an emergency, including e.g. possible lack of broadband 
communication capacities, polar lows etc., coordinators may have to rearrange their roles, authority 
structures and procedures (Andreassen et al., 2018).  
Thus, the coordinative mechanisms in emergency management have to be adapted to the 
complexity of the disaster response (Buck et al., 2006). Borch & Andreassen (2015) claim that in 
high complexity – high volatility environments like the maritime Arctic, there is a need for 
additional coordination roles and mechanisms incorporated into the standard organizational 
structures such as the ICS, most importantly to deal with contextual complexity and to allow 
improvisation.  
To understand the dynamic balance of management during incident response, when two or more 
organizations with different managerial systems are involved, it is important to look into the 
implemented command systems, the set of managerial roles, and structuring mechanisms that 
guide these roles and functions. Structuring mechanisms influence roles flexibility and thus the 
inter-organizational operational action pattern and the hierarchy of the task force.   
Methodology 
This study builds upon in-depth case studies of four ship fire incidents that include the response 
of Maritime Incident Response Group (MIRG) teams or other firefighting efforts. We examine 
the following incidents:  Britannia Seaways, Nordlys, Le Boréal, and Norma Mary. These are used as 
illustrative cases of high-risk events, which have potentially serious consequences for people and 
for the environment. Data has been gathered from both primary and secondary sources including 
incident reports, evaluation reports, conference presentations, interviews and examination of 
standard operating procedures.  
The context with weather factors, crisis complexity in terms of challenges experienced by the 
involved actors, as well as the interdependences between them, are linked up to reflections on the 
command system, managerial role set, and the structuring mechanisms implemented.  
Data 
The Maritime Incident Response System 
International conventions and standards for maritime and aeronautical SAR services are set by the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) and International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO). The International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (IMO, Hamburg 
Convention) and the Convention on International Civil Aviation with its Annex 12 (ICAO, 
Chicago Convention), provide the rules and regulations for SAR services. The International 
Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual (IAMSAR Manual), published by the IMO 
and the ICAO is based on the Hamburg Convention and the Chicago Convention. The IAMSAR 
Manual contains practical guidelines for the organization of maritime and aeronautical SAR, 
mission coordination, operations of search and rescue units (SRUs) and provision of SAR-related 
training. The manual is not binding but provides internationally accepted foundation for the 
appropriate provision of maritime and aeronautical SAR services (IMO and ICAO, 2016a,b). 
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Other international agreements relevant to maritime SAR, are the International Convention for 
the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), the International Ship and Port Facility Security-code (ISPS) 
and the STCW Convention – International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification 
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, and the Polar Code. 
The IMO’s recently adopted International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code) 
is “intended to cover the full range of shipping-related matters relevant to navigation in waters surrounding the two 
poles – ship design, construction and equipment; operational and training concerns; search and rescue; and, equally 
important, the protection of the unique environment and eco-systems of the polar regions” (IMO, 2017).  
For the Arctic region, the eight Arctic countries have signed an Agreement on cooperation on 
aeronautical and maritime search and rescue in the Arctic under the auspices of the Arctic Council 
in 2011 (Arctic SAR Agreement). The objective of the agreement is to ‘‘strengthen aeronautical 
and maritime search and rescue cooperation and coordination in the Arctic”, and each member 
state has a particular SAR area of responsibility.  
Norway’s maritime SAR responsibility goes beyond its territorial-, economic- and fishing zones 
and covers a very extensive area. The Norwegian Rescue Services carry out the Norwegian duty 
according to the relevant international SAR agreements. The Norwegian maritime SAR service in 
Northern Norway above 65 degrees, hence in the Arctic maritime regions, is the responsibility of 
the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC) Northern-Norway. The JRCC has at its disposal the 
dedicated AWSAR helicopters, and may mobilize whatever resources they find necessary including 
military and voluntary forces, and support from other countries. Emergency response agencies 
that are involved into incident response may belong to different institutions and have different 
jurisdictions as well as have different command, coordination and control structures. 
Fire safety on board ships is governed by international maritime legislation. After the disastrous 
Scandinavian Star incident, the maritime authorities have implemented a number of measures, 
which have strengthened fire safety at sea. Fire safety on vessels is primarily dependent on 
precautionary measures taken aboard and the ship owner’s emergency preparedness plans. 
According to the conventions of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the vessel’s own 
crew has to be able to start firefighting during an incident before receiving assistance from a land-
based fire department. To support rescue measures and firefighting carried out by the ship’s crew 
Maritime Incident Response Groups (MIRG) operated by the national fire departments have been 
trained for special maritime SAR situations and smoke diving on board vessels. 
The Cases 
Britannia Seaways - Western Norway  
On 16 November 2013, fire broke out on Britannia Seaways, a ro-ro cargo ship that was on a voyage 
to the south from Northern Norway carrying military equipment, vehicles and a number of tank 
containers, and flatracks with jerrycans containing petrol and aviation fuel. Personnel from the 
armed forces were on board as passengers. Outside the Norwegian west coast, the weather 
deteriorated, with storm and high waves, resulting in severe rolling. The cargo lashing came loose 
and the cargo shifted. A fire broke out in petrol that was leaking from damaged jerrycans stowed 
on flatracks on the forepart of the weather deck (Danish Maritime Accident Investigation Board, 
2014). 
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The ship’s officers and own crew started a lengthy firefighting effort, assisted later by the military 
personnel. The master realized that there were 12 trained military passengers on board wearing 
clothes well suited to withstand the cold and water. Some of the military personnel volunteered to 
assist with the firefighting efforts and together with the crew managed to contain the fire on the 
forepart of the weather deck. The Joint Rescue Coordination Centre in Stavanger requested to 
evacuate all non-essential persons on board the ship. However, in order to evacuate the passengers, 
the ship would have to change course and expose itself to severe rolling and wind. The master 
refused to attempt to turn the ship, because this would hinder the ongoing firefighting due to 
severe rolling, and the flames would be dangerous to the firefighters and the ship’s superstructure 
because of the wind. The master assessed that it would involve a clear hazard to the ship and those 
on-board (Danish Maritime Accident Investigation Board, 2014). 
Later a Norwegian navy frigate arrived to the scene and took the position as the on-scene 
coordinator (OSC). An offshore supply vessel with firefighting capacity had also been 
requisitioned by the shipping company’s crisis management team. Firefighting efforts were joined 
by three firefighters from shore and a MIRG team with firefighters specialized in maritime 
incidents (Danish Maritime Accident Investigation Board, 2014). A report from the Bergen fire 
and rescue service (2013) stated that neither the emergency call centre nor the MIRG team were 
notified of the other three firefighters that joined the firefighting efforts, causing some confusion 
both on board the vessel and with the strategic management of the fire and rescue services on 
shore as they had not included the additional resource in their plans.  
This incident involved several stakeholders, both civilian and military, and inter-organizational 
action between the master of the vessel, the firefighters, and operative on-shore coordination. The 
vessel captain’s experience-based decision-making and evaluation of bad weather and its effects 
for firefighting was crucial. Furthermore, the captain’s ability to find flexible solutions, such as 
utilizing passengers from the armed forces in firefighting, maintaining command, as well as keeping 
the on-scene coordinator, the vessel owner, and the JRCC informed, contributed to a positive 
outcome (Danish Maritime Accident Investigation Board, 2014). The traditional commander role 
of the SAR mission coordinator on shore and the on-scene-coordinator was overruled by the 
vessel captain who made his decision based on the prevailing conditions. He therefore took the 
role of incident commander himself with a flexible command structure including the military 
forces on board.  
The harsh weather and wave conditions were the cause of the fire, and caused changes in the 
traditional command system and the managerial roles set for this type of operations. The captain 
decided against the requests by the SAR mission coordinator as well as the helicopter captain based 
on his own situational awareness and mobilization of extra resources on board. He also took 
charge of the next steps of the firefighting action by directing the navy frigate and the professional 
MIRG team that came onboard.  The captain and the crew at Britannia Seaways later received the 
IMO’s medal for bravery at sea.  
Le Boréal - Falkland Islands 
On 18 November 2015, the cruise ship Le Boréal on a route to Antarctica was near Falkland Islands 
when a fire broke out in the engine room, which led to a complete loss of power. The fire broke 
out due to a mistake by one of the engineers. The weather was bad, and the fire left the ship adrift 
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in gale force winds and high waves. The cruise ship had 347 people on-board. Firefighting 
measures were started. However, as the vessel was drifting towards the coast without power and 
there were smoke all over the cabins, the master decided to drop the anchor and evacuate all 
passengers and non-essential crewmembers (IMRF, 2016a; BEAmer, 2016). 
The passengers account very chaotic circumstances on board with a crew who were uncertain 
about their roles and responsibilities; “Total chaos on board according to passengers in Stanley. Smoke in the 
accommodation, lifeboat embarkation chaotic and uncontrolled, lifeboats not manned with experienced crew.” Some 
of the passengers were launched into life rafts although there was life boat capacity for all 
passengers (Walker, 2015). 
The Antarctic region has many of the same challenges as the Arctic region when it comes to 
emergency response. Distances are often vast, resources are scarce, water is cold, sea is rough, 
capacities to host and accommodate passengers are limited, and communication lines and 
networks might not be available. Luckily, Le Boréal was close to the British naval base at the 
Falkland Islands. The Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) Falmouth in the UK, who 
had received the initial distress alert, coordinated the response. As the island is remote and sparsely 
inhabited, the response required full-scale marine, air and land response assets from the Falkland 
Island government, military and private sector. Three helicopters, a fixed wing C130 aircraft and 
4 vessels were sent to the incident site. At first, the on-scene coordinator role was given to an OSC 
on board the first helicopter to arrive to the incident site, but was later transferred to the C130 
aircraft so that the helicopter could concentrate to the rescue operation and go refuel. Le Boréal’s 
sister ship, L’Austral, was also in the vicinity of the incident site and had capacities to take on 
passengers from Le Boréal. (IMRF, 2016a; BEAmer, 2016) Because of the high waves, there were 
problems with rescuing the passengers from the tenders/life boats onto the frigates. Thus, the 
frigates had to tow the life boats into calmer waters. This was a tough experience for the passengers 
on board. 
The initial landing point was established at Cape Dolphin and the helicopters took some 
passengers there. Simultaneously, a reception center was being established at Mount Pleasant 
military base and L’Austral was boarding passengers to be taken to Port Stanley. This caused some 
confusion with accounting the passengers and identifying their whereabouts. The MRO operation 
was successful and there were no injuries to the passengers or crew (IMRF, 2016a; BEAmer, 2016). 
Regarding the managerial roles, there was some obscurity with the roles of the officers and crew 
onboard the ship and the life boats during the evacuation. In addition, the rescue operation was 
very demanding and called for improvisation by the rescue units. This in turn caused some 
confusion about the whereabouts of the passengers that were brought ashore. This is normally a 
task for the on-scene coordinator to control. The Commander of British Forces in the South 
Atlantic Islands characterized the emergency evacuation as “an extremely complex and hazardous rescue 
operation in difficult conditions.” 
Norma Mary - Barents Sea 
Distance to resources is one of the biggest challenges in the Arctic limiting the number of assets 
that can be sent to a rescue operation, and therefore the ship’s own efforts with fire safety are 
crucial. In the case of Norma Mary, a fishing trawler sailing in the Barents Sea in the High Arctic 
had a fire in the factory area on-board. A coast guard vessel with firefighters was 10 hours away 
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and two helicopters four hours away at Svalbard. Due to the incident site being so far away, the 
helicopters would have to be ready to refuel on the way to the site. Another fishing vessel was two 
hours away from Norma Mary, and was asked to assist and follow Norma Mary, if necessary. The 
crew of Norma Mary started firefighting efforts however the fire was causing heavy smoke, which 
prevented the crew from properly inspecting the situation. The master, however, assessed that 
there was no danger for the crew and no need for evacuation. The master also requested that the 
other fishing vessel following Norma Mary could be released from this duty. The other vessel was 
asked to follow Norma Mary until meeting with the coast guard vessel regardless of Norma Mary’s 
master’s assessment.  
The coast guard vessel reached the distress vessel after 10 hours. After boarding Norma Mary, the 
firefighters from the coast guard vessel found that the fire had been put out but discovered water 
in the factory area. The fishing vessel did not have suitable pumps, so pumps were brought from 
the coast guard vessel. After all efforts, the master wished to return to Iceland for repairs (JRCC, 
2015).  
In this incident, the crew onboard was totally without support for many hours, but managed to 
cope on their own. This incident could have had serious consequences, if the fire on board was 
bigger and the coast guard vessel not sailing conveniently in the area. Ship fires often spread fast, 
and the distance in this case to any assisting resource was extremely long. This highlights the 
increased complexity of response, the lack of resource availability in the High Arctic and the 
vessel’s own ability to respond to the fire.  
Hurtigruten Nordlys - Ålesund, Norway 
The coastal cruiser Nordlys from the company Hurtigruten faced a dramatic engine fire near 
Ålesund, Norway. The weather conditions were fair and the incident site was close to the Ålesund 
harbor. There were plenty of resources available however the ship fire and the complexity of the 
incident itself had significant consequences for human life and potential consequences for 
environmental as well. Nordlys was approaching Ålesund on 15 September 2011, when there was 
a fire in the engine room, which caused both the main engine and the auxiliary engines to stop. 
Two crewmembers went missing and the captain did not dare to release the fire exhaustion system 
as he did not know the location of the missing crew. One the missing crewmembers was the chief 
engineer who plays a vital role in the contingency management organization. The two missing 
crewmembers both died and two suffered serious injuries. Seven other crewmembers suffered 
minor injuries. The auxiliary generator failed and the ship faced total black out making firefighting 
impossible.   
A rescue cutter close by heard the MAYDAY call, and went to assist Nordlys with emergency 
towing. The ship was towed to Ålesund harbor and the passengers were evacuated by launching 
lifeboats. All the 207 passengers on board were evacuated without any physical injuries. A coast 
guard vessel was appointed as the on-scene coordinator for the SAR operation. As the vessel was 
being berthed, the starboard stabilizer fin was pressed through the hull, which flooded the cargo 
holds with water. Nordlys developed a 20 degrees list, nearly capsizing, and all personnel onboard 
had to be evacuated. The hole was later fixed and water pumped out, stabilizing the vessel (AIBN, 
2013). 
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The AIBN’s investigation (2013) concludes there were inadequacies in job specifications for 
equipment and fire safety on board the vessel. The safety management system also lacked 
procedures for training to deal with loss of personnel. The loss of personnel and injuries were 
caused by the crew being trapped by heat and smoke with limited possibilities for evacuation.  The 
personnel also lacked training for such situations, which is why some safety critical tasks were not 
carried out. Among other things, the air supply and fuel supply were not shut off. If the supply of 
fuel and air had been shut off, the fire could have died down by itself (AIBN, 2013). 
As the incident happened near the Ålesund harbor, plenty of resources including the police, fire 
and rescue service, coast guard, rescue vessel, health personnel, private sector and other rescue 
crew could be mobilized rather quickly to the harbor (AIBN, 2013). Many of these authorities 
were involved in the response efforts at the same time, and the JRCC Stavanger led the operative 
coordination for the SAR efforts. The coordination of the joint response, both operational and 
tactical, was fluent and effective in this incident. As the vessel was close to the harbor, the fire and 
rescue services had a chance to gather their whole management team and the MIRG team from 
Ålesund to the harbor, as well as later send a liaison officer for the fire incident commander 
together with the MIRG operation commander to the bridge, which would be unusual in normal 
MIRG operation at sea. This however provided more flexibility and better coordination of the 
command and control system. The MIRG crew was assisted by the vessel’s own smoke divers and 
a MIRG team from Bergen was also on stand-by in Ålesund. MIRG crew boarded the vessels and 
found the two bodies while inspecting the spaces and conducing rescue efforts for the missing 
crewmembers.  
In remote areas, heavy weather, and in Winter time such a situation would have been even more 
dramatic. Luckily, the vessel was close to a town with significant resources available. The incident 
showed that only having trained for specific roles in the vessel emergency response management 
team and not having others prepared for entering into this role hampered the initial response. 
Onshore, the response teams were faced with a situation they had not experienced before. This 
called for improvisation in the organization. Among other measures, they introduced a new role 
as liaison together with the MIRG team onboard the vessel to facilitate internal communication. 
They also needed additional advisors to assess the risk of the ship capsizing. The case shows that 
improvisation as to the number and types of roles as well as having backup for important 
managerial roles is crucial.  
The Command Systems 
Search and rescue (SAR) operations, including firefighting at sea, are conducted in accordance with 
defined procedures in the International Aeronautical and Maritime SAR Manual (IAMSAR 
Manual). According to the IAMSAR manual, the SAR system has three levels of coordination; the 
SAR coordinator (SC), the search and rescue mission coordinator (SMC), and the on-scene 
coordinator (OSC). The SAR coordinator (SC) has the overall responsibility for establishing, 
staffing, equipping and managing the SAR system including legal and funding support for the 
agencies but are not normally involved in the SAR operations (IMO and ICAO, 2016a). The Chief 
of Police, and ultimately the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, act as the SAR coordinator in 
Norway. The operational level coordination is conducted by SMCs at the JRCC operational center 
under authorization by the Chief of Police. The SMC will be in charge of the overall coordination 
of incidents and allocation of all necessary resource. The tactical level coordination during 
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operations is delegated to the first vessel on-scene and later to a larger vessel as an OSC. The OSC 
task is to rescue people and at the same time communicate with the distress vessel, report to the 
SMC, coordinating the search and rescue patterns of the other vessels, and keep control with the 
air activity. In reality, the OSC role has to be performed by several people in order to be properly 
handled. The IAMSAR manual does not address these aspects with a more detailed command 
system.  
Other tasks of the OSC include modifying the action plan received from the SMC based on the 
prevailing conditions, ensuring that the operations are conducted safely, maintaining a detailed 
record of the incident, keeping track of the number and names of the rescued people, and 
providing situation reports to the JRCC. The OSC will liaise closely and act as support for the 
vessel master (IMO and ICAO, 2016a). The Britannia Seaways case shows that the captain at the 
distress vessel may take a vital role in the grey zone between the SMC and the OSC, taking over 
the command based on the prevailing conditions. 
The relation between an OSC and SMC is always a joint-effort and a mutual discussion on how 
much responsibility the OSC can handle and the best way to coordinate the incident. This is based 
on OSC observations and situational reports. There could be incidents where the SMC has better 
overview over the situation because of available technology like drone cameras, satellite images 
and other sensors where the SMC may take on more of the OSC role. Also, the other way round. 
In the High Artic, the communication north of 70 degrees is occasionally breaking. If the OSC 
becomes aware of a distress situation directly and communications cannot be established with the 
JRCC, the OSC may have to assume some of the SMC duties and actually govern the whole 
operation, including shore mobilization (IMO and ICAO, 2016).  
In maritime incidents involving a passenger vessel, it is important to determine the responsibilities 
and authority of the SAR agencies and the master of the distress vessel (Finnish Border Guard, 
2014). The distress vessel management includes the master of the vessel and his officers 
comprising usually of chief officer, chief engineer, bridge team and the safety crew. Each will have 
dedicated tasks on the muster list and competences to handle various emergencies. In the Polar 
Code, there are demands for additional Polar Code courses for the captain and deck officers 
focusing on safe navigation in polar waters. However, they do not have an obligatory education 
and training as to emergency contingencies and response in Arctic waters. 
The master of the distress vessel is responsible for the vessel and passengers’ safety for all types 
of acute emergency and preparedness incidents, in which the vessel is involved. The master 
coordinates rescue measures on board a vessel in distress, including giving information and orders 
to external groups such as the paramedics, the MIRG teams, chemical divers, etc. The master also 
needs to assess the conditions of the vessel and the incident site in order to make the best decisions 
for passengers’ safety. The Britannia Seaways case illustrates a successful outcome of the master 
of the distress vessel being in charge. The role sharing mechanisms and the authority between the 
distress vessel captain and the SMC is a challenge.  
The fire and rescue services in Norway follow the Incident Command System which has a different 
organizational model than the IAMSAR manual. The Incident Command System will be used in 
mass-rescue operations involving for example the fire and rescue brigades and oil spill response, 
such as during the Nordlys ship fire. Firefighting and MIRG operations at sea will be coordinated 
from the JRCC following SAR procedures and command system. The MIRG operation 
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commander acts under the authority of the SMC and is responsible for reporting to both the SMC 
and the OSC. However, the organizational structure will be different at tactical level. The staff and 
operations at the fire department will follow the ICS structure. During the Nordlys incident, the 
fire department management gathered in the harbour next to the vessel following the ICS, which 
increased the situational awareness and efficiency in coordination (DSB, 2011; IMO and ICAO, 
2016b). They also introduced liaison and advisory roles in the rescue team to facilitate good 
communication between the various groups involved. 
Similar to any maritime incident, if a fire on board a vessel can be tamed by the vessel crew and 
danger to the crew and passengers is small, the ship owner is responsible for coordination of the 
incident. The ship owner can request some assistance such as advice, but may handle the overall 
coordination while the situation is under control. If the emergency evolves to the point where the 
ship owner and the ship crew cannot handle the fire, the coordination will be passed to the JRCC 
and the MIRG crew will be alerted, if necessary (Salten Brann, 2011; Finnish Border Guard, 2014; 
2016). Meanwhile, the crew will continue the firefighting measures, and evacuation if needed. Once 
aboard the vessel, the MIRG team will start firefighting and other MIRG measures led by the 
MIRG operation commander in cooperation with the captain (Finnish Border Guard, 2016).  
Discussion 
Arctic Challenges and Inter-Organizational Action Patterns 
Arctic maritime operations pose a difficult environment for emergency response, including 
firefighting operations. Major ship fires or explosions can have significant consequences for both 
people and the environment, especially in the Arctic where response is challenged by resource 
scarcity, long distances, difficult weather conditions and poor communication connections.  
One of the major challenges with ship fires relates to the decision-making on whether to bring in 
external firefighting assistance and how long the firefighting measures should be carried out before 
the passengers are evacuated. In the Arctic region, vast distances, long response times and rough 
weather conditions may create extra uncertainty about the time span before rescue is possible. 
Particular attention also has to be paid to the demands that the Arctic environment with ice and 
icing poses to the firefighters’ equipment, operations, training, and safety (Finnish Border Guard, 
2014). 
As a fire tends to spread fast, dispatching MIRG teams might not be a valid option in the North 
because of long response times. Fire safety on a vessel is primarily the responsibility of the ship 
owner and the captain. Fire safety depends on the presence of relevant equipment and 
countermeasures on board, the effective functions of the ship’s preparedness system, and 
crewmembers’ abilities of fire prevention, firefighting, smoke diving, search and rescue, and 
evacuation. This is especially true for the Arctic waters. However, the need for additional capacity 
for the crew to be able to operate on their own with firefighting for a longer time period is bad 
weather conditions, is not included in the Polar Code. 
The Nordlys and Britannia Seaways incidents happened quite close to the shore and relevant resource 
assets, making it easier to deploy the MIRG team and firefighting assistance. If put in the Arctic 
context with a longer distance to shore, rough seas, and cold conditions, as it was during the Le 
Boréal incident, deploying MIRG teams would be more challenging, thus leaving the main 
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responsibility to the vessel crew.  This was well demonstrated in the Norma Mary case. While the 
fishing vessels own crew had the fire in control most of the time, in bad conditions with Norma 
Mary’s inadequate equipment, the firefighting efforts might not have been so successful.  
Since MIRG operations are part of the SAR system, MIRG procedures and the chain of command 
is very clear in small scale events. However, in major multinational incidents, there will be 
challenges in understanding the leadership between various teams, their organizational cultures, 
structure and procedures. Usually, the fire and rescue services follow the ICS model that differs 
somewhat from the SAR system. The ICS has more functions and roles within the operational and 
tactical management and can accommodate various organizations and incident commanders in its 
unified command. The ICS is quite flexible, but on the other hand can cause some confusion, for 
example, with which functions are established and who is in command, especially if the incident 
involves many regions, fire brigades, agencies and other nations that have their own versions of 
the ICS. The SAR system in turn can be quite overloading for the persons in charge of operational 
and tactical command as they are put under a lot of pressure and responsibility. However, the 
command line is clear and established similar in all countries as it is based on the IAMSAR system. 
Because the MIRG teams have to know both the ICS system for their daily fire and rescue service 
operations and the maritime SAR system for MIRG operations, education and competence 
building in both of these areas is very important. In order to fully understand the chain of 
command, the MIRG teams, especially the operation commander, should be familiar with the SAR 
system in addition to the ICS.  
Flexibility of the On-Scene Coordination, Managerial Roles, and Structuring 
Mechanisms 
The incident with Britannia Seaways involved several stakeholders, both civilian and military, and 
inter-organizational action between the master of the vessel, the firefighters, and operative on-
shore coordination. The experience-based decision-making of the on-board management and 
evaluation of bad weather and its effects for firefighting was crucial for the successful response 
efforts. Furthermore, the ship management’s ability to cooperate, and find flexible solutions and 
procedures, such as making decisions based on knowhow and keeping relevant parties including 
the on-scene coordinator outside the ship informed, contributed to a positive outcome (Danish 
Maritime Accident Investigation Board, 2014).  
In terms of the flexibility of the system, the mechanism for structure elaboration can be referred 
to when discussing demanding operational circumstances. Role switching in Britannia Seaway’s case 
was also an important mechanism, as the ship’s crew managed to maintain command and were 
able to coordinate efforts utilizing the experienced passengers. The operation was successful, and 
the OSC position was given to a Norwegian navy ship in later stages of the operation. This calls 
for further attention to informational roles, where the coordinator assesses the prevailing 
environment and receives information and orders from the on board management at the distress 
vessel. 
In the case with Le Boréal, at first the on-scene coordinator role was given to an OSC on board the 
first helicopter to arrive to the incident site but was later transferred to the C130 aircraft so that 
the helicopter could concentrate to the rescue operation and go refuel. Distance and the scarce 
resources in this case also had a direct influence on the interdependence between all the 
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stakeholders as well as the flexibility of the OSC role. As the aircrafts cannot stay airborne 
indefinitely, there had to be a transfer of control in the middle of the operation. The OSC and the 
MRCC should consider sequencing tasks, or dividing responsibilities in order to maintain 
continuity in or smooth transfer of command, control and understanding of the situation (IMRF, 
2016b).  
The incident command allocation is highly dependent on the efficient mechanisms of role 
switching and system reassembling. Coordination between the government authorities, private 
operators, local authorities as well as dividing responsibilities is extremely important in mass rescue 
operations and point to the need of a comprehensive MRO plan and standard operating procedure, 
for example in this case, in establishing evacuation reception centers. The procedure for 
assignment and reassignment of personnel to different positions according to the functional 
requirements of the situation is important in this case. 
After boarding Norma Mary, the firefighters from the coast guard vessel discovered much water in 
the factory area with a risk for negative vessel stability. They had to mobilize for a new type of 
action, i.e. salvage of the vessel. This incident highlights the increased complexity of response and 
the need for multi-skilled crew in the High Arctic, and the vessel’s own ability to respond to the 
fire. In such situation, mechanisms of structure elaboration and system resetting would be critical. 
On-scene command should be organized under demanding circumstances of scarce resources, and 
should be able to utilize the available structures, routines, and competences. 
Another example illustrating the importance of role switching can be drawn from the Nordlys case. 
The decision-support system on the bridge included a checklist in the event of a fire. In an 
emergency, the chief engineer was to muster to the bridge and follow up the checklist. However, 
the chief engineer was one of the persons trapped in the engine room. According to the muster 
plan on Nordlys, the first mate was to take over the chief engineer’s tasks in case the chief engineer 
could not perform his tasks. However, these procedures were not followed and several important 
tasks initially assigned to the chief engineer and first engineer were not carried out. This led to a 
deterioration of the situation (AIBN, 2013). In this case, the response flow was affected by unclear 
roles within the ship’s own safety management and the ability to apply flexible command of 
responsibilities in a very stressful situation. 
The Nordlys case also illustrates the importance of authority delegation mechanism. During the on-
shore phase of the operation, the prevention efforts for possible oil spills were initiated. The police 
also established a unified command center for tactical coordination and prepared the harbor for 
response efforts. The priority will always be first on saving lives and conducting rescue efforts, and 
then handed over to the next responsible authority. According to the Norwegian Directorate for 
Public Security (DSB), there was some confusion over the ownership of the crisis after the JRCC, 
the captain and the fire services had completed their duties (Eikrem, 2012). The rescue sub-centre, 
which usually gathers operative leaders from each relevant organization for coordination, was not 
established since the police led their response and held communication from the staff room. In 
this case, the decision for not following standard procedures somewhat affected a transparent 
communication and coordination between different authorities. System flexibility and alternative 
procedures may cause confusion in roles and responsibilities with various stakeholders if not taken 
to the right level of decision-making or if all parties are not aware of the deviation from standard 
procedures.  
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Conclusions  
In this paper we have examined the inter-organizational coordination patterns and the command 
structures implemented in the context of Arctic emergency response. The complexity of 
coordination relates to the various organizations involved with somewhat different command 
systems and their reciprocal dependencies in a crisis situation. We have highlighted the need for 
introducing inter-organizational restructuring mechanisms allowing flexible on-scene coordination 
of emergency response to meet the challenges of the Arctic environment.  
Large-scale maritime SAR incidents in the Arctic may result in an overload in the normal 
emergency response system. Limited resource availability, resource-consuming mobilization time 
and the lack of experience in these kind of incidents in the High Arctic context may put a heavy 
strain on the management levels. Deploying specialized services in densely populated areas with 
high predictability, sufficient capacity and good communication, is potentially fast and efficient. 
The deployment of sufficient task forces in the Arctic may mean operation in unknown territory 
and cooperation with different actors than normally trained with. Also, the units in distress have 
to manage on their own for a longer time, and have to help out the professional forces with their 
duty. This study has shown that for the units in distress, managerial roles connected to information 
sharing are crucial for a positive outcome. The involved coordinators should both monitor the 
operational environment, and share information that would help the overall situational awareness 
in spite of limitations in information exchange capacities. Flexibility in the decision-making process 
is important at all management levels including finding new resources and solutions, as well as 
adapting standard operating procedures to the prevailing environment and using local knowhow 
and resources.  
Role flexibility, re-planning capability, and authority delegation are critical prerequisites for an 
efficient management response in the Arctic. The mechanisms for assembling and reassembling 
task forces, role switching, authority coordination and system resetting are also important 
mechanisms that provide command system flexibility. The capability of role switching is important 
for all actors involved in the maritime incident response. However, these demands call for further 
education and competence building in the maritime SAR system for authorities, ship owner 
management, and the vessel crew.  
In this study, we have built upon few illustrative cases. There is a need for quantitative studies 
demonstrating the contextual elements and their influence on the managerial roles and structuring 
mechanisms. In particular, one should elaborate on the resource re-configuration with a mix of 
capacities from various sources, including the resources from neighboring countries. As for the 
managerial roles, improvisation beyond the standard authority responsibility and role switching 
among the incident commanders, should be further focused on. 
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Can the Civil Liability Convention for Oil Pollution 
Withstand the Pressure of a Major Oil Spill in the 
Arctic Ocean? 
 
Ilker K. Basaran 
 
 
As the Arctic Ocean is becoming a busier place for shipping due to an unprecedented sea ice retreat and integration of the 
regional resources with the world economy, regulatory challenges for the protection and safety of the region become the top priority. 
According to the Arctic Council’s Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) report “the greatest environmental threat 
presented by the marine shipping industry pertains to the release of oil into the Arctic waters” (AMSA, 2009). Given the 
magnitude of the threat and the lack of technology to clean up the spilled oil in the Arctic Ocean, it is not surprising that the 
prevention measures become the highest priority in Arctic marine environmental protection efforts. To this effect, the Arctic 
states, through Arctic Council, have already agreed on several legal instruments regionally. The IMO Polar Code has also 
brought various precautionary measures to avoid oil spills in the Arctic Ocean. However, the civil liability scheme in oil pollution 
has not been properly examined yet. Civil Liability regimes are not drafted in light of the Arctic’s unique environmental 
conditions and risks; therefore, they require adjustments according to the Arctic shipping realities that we face today.  
 
 
Introduction 
Major disasters, in general, translate to change in legal structures because only after the accident 
we can test the true functionality of a legal framework set for the given industry. In oil pollution, 
it was the Torrey Canyon incident causing massive oil pollution in England and France in 1967 
that become the turning point for the major change in the civil liability structure of oceanic oil 
pollution. In the wake of this incident, it became clear that no proper legislation governing liability 
and compensation for such events existed either nationally or internationally (Jacobsson, 2007: 1). 
For example, the immediate problems with the Torrey Canyon incident were first how to establish 
jurisdiction because to establish jurisdiction one needed to arrest the ship, but the ship had sank 
right after the incident; and second how to compensate the damages because civil actions for oil 
pollution were limited to common law claims in tort against the vessel owner or other responsible 
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parties which required proof of fault (Griggs, 2012). As a result, in order to respond to 
shortcomings of the system, a global regime addressing these issues was created by means of two 
international treaties adopted under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO), at that time the International Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) (Jacobsson, 
2007: 1). 
After decades of existence and evolvement, the three-tier International Civil Liability Convention 
for the Oil Pollution Damage, consisting of the Civil Liability Convention (CLC), the Fund 
Convention (The Fund), and the Supplementary Fund Convention is about to face its biggest test 
against the recent phenomena of Arctic marine transportation. The question is, would this regime 
withstand a possible major oil pollution damage occurring in Arctic waters? 
As for this article, I will only examine the 1992 International Civil Liability Convention as all the 
Arctic states, except the USA, is party to it. 
Brief Review of the Civil Liability Convention for Oil Pollution Damage 
A. The CLC 
Geographical Scope 
According to the CLC Article II, the convention exclusively applies to oil pollution damage 
suffered in the territory, including the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone of a 
Contracting State. Therefore, place of the damage is important to define the geographical 
application of the convention.  
Additionally, the convention also applies to preventive measures, wherever taken, to prevent or 
minimize such damage within the geographic scope of the Convention. Scenarios where a tanker, 
for example, is involved in a collision beyond the territorial sea of a Contracting State and threatens 
to cause pollution within it: measures taken to prevent further oil spillage or collect the already 
spilled oil will be eligible for compensation under the Convention if all other criteria are satisfied.  
The nationality of the ship involved in the oil spill is irrelevant for this purpose.  
Ship 
Liability is imposed on certain vessels that constitute a “ship” as defined by the 
Convention. 
Article I (1), 1992 CLC defines ship as: 
“…any sea-going vessel and seaborne craft of any type whatsoever constructed or 
adopted for the carriage of oil in bulk as cargo, provided that a ship capable of 
carrying oil and other cargoes shall be regarded as a ship only when it is actually 
carrying oil in bulk as cargo during any voyage following such carriage unless it is 
proved that it has no residues of such carriage of oil in bulk aboard.” 
The definition of a “ship” is narrow, referring to ships that carry oil in bulk as cargo, for example, 
typical oil tankers. CLC does not apply to spills from dry cargo ships, passenger vessels or other 
non-tankers despite the fact that large ships in these categories often carry in their bunkers 
substantial quantities of fuel oil capable of causing considerable pollution damage. 
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Combination Carriers 
Combination carriers, or Oil/Bulk/Ore ships (OBOs), as well as tankers capable of carrying 
cargoes of persistent oil but also other liquid cargo in bulk, such as non-persistent oil or chemicals, 
are covered by the definition of “ship” only when actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo or when in 
ballast following such carriage. 
Oil Barges 
In general, the CLC does not require the ship to have any means of steering or propulsion. 
Therefore, an oil barge carrying oil in bulk as cargo from one place to another may actually 
constitute a “ship” for the CLC and Fund purposes. However, we have to bear in mind that there 
are also contradicting court rulings regarding the ship status of oil barges (De La Rue & Anderson, 
2009: 86-92). For example, in the 1998 Pantoon No 300 Case, in relation to the questions whether 
the barge constituted a “ship” for the purposes of the Civil Liability Convention 1969, the 
Executive Committee of the 1971 International Oil Pollution Compensation (IOPC) Fund 
attached importance to the fact that the barge had been actually transporting oil in bulk as cargo 
from one place to another and concluded that in these circumstances it was a “ship” for the 
purposes of the Conventions (IOPC Fund Claims Manual, 2010: 86-87). Other example cases 
involving oil barges under tow include the Nestucca Incident (Canada, 1998) and the Vistabella 
incident (Caribbean, 1991), both of which gave rise to claims against the 1971 Fund. In the former 
case the question whether the barge constituted a ‘ship’ was not raised, and did not arise in the 
decision, because it was concluded that the Fund Convention 1971 did not apply to the incident 
on the grounds that it occurred before the Convention entered into force in Canada (IOPC Fund, 
1990). In the latter case, it appears to have been accepted without debate that the barge was a 
“ship” (IOPC Fund, 1991). 
        Offshore Floating Storage Units 
The situation regarding Floating Storage Units (FSU) and floating production, storage, and 
offloading units (FPSOs) is not crystal clear. It is agreed by the 1992 Fund Assembly that the 
offshore crafts should be considered as ‘ships’ under the 1992 Conventions only when they carry 
oil as cargo on a voyage to or from a port or terminal outside the oil field in which they normally 
operate (Attard, Fitmaurice, Martinez & Hamza 2009: 292). Accordingly, the offshore craft would 
fall outside the scope of the 1992 Conventions when they leave an offshore oil field for operational 
reasons or simply to avoid bad weather. The circumstances of an incident should be taken into 
account when assessing the situation. 
         Anchored Vessels 
Permanently and semi-permanently anchored vessels engaged in ship-to-ship oil transfer 
operations should be regarded as ‘ships’ under the 1992 Civil Liability and Fund Conventions 
(Attard, Fitmaurice, Martinez, Hamza 2009:292). The 1992 Fund Assembly decided in 2006 that 
such vessels should be regarded as ships only when they carried oil as cargo on a voyage to or from 
a port or terminal outside the location in which they normally operate, but that in any event the 
decision as to whether such a vessel fell within the definition of ship should be made in the light 
of the particular circumstances of the case. 
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          State Owned Ships 
As stated at CLC Article XI (1), the Convention does not apply to warships or ships owned or 
operated by a State for non-commercial purposes. 
Oil 
Under the Article I (5) of the CLC, oil is defined as: 
“any persistent hydrocarbon mineral oil such as crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil, and 
lubricating oil whether carried on board a ship as cargo or in the bunkers of such a ship”.  
The targeted oil in the convention is, therefore, “persistent oil” because it is slow to dissipate when 
spilled into the water; therefore, it has potential to create widespread pollution that requires an 
effort to clean up, whereas non persisent oil normally evaporate by itself fairly quickly and does 
not require a clean up operation. Spills of non-persistent oil include, gasoline, light diesel oil, and 
kerosene, and they are not covered by the Conventions. Additionally, spills of non-mineral oils, 
for instance, palm oil and whale oil, fall outside the 1992 Conventions as well. 
Notably, there is no definition for persistent oil in the convention. And this omission seems to be 
intentional and non problomatic as it has not given rise to any difficulties in the application of the 
Conventions yet (cf. the Maritza Sayalero Incident (Venezuela, 1998)). But it is important to 
highlight the fact that the Fund Assembly later provided explanation to the term “persistent oil” 
as: 
“All oils which are not within the category of “non-persistent oil” as defined shall be regarded 
as “persistent oil”. “Non-persistent oil” is oil which, at the time of shipment, consist 
predominantly of non-residual fractions and of which more than 50 per cent by volume distills 
at a temperature of 340ºC when tested by the ASTM Method D 86/78 or any subsequent 
revision thereof” (F.D. Fund/A.4/11, 15/7/81: 17). 
Both the operational or accidental oil spill cases are covered under the CLC. An oil spill that 
occurred while loading and discharging operations, collisions, groundings, hull failures, equipment 
failures, bunkering, fires and explosions is also in the CLC coverage. Moreover, it is immaterial 
whether the oil is part of the ship’s cargo or escapes from the ship’s bunkers. Thus, pollution 
damage covered by the Convention may arise both where the ship is actually carrying oil in bulk 
as cargo, where the ship is laden, or during any voyage following such carriage, where the ship is 
in ballast. 
Types of Damage Covered 
An oil pollution incident can generally result in six types of damage: 
            Property Damage  
Pollution incidents often cause damage to property; the oil may contaminate fishing boats, fishing 
gear, yachts, piers, and embankments. Costs for cleaning polluted property are admissible for 
compensation under the Conventions (Fund Claims Manual, 2008: 12). If the polluted property 
for example fishing gear cannot be cleaned, the cost of replacement qualifies for compensation, 
subject to deduction for wear and tear.  
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Preventive Measures  
As indicated in the Article 1.6. and 1.7., ‘Pollution damage’ includes the cost of ‘preventive 
measures’ that is reasonable measures to prevent or minimize pollution damage, as well as loss or 
damage caused by preventive measures. Clean-up operations at sea or onshore have generally been 
considered to fall within the concept of preventive measures (Attard, Fitmaurice, Martinez & 
Hamza 2009: 295). For example, clean-up costs occurring on the high seas or within the territorial 
waters of a State that is not a party to the convention will be covered under the convention.  
            Consequential Loss 
Compensation is payable for the loss of earnings suffered by the owners of property damaged by 
oil as a result of the spill, for example, a fisherman who is unable to fish while his fishing gear is 
being cleaned (consequential economic loss) (Fund Claims Manual, 2013:13). 
Pure Economic Loss 
People whose property has not been damaged can also suffer the loss of earnings. For instance, 
fishermen who are prevented from fishing in a particular area of the sea because of the oil spill, 
even though their nets have not been damaged, may be eligible for compensation (Attard, 
Fitmaurice, Martinez & Hamza 2009: 295). Also, hoteliers who suffer losses because of a downturn 
in the number of guests due to contamination of a public beach may also have a claim. Such losses 
are, in common law jurisdictions, referred to as pure economic losses.  
Even though the compensation for such losses is allowed, there is an inconsistency in practice 
because the regime does not specify the criteria that should be applied in order to settle the pure 
economic damage claims. In common law countries, the matter is left entirely at the discretion of 
national courts and thus creates a potential for the discrepancy in states (such as Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, and the United Kingdom), which have implemented the international regime into 
their legal systems (Soyer, 2009). The situation in countries outside the common law system is also 
unclear. In some of these countries, pure economic loss is not considered to be a separate type of 
damage. The courts in these countries may apply the criterion of foreseeability and remoteness or 
require that there is a direct link of causation between the damage and the defendant’s action and 
that the damage must be certain and quantifiable in monetary terms (Jacobsson, 2016: 249). 
Environmental Damage 
Significantly, in accordance with the Article 1.6(a), general claims for damage to the marine 
environment are not admissible, therefore, they cannot be awarded for claims of a non-economic 
nature. The marine environment provides environmental services that support the plants and 
animals that live within it and to the humans who depend on the sea and shoreline for their 
livelihoods, recreation and enjoyment. The Conventions do not provide compensation for what is 
sometimes referred to as ‘pure’ environmental damage; that is, compensation for the loss 
of environmental services (IOPC Funds, 2018: 8). For example, a father who usually spends time 
with his children in a particular spot engaging in recreational activities such as fishing and camping 
for the last two years cannot claim damage because he can not find any other close by place to 
camp and fish with his children.  
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However, claims for the economic consequences of such environmental damage can be 
compensable according to Article 1.6(a). Typical claims for loss of profit resulting from 
impairment of the environment might include loss of revenue for a marine or coastal park or a 
nature reserve, for example, due to reduced income from car parking, camping or mooring fees. 
In the fisheries sector, claims may be admissible for reduced catches of commercial species of 
marine products. An example might be the disruption of the capture and sale of mangrove crabs 
and other shell fish due to the contamination of mangroves.  
Additionally, compensation for the environmental damage may be available, provided that any 
compensation claimed, other than loss of profit, is limited to the costs of reasonable measures 
taken, or to be taken, to restore the environment to the condition that it was in prior to the incident 
(Claims Manual, 2008: 13). For example, if a response were undertaken on the high seas or within 
the territorial waters of a State that is not a Party to the Conventions in order to prevent or reduce 
pollution damage within the territorial sea or EEZ of a State Party, the cost of the response would 
in principle qualify for compensation. Such compensation includes the reasonable costs associated 
with the capture, cleaning and rehabilitation of wildlife, in particular birds, mammals and reptiles 
(2013 Claims Manual, 2013: 14)  
Claims for the environmental damage can be presented by anyone who has suffered a financial 
loss due to oil pollution caused by a tanker. This could be national or regional governments or 
government agencies mandated to manage natural resources on behalf of the nation or region. 
Similarly, any claim for the reinstatement can be admissible with the condition to align with the 
standards set out in the Fund Claims Manual (IOPC Funds, 2018: 8) 
Shipowner’s Liability 
Under the CLC Article 3(1), the registered shipowner is strictly liable for any oil pollution damage 
caused by his ship unless the circumstances fall within one of the stated exceptions from liability. 
This also means that the claimant is not under any duty to prove the fault or blame on part of the 
shipowner or its crew, and the proof of “incident” is not necessary to hold the shipowner liable 
for the damage that his ship caused.  
The shipowner is exempt from liability under the Article 3.2 only if he proves that:  
(a) the damage resulted from an act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection, or a natural 
phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character, or  
(b) the damage was wholly caused intentionally by a third party, or  
(c) the damage was wholly caused by the negligence of public authorities in maintaining lights 
or other navigational aids.   
Limitation of Liability  
Under certain conditions, shipowners are entitled to limit their liability under 1992 CLC 
Convention to an amount which is linked to the tonnage of the vessel. The limitation amounts 
under the 1992 Convention are—after increases by 50.73 percent with effect from 1 November 
2003—as follows:  
(a) for a ship not exceeding 5,000 units of gross tonnage, 4,510,000 Special Drawing Rights 
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(SDR) (6.2 million USD);  
(b)  for a ship with a tonnage between 5,000 and 140,000 units of tonnage, 4,510 000 SDR 
(6.2 million USD) plus 631 SDR (879 USD) for each additional unit of tonnage; and  
(c)  for a ship of 140,000 units of tonnage or over, 89 770 000 SDR (125 million USD).  
Constitution of Limitation Fund  
In order to be entitled to limitation of liability, the shipowner must, under the CLC Article V.3, 
establish a limitation fund corresponding to the limit of his liability by depositing that amount in 
court or by producing a guarantee acceptable to the court. The limitation fund should be 
constituted with the competent court (or other competent authority) in one of the States parties 
where an action for compensation has been brought against the shipowner under the Convention 
or, if no such action has been brought, with any court in one of the States parties where such an 
action can be brought under the Convention. 
In some jurisdictions the courts accept that the limitation fund is constituted by means of a letter 
of guarantee, for instance by a Protection and Indemnity Association (P&I Club), whereas in other 
jurisdictions the limitation amount will have to be paid into the court (Attard, Fitmaurice, Martinez 
& Hamza 2009: 302) 
Channeling the Liability 
According to the CLC Article III(4)(a)-(f), the shipowner is the only liable party and subject to 
liability. His servants or agents are outside of the scope of the rule, therefore, they cannot be found 
liable for the oil pollution damage unless they cause the damage willfully or recklessly.   
Following is the list of people exempt from liability: 
(a) the servants or agents of the owner or the members of the crew; this exclusion extends 
to the employees of representatives of the owner, manager, operator and other parties 
whose liabilities are excluded; 
(b) the pilot or any other person who performs services for the ship;  
(c) any charterer, including bareboat charterer, manager or operator of the ship;  
(d) any person performing salvage operations with the consent of the owner or on the 
instructions of a competent public authority;  
(e) any person taking preventive measures, and 
(f) all servants or agents of those persons in subparagraphs (c)-(e).  
This system provides a simplified and efficient claims procedure for those who suffer pollution 
damage, and also allows the insurance market to provide appropriate cover. There are numerous 
important exceptions to this list: proceeding against the builders of the ship or its classification 
societies is allowed if there is any defect that causes or contribute to the incident. Similarly, 
proceeding against the owners or operators of a terminal is allowed if there is any fault on their 
part; or proceeding against the owners of another vessel is possible if they are involved in a collision 
with the tanker from which the oil spills. 
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Compulsory Insurance  
The owner of a ship registered in a State, party to one of the Civil Liability Conventions and 
carrying more than 2,000 tonnes of persistent oil as Cargo, is under Article VII.1 obliged to 
maintain insurance or other financial security to cover the liability under the applicable 
Convention. 
B. The Fund Convention  
The Fund Convention (1992 International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund) is created to be the 
second part of the two-tier international compensation system. Its main purpose is to provide 
additional compensation for victims of oil pollution and transfer some of the economic 
consequences of the damage to the oil cargo owners, as well as the shipowners. 
Since the Liability Convention had chosen the shipowner as the liable party on the basis of strict 
liability, it was considered necessary to shift some of the burden of compensation onto the oil 
industry, the main beneficiary of the carriage of oil by sea, which led to the idea of a second 
convention establishing a Fund to which the industry would contribute (Wu, 1996:76). 
Payment of Compensation  
According to the Fund Article IV.1, there are three situations in which compensation will be 
payable to any person who is unable to obtain full and adequate compensation under the CLC, 
these situations are: 
a) where there is no liability for the damage arising under CLC; 
b) where the owner liable for the damage under CLC is financially incapable of meeting his 
obligations in full, and any financial security provided under CLC does not cover or is 
insufficient to satisfy the claims for compensation which result from an incident; or  
c) where the damages exceed the amount of the shipowner’s limited liability under the 1992 
CLC.  
It should be noted that the 1992 Fund is only obliged to pay compensation under item c) if the 
shipowner is entitled to limit his liability.  
Fund’s Liability Limit 
According to the Fund Article 4(4)(a), for incidents occurring on or after 1 November 2003 
(Amendment 2003), the liability of the Fund in respect of any one incident is limited to the 
aggregate sum of 203 million SDR (approximately 313.21 million USD). This amount is available 
irrespective of the size of the ship and includes any compensation actually paid under the Fund 
Article IV.4.(a). 
C. The 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol 
As a third-tier compensation system, the Protocol on the Establishment of a Supplementary Fund 
for Oil Pollution Damage adopted on 16th May the 2003 and came into force on 3 March 2005 
(Supplementary Fund Protocol). 
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Limits of Compensation   
According to Supplementary Fund Protocol Article IV(2)(a), the aggregate amount of 
compensation payable by the Supplementary Fund, in respect of any one incident, is limited to 750 
million SDR (approximately 1157.1 million USD). This amount is inclusive of any compensation 
actually received under the CLC and Fund Conventions.  
 
 
 
Source: The International Oil Pollution Compensation (IOPC) Funds Website. 
Application of the Convention to the Arctic Ocean 
Sufficiency of the Monetary Compensation  
Aside from the economic damages, the most important contributor to overall oil spill incident cost 
in the Arctic Ocean will be the cost of preventive measures, including the response and clean-up 
efforts.  
It is difficult to answer the question whether the monetary compensation schemes will be sufficient 
to meet the cost of responding to a major oil spill in the Arctic Ocean since we have not 
experienced one yet (CMI, 2017: 51). But it is possible to state that the cost will be considerably 
higher compared to any other place in the world. For example, in BP oil spill, it has been reported 
that on a single most demanding day of the response, 6,000 vessels, 82 helicopters, and 47,849 
individuals were on the spill site helping with the clean-up efforts (Department of Health and 
Human Services, 2011: 1)  
At the end of the day, the clean-up cost for the BP was $11.8 billion USD (Spear, 2012) which was 
a sizable portion of the total cost of $62 billion USD (Busso, 2018).  
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The Gulf of Mexico in BP oil spill represents an ideal environment for oil spill recovery and 
cleanup operations, therefore, for a closer comparison to actual Arctic Ocean settings, we may 
need to examine the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska. In 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill clean-up 
efforts involved more than 1,000 people and 1,400 vessels, and it was not only about cleaning up 
the oil but also accessing the spill site. Therefore, there was a substantial land-based infrastructure 
build up as well (Patrick, 2018). Systematic cleanup operations underwent during the spring and 
Summer of 1989-1992, and at the end, the overall clean-up cost was about 2.5 billion USD which 
was an important portion of the total cost of 7 billion USD (Patrik, 2018), As a result, the clean-
up factor of the Exxon Valdez oil spill was a lot higher as a proportion of the total cost compared 
to the BP oil spill. 
It is clear that when we go further north, the circumstances change drastically. The remoteness, 
lack of infrastructure, limited seasonal operation window leading to a multiyear clean-up operation, 
and the harsh climate conditions will escalate the response and clean-up cost in the Arctic Ocean. 
Response measures need to be mobilized and brought in from far distances, and in many instances, 
national response options will likely be inadequate, therefore, they will be supplemented by 
resources procured on market terms (CMI, 2017: 51). 
Overall, the CLC and Fund Conventions will not be enough to cover the cost of oil spill damage 
in the Arctic Ocean. And as for the Supplementary Fund, it seems that the Arctic oil spill will be 
a real test. Some claim that the Supplementary Fund is sufficient enough to cover all the costs 
exceeding the CLC and Fund limits (CMI, 2017: 53), however, given the facts listed above this 
seems very optimistic and actually unrealistic. 
Reasonableness Test 
The Article VI (a) of the CLC states that “only reasonable reinstatement costs are admissible for 
compensation”.  
The reasonableness concept for reinstatement costs needs further analysis. In order for the 
preventive measures to qualify for compensation, the measures must be reasonable, and 
reasonableness should be determined on the basis of objective criteria in the light of the facts 
available at the time of the decision to take the measures. For example, the Fund has accepted to 
pay compensation for reasonable costs of cleaning and rehabilitation of contaminated birds and 
mammals, provided the measures were taken by qualified personnel and there was a reasonable 
chance that the animals would actually survive the process. It is extremely difficult in the Arctic to 
apply a reasonableness test. For example, how the reasonableness question will be answered in a 
salvage situation in the Arctic Ocean. It is difficult to answer this question because there is a high 
possibility that salvage operations alone will exceed the cost of the ship, or it will not even be 
possible. The Funds’ governing bodies have taken the position that the costs incurred for such 
operations qualify in principle for compensation under the CLC and Fund Conventions if the 
primary purpose of the operations was to prevent pollution damage; should the operations have 
another purpose, such as saving the ship or cargo, they would not fall within the definition of 
preventive measures and the costs incurred would not be admissible under the Convention (Attard, 
Fitmaurice, Martinez & Hamza 2009: 298). 
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Environmental Damage  
The CLC does not have environmental damage coverage. In other words, the meaning attached 
to the environmental damage compensation does not cover all the possible circumstances of an 
environmental damage. Victims of oil pollution damage in international regime can claim for 
impairment of the environment, but such claims are limited to property damages and economic 
aspects. Thus, only economic damage, cleaning, and reinstatement costs may be compensated by 
the CLC regime. (Attard, Fitmaurice, Martinez & Hamza 2009: 298). 
Irreversible damages such as destruction and death of wildlife and flora are considered indirect 
consequences that are not compensable. In other words, the environmental damage itself, or pure 
ecological damage, is not addressed by the regime. 
The Arctic Ocean sets itself apart from the rest of world’s oceans with its unique environment and 
marine biodiversity. Scientists predict that oil spilled in the Arctic waters may prevail for more than 
50 years before natural elimination processes make it disappear (Ostreng, 1999:10) This gives us 
an overall idea about the magnitude of the environmental damage and difficulty for nature to 
recover in the Arctic Ocean.  
Therefore, we should start considering environmental damage compensation systems where the 
damage to the environment itself can also be translated into a monetary value and compensated 
under the CLC regime.  
Navigational Aid 
Navigational Aid, also known as Aid to Navigation, is described as any device external to a vessel 
specifically intended to assist the navigators in determining their position or safe course or to warn 
them of dangers or obstructions to navigation (US Coast Guard). The common types of such aids 
include lighthouses, buoys, fog signals, and day beacons.   
Safe and effective use of the Arctic Ocean for shipping depends heavily on safety systems as such 
as fixed and floating aids to navigation, long-range aids to navigation (shore-based electronic or 
satellite-based), as well as safety and navigation information broadcasts (AMSA). While the 
southern waters and maritime routes are well served by the established systems, northern waters 
are served by a patchwork of said systems (AMSA). Therefore, ships in this part of the waters have 
no other option but to use and rely on a combination of satellite positioning and traditional 
navigation techniques (AMSA). And this situation can create a scenario where the shipowners can 
exonerate from legal liability for oil pollution by exposing the Arctic coastal state governments to 
the oil pollution liability. 
As indicated above, under the Article III(2)(c), the CLC regulates “Navigational Aid” exemption 
to shipowners’ liability. According to this Article, no liability for pollution damage shall attach to 
the owner if they prove that the damage “was wholly caused by the negligence or other wrongful 
act of any Government or other authority responsible for the maintenance of lights or other 
navigational aids in the exercise of that function.” This exemption only applies if the shipowner 
proves that damage was “wholly caused” by matters falling within the exclusion. Thus, a shipowner 
would not be able to rely on the exemption in cases where the oil pollution damage was also due 
to another contributory cause, such as contributory negligence by those on the board the ship 
(Tsesis Case, 1977). For example, if an oil tanker with maximum draft of 8 meters runs aground 
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in a Russian Arctic port with the depth of 7 meters by relying on the official draft limitation of 9 
meters set by the Northern Sea Route Administration, they can claim to be exonerated from the 
oil pollution liability if the shipowner can prove that the 7 meters depth was not marked on the 
chart, or the chart was not up to date.  
High Seas 
Currently, the high seas area of the Arctic Ocean is not open to marine transportation due to thick, 
multiyear, sea ice coverage, even in Summer. However, the prediction is that the high seas will be 
open to trans-Arctic shipping in the near future due to trends in climate change (Humpert & 
Raspotnik, 2012). Arctic coastal states do not have jurisdiction in the area as this is beyond their 
EEZ. This issue raises liability questions in case an oil spill occurs in the area. Because a coastal 
state’s authority to regulate foreign shipping does not extend to the high seas, transiting ships 
would only be subject to global shipping safety, environmental and security rules and standards 
adopted through the IMO and as may be applied by the flag states (CMI, 2017: 50) Therefore, the 
question arise as what happens if the oil spill occurs in the High Seas area, outside of the 
geographical scope of CLC 1992. 
The current gap with respect to the High Seas in the Arctic is not a problem at the moment as 
there is no access to the area, however, in time, this issue needs to be addressed. The vastness of 
the area is a great challenge from a response perspective and the problem could possibly be 
managed and resolved to some extent by establishing transport corridors and restricting navigation 
to certain areas (CMI Report, 2017: 51) 
Alternatively, a simpler approach would also be to copy the Norwegian model of extending the 
application of the CLC 1992 (as impended nationally) to oil pollution on the High Seas as that 
would benefit both the environment and the polluting ship owner (CMI Report, 2017: 51). 
Conclusion 
As the Arctic is warming at an unprecedented rate, it is imperative that we review and revisit the 
legal liability systems for oil pollution damage. With the International Oil Pollution Regime for Oil 
Pollution, the Arctic Coastal States have in place legislation that deals with the pollution, liability, 
calculation of losses, responsible parties and funding. However, there are many issues that we need 
to re-consider in adjusting and applying in Arctic setting. For example, with the lack of 
infrastructure and difficulty in responding to an oil spill, it’s almost certain that the monetary 
compensation will not be enough to cover the expenses that come with a major oil spill in the 
Arctic. This may create a particular problem for Russia as it is still not a party to the Supplementary 
Fund Protocol. The lack of infrastructure will also potentially lead to Coastal State’s exposure to 
liability in oil pollution. Interpretation of some of the articles in Arctic Ocean will be difficult, and 
we certainly need to have a section that requires compensation for the damage to the environment 
itself. And lastly, even though it is not an immediate problem, we have to start considering the 
ways to deal with possible high seas oil pollution scenarios and create the necessary rules. 
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Arctic Hydrocarbon Exploration & Production: 
Evaluating the Legal Regime for Offshore Accidental 
Pollution Liability  
 
Sergei Vinogradov & Smith I. Azubuike  
 
 
The Arctic has enormous hydrocarbon potential which is attracting international oil companies to invest, explore and exploit 
its reserves. Drilling in this region presents infrastructural, technological and environmental challenges with high accidental 
pollution risks involved. In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon incident of 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico, there are serious 
concerns about the effects and legal consequences of a possible major oil spill. This calls into question the adequacy of existing 
global and regional regulatory frameworks governing accidental pollution, particularly in such important area as oil pollution 
damage liability and compensation. It is important that an international regime is in place that provides prompt and adequate 
compensation to the victims of pollution and remedial measures necessary to protect the Arctic environment and innocent third 
parties. This paper examines and evaluates global and regional regulations pertinent to pollution resulting from offshore 
petroleum operations in the Arctic, focusing especially on accident pollution liability and compensation from offshore facilities. 
A regional intergovernmental framework or an industry-wide compensation scheme would be among the most obvious options 
in addressing the apparent gap in the existing environmental regime of the Arctic. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Geographically, the Arctic is defined as the region situated north of the Arctic Circle (U.S Energy 
Information Administration, 2012). A simple definition is that it is approximately 66 degrees North 
parallel, enclosing parts of Alaska (USA), Canada, Greenland (Denmark), Iceland, Sweden, 
Norway, Finland, and Russia (Johnstone, 2015). The economic and hydrocarbon potential of the 
Arctic region is gradually attracting global interest (Kaiser, Fernandez & Vestergaard, 2016). 
Viewed as the final frontier for conventional hydrocarbon development, it is likely to become the 
most promising area for international oil companies (IOCs) in the near future.  
The Arctic is portrayed as one of the few unspoiled ecosystems with limited human interaction, 
although offshore exploration began in the 1970s, with about 10,000 wells drilled to date (Sahu, 
2016). It is mostly occupied by Indigenous peoples and has unique environmental characteristics 
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which can be affected by large-scale economic activities (Newman, Biddulph & Binnion, 2014; 
Scarpa, 2014). There are over four million people including thirty Indigenous groups living in the 
region (Stouwe, 2017).  
An oil spill could damage all aspects of the ecosystem (Gordeeva, 2013). As the Arctic ice cover is 
gradually decreasing due to climate change, the prospects for hydrocarbon exploration and 
production (E&P) in places that were inaccessible before are increasing (Osofsky, Shadian & 
Fechtelkotter, 2016; Ebinger, et al., 2014). The Arctic has valuable marine living resources which 
could be affected by large scale E&P activities. Presently, there exists no confirmed technology 
that could remove oil pollution from under the ice, although some areas where petroleum 
production will be taking place are already ice free. The main environmental concern is about the 
impact of possible oil spills on Arctic waters and the transboundary dimension this could assume, 
calling into question the effectiveness of the existing emergency preparedness and response 
measures in the Arctic, as well as the adequacy of the liability and compensation regime for 
offshore pollution damage arising from hydrocarbon E&P. These concerns are informed by the 
Macondo incident in the Gulf of Mexico and the damage it caused to local fishermen, businesses 
and tourism. The Macondo oil spill impacted the shorelines of about five littoral states in the U.S. 
and was capped after 87 days (The Guardian, 2010).  
With offshore drilling operations significantly benefiting the Arctic countries’ economies, it is 
imperative that an international or an Arctic-specific regime is in place to address accidental 
pollution liability and emergency response, to adequately protect the Arctic environment and 
innocent third parties. Although non-binding vessel-focused pollution prevention measures have 
been developed within the Arctic Council, a rather soft regional institutional mechanism (Sahu, 
2016), no Arctic-wide offshore liability regime exists today to address accidental pollution arising 
from hydrocarbon E&P. The aim of this paper is to examine and evaluate global and regional 
regulations pertinent to pollution resulting from offshore petroleum operations, focusing 
especially on liability for accidental pollution damage. This paper suggests that an industry-wide 
compensation scheme or a binding regional instrument would be two most likely options in 
establishing an accidental pollution liability regime for the Arctic Ocean. 
Hydrocarbon Potential of the Arctic 
Global interests in developing Arctic hydrocarbon resources have been growing fast. This 
attention has been influenced largely by the demand for energy and significant potential oil and 
gas resources of this frontier region (Kaiser et al., 2016). It is estimated that the entire Arctic holds 
more than 87% of the earth’s oil and natural gas reserves (Murray, 2018). These estimates were 
based on a probabilistic methodology of geologic analysis and analogue modelling; they are 
however not final (Bishop, Bremner, Laake, Parno & Utskot, 2011). The US Geological Survey, in 
2008, assessed the oil and gas potential of the North Arctic Circle and indicated that it holds about 
90 billion barrels of oil and 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and a possible 44 billion barrels 
of undiscovered natural gas liquids, with 84% of these located offshore (USGS, 2008). These 
estimated figures represent 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil resources and 30% of world’s 
undiscovered natural gas resources (Ebinger, Banks & Schackman, 2014).  
Similar estimates from Russia support assessment of the significant petroleum potential of the 
Arctic (Schofield & Potts, 2008; Baev, 2007). Russian scientists used the regression relationship 
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method to calculate the probabilistic estimate of oil and gas resources of the Eurasia sedimentary 
basin in the Arctic Ocean (Kontorovich et al., 2010). The findings show that in the second half of 
the century, the Arctic petroleum super basin could provide the required energy resources that are 
comparable to those of the West Siberian petroleum basin or the Persian Gulf (Kontorovich et al., 
2010). The bulk of the estimated oil and gas can only be retrieved through complex offshore 
drilling techniques; about 80% of the Arctic energy resources are situated in the areas covered by 
ice for most of the year (Osofsky et al., 2016). More than 15 oil and gas fields have been discovered 
in the Kara, Pechora, and Barents Seas of the Russian Arctic region (Bishop et al., 2010).  
Recent oil discoveries in the Nanushuk and Torok formations announced during 2015-2017 in the 
US, indicate that the North Alaska Slope holds significant reserves (USGS, 2017). In 2011, the 
Prudhoe Bay field in Alaska’s North Slope was estimated to hold about 2.1 billion m3 of 
recoverable oil, out of the 4.0 billion m3 estimated. It also has a projected 736 billion m3 of 
recoverable natural gas, out of 1.3 trillion m3 estimated (Bishop et al., 2011). The Drake gas field 
in the Canadian Arctic has been evaluated to hold 153 billion m3 of gas, while about 453,160 m3 
of oil was extracted from the Bent Horn field on Cameron Island from 1985-1996 (Bishop et al., 
2011). The Norwegian Snohvit field is also estimated to hold significant recoverable reserves.  
The territories controlled by the five coastal states of the Arctic Ocean - Canada, US, Norway, 
Russia, and Greenland (Denmark) - hold more than three-quarters of the Arctic resources 
(Henderson & Leo, 2014). As ice covered areas diminish due to the increase of global 
temperatures, these resources are becoming more accessible, opening new opportunities for 
hydrocarbon development and transportation to world markets, through the Northern Sea routes 
(ibid). Recent innovations in extraction technologies and ship design enable access to the Arctic 
resources, thereby increasing energy security in the twenty-first century (Stouwe, 2017). The 
resource potential of the region has led to the Arctic being branded as the “new energy province” 
(Østhagen, 2013).  
Existing and Prospective E&P Activities in the Arctic 
Energy companies have made high-profile forays into the Arctic to develop its oil and gas 
resources. Prior to this recent interest, there had been several rather earlier attempts to develop 
hydrocarbons in the Arctic. In 1968, Standard Oil and ARCO drilled a well that tapped the largest 
oil field in Prudhoe Bay on the North Slope of Alaska. Production started in 1977 after the trans-
Alaska Pipeline System from Prudhoe Bay to Valdez was completed (Tippee, 2015). As time went 
on, Shell also discovered oil in the Arctic in 1980, and in 2012, BP found oil at its Liberty field in 
the Beaufort Sea; but high production costs had led to the abandonment of these discoveries. 
In the Far North and the Arctic Norwegian and Russian waters, Gazprom, Statoil and Rosneft 
carried out E&P activities over several years (Wilson Center, 2014). In the Barents Sea, about 130 
wells have been drilled to date with mixed results (Murray, 2018). At the Goliath field in the Barents 
Sea, Eni Norge AS has been producing for about a year. In January 2017 Statoil discovered oil and 
gas in the Cape Vulture well, followed by two additional finds in July (Murray, 2018).  
In the Russian waters of the Arctic, Gazprom is progressing in the Pechora Sea (Stouwe, 2017). 
In 2014, the Rosneft-ExxonMobil venture successfully completed the drilling of the northernmost 
well in the world - the Universitetskaya-1 well in the Kara Sea oil province (Rosneft, 2014). As of 
January 2017, Rosneft owns 55 licenses in the offshore areas of the Arctic (Rosneft, 2018).  
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In the Nikaitchuq field offshore the North Slope of Alaska, Eni has attained its production goal 
of 25,000 barrel per day. In a water depth of 3 metres, the field holds reserves estimated at 200 
MMboe (Offshore Energy, 2014).  
Exploratory drilling in the Canadian Arctic could be traced to the Canadian Beaufort in 1972. 
Although activity in the region slowed down in the 1980s, renewed exploratory efforts resumed in 
the early 2000s. It is Canada’s largest offshore oil project and remains an important test case along 
the Arctic learning curve. Hibernia in the Canadian sub-Arctic waters is one of the biggest resource 
development projects (Stouwe, 2017).  
In Greenland, the first substantial offshore seismic surveys were carried out and experimental wells 
drilled in West Greenland in the 1970s, and another exploratory well drilled in 2011, albeit, with 
little success. Despite this, Tullow Oil accepted to buy a 40% stake in an exploration block in the 
Baffin Bay.  
These discoveries have shown that hydrocarbon development in the fragile Arctic environment is 
gaining pace (Wilson Center, 2014). Experts forecast that by 2030, geological exploration will 
mainly be carried out on the Arctic shelf, and petroleum deposits in the area will be prepared for 
further, large-scale development (RIAC, 2015). The exploratory efforts have raised global 
awareness and concerns about the Arctic environment in the event of a significant oil spill. While 
IOCs continue to invest in and ramp up exploration, development, and production operations 
across this frontier region, serious regulatory, environmental, and technological challenges that 
face hydrocarbon operations must be properly addressed (Tippee, 2015).  
Offshore Operations and their Possible Effects 
Offshore E&P activities are risky. They involve the extraction of hydrocarbons, require the use of 
potentially harmful substances and produce various emissions and discharges (E&P Forum & 
UNEP, 1997). Accidental pollution caused by gas blowouts, oil spills and chemical spills during 
offshore petroleum development could result in possible or actual harm to the environment, in 
the form of physical, chemical, and biological disturbances in the water column, on the seabed, 
and in the atmosphere (Vinogradov, 2013). The Arctic is particularly fragile in this respect, being 
home to Indigenous populationS and important marine resources, and is characterised by special 
environmental vulnerabilities. It is exposed to possible impacts from various marine activities 
(Arctic Council, 2009) such as accidental releases of oil during petroleum extraction and 
transportation. E&P may cause oil pollution, which is considered one of the six priority 
environmental problems threatening the Arctic. Others are radioactivity, persistent organic 
contaminants, noise, heavy metals, and acidification (Koivurova, Kankaanpaa & Stepien, 2015).  
The melting of the ice cover has improved access to mineral resource development (Schofield & 
Potts, 2008) and heightened IOCs interests to explore and exploit this resource-rich region 
(Stouwe, 2017). An assessment of hydrocarbon activities by the Arctic Council shows that at 
present the extent of oil pollution in the Arctic is low and is mostly related to natural seepage. 
However, it was noted that an accidental oil pollution is the largest threat to the marine 
environment (Arctic Council, 2009). In the event of an oil spill, the response time is substantially 
slower, as containment crew must wait for temperate seasons to assess damage. Although chemical 
dispersants could reduce the extent of an oil spill (Lewis & Prince, 2018), they are highly toxic. A 
combination of crude oil and dispersants significantly increases their toxicity and potential impact 
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on microzooplankton and planktonic communities (Almeda, Hyatt & Buskey, 2014). Due to tightly 
interwoven food chains, high north ecosystems are uniquely vulnerable to substantial disruptions 
resulting from oil spills (Stouwe, 2017).  
The apparent vulnerability of the Arctic environment has led to calls for a moratorium on offshore 
activities in the Arctic (UKPEC, 2012), especially as the Gulf of Mexico oil spill has shown the 
difficulty of clean-up even in the significantly more favourable climate and weather conditions 
(Cunningham, 2012). Oil pollution is slow to disappear, while sub-zero temperatures, darkness and 
sea ice may impede access to spill-covered areas and reduce the effectiveness of clean-up 
techniques and operations (National Research Council, 2014).   
The frontier’s biodiversity is unique but not sufficiently understood. The changing climatic 
conditions may increase the frequency of storm surges, making it more likely for an oil spill to 
reach coastlines and damage coastal species (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2013). Another challenge is 
the fact that regulatory enforcement is extremely difficult in the High North. Regulatory agencies 
are usually “captured” by industry interests, whom they depend upon for personnel and technical 
expertise. Agencies find it difficult to set adequate standards without corporate assistance, and this 
power asymmetry tilts the scale in favour of IOCs (Stouwe, 2017).  
A Macondo-type disaster would be catastrophic for the Arctic. It is the duty of both relevant 
national governments and the international and business community to take on this challenge. It 
has been asserted that IOCs and the Arctic coastal states are far from ready to effectively deal with 
major oil spills in the Arctic (Nunez, 2014). There is no doubt that the impact of oil pollution on 
the Arctic ecosystems and vulnerable marine living resources could be devastating and long-lasting. 
This is so as toxic substances could remain in the marine environment for decades and be 
transported by ice floes over large distances while affecting wildlife and the pristine environment 
(Cameron, 2015).  
Legal Regime of the Arctic: An Environmental Perspective 
The legal regime of the Arctic represents a combination of different global and regional 
environmental treaties and soft law instruments (Sahu, 2016). The protection of the Arctic is 
achieved using mainstream and side-stream regulations. Some global conventions, primarily related 
to the law of the sea, and polar-specifics regulations, including those passed by the Arctic Council, 
constitute the mainstream regime. Individual efforts of the coastal states to protect their northern 
shores and waters constitute the side-stream regime (Stouwe, 2017).  
Applicable hard law comprises customary rules and relevant treaty provisions that are legally 
binding and define or prohibit the specific states’ conduct (Canuel, 2015). When states consent to 
implied customary law or treaty-based hard law, they are bound by it, albeit, compliance issues 
arise sometimes when an international norm conflicts with perceived national interest (ASIL & 
ILA, 1991). It is a customary international law obligation of a coastal state to ensure that 
hydrocarbon activities within its marine environment do not result in transboundary 
environmental harm to other states (Bosma, 2012). 
International environmental law and its principles play a vital role in governing various economic 
activities in the Arctic. UNCLOS and other global treaties, such as the Biodiversity, Persistent 
Organic Pollutants and the Climate Change conventions, are all relevant in terms of environmental 
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protection of the Arctic. They provide general guidelines for the protection of the environment 
during petroleum operations.  
Regional legal frameworks also govern some economic activities in the Arctic, at least in certain 
geographic areas. These include the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of 
the North-East Atlantic (the OSPAR Convention).  
The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), a “soft law” framework for environmental 
cooperation, and its successor, the Arctic Council, an intergovernmental forum established in 
1996, are also part of the Arctic legal regime, although of a non-binding nature (Nowlan, 2001). 
The Arctic Council is the main regional institutional mechanism intended to provide a platform 
for cooperation on various issues among the Arctic states. It does not have a legal personality as 
an intergovernmental organization, and its regulations are simple recommendations (ibid). It has 
launched several programmes with mandates relevant to environmental protection. As far as 
accidental oil pollution arising from E&P activities is concerned, the Arctic environmental regime, 
as will be shown later, is rather piecemeal compared to other regional seas. While coastal states 
may have sufficiently developed national regulatory frameworks for offshore E&P operations, the 
Arctic-wide regime for compensating other coastal states and victims of pollution, including 
Indigenous peoples, is missing. The fundamental question here is which liability and compensation 
regime should govern compensation for environmental harm, including transboundary damage, 
caused by accidents in the Arctic either within the coastal states’ jurisdiction or beyond it. 
UNCLOS and Other Global Instruments  
No special international regime applies to hydrocarbon development in the Arctic (Johnstone, 
2016). As earlier stated, such activities are governed by general international law, mainly in the 
form of 1982 UNCLOS and its implementation agreements (Cinelli, 2014). UNCLOS is often 
referred to as the “constitution for the seas” (Fowler, 2012). Art. 192 of UNCLOS obligates states to 
protect and preserve the marine environment. UNCLOS codifies the rights of various states, 
determines the limits of various maritime zones, from the territorial sea to the Exclusive Economic 
Zones (EEZ) and the continental shelf, and establishes applicable rules associated with marine 
scientific research in the Arctic, and the rights and responsibilities for marine environmental 
protection (Joyner, 2009). 
Under Article 194 of UNCLOS, there exists a duty to take all necessary measures to prevent, 
reduce and control pollution of the marine environment. Article 194 (3) expressly refers to 
“pollution from installations and devices” used to explore and exploit natural resources from the seabed 
and subsoil. In particular, such measures must aim at preventing accidents and dealing with 
emergencies, ensuring the safety of operations at sea, and regulating the design, construction, 
equipment, operation and manning of such installations or devices. Clearly, this obligation applies 
to hydrocarbon E&P in the Arctic. 
Further to this general obligation, there are two more specific provisions related to offshore 
operations - Articles 208 and 214, that directly relate to the prevention and control of operational 
and accidental marine pollution resulting from offshore E&P. Together these articles embrace 
both aspects of anti-pollution measures: regulation and enforcement. Article 208 obliges states to 
adopt laws and regulations that will prevent, reduce and control pollution emanating from seabed 
activities, and to harmonise and cooperate with other states to create a regional framework to 
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address marine pollution. Article 214 also deals with the issue of pollution resulting from seabed 
activities under the jurisdiction of coastal states. It complements Article 208 and operates as an 
enforcement provision (Vinogradov & Wagner, 1998).  
There is one Arctic-specific provision in UNCLOS, which however applies to navigation only. 
Under Article 234, coastal states have a right to make laws that are non-discriminatory to prevent, 
reduce and control vessel-related pollution in ice-covered areas within their Exclusive Economic 
Zones.  However, Art. 234 does not provide for an adequate legal mechanism to protect the Arctic 
environment from other sources (Stouwe, 2017). UNCLOS does not stipulate either the content 
or procedures that should be followed to prevent such pollution of the Arctic Ocean (Rixey, 2016). 
Russia and Canada have explicitly referred to Article 234 as the basis for their unilateral 
introduction of additional environmental regulations and, in the case of Russia, icebreaker escort 
fees to ensure the safety of the environment and seafarers in their respective Arctic EEZ (Fields, 
2015). While this provision applies only to navigation, there is nothing in either UNCLOS or 
general international law which precludes coastal states from establishing and enforcing stricter 
measures with respect to offshore E&P operations in their Arctic waters. 
Finally, Article 197 calls for environmental cooperation, where appropriate, on a regional basis, 
directly or through competent international organisations. Such cooperation should focus 
primarily on formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and international practices 
and procedures for the protection of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic 
regional features. The Arctic is a particularly sensitive and vulnerable maritime region where 
cooperation among its coastal states and other countries using it is essential. From this perspective, 
it is important to analyse and assess the emerging regional environmental regime of the Arctic 
Ocean to ascertain its effectiveness, especially regarding petroleum E&P. This is essential as 
UNCLOS strongly encourages regional solutions to prevent, reduce and control pollution in the 
Arctic (Stokke, 2009). 
Apart from UNCLOS, there are several international conventions aimed at protecting the marine 
environment which were adopted under the auspices of the International Maritime Organisation. 
The most relevant among them in the context of this paper are the International Convention on 
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC) of 1992, the Fund Convention of 1992, and the 
2003 Supplementary Fund, which may offer possible solutions for the Arctic. The aim of the CLC 
1992 was to ensure adequate compensation for victims of vessel-based accidental pollution 
damage. The CLC provides for a strict liability regime against a ship owner with limited exceptions 
for acts of war, third party intentional acts, and the wrongful acts of an authority responsible for 
navigation (Art. 3, CLC 1992). The strict liability approach was chosen to ensure optimal 
compensation to the victims of accidental pollution (Hui, 2007). 
The CLC requires mandatory insurance to cover ship owner’s liability (Art. 7, CLC 1992) 
essentially to guarantee such compensation (Verheij, 2007). The limit of the ship owner’s liability 
is calculated based on the tonnage of the vessel (Art. 5, CLC 1992), and victims could claim directly 
from the ship owner’s insurer or the provider of the financial security (Art. 7 (8), CLC 1992). After 
the 2000 amendment, the maximum amount payable by a ship owner is 89,770,000 Special 
Drawing Rights (SDR). However, the CLC has been criticised for having a low maximum amount 
which may not compensate for a large-scale damage, thus defeating the goal of prompt and 
adequate compensation set out by the regime (Mason, 2002). 
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To accommodate this criticism, the 1992 Fund was established to provide compensation for 
victims who do not obtain full compensation under the CLC. The 1992 Fund functions as an 
alternative source of payments and as a second-tier compensation mechanism for claim settlement 
(Art. 3 (2), CLC 1992). Thus, it provides victims with realistic opportunities of recourse, and a 
wider scope of claims application (Pavliha & Grbec, 2008). Through contributions from the 
shipping and oil industry, compensation is available under the CLC and Fund regime, thus 
facilitating risk spreading between different parties. 
Despite the seemingly wide scope of the Fund and substantial amount available, subsequent 
incidents demonstrated that the CLC and the Fund were inadequate to provide compensations in 
the most severe cases, as some claims may surpass the liability limit under the two instruments 
(Hui, 2011). The combined amount of compensation available under the CLC and Fund was 203 
million SDR. This limitation paved the way to the adoption of the 2003 Supplementary Fund 
Protocol to ensure availability of adequate funds for compensation payment. The limit was 
increased to 750 million SDR (Art. 4, 2003 Fund Protocol). The 2003 Fund operates as an 
additional tier of compensation and applies when the joint coverage under the CLC and the 1992 
Fund is insufficient.  It is derived from levies collected from companies situated in the contracting 
states that receive more than 150,000 tons of oil per year (Art. 10, 2003 Fund Protocol). Yet, the 
liability limit under the 2003 Fund is still inadequate in addressing potential damage caused by a 
major spill in the Arctic. 
The regime has achieved a balance between various competing interests as it continues to ensure 
prompt and adequate payment of compensation for pollution damage. The entire CLC regime 
offers certain options for the Arctic region. The success of the CLC as a model for developing an 
international liability mechanism for the marine transportation of hazardous and noxious 
substances is an indication of its likely applicability in the Arctic region.  
Regional Environmental Frameworks in the Arctic 
It has been earlier mentioned that there is no single regional convention governing the 
environmental protection of the Arctic Ocean, including offshore oil and gas activities. What is 
currently in place is a combination of some regional binding and soft law instruments in the form 
of numerous guidelines and recommended practices. This could relate to the fact that the Ottawa 
Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council does not impose legally binding 
responsibilities on any of its members and that the Arctic Council is also not authorised to do so 
(Koivurova & Molenaar, 2009). The Arctic Council’s position and role could and should be 
strengthened to improve the effectiveness of environmental cooperation. 
The most relevant regional environmental regime which applies partly to the areas under the 
jurisdiction of some Arctic states is the OSPAR Convention. It was open for signature at the 
Ministerial Meeting of the Oslo and Paris Commissions on 22 September 1992. The OSPAR 
Convention replaced two instruments concerning land-based pollution and dumping adopted in 
the early 1970s. It provides a broad normative framework and an institutional mechanism (the 
OSPAR Commission) for regional cooperation. One important feature of the OSPAR regime is 
its geographical coverage, which includes Region I (Arctic waters) that constitutes approximately 
40% of the OSPAR maritime area. 
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In addition to the general obligation regarding the prevention and elimination of pollution from 
“offshore sources” (Article 5), it has Annex III regarding offshore installations. However, neither 
the OSPAR Convention, nor its Annex III contain technical requirements and standards, leaving 
this to be developed by the Commission through its agreements, decisions and recommendations. 
The OSPAR Convention focuses almost entirely on regulating operational pollution and the 
disposal of disused offshore platforms (Vinogradov, 2013).  
Some soft law instruments embrace internationally accepted technical norms, standards and 
practices that have been institutionalised (Koivurova et al., 2015). Although they influence states’ 
behaviour, they do not create an excessive burden or obligation on the respective states. Soft law 
instruments play an important role in shaping the actor’s behaviour, both in terms of their general 
conduct and, especially, when it comes to regulating some specific industrial or commercial 
activities. The Arctic Council has produced important guidelines, including the 2009 Arctic 
Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines. The purpose of the guidelines is for the Arctic nations to use 
them during petroleum operations by applying common policy and practices (Arctic Council, 
2009d). The objective is to assist regulators in designing standards, which are applied and enforced 
consistently for all offshore hydrocarbon operators in the Arctic. The guidelines are non-binding 
and are intended only to encourage the application of the highest standards of petroleum 
operations. The Council’s various task forces, working groups, and adopted documents aimed at 
achieving the Council’s twin aims - environmental protection and sustainable development of the 
Arctic natural resources (Canuel, 2015).  
In 2013, the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in 
the Arctic was adopted to serve as a legal platform for prompt and effective action and cooperation 
in the event of an oil pollution incident. In 2015, the Arctic Council approved the “Framework 
Plan for Cooperation on Prevention of Oil Pollution from Petroleum and Maritime Activities in 
the Marine Areas of the Arctic” (Framework Plan). The Framework Plan aims to strengthen 
cooperation, including exchange of information, in the field of prevention of marine oil pollution. 
However, both the hard law instruments and soft law guidelines are practically silent on the issue 
of accidental oil pollution damage to the environment and this question requires more detailed 
analysis which will follow.    
Accidental Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation in the Arctic   
Current Status 
While accidental oil pollution is one the most serious issues that threatens the Arctic, the region 
does not have a proper legal regime that addresses liability and compensation for damage arising 
from E&P activities. Although various national laws govern hydrocarbon E&P in the Arctic 
waters, these regulations are not harmonised, neither do they provide adequate protection to the 
victims of pollution in the case of transboundary environmental harm. There are considerable 
differences in relevant national regimes which can lead to ambiguities and unnecessary delays and 
inadequate compensation (Lahn & Emmerson, 2012). As states look to address the unique 
challenges of regulating offshore drilling activities in the Arctic region, a major concern is the 
liability limits set out in national regulations (Byers, 2012). The liability for offshore pollution 
damage in Russia, Norway and Greenland is unlimited, whereas that of US and Canada is limited 
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(Lahn & Emmerson, 2012). The US Oil Pollution Act of 1990 sets the limit of liability at $75 
million for economic and natural resource damage, although no limit standard applies for gross 
negligence (33 U.S.C S2701 of OPA). Liability for offshore pollution damage in the Canadian 
Arctic is $40 million under the 1970 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. 
A fundamental question with respect to liability for pollution damage in the Arctic is which liability 
regime should apply. Stakeholders in the Arctic region have expressed divergent views on this 
issue. Non-governmental organisations in the region argue that the liability cap should be removed. 
The reason advanced is that the environment is vulnerable, the climate is harsh, and that there is 
no precedent to base cost assessment for damage caused to the environment (Lahn & Emmerson, 
2012). Some scholars posit that liability caps prevent cost internalisation and can facilitate activities 
that do not make economic sense from an inclusive viewpoint (Byers, 2012). Oil companies and 
some states hold a contrary view. Unlimited liability is usually assumed to create a risk too great 
for investors as it does not ensure certainty in insurance, although some investors may accept it as 
a way of covering for the current and future loss of fishing revenues by locals (Vanderklippe, 2011) 
Again, how to address victims’ claims where the liability limit is low, and what limit of financial 
responsibility to apply, is an issue of debate in the Arctic region (Lahn & Emmerson, 2012). In the 
U.S, the demonstration of financial capacity is set at 150 million USD. In Greenland, the 2010 
Baffin Bay licensing rounds required companies to have at least 10 billion USD of equity to qualify, 
and small companies were required to provide a 2 billion USD bond for clean-up in the event of 
a spill (Webb, 2010). States and companies may be unable to act alone in the event of a disaster 
and the liability regime of a state may limit victims’ claims as the amounts vary (Lahn & Emmerson, 
2012). It therefore seems necessary to harmonise national regimes in the Arctic region for a more 
effective liability framework.  
Under Article 235 of UNCLOS, states are obligated to ensure that recourse is available for 
adequate compensation or other relief, and to ensure this, it is the duty of states to cooperate in 
the implementation of existing international law, and the development of the law regarding liability 
and compensation for marine pollution damage. This provision also emphasises the need for the 
development of criteria and procedures, such as compulsory insurance or compensation funds, for 
payment of adequate compensation. This highlights the importance of a robust and streamlined 
regime that would allow for adequate compensation and a well-considered liability limit in the 
fragile Arctic region.  
At present “existing international law” relating to liability and compensation for oil damage to the 
marine environment is limited to accidental pollution arising from navigation only. There is a well-
established global regime governing civil liability for pollution damage caused by maritime 
accidents involving transportation of oil. However, nothing of this kind at either the global or 
regional level exists with respect to petroleum E&P. The 1977 Convention on Civil Liability for 
Oil Pollution Damage that could have been relevant, is not in force and in practical terms is 
obsolete. Thus, in view of the advent of large-scale E&P operations in the Arctic there is a clear 
need to consider adequate liability and compensation schemes and mechanisms with respect to 
offshore pollution, if not global, at least regional, especially for the vulnerable Arctic Ocean.   
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Options for Liability and Compensation Schemes    
In the face of environmental challenges and increasing economic activities in the Arctic, questions 
have been raised over the sufficiency of the existing regime to manage and protect this frontier 
region (Stokke, 2009). This paper identified as one such issue the absence of a regional liability and 
compensation scheme for damage caused by E&P activities in the Arctic. As IOCs look towards 
expanding their operations in this region, one may consider various options to fill this obvious 
gap, including primarily two: an industry-specific private compensation mechanism modelled on 
the OPOL scheme and a regional intergovernmental civil liability regime.  
Using the OPOL-type Framework 
One possible solution in addressing the regime gap in the Arctic is an OPOL-type framework for 
pollution liability arising from the hydrocarbon E&P operations. The Offshore Pollution Liability 
Association Limited is an industry body in the oil sector, set up as a company limited to administer 
a voluntary but strict liability compensation scheme known as the Offshore Pollution Liability 
Agreement (OPOL) (Faure & Liu, 2017). The OPOL is an agreement between several major oil 
companies, intended to make compensation available to the victims of oil pollution damage 
emanating from an offshore facility or reimbursement to public authorities for remedial measures 
carried out following a spill (Clause IV, OPOL). OPOL was designed to fill the gap in the UK 
pending the ratification of the 1977 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 
Resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources (1977 CLEE) 
(Rochette, Wemaere, Chabason & Callet, 2014). However, the CLEE was never ratified, and 
OPOL remains the only instrument at present to address the issue of accidental pollution liability 
not only in the North Sea and adjacent areas, but globally. 
OPOL’s origin is traceable to the UK. It entered into force on 1 May 1975 as an agreement 
between all offshore operators in the UK (Faure & Liu, 2017). Its coverage was extended to 
offshore facilities within the jurisdiction of other states: Denmark, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, France, the Republic of Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, the Isle of Man, the Faroe 
Islands and Greenland. This means that OPOL applies to some Arctic waters.  
The legal nature of the OPOL agreement is a contractual arrangement by offshore installation 
operators (Bonfanti & Jacur, 2014) and is based on the principle of a strict but limited liability. 
Membership of OPOL is a condition for the granting of a licence in the UK (Faure & Liu, 2017). 
Outside the UK, OPOL membership has declined as there is no regulatory duty to be a member 
in states such as Germany, France or Denmark (Faure & Liu, 2017). Presently, the total liability of 
an operator under OPOL is capped at 250 million USD per incident, with a requirement for 
members to “establish and maintain” financial responsibility to ensure that claims are met (Clause 
II 2c, OPOL), evidenced through insurance or self-insurance (Rochette et al., 2014). Claims to be 
considered as admissible include clean-up operations on shore or at sea, property damage, disposal 
costs of collected material, other losses which must be quantifiable, and which must result directly 
from the contamination. OPOL does not take away a claimant’s right to seek redress through the 
courts for losses exceeding the recoverable maximum, or those beyond the scope of the 
Agreement. 
A commendable feature of the OPOL regime is that it appears to demonstrate the industry’s 
commitment to make available adequate coverage of pollution damage. Again, if a member is 
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unable to meet its obligation due to insolvency, other members are obligated to contribute in 
proportion to the number of their offshore facilities at the time of the incident. This guarantees 
that funds are available to meet claims, thus, ensuring expeditious claims settlement and enhancing 
mutual risk sharing in the case of insolvency. Furthermore, the strict liability obligation means that 
there is no need to prove fault, and the fact that liability is channelled to the operator takes away 
the question of attribution of liability when claims are to be lodged. 
There are, however, limitations to OPOL. It is not a fund but a contractual arrangement to 
compensate losses where a member fails to meet its obligation (Hancock & Stone, 1982). It means 
that OPOL will not intervene where there is no insolvency. OPOL does not prevent a claimant 
from suing the operator for other types of damages (Faure & Liu, 2017). Its definition of direct 
loss or damage appears limited in scope. Whether damage caused to the environment falls under 
this definition is debateable (Rochette et al., 2014). Finally, OPOL’s liability limit pales in 
comparison with the extent of damage occasioned by the Deepwater Horizon incident in the Gulf 
of Mexico (Smith, 2011).  
Although the OPOL’s compensation limit is quite high, it may still be inadequate in the event of 
a major offshore catastrophe. However, it is unclear whether the industry will be willing to raise 
the limit to a point that assures adequate compensation. Recalling that the Arctic has a challenging 
environment and a fragile ecosystem, a major oil spill in its waters could result in huge damage. 
OPOL has not been tested, and the adequacy of its application in the Arctic may be questionable. 
Nevertheless, OPOL demonstrates a potential governing option for liability and compensation for 
E&P activities in the Arctic region, if expended or modelled upon. This is so as it was established 
by operators (Churchill, 2001). OPOL can be improved by increasing the limit of liability to cover 
a Macondo-type damage; setting up a fund to address claims in excess of the liability limit. Some 
OPOL “designated states” are also members of the Arctic Council, thus, the regime will not be 
entirely new to them.  
Creating a Regional Liability Regime  
Another possible solution is to create a legally binding Arctic-wide framework establishing a 
liability regime for the region similar to the 1977 CLEE. The CLEE is restricted to the coastal 
states of the North Sea, Baltic Sea and the northern parts of the Atlantic Ocean (Sands, 2003). It 
is based on strict but limited liability channelled to the operator. However, the operator could be 
exempted from liability where the damage was caused by an act of God or from a well abandoned 
for longer than 5 years (Churchill, 2001). The Convention applies to petroleum operations on the 
seabed and covers fixed and mobile facilities offshore. The Convention deals with accidental oil 
pollution emanating from the coastal state’s jurisdiction, damages suffered because of the spill and 
compensation payable. It imposes a requirement of mandatory insurance for operators. 
Under the CLEE regime, there is no provision for a supplementary fund. Yet, it allows states 
where the offshore facility is situated to prescribe higher or unlimited liability for pollution damage. 
It must be reminded that the CLEE has never entered into force. This can be explained by 
disagreements regarding the standard and limitation of liability; lack of political will on the part of 
states to agree on important aspects of the convention; the absence of a separate fund to provide 
compensation for claims in excess of the limit of liability; states interest in uniformity of laws as 
opposed to states interest in stricter regulations for offshore operations; and disagreements 
regarding the potential magnitude of risk involved, among other reasons (Dubais, 1977).  
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A look at the regime established by the CLEE reveals some serious shortcomings. The absence of 
a supplementary fund undermines the effectiveness of the regime where claims exceed the liability 
limit. The power of states to establish a higher limit of liability could create non-uniformity, 
contrary to the aim of harmonisation of rules and procedure as stated in the preamble of the 
Convention.  Again, the operators were required to maintain insurance or financial security as a 
cover for liability, however, states could independently determine the amount, type and terms of 
the insurance. This could result in non-uniformity as well. The CLEE was criticised for setting a 
low liability limit of 35 million SDR (Ibid.). 
However, all the obvious shortcomings of the CLEE model do not necessarily negate this 
approach in principle as a possible option for the Arctic. Intergovernmental environmental 
frameworks adopted at the regional level, albeit not in the area of civil liability for accidental 
damage, have shown significant advantages due to their legally binding character and uniformity 
of the regulatory approach.     
Conclusion 
The analysis of different options discussed above from the viewpoint of an optimal model to be 
used in the Artic region, reveals that the applicability of a liability and compensation regime for oil 
pollution damage from offshore E&P operations may depend on several key factors. A strict but 
limited liability is essential to facilitate prompt and adequate compensation for damage caused by 
E&P activities. It enables cost internalization, and guarantees compensation irrespective of 
operator’s fault, especially in the oil industry’s complex contracting chain. It is also the prescribed 
standard for ultra-hazardous and high-risk activities such as offshore E&P (ILC, 2003). The strict 
liability requirement should be balanced with a liability limit to encourage its acceptance by the 
industry and ensure the availability of insurance to operators. Legal certainty is guaranteed in the 
insurance market when liability is strict but limited (Faure, 2009). 
Again, liability should be channelled to the operator as it enables the victim to identify the 
responsible party for the purpose of compensation. This is so as the operator is the party that 
designs the well programme, interfaces with the government, and receives the long-term financial 
upside from the petroleum operation (Cameron, 2012). The operator could still contractually 
allocate risks to other participants during E&P operations. Furthermore, the regime should 
provide for compulsory insurance or evidence of financial security to guarantee claims payment. 
Offshore energy insurance is one of the prerequisite conditions for the development of an 
international regime on liability for pollution damage (Shaw, 2012).  
The choice of options in terms of the final legal shape of the possible liability regime is rather 
limited. On the one hand, one may consider developing a proper intergovernmental legal 
framework analogous to the CLEE. However, the failed attempt to create such a regime in the 
maritime area famous for a very high degree of cooperation among the coastal states concerned 
does not bode well for its success in a divided and politically controversial regime such as the 
Arctic Ocean. Thus, on the other hand, what is more feasible is to apply the OPOL or develop an 
OPOL-type mechanism. At present OPOL, as a voluntary compensation scheme, provides an 
adequate platform for remedial action by operators of offshore facilities in the event of a spill. One 
substantial advantage of this scheme is the fact that it already applies by some of the Arctic or sub-
Arctic countries. It will not be particularly hard to extend the territorial scope of the scheme to 
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other Arctic countries. Or, alternatively, one may contemplate the establishment of a similar 
compensation scheme for the Arctic waters exclusively. Either option has advantages and 
shortcomings, which require further deliberation.    
An additional tier of compensation in the form of a supplementary fund may also be considered 
at some point. It would provide a wider scope for settling claims, especially when the damage 
significantly exceeds the established limit. Its funding could come from the oil industry and states 
as they are stakeholders too. State contribution could be based on the amount of oil produced or 
well drilled in a given jurisdiction. The Arctic Council may hypothetically be entrusted with 
managing such a supplementary fund. The liability regime should be able to facilitate prompt and 
adequate compensation by removing barriers that may prevent recourse, considering the potential 
magnitude of the risk and taking a cue from the extent of damage caused by the Deepwater 
Horizon incident. 
The Arctic states should exercise the political will and commit to a regional regime that will be 
adequate to provide necessary guarantees to both public authorities and juridical and physical 
persons in the event of an oil spill. Accidental pollution associated with offshore E&P activities, 
including large-scale discharge of oil, creates a very high environmental risk. In the light of the 
Macondo incident in the Gulf of Mexico and the Montara spill in the Sea of Timor, the need for 
a regional regulatory framework designed to deal with liability issues, which arise from oil pollution 
damage caused by offshore E&P, is obvious. While there are possible options available to the 
Arctic states, the most realistic would be to develop an industry-wide framework, which would 
cover all operators engaged in offshore E&P in the Arctic. This regime could be modelled on a 
modified version of the OPOL scheme and other conventions discussed, taking into consideration 
their key positive features.  
The Arctic states should be able to harmonize their policies at the appropriate regional level, and 
develop regional rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures to address oil 
pollution from offshore facilities (Vinogradov, 2013). There have been suggestions to impose a 
moratorium on offshore activities until a strong civil liability regime, among other things, has been 
created in the Arctic (Johnstone, 2016). While this proposal may be viewed as extreme, there is 
indeed a need in a more vigorous cooperative effort to develop international law and adequate 
mechanisms to deal with the issue of liability and compensative on a regional level in the Arctic.  
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Arctic Oil & Gas Development: The Case of Greenland 
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Despite the fact that not a single barrel of Greenlandic oil was ever extracted, refined and consumed in or exported from 
Greenland, hydrocarbon has nevertheless played a significant role in contemporary economical, environmental, and political. 
discourses. Not least as a key political issue in Greenland as well as between Greenland and Denmark is the discourse about 
Greenland’s development from a colony to Self-Governance (2009) via status as a Danish county (1953) and Home Rule 
(1979). One of the article’s foci is how the discourse about and the gradual acknowledgement of the Greenlanders’ rights to the 
Greenland subsurface has been an important part of Greenlandic nation building. Furthermore, visions for an independent 
Greenland have been fuelled by the hopes for ‘a shortcut’ via discoveries of oil and gas that eventually could compensate for the 
Danish block grant and pave the way for an independent Greenland. In 2012 Greenland Self-Governance took over the full 
authority of mineral resources including oil and gas. 2012 was also the year following explorative drillings of eight wells that 
were all dry. The following years were characterised by a rapidly declining interest from the oil industry in developing hydrocarbon 
activities in Greenland waters and demonstrated Greenland’s dependency on the international market for oil. Greenland being 
part of a globalised world also became apparent when Greenland was confronted with, for instance, environmental concerns 
caused by Greenland’s wish to be an oil-producing country. Conflicting interests internationally were also reflected in the results 
based on a national survey on attitudes to, perceptions of as well as hopes and concerns related to oil development. Some results 
are presented in the article. 
 
 
Introduction 
The Greenland history of petroleum exploration activities dates back to the mid-1970s when the 
Danish state planned to initiate oil exploration. The plans were met by concerns by many 
Greenlanders not least because of the potential impacts on the natural environment, on marine 
mammals and fisheries and on traditional ways of living.  
Despite the lack of economic benefits from petroleum exploration activities so far, Greenlandic 
discourse about oil and gas is, however, significant in different ways – not least because future 
petroleum exploration activities to some are seen as potential drivers for economic self-sufficiency 
and thus developing a key precondition for Greenland being politically independent from 
Denmark and a sovereign state. 
The existence of a national oil and minerals strategy from 2014-2018 and the plans of the 
Greenland government to update the strategy despite the actual lack of interest from the large 
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international oil companies indicate that different government coalitions both have been and are 
determined to include petroleum exploration activities in their economic development strategies. 
At the same time there is a considerable public concern that petroleum exploration and possibly 
production in case of a discovery, especially in Arctic waters, might cause environmental disasters 
and disturbances to the marine environment. 
The article will focus on different aspects of Greenland’s oil and gas discourse over time including 
how the focus on oil and minerals has been a key element in Greenlandic nation building, 
Greenland’s oil and mineral strategies and economic development policies. It will further include 
some results from a Greenland public opinion research study focussing on perceptions, trust and 
important factors in decision making concerning petroleum exploration activities. 
Arctic Oil and Gas Experiences in Brief1  
The first Arctic oil field was developed in the Canadian Arctic at Norman Wells in the Mackenzie 
Valley in the 1920s, following which exploration was conducted in Alaska, the Canadian and the 
Russian Arctic. Several decades passed, however, until commercial production started in other 
parts of the Arctic as for instance in the Timan-Pechora Basin in the Russian North; the North 
Slope in northern Alaska (since 1974); Northwest Territories/Yukon in the Canadian Arctic and 
offshore Norway (the Norwegian Sea and since 2015 the Barents Sea) (AMAP, 2010: 2_13-2_172).  
Most Arctic regions have, for a shorter or longer period of time, been affected by petroleum 
activities; but not necessarily the whole process from exploration to production. In addition the 
preparatory processes vary between states, countries, and regions but often include public 
information meetings, hearings or consultation processes based on different kinds of reviews such 
as environmental and social impact assessments.  
Whereas Denmark has been an oil producing country since the 1970s, neither of the Arctic parts 
of the Danish Kingdom, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, have experiences with petroleum 
activities beyond oil exploration. The Faroe Islands had a number of exploration drilling activities 
offshore in the first decade of the 21st century (Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, 2011). 
Greenland has had offshore exploration drilling activities in the 1970’s and most recently in 2010 
and 2011 in the Davis Strait between Greenland and Canada. Furthermore, onshore explorations 
have been carried through in Central East Greenland in the 1980s. Neither of the exploration 
drilling activities, however, led to discovery of hydrocarbons at any commercially viable scale. 
Hydrocarbon Exploration in Greenland: Early Days2 
Hydrocarbon exploration in Greenland dates back to 1939 where the interest was focused on the 
Nuussuaq Peninsula. The interest in the Nuussuaq Peninsula and Disko Island region, onshore as 
well as offshore, has remained and manifested in a number of geological exploration campaigns 
including seismic acquisition, mapping and exploration drillings (1966-1978 and 1993-2000). 
Since the late 1960s a number of fieldwork and core drilling activities have been carried out to 
develop relevant geo-information related to, for instance seabed features and petroleum systems 
to expand the knowledge and understanding of the Greenland petroleum geology. These activities 
have been carried out primarily (but not solely) by the Geological Survey of Greenland 
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(GSGU)/the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland (GEUS)3 to stimulate the interest of 
the oil and gas industry. 
The 1970s: Hydrocarbons and Home Rule 
Rights to the Greenland Subsurface: Mineral Resources Including Hydrocarbon –  
A Key Political Controversy Unsolved in the Act of Home Rule 
 
The ownership of and the rights to ‘mineral resources’ (including both oil and gas, gemstones and 
other minerals) has, since the 1970’s, been a prominent theme in all discussions about Greenland’s 
road towards still more economic and political self-determination and in the political movement 
towards Greenland Home Rule it is fair to say that this controversy was a significant driver in its 
own right. 
The judicial point of departure was a Royal Decree from 19354 stating that ‘All mineral resources 
in Greenland belong to the State’. The Legal Act of Mining that substituted the Royal Decree in 
1965 contained the same wording (Nielsen & Larsen, 1985). 
In 1975 the Danish state granted licenses to explorative drillings5 on the fishing grounds off and 
north of Sisimiut. This led to protests because of concern that the environment might suffer from 
exploration activities. Protests also included an occupation of the Ministry of Greenland Affairs in 
Copenhagen by ‘Unge Grønlænderes Råd’ (the Association of young Greenlanders) as the young 
Greenlanders feared that the Danish state might profit from a potential oil development at the 
expense of Greenland (Sejersen, 2014: 17). 1975 was also an election year and in both the Danish 
Parliament and the Greenland provincial council election campaigns, the property rights to the 
subsurface was in focus (Sejersen, 2014: 63). 
A unanimous decision by the Greenland provincial council in 1975 following the election stated 
that the Greenland subsurface should belong to the permanent residents of Greenland. This 
decision was targeted at the discussions of the, then recently (October 1975), established joint 
Danish-Greenlandic Home Rule Commission (Skydsbjerg 1999; Frandsen et al., 2017) 
The Danish position on the ownership to the subsurface was made perfectly clear by the Danish 
Premier, Anker Jørgensen who, in an interview with Greenland Broadcasting in 1976, indicated 
that having the title/proprietary rights to the Greenland subsurface/subsoil would mean a 
definitive split between Greenland and Denmark and, following, that Greenland would have to 
become economically self-sufficient (ibid.). The Danish stance was – at least partly – based on the 
expectation that mineral resource earnings might eventually result in compensating the Danish 
state part of the expenses related to Greenland.6 Furthermore, there was a hope that oil discoveries 
in or around Greenland might contribute to the Danish energy consumption.7  
The Greenland position was not least based on the quest for being economically self-reliant as a 
means of becoming more politically independent and the struggle can be seen as an important part 
of the Greenland nation-building. 
The disagreement was discussed at length in the Commission concluding that ‘(t)he resident 
population of Greenland has fundamental rights to Greenland’s natural resources.’ (Act No. 577, 
1978: Section 8, 1).8 This wording was a compromise as the Greenland delegation in the 
commission had strongly argued for a wording stressing ‘… the fundamental rights …’ (author’s 
accentuation) (Dahl 1986: 91-92; Nielsen & Larsen, 1985: 100). 
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The Commission report stated, however, that the term ‘fundamental rights’ was merely a 
declaration of political principles than based on a judicial foundation (Frandsen et al., 2017; 
Kommissionen om hjemmestyre i Grønland, 1978: bind l: 107) and according to Nielsen and 
Larsen the chairman of the commission later emphasized that the wording had a moral but hardly 
a judicial content (Nielsen & Larsen, 1985: 100). 
This compromise, concluding the, probably, most complicated and conflictual part of the Home 
Rule Commission’s negotiations, was – as a part of the Home Rule Act – adopted by the Danish 
Parliament in 1978 and by a Greenland referendum in 1979 whereas all other aspects related to 
mineral resources in Greenland including rules of procedure, political decisions, and 
administration was regulated in legislation decided by the Danish Parliament.9 
The significance of the mineral resource discourse in the 1970s – not least based on the on-going 
debates about the power to grant oil exploration licenses and the potential environmental impacts 
on marine resources – was also mirrored in the formation of Greenland parties in the process 
towards the establishment of Home Rule. Three political parties were founded: Siumut (a social 
democratic party) in 1977, Atassut (a liberal conservative party), and Inuit Ataqatigiit (IA) (a 
socialist oriented party) both founded in 1978. The latter of the parties, Inuit Ataqatigiit (IA) 
advocated for a self-reliant and independent Greenland but campaigned against the Home Rule 
arrangement because the rights of the people of Greenland to the subsurface/subsoil was not 
recognised (Skydsbjerg, 1999). 
Whereas the Greenland Home Rule Act did not meet the demand for Greenland’s right to the 
subsurface the acknowledgement of ‘fundamental rights’ and the establishment of a Joint (Danish-
Greenland) committee on Mineral Resources in Greenland10 might be perceived as ‘a step forward’. 
The appointment of a ‘Joint Committee’ might also be seen as, to some degree, complying with 
Greenland claims, despite, as emphasized by Dahl, there was still an asymmetric balance of power 
as the advisory institutions and administrative capacities were all located in Copenhagen (Dahl, 
1986: 120). 
Apart from the basic demand for the ‘right to the Greenland subsurface’ several overall problems 
were in focus in the decades following the introduction of Home Rule including the prospect for 
Greenland to govern and influence the hydrocarbon policy – including the economic activities 
ensuring that Greenland society would benefit economically. Furthermore, monitoring, inspection, 
and safety issues were prominent in the public discourse (Nielsen & Larsen, 1985; Sejersen, 2014: 
20-21). 
 Hydrocarbon Exploration Including Drilling Activities in the 1970s 
In 1969 the Danish government appointed an advisory commission on hydrocarbon licensing. The 
commission delivered its report ‘The report of the commission on hydrocarbon licensing’ 
including a ‘model concession’ for oil and gas. The conclusions and recommendations of the report 
led to rewarding 13 exploration licenses offshore Southern West Greenland to six groups of 
companies (19 non-Danish companies (including major oil companies such as Chevron, BP, Mobil 
and Gulf) and one Danish Consortium) (AG Ekstra, 1975: 7).   
The exploration was not least based on pilot studies conducted between 1969 and 1972 on the 
offshore of Greenland’s west coast and concluded in five deep drillings. The five wells were drilled 
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in 1976 and 1977 in the Davis Strait south of the Disko Island between Maniitsoq and Aasiaat. As 
all five wells were dry the licenses were surrendered in 1979 (Henriksen, 2008: 238-39; 2015: 64-
65). Figure 1 shows a ‘Timeline’ with key hydrocarbon related activities including granting of 
licenses and drilling campaigns in Greenland in the period 1975 – 2013. 
Figure 1: Timeline – hydrocarbon related activities including granting of licenses and drilling campaigns. 
Greenland 1975 – 2013 
 
 
 
Source: Nunaoil (2013). Annual Report.  
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Environmental Concerns: Before and After the Introduction of Greenland 
Home Rule and Beyond 
As mentioned above the petroleum exploration drilling campaign offshore West Greenland in the 
mid-1970s had raised environmental concerns. These concerns were substantiated when the USN 
tanker Potomac on August 5, 1977 hit a small iceberg and leaked about 380 tons of heavy fuel into 
the Melville Bay, 100 km south of Savissivik.11 The local hunters in Avanersuaq reported declining 
seal catches and marine animals soiled by oil and the hunters thus sued the Potomac but got no 
compensation12 (Fægteborg, 2013: 86). 
The Potomac incidence influenced the resistance to the Arctic Pilot Project (APP)13, a proposal to 
ship liquefied natural gas (LNG) in ice breaking super tankers from Lancaster Sound in Northern 
Canada through Melville Bay and Davis Strait to North American markets. The concerns were 
both related to potential leakages and the impacts on the marine mammals from the level of noise 
produced by the vessels. Furthermore, the disturbance that would be caused by the vessels when 
sailing through the waters where the hunters hunted marine mammals and fished was of major 
concern. Not only the hunters perceived the APP as a threat to their living conditions and the 
traditional livelihood of the citizens and communities of northern Greenland. The governments 
of both Greenland and Denmark also opposed the project and while environmental hearings of 
the “northern component proceeded … the project proponents withdrew the project from the 
regulatory process” (Heginbottom, 2018). According to both Heginbottom (2018) and Fægteborg 
(2013: 87) the most likely reason for abandoning the APP was, however, the drop in the world 
market prices on natural gas. 
Sailing and navigating in the waters of East Greenland is generally perceived to be as challenging 
as sailing and navigating in the Baffin Bay. It thus came as a surprise to many Greenlanders that 
Atlantic Richfield Corporation (ARCO) was granted an exploration license (onshore) in East 
Greenland in 1985, as the large vessels would have to go through icy waters to and from the 
exploration site (Fægteborg, 2013: 88). At the same time the exploration activities meant a positive 
economic impact to a number of households and individuals as well as to the municipality of 
Ittoqqortoormiit (Scoresbysund) (Larsen, 1989). 
Environmental concerns has played and still plays a significant role in the Greenland discourse 
about mineral exploration and exploitation in general and not least in relation to hydrocarbon 
activities. As this theme is not the main focus of the article, just one example will be mentioned. 
Therefore the discourse related to environmental and social impacts assessments, will not be dealt 
with (see e.g. Olsen & Hansen 2014; Hansen 2016; Hansen & Johnstone 2018) and neither will 
the debates on, for instance, the use of chemicals in explorative drillings.  
Particularly when there is a risk that explorative activities impact local or regional marine mammals 
and/or fish negatively and thus threaten hunting and fishing and ultimately a way of life, concerns 
have been raised. This has for example been the case in the Baffin Bay where a consortium led by 
Shell has carried out a series of seismic site surveys in 2012-2014, some of which overlapped with 
the narwhal protection zone. After these surveys had finished, hunters from Melville Bay 
communities reported that narwhal behaviour was different and that the hunt had been influenced 
negatively due to the seismic activities in the area.  
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Marine biologists and hunters in Greenland have also begun to express concern over the possible 
effects of intense seismic survey activities and increased shipping on marine mammals and the 
future of hunting communities, and are calling for long-term monitoring programmes to be put in 
place (see e.g. Heide-Jørgensen et al. 2013a). There are concerns that seismic noise affects 
narwhals, particularly increasing the possibility of ice entrapment (Heide-Jørgensen et al., 2013b). 
Home Rule in Action: 1979-2009 
Gradual Devolution of Administrative Power to Greenland Authorities and the 
Establishment of a National Oil Company for Greenland 
During the Home Rule period a number of agreements between the Greenland and the Danish 
governments resulted in changed legislation implying for instance 50% of all revenues from 
mineral activities to the Home Rule government14 and a gradual devolution of administrative 
power and facilitating Greenland’s development of expertise illustrated by the foundation of 
NUNAOIL A/S in 1985 and moving the company to Nuuk, Greenland in 1992: “NUNAOIL 
A/S is responsible for Greenland’s Government’s participation in hydrocarbon licenses as well as 
tasks in and outside Greenland which are naturally connected to this.”15 
NUNAOIL A/S is thus Greenland’s national oil company and is a carried partner in the 
exploration phase in all hydrocarbon licenses in Greenland with an ownership interest in the 
licenses varying from 6.25% to 12.5%: “NUNAOIL participates in the exploration licenses on 
behalf of Namminersorlutik Oqartussat (the Government of Greenland) and collaborates with 
various international oil companies on the exploration of commercial deposits of oil and gas in 
Greenland”.16 
Furthermore, the administration of mineral resources (Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum) and the 
authority to grant licenses17 was transferred to Greenland in 1998. This gradual devolution of 
administrative power to Greenland authorities strengthened the Greenland self-confidence and 
thus contributed to the nation-building process paving the way for Greenland’s ambitions of 
acknowledgement of the subsurface rights. 
Hydrocarbon Exploration Including Drilling Activities in the Home Rule 
Period 
To revitalise the interest of the oil and gas industry following the decline of exploration activities 
because of, not least, the five dry wells in 1976 and 1977, a number of activities were initiated from 
the mid 1990s and onwards. One of the most significant was the so-called KANUMAS (Kalaallit 
Nunaat Marine Seismic – Kalaallit Nunaat is Greenlandic for Greenland) project. The overall goal 
of KANUMAS was to acquire 22,000 line km of new marine seismic data offshore East, Northeast 
and Northwest Greenland and re-examine 8,000 line km of seismic data from West Greenland. 
The project was politically upheld in 1989. Nunaoil was granted an exploration license as a carried 
partner in a consortium including six oil companies: BP, Exxon, Japan National Oil Company, 
Shell, Statoil and Texaco that financed the project. The seismic surveys conducted for the 
KANUMAS project between 1990 and 1996 have provided data for the licensing rounds in 2010 
and 2012-201318 (Henriksen, 2008: 241, 2015: 131-133). 
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In 1993 the Geological Survey of Greenland conducted an onshore stratigraphic drilling at Marrat 
Killiit on the Nuussuaq Peninsula, finding traces of oil. Following this discovery, GrønArctic 
Energy Inc. carried out four onshore exploration drillings on the Nuussuaq Peninsula in 1995 and 
1996 (Henriksen, 2015: 64).  
Map 1: Explorative hydrocarbon drillings (15) in Greenland 1975-2011. 
 
Source: Government of Greenland, Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum, 2011:  
https://www.govmin.gl/en/images/Documents/UulexNewsletter/2011Uulex02.pdf. 
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Hydrocarbons and Self-Governance: 2009 to 2013 
Greenland’s Move to Self-Governance and Responsibilities over Hydrocarbon 
Development 
As the Home Rule Act was exhausted (the original goals had been reached) at the beginning of the 
new millennium a political process towards further Greenland self-determination was initiated. A 
Greenland Commission on Self-Government19 prepared a report that became a point of departure 
for a joint Greenland-Danish Self-Government Commission.20 The efforts of the joint 
commission resulted in the Act on Greenland Self-Government that was set into effect June 21, 
2009.21 
Mineral resource rights were high on the agenda in the work of both the Greenland and the joint 
Commission and among the more prominent achievements for the Greenlanders, following more 
than 30 years of disagreement with the former colonial power, the Greenlanders’ subsurface rights 
were acknowledged22 (Explanatory notes to the Mineral Resources Act, 2009). 
The Act on Greenland Self-Government listed a number of fields of responsibility that the 
Greenland Self-Government authorities could decide to assume responsibility over. The ‘mineral 
resource area’ was – as the first field of responsibility according to the Self-Government Act – 
transferred to the Greenland Self-Government on January 1, 2010 as the Inatsisartut (Parliament 
of Greenland) Act no. 7 of December 7, 2008 on mineral resources and related activities (the 
Mineral Resources Act) came into force.23 Finally, Greenland’s subsurface rights were recognised 
and the implications were that the Greenland Self-Government now had the legislative as well as 
the executive power within the mineral resource area, which included the right to control 
Greenland’s hydrocarbon potential Greenland-Danish Self-government Commission 2008: 193-
194).24 A cornerstone was thus established in the process of nation building.  
Mapping Greenland’s petroleum systems and making seismic and other relevant data accessible to 
the petroleum industry has increasingly been accompanied and promoted by the public authorities. 
Not least the establishment of the Greenland Home Rule in 1979 and the gradual transfer of 
administrative powers25, knowledge and eventually also the decision making power which 
happened as a continuation of the introduction of Greenland Self Governance in 200926 has been 
followed by initiatives – including national oil and mineral strategies (Greenland government, 2009; 
2014) and a number of licensing rounds – to attract interest and eventually investments from major 
international oil companies. 
The 2009-2013 Coalition Government and its Strategy Documents 
The optimism generated27 is illustrated by a few examples of how different aspects and the 
significance of potential mining and hydrocarbon development was portrayed in government 
documents such as government coalition agreements, the hydrocarbons strategy (Government of 
Greenland, 2009) and in interviews as well as in a number of well-attended conferences in 
Greenland.28  
In the coalition agreement, signed less than two weeks before the introduction of self-governance, 
the three parties agreed that: 
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The prospect of globally rising prices for minerals and fossil fuels has reinvigorated the possibilities 
of exploiting our non-living resources whose economic reach can be very high. Therefore, it is very 
important that Naalakkersuisut's (Government of Greenland’s) mineral exploration policy is closely 
coordinated with business policy, labour market policy, environmental policy, education policy, 
language policy and integration policy (Government of Greenland, 2009b: 16) (author’s translation). 
A Hydrocarbons Strategy (Hydrocarbons Strategy 2009) was published in December 2009 stating, 
among other things, that  
(t)here is broad political consensus in Greenland to work towards developing the mineral resources 
sector into a sustainable industry which will make positive contributions to economic development 
and create new jobs. The objectives are an important part of the long-term economic policy to 
support development of alternative business sectors to fisheries, partly with the goal to reduce the 
large current dependence on the annual block grant from Denmark (Government of Greenland, 
2009a: 5). 
This is one of several examples that the mineral resource sector including hydrocarbon activities 
potentially providing the necessary future economic foundation is perceived as an important 
precondition in the continued Greenland nation building.  
Parallel to stating that “hydrocarbon activities should be promoted aiming at increasing 
employment and earnings” (Government of Greenland, 2009a: 5) in political documents, strategies 
and interviews it was most often also emphasized that oil and gas activities should be “carried out 
safely and with due consideration for the environment. The Arctic environment is vulnerable, and 
the Greenland commercial basis and culture is very much linked to nature and the environment” 
(ibid.) and furthermore, that ensuring “the direct contributory influence and involvement of the 
population in decision-making processes” (ibid.: 16) (author’s translation) was important. 
The political coalition governing Greenland from 2009 to 2013 further elaborated on its political 
goals and issued a joint vision named ‘Our Future – the responsibility of you and me – on the way 
towards 2025’.29 On developing hydrocarbon activities a number of initiatives – including ‘stable 
framework conditions’, ‘comparison and adaptation of taxation systems in relation to other 
relevant countries’, ‘efforts to increase corporate and employee competencies’ “together with the 
conducting of new licensing rounds every 2 to 3 years, will ensure that investment in oil and gas 
exploration is maintained at a high level in order to promote the possibility of a commercial oil 
and gas fund being made by 2025” (ibid.: 22). It was further added that direct impacts would not 
be manifest until after 2025 as no economically interesting discoveries had yet been found (Idem.). 
In an interview, January 11, 2011 under the heading: ‘Greenland steps up its independence calls as 
oil ambitions grow’, Kuupik Kleist (Prime Minister of Greenland 2009-2013) said:  
The recent discoveries of possible findings of oil have increased the debate on the issue of 
independence. It is a goal and every day we are coming closer to that (and he added) “If everything 
goes as we wish, 5-10 years would probably be the time table for oil production to start” (Stigset, 
January 11, 2011). 
A more in-depth interview30 with Premier Kleist under the heading ‘Greenland is NOT for sale’ 
(Greenland Oil and Minerals, 2011) added, however, nuances to the optimism:  
Fast wealth brings lots of risks. Not only with regard to the environment, but also with regard to an 
influx of foreign workers. You only have to take a look around the world to see how bad things can 
turn out. Multinational companies in the oil and mineral business like to try to influence political 
decisions. We are already finding that companies are trying to gain sway by influencing the public in 
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general, so it is important that we are ready, should Greenland become an oil and mineral nation. 
And there is fortunately wide political agreement about how we should prepare for this (Greenland 
Oil and Minerals, 2011). 
Premier Kleist also addressed the potential economic implications emphasising that, 
“(…) an economic boost would make Greenland less financially dependent on the dominating 
fishing industry and on the annual block subsidy of more than DKK 3.4 billion from Denmark. 
With increased revenue from, e.g. the oil industry we would have more resources to develop and 
improve a series of social concerns, including raising the standard of living where necessary. But 
it is important that this takes place through an economic model we can handle” and Kleist further 
stated that “like the Norwegians, we will place the money in an oil fund and only use the interest 
the capital earns (Greenland Oil and Minerals, 2011). 
Mineral Resource – Including Hydrocarbon – Activities: Intensified Initiatives  
In several ways 2009 and the following years became epoch-making years for Greenland, not least 
because of: 
• The introduction of Greenland Self-Governance and the optimism based on this next step in 
Greenland’s road towards still more political autonomy and even sketching the road map 
towards independence; 
• A general election that resulted in a political regime change just a few months before Self-
Governance became a reality, as a coalition between the left-wing party (Inuit Ataqatigiit, IA), 
the social liberal party (Demokraatit) and a centre party (Katusseqatigiit Partiat) formed the 
government for the period 2009-2013. 
Also in relation to minerals – especially hydrocarbons – marked changes occurred 
• A Hydrocarbons Strategy 2009 was released in December 2009. 
• Greenland assumed full responsibility for the minerals including hydrocarbon, January 1, 
2010.31 
• The number of active exploration and exploitation hydrocarbon licenses increased from 2 in 
2007 to 13 in the period 2008-2010 and 20 in 2011. 
• The Scottish oil company Cairn Energy conducted 3 explorative offshore drillings in 2010 and 
further 5 in 2011. 
Both the Greenland Hydrocarbon strategy 2009 (Government of Greenland 2009a) and the Arctic 
strategy of the Danish Kingdom (Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands, 2011: 24), jointly 
developed by Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands in 2011 are generally optimistic when it 
comes to both oil and gas and mineral activities. The expectations to hydrocarbon activities in 
Greenland was based partly on a number of successful licensing rounds and not least on the United 
States Geological Survey’s (USGS) assessment for yet unproven oil and gas resources in Greenland 
territorial waters: 31 billion barrels of oil and gas off the coast of Northeast Greenland and 17 
billion barrels of oil and gas in areas west of Greenland and east of Canada could be discovered 
(Government of Greenland, 2009a; Bird et al., 2008) 
In the drilling seasons of 2010 and 2011 the Scottish oil company, Cairn Energy spent roughly 5 
billion DKK (573 million USD) on drilling 8 exploration wells in the Davis Strait between 
Greenland and Canada bringing the total number of drillings in Greenland since 1975 up to a total 
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of 15.32 The eight exploration drillings, however, did not find a sufficient amount of hydrocarbon 
to develop any of the drillings to production. The Greenland government maintained its optimism, 
and in Greenland’s oil and mineral strategy 2014-2018 one of the statements is: “Based on the 
current assumptions, the establishment of two oil fields – a 500m barrel field from 2020 and a 2bn 
barrel field from 2025 – would generate more than DKK 435bn to the Mineral Resources Fund33 
until 2060” (Government of Greenland 2014:8).34 For several reasons, however, this projection 
did not come true, as the only exploration activities in recent years have been stratigraphic drilling 
campaigns in the Baffin Bay by a consortium with Shell as operator. (NUNAOIL Annual Reports, 
2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017).  
Exploration activities, offshore as well as onshore, have generally been set on hold, and all licenses 
in North and West Greenland have been relinquished or are under relinquishment, primarily 
because of the decrease in world market oil prices35, that only recently (since December 2017) have 
increased to a level above $60. Figure 2 (Holmgreen & Ronnle, 2012) and Figure 3 (NUNAOIL, 
2014) illustrate the development of world market prices and hydrocarbon exploration drillings in 
Greenland and seismic testing respectively. Both figures indicate a close relationship between the 
petroleum industry’s commercial interest in Greenland and the development of crude oil price. 
Interviews with oil company executives and market analysts confirm this relationship and further 
point to the generally high operating costs in Greenland (see e.g. Lindkvist 2015 and McGwin 
2016) as well in other parts of the Arctic.36 In an interview in 2016 when Statoil, GDF Suez and 
Dong hand recently surrendered their Baffin Bay licences, Roy Ledholm, a ConocoPhillips 
executive and head of GOIA (Greenland Oil Industry Association) was less pessimistic about long 
term perspectives for Greenland as an oil-producing country but specified that “Clearly the drop 
in the oil prices entails very real challenges for the industry. Choices have not become easier and 
companies will indeed only move to drilling in Greenland if the opportunities are competitive 
within their global portfolios” (McGwin 2016: 20-21).  
To some analysts the changed political attitude towards issuing licenses that was reflected in the 
Coalition Agreement of March, 26, 2013 between Siumut, Atassut and Partii Inuit: “Exploration 
and extraction permits in the field of hydro-carbons are in force, though further permits will be 
granted reluctantly” further created an uncertainty among the oil companies (see Nyvold 2014: 
32-33).  
Another, and contributing, reason to the hesitance from the oil industry seems to be the increased 
international concern about the environmental risks accompanying oil and gas activities in Arctic 
waters. One of the world’s largest oil companies, Total, which in 1976 was among the first 
companies to drill off the coast of West Greenland warned in an interview in Financial Times 
(September 25, 2012) against Arctic offshore drilling for oil:  
“Christophe de Margerie, Total’s chief executive, told the Financial Times the risk of an oil spill in 
such an environmentally sensitive area was simply too high. “Oil on Greenland would be a 
disaster,” he said in an interview. “A leak would do too much damage to the image of the 
company” (Chazan September 25, 2012). 
Total thus surrendered its licenses. The other licensees did not go that far but Mærsk oil, as an 
example, emphasized the significance of ‘environmental challenges’. When asked about Mærsk 
Oil’s future Greenland exploration activities, the company’s Global Head of Exploration, Lars 
Nydahl Jørgensen, stressed that the company’s decision would be based on two things: “… how 
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attractive it looks in terms of exploration. Secondly, we need to be absolutely convinced that we 
can control any environmental challenges, which may arise” (Nyvold 2013: 43). 
Figure 2: Number of wells drilled in Greenland 1975-2011 and real oil prices (USD/barrel) 1930-2011. 
 
Source: Holmgreen & Ronnle, 2012 
The International Petroleum Context 
The international ‘petroleum context’ in which the abovementioned took place was characterised 
by a number of events and developments that affected international oil companies’ interest in the 
Arctic and not least the Greenland hydrocarbon potential – to mention just a few important 
occurrences: 
• In 2008 the U.S. Geological Survey (Bird et al., 2008) announced its projections of the 
undiscovered technically recoverable resources in the Arctic. According to the USGS the sea 
North East of Greenland holds more than 30 billion barrels of oil equivalent and the 
subsurface under the waters between Canada and Greenland hold 17 billion barrels of oil 
equivalent (Bird et al., 2008). 
• Oil prices peaked in the years 2011-14 reaching, in these years, and going beyond the 100 USD 
a barrel crude oil level (see Figure 3).  
Attitudes Toward Natural Resource Development and the Marine Environment:  
A 2013 Greenland Public Opinion Study Focusing on Oil and Gas Development 
 
In September and October of 2013 – roughly six months after an election that once again handed 
over the majority to a Siumut (social democratic) led government – a telephone survey, 
representative of the Greenland population was conducted among adults age 17 and above.37 
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Figure 3: Seismic surveys in East and West Greenland 1970-2014 and the world market oil prices (USD/ 
barrel) 
 
Source: NUNAOIL Annual Report 2014: 10 
The focus of the survey was ‘attitudes towards natural resource development and the marine 
environment’ and the overall topic was approached via 14 questions about perceptions, views, and 
attitudes related to for instance the significance of oil and gas development in the waters around 
Greenland. 
Some of the main findings will be presented and discussed below (the number of the question in 
the questionnaire is noted in brackets). 
The telephone survey was conducted at a time when a new political coalition had come into power 
and had agreed upon limitations in the license policy: “Exploration and extraction permits in the 
field of hydro-carbons are in force, though further permits will be granted reluctantly” (Greenland 
government, 2013: 11-12).38 It was two years since Cairn Energy carried through the company’s 
final explorative drillings, and the price of crude oil was still more than 100 USD/barrel prices.  
A few of the overall findings from the survey – not all unequivocal – can be summarized in the 
following statements: 
• A majority finds oil and gas development important to the economic future of Greenland; 
• A majority also finds that in the long run most or all Greenlanders would benefit from 
petroleum development;  
• Half of the adult population agreed that ‘economic growth should be a priority for Greenland, 
even if we have to take some environmental risks’. 
• Two thirds of the Greenlanders considered oil spills to be the biggest threat to Greenland 
waters; 
• Almost all agree that Greenlanders are a people with a powerful connection to the sea. 
Whereas a telephone survey does not necessarily give answers to the reasons why – at least at first 
glance – some perceptions, attitudes and points of view seem conflicting, some of the answers 
might contribute to a more in-depth understanding of the mixed concerns and expectations of the 
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Greenlanders and, following, challenges to the Greenland politicians and other decision makers 
when it comes to strategic as well as short-term decisions about oil and gas development.  
Answers to the question about “factors to consider when making decisions about oil development 
in Greenland” illustrate some of the conflicting goals among Greenlanders. Almost all – including 
the majority that finds offshore drilling very or fairly risky and the majority that prioritises 
“economic growth for Greenland, even if we have to take some environmental risks”  – find that 
“Protecting long-term health and well-being of communities” as well as “Protecting nature and 
the environment” ‘matters a lot’ (89 and 87 per cent respectively) and no one finds that it does not 
matter at all.  
All in all, survey results stating some of the hopes, concerns, dilemmas and potential 
inconsistencies among the general public towards hydrocarbon activities that have been and still 
are part of the political discourse in Greenland and with stakeholders outside Greenland. 
Declining Crude Oil Prices, Environmental Concerns and Diminishing 
Interest from the Petroleum Industry: 2013 to Present 
Coalition Agreements/Government Policy 2013 - 2018 
Four government coalitions39 – all led by Siumut (the social democratic party) – have been in power 
since the 2009-2013 coalition and all coalition agreements have contained sections on oil and 
minerals focussing primarily on framework conditions for the minerals resource sector, 
environmental considerations and ensuring inclusion of and benefits to local communities 
(Government of Greenland 2013; 2014a; 2016; 2018).  
The coalition agreement from 2013 stated that “(e)xploration and exploitation permits in the field 
of hydro-carbons are in force, though further permits will be granted reluctantly” (Government 
of Greenland 2013: 12). A combination of eight dry wells in Cairn Energy’s 2010-2011 campaign 
– or at best – discoveries that were not commercially viable, decreasing world market prices on oil, 
and concerns, internationally, because of the extraordinary risks as well as costs conducting oil 
explorations in Arctic waters led to a markedly decline in interest from the petroleum industry in 
applying for new licenses.  
Despite the declining interest from the petroleum industry, the Greenland Oil and Mineral Strategy 
2014-2018 was still – and not least seen in retrospect – (overly) optimistic, as the oil price level 
plummeted in the second half of 2014.40 The Oil and Mineral Strategy assumed that “(b)ased on 
the current assumptions, the establishment of two oil fields – a 500m barrel field from 2020 and a 
2bn barrel field from 2025 – would generate more than DKK 435bn to the Mineral Resources 
Fund until 2060” (Government of Greenland, 2014b: 8).41 
Since the Greenland Oil and Mineral Strategy was published exploration and extraction licenses 
have been surrendered to the Greenland authorities resulting in just seven active exploration and 
extraction licenses for hydrocarbon – all in East or North East Greenland (status: June 2018).42  
In an article from June 7, 2017 entitled ‘Last oil company exits West Greenland’ the Greenland 
newspaper AG quoted Deputy Minister for Minerals and Petroleum Jørgen Hammeken-Holm as 
saying that Cairn Energy as the last oil company had surrendered its licenses on the Greenland 
West Coast following major former licensees such as Shell, Maersk Oil, ConocoPhillips, Statoil, 
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Dong and GDF Suez. In the article it was further stated that the only remaining active licenses 
were five offshore blocks in North East Greenland and an onshore on Jameson Land in East 
Greenland. (AG June 7, 2017: 12).43 The active licenses are included in Map 2 below. 
Map 2 
 
Source: Nunaoil Annual Report 2017 
Current Status of Petroleum Licenses and Hydrocarbon Initiatives 
The current status (June 2018)44 of petroleum exploration, exploitation and prospecting licenses 
according to the Greenland Bureau of Minerals and Petroleum is listed below: 
Petroleum exploration and exploitation licenses (exclusive) for hydrocarbons: 
• 6 offshore licenses in North and North West Greenland (surrender is on-going) 
• 5 offshore licenses in North East Greenland (see MAP 2) 
(the following companies are licensees (with number of licenses): ENI Denmark BV (2); 
BP Exploration Operating Company Ltd. (2); DONG E&P Grønland A/S (1); Statoil 
Greenland A/S (1); Chevron East Greenland Exploration A/S (2); Greenland Petroleum 
Exploration Co. Ltd. (2); Shell Greenland A/S (2); and Nuna Oil (5) as a carried 
partner.45 
• 2 onshore licenses in East Greenland (see Map 3 below) 
(Licensees: Greenland Gas and Oil A/S & Nuna Oil A/S)46 
Petroleum prospecting licenses (non-exclusive) for hydrocarbons: 
• 8 offshore licenses (North Greenland (3); West Greenland (3); North Greenland (2) 
• 2 onshore licenses (East Greenland) 
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Map 3 
 
Source: Nunaoil Annual Report 2017 
One of the more manifest consequences of the decline in the interest from the international 
petroleum industry has been a reduction in 2017 in the staff as well as in the number of board 
members in the national Greenland oil company NUNAOIL A/S. 
When the recently elected Naalakkersuisut (government) came into office (May 2018) the 
administration and management of hydrocarbons was separated from the administration and 
management of minerals into two departments. No explicit arguments for the separation have yet 
been shared publicly. The newly published draft Budget for 2019 states, however, that 
‘Naalakkersuisut, the Greenland Government, has decided to increase focus on the hydrocarbon 
field (oil and gas) to make the hydrocarbon field an economic potential for Greenland. Therefore 
48 million DKK is included in the budget to fund, among other things, acquisition of data’ 
(Government of Greenland 2018: 486).  
The former government planned to update and publish an Oil and Mineral strategy 2019-2023. It 
is expected that an oil strategy 2019-2023 is going to be developed to reinforce hydrocarbon 
activities. 
 A Digression on the Danish Block Grant & Other Danish State Expenditures in
 Greenland 
One of the core figures in the discourse on ‘how far is Greenland to be economically self-sufficient’ 
is the Danish block grant that annually is transferred to the Government of Greenland.47 The block 
grant amounted in 2017 to 3.7 billion DKK (equal to roughly 500 million EUR, July 10, 2018). 
Furthermore, the Danish state has expenditures in Greenland on non-transferred activities 
amounted to roughly 600 million DKK (equal to roughly 80 million EUR, July 10, 2018). A total 
of 4.3 billion DKK (equal to roughly 580 million EUR, July 10, 2018) is the annual Danish 
spending and thus the amount Greenland would have to earn to compensate the block grant and 
the transfers to become economically independent. Figure 4 shows the total Danish state 
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expenditure as part of Greenland’s GDP and thus the development in dependency, economically. 
The overall trend is a decreasing dependency rate not least because of an increased Greenland 
value creation enhanced by the impacts of the mechanisms regulating the magnitude of the block 
grant.48 
Figure 4: Total expenditures (block grant and state expenses) of the Danish state related to Greenland. 
Percentage of Greenlandic gross domestic product (GDP) 1979-2014. 
 
Source: Statistics Greenland 2016. 
Greenland as an International Actor in Relation to Hydrocarbons and 
Climate Change Negotiations – Also a Part of Nation-Building 
Greenland, no doubt, was in focus of the international press in the beginning of the century’s 
second decade, and the Arctic Council Ministerial in Nuuk, May 2011 was yet another occasion to 
call attention to the visions for Greenland.49 
More frequent participation in international conferences, trade fairs/trade shows, bilateral visits 
with foreign heads of states etc. definitely expanded the visibility of Greenland, the nation building 
process taking place, and the vision of an independent Greenland. Greenland’s visibility was 
further promoted as heads of states and international political leaders at several occasions were 
invited to Greenland by the Greenland and/or the Danish Government – the invitations of the 
latter were most often for the invitees to watch the retrieving glacier in the Ilulissat Ice Fiord that 
has been showcased as ‘the visualisation’ of global warming and climate change. 
In one of the abovementioned interviews (Greenland Oil and Minerals, 2011) Premier Kuupik 
Kleist stated that: 
Cairn’s test drilling has definitely put Greenland on the map, although all the applications in the 
2010 licensing round were received before drilling started. The international press has also shown 
interest in Greenland and we will, of course, try to exploit this. We will also seek to expand our 
international relationships (Greenland Oil and Minerals, 2011). 
Two internationally reported and much debated occasions - one directly and another, more 
indirectly - related to hydrocarbon activities highlighted some of the challenges facing the self-
governing Greenland when the country, being a nation-in-the-making, deals with ‘hot topics’ such 
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as explorative off-shore hydrocarbon drillings (Cairn Energy’s 2010 drillings) and global 
warming/climate change (the Paris 2015 Climate Accord). They are summarised below. 
 Greenpeace’s Campaign Against Cairn Energy’s Explorative Offshore Drillings,
  2010  
During Cairn Energy’s first hydrocarbon exploration drilling campaign in August 2010 
Greenpeace conducted a campaign entering one of the oilrigs (four campaigners attached 
themselves to the oilrig). The Cairn Energy drilling campaign took place just a few months after 
the oil spill disaster in the Gulf of Mexico following explosions and fire that finally sank the 
Deepwater Horizon oilrig.50  
According to an article in the Guardian (Carrell, August 31, 2010)51 Greenpeace had described the 
drilling site as “an important battleground” and had argued, “that deep-sea Arctic drilling is 
extremely perilous because of the sea ice and intense weather conditions in the region.” Figure 5 
depicts the notion ‘battleground’. Greenpeace thus believed the risks posed by this operation go 
“far beyond the Deepwater Horizon oil disaster in the Gulf of Mexico”.52  
Figure 5: - Oil exploration in troubled waters: Greenpeace’s MV Esperanza protest ship (left) and a Royal 
Danish Navy patrol vessel (right) keep near the Stena Don drilling platform off Greenland’s West coast. 
 
Photo caption: Will Rose, Greenpeace (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1305779/British-oil-
company-Cairn-Energys-Arctic-fuels-hope-new-reserves.html) 
Greenpeace further argued that “(i)n the Arctic an oil spill would destroy vulnerable and as yet 
untouched habitats, while the cold water would prevent the oil from breaking down quickly” and 
that “any emergency operation to tackle a disaster would encounter huge technical and logistical 
problems in such a remote area.” Finally, the Guardian reported, “campaigners warn this will lead 
to a dangerous rush to exploit one of the world's last major untapped oil and gas fields in one of 
the planet's most fragile locations” (Carrell, August 31, 2010).  
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The same article also reported that: 
Kuupik Kleist, the government’s socialist prime minister, denounced the campaigners' actions, 
claiming they were damaging the economy of the country, now largely independent from Denmark, 
and ignoring the strict environmental and safety regulations Greenland had imposed on oil 
companies. “This is clearly an illegal act, ignoring the rules of democracy” he said in a statement. 
Kuupik Kleist further stated, “(t)he cabinet regards Greenpeace's action as very serious and an illegal 
attack on the country's constitutional rights. It is worrying that Greenpeace, in their hunt for media 
exposure, violate security rules made to protect human lives and the environment” (Carrell, August 
31, 2010). 
Greenland at COP21 and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
Another event that, internationally, brought Greenland centre stage occurred at the United 
Nations Conference on Climate Change, COP2153 in Paris, November 30 – December 12, 2015. 
Although Greenland is a part of the Danish Kingdom, Greenland is not a party to the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. During the conference, the Greenland delegation, 
headed by Greenland Minister of Finance, Mineral Resources and Foreign Affairs, Vittus 
Qujaukitsoq, the government of Nunavut (Canada) and the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) 
worked to have Indigenous peoples’ rights acknowledged and included in the COP21 final 
document. 
In a joint statement from the governments of Nunavut, Greenland and from the ICC 
(Governments of Nunavut, Greenland and ICC December 8, 2015), they confirmed the need to 
take “measures … to make certain global temperature increases will remain between 1.5°C and 
2°C” stating that “(e)ven slight changes in the temperature cause major disruptions in the way that 
northern communities live and work”. Further stating that “current greenhouse gas emissions are 
caused by industrialized nations from activities that have taken place outside the Arctic” the two 
governments and the ICC urged the United Nations member states “to deliver a Paris agreement” 
that “(e)nsures equal access to the right to development, also for the peoples of the Arctic”.  
Without explicitly referring to the ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples54 (ILO 169 
1989) or the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples55 (UNDRIP 2007) the reference 
to ‘equal access to the right to development’ is, in a condensed form, a paraphrase of the content 
of two key articles in these documents: 
The rights of the peoples concerned to the natural resources pertaining to their lands shall be specially 
safeguarded. These rights include the right of these peoples to participate in the use, management 
and conservation of these resources” (ILO 169, 1989: article 151) and “Indigenous peoples have the 
right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the development or use of their lands or 
territories and other resources (United Nations, 2007: article 23). 
Apart from claiming the rights of Indigenous peoples, the joint statement from the governments 
of Nunavut and Greenland with the association of the Indigenous peoples of these countries (as 
well as of Inuit in other parts of the Arctic) argued that global warming is caused by the 
industrialised nations and demanded significant financial aid from these industrialised nations.56 
These positions expressed by Arctic Inuit are parallel to the positions taken by developing states 
in the UN climate negotiations and agreements but the demands were not included in the Paris 
Accord.  
The Greenland economy is based partly on annual transfers (block grants) from the Danish state57 
and it goes without saying that Greenland will have to develop its economic base to be still more 
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economically self-sufficient. As articulated by Minister of Finance, Mineral Resources and Foreign 
Affairs Vittus Qujaukitsoq in an interview with the Guardian:58 “The economic situation gives us 
no choice but to develop mining and oil. We would most likely [seek] a territorial reservation. It 
would be very costly if we were to submit to a binding agreement” (Vidal, January 28, 2016). This 
stance was further emphasized in the same article in the Guardian as the deputy minister Kaj Holst 
Andersen stated: “If we sign it will cost us hundreds of millions of dollars and we would never be 
independent”. The interview further quoted Andersen as saying: “New emissions restrictions on 
Greenland would be almost impossible to honour”… “(i)f we want to make a living we cannot 
afford to make an agreement that will bind us [to cutting emissions]. We are not an independent 
state. Independence is cancelled if we sign [Paris]” (Vidal, January 28, 2016). 
The two disagreements were handled by two Greenland governments with somewhat different 
political orientations but both governments were prepared for confrontations to emphasize the 
long-term goal: an economically self-reliant and politically independent nation. The point of 
departure in both situations was defending Greenland’s rights as a self-governing country but also 
defending Greenlanders’ rights as Indigenous peoples. And that included, according to both 
Greenland governments, the right to develop hydrocarbon activities. 
Different ‘Battlefields’ 
Greenpeace’s action took place in Greenland waters, where the authority to exercise sovereignty 
still lies within the Danish Kingdom. Greenland thus had to rely on the Danish state and how the 
Danish authorities (in this situation: the Danish Police and Arctic Command) interpreted and 
decided to handle a situation that by the Greenland government was considered “a very serious 
and an illegal attack on the country's constitutional rights” (Premier Kuupik Kleist in: Carrell, 
August 31, 2010). 
The disagreement about Greenland’s demands to the UN climate accord took place at the COP21 
in Paris and whereas the allied power of the Greenland government in the conflict with 
Greenpeace was the Danish police and navy, the allies in Paris were Indigenous partners reflecting 
the different rules in the different battlefields that Greenland has to master in the process of 
continued nation-building. 
The two disagreements provided food for thought in several aspects including the stakeholders, 
the partners, the disputes, and the responses, nationally and internationally, and how Greenland’s 
image was affected. A more detailed analyses is beyond the scope of this article but it is worth 
noting that among the lessons learned was the need to develop, refine and promote an argument 
for how to create the preconditions to become an economically self-sufficient nation partly 
relying on income from non-renewable resources including oil and, at the same time, maintaining 
‘sustainable development’ as the long term development goal.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
‘Rights to the Greenland subsurface’ has been a key political issue in the discussions in Greenland 
as well as between Greenland and Denmark on Greenland’s development from a Danish colony 
to Self-Governance via status as a Danish county (1953) and Home Rule (1979). In this process 
hydrocarbon exploration has been of particular interest from a Greenland perspective because oil 
finds might mean a shortcut to a self-reliant national economy and thus developing the 
precondition for an economically independent and politically sovereign Greenland. At the same 
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time both hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation have raised concerns – especially offshore – 
because of the special challenges in Arctic waters and thus the potential environmental risks 
including the feared negative impacts on marine mammals and fish stocks. 
A process has developed over the last fifty years that in retrospect can be viewed as a key part of 
Greenland nation-building: from a Danish point of departure where the Greenland subsurface 
beyond discussion belonged to the Danish state and where decisions about and administration of 
the subsurface were Danish fields of responsibilities. In continuation of this standpoint earnings 
potentially generated from mineral exploitation belonged to the Danish state. Gradually, and 
driven by a persistent political movement and a maturing Greenland administration, devolution of 
administrative power and influence has been transferred to Greenland until – in 2010 – the 
Greenlanders’ rights to the subsurface was recognised and all political and administrative power 
was in the hands of Inatsisartut (the Parliament of Greenland) and Naalakkersuisut (the 
Government of Greenland). 
Whereas many Indigenous peoples around the world are opposed to and fight hydrocarbon 
exploitation for environmental reasons and potential threats to traditional ways of living the 
Greenlanders (being both an indigenous peoples and the majority population in Greenland) has 
not only (and successfully) claimed the right to the subsurface but has also claimed the right to 
mineral development including hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation to pursue the long term 
goal, an economically and politically independent Greenland. 
The official attitude of Greenland governments, so far, towards hydrocarbon activities has been 
in favour, while some international environmental organisations have warned against engaging in 
these activities because of the extraordinary difficult conditions for offshore drillings in Arctic 
waters. Not least because of the relatively low crude oil prices the interest from the petroleum 
industry has been almost absent during the latest licensing rounds and the public discourse 
nationally and internationally has not been prominent for the last couple of years.  
A national survey on ‘attitudes towards natural resource development and the marine environment’ 
was conducted in 2013 when the general rhetoric still talked about Greenland as a country with a 
hydrocarbon potential. Without jumping to conclusions it seems fair to say that the public opinion 
expressed through the survey reveals some of the hopes, concerns, dilemmas and potential 
inconsistencies among the general public towards hydrocarbon activities that have also been and 
still are part of the political discourse in Greenland and with stakeholders outside Greenland. 
The future of hydrocarbon activities in Greenland is, for several reasons – not least due to 
conditions that Greenland cannot influence – unsure. There is, however, no doubt that the 
Greenlanders’ efforts over several decades to ensure that the subsurface rights were acknowledged 
have been important in creating a national identity. Likewise, developing the vision of a partly non-
renewable resource based foundation for economic self-reliance has contributed to further the 
nation-building process and the – in recent years – intensified discourse about Greenland as a 
politically independent nation. It is fair to assume that Greenland participation in international 
political forums – for instance in relation to minerals including hydrocarbon activities – apart from 
providing insights and useful experience to the government and its administration also contributes 
to the general public’s perception of Greenland as a nation in the making.  
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Notes 
1. For further and more in depth studies on Arctic oil and gas development (activities and 
perspectives) see e.g. Nuttall & Wessendorf (2006); AMAP (2010); Lindholt and Glomsrød 
(2017); AMAP (2018). 
2. For further and more in depth studies on Greenland oil and gas activities and perspectives 
see e.g. AMAP (2010); Henriksen (2008); Nuttall (2012); Henriksen (2015); Wilson (2015). 
3. In 1995 the Geological Survey of Denmark (DGU) and the Geological Survey of 
Greenland (GGU) were merged into Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland 
(GEUS). 
4. Royal Decree no. 153 of April 27, 1935 that in 1965 was substituted by the so-called Legal 
Act of Mining 1965 (Lov om mineralske råstoffer, 1965). 
5. 13  licenses were granted and five explorative drillings were conducted in the Davis Strait 
in the period 1975-1978. 
6. Both before the introduction of Home Rule in 1979 and according to the 1979 Home Rule 
Act the net earnings from mineral resource extraction in Greenland would revert to the 
Danish state. 
7. It should be noted that the negotiations in the joint Danish-Greenlandic Home Rule 
Commission took place just a few years after the so-called ‘energy crises’. 
8. Act No. 577 of 29 November 1978. The Greenland Home Rule Act. 
http://www.stm.dk/p12712.html retrieved 180602. 
9. For a more detailed analysis of the discourse about Greenland mineral resources in the 
1970s see: Nielsen & Larsen, 1985.   
10. The Joint Committee was closed down in 2009. 
11. The resume is based on a more thorough description in Fægteborg (2013). 
12. The hunters sued the Potomac for damages as they experienced a severe decrease in the 
number of seals caught. Two years later the Junior Counsel to the Treasury informed the 
Ministry of Greenland that a lawsuit could not be raised against a naval vessel according 
to civil law. 
13. The project was formally proposed in 1979 and was relinquished in 1983. Both Fægteborg 
(2013) and Heginbottom (2018) https://www.climate-policy-watcher.org/canadian-
arctic/arctic-pilot-project.html (retrieved July 1, 2018) contain more in-depth descriptions 
of the APP and its potential implications. 
Arctic Yearbook 2018 
Arctic Oil & Gas Development: The Case of Greenland 
 
351 
14. In 1988 an agreement between the Home Rule Government and the Danish Government 
was fleshed out in an amended Mineral Resources Act, adopted as Act No. 844 of 
December 21, 1988 on Mineral Resources. 
15. See (http://nunaoil.gl/en/about-nunaoil/by-laws.html) 
16. See (http://nunaoil.gl/en/about-nunaoil.html)  
17. An amendment to Mineral Resources Act, effective of July 1, 1998 was included in the 
Consolidated Act No. 368 of 18 June 1998 on Mineral Resources in Greenland. 
18. It should be noted that the KANUMAS project (and its participating oil companies) has 
preferential rights in the licensing rounds where the project has acquired seismic data. 
19. The Greenland Commission was established in 2000 and delivered its report in 2004. 
20. The joint Greenland-Danish Self-government Commission was established in 2004 and 
delivered its final report in 2008. 
21. See (http://naalakkersuisut.gl/~/media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Engelske-
tekster/Act%20on%20Greenland.pdf)  
22. Furthermore, and of outmost importance to the Greenlanders, the Act on Greenland Self-
Government also acknowledges that the people of Greenland is a people pursuant to 
international law with the right of self-determination and thus having the right to determine 
if and when Greenland should be independent.  
23. The Mineral Resource Act replaced the Consolidation Act No. 368 of June 18, 1998. 
24. The Commission Report emphasized, however, that until Greenland became independent, 
the sovereignty of the Greenland territory (land, sea and airspace) was still responsibility 
of the Danish state. 
25. In 1998 the administration of mineral resources including hydrocarbon was moved to 
Greenland.   
26. As a part of the Home Rule arrangement a Joint Committee on Mineral Resources in 
Greenland was established in 1979. The Joint Greenland-Danish committee operated until 
2009. When the Act on Greenland Self-Government entered into force on 21 June 2009 
the Government of Greenland was given the opportunity to decide taking over authority 
over a number of fields of responsibility, including mineral resources (The Greenland-
Danish Self-government Commission’s Report on Self-Government in Greenland, 2008). 
The 2009 Hydrocarbon Strategy summarized the content of the new legislation on 
minerals: “With the new Self-Government scheme all proceeds from mineral activities 
accrue to the Government of Greenland including revenues via Greenland and Danish 
authorities in the form of licenses, taxes, ownership shares etc.” (Government of 
Greenland 2009a: 7), and further: “On 1 January 2010 the Inatsisartut act no. 7 of 7 
December 2009 on mineral raw materials and related activities (Mineral Resources Act) 
entered into force, replacing the former Danish act on mineral resources in Greenland cf. 
Consolidated Act no. 368 of 18 June 1998” (Government of Greenland 2009a: 8). 
27. It should, however, be mentioned that the optimism related to hydrocarbon development 
in Greenland was not just a Greenland local fad. This can be illustrated by the following 
quote from US Geological Surveys 2011 Minerals Yearbook: “Greenland has abundant 
mineral and natural resources. More areas for exploration are expected to open up if global 
warming continues, and new mineral deposits are likely to be discovered as a result. Finding 
new sources of hydrocarbons will continue to be very important for Greenland as possible 
sources of revenue and offshore exploration is expected to increase as interest in this area 
increases. The country’s independent status and the government’s encouragement are 
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expected to continue to accelerate the development of the mineral industry in Greenland” 
(U.S. Department of the Interior U.S. Geological Survey, 2013). 
28. In the autumn of 2011, as an example, two conferences focussing on oil were convened 
in Nuuk, Greenland: 
- Joining Forces 2011. Greenland Conference on Oil and Minerals. Convened by the Greenland 
Employers’ Association, September 21-22, 2011 
http://www.ga.gl/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=rOr6nZ6F9VQ%3D&tabid=36&langua
ge=da-DK  &  
- 2011 Arctic Dialogue Greenland. Conference and Workshop. Convened by Ilisimatusarfik, 
University of Greenland, September 24-26, 2011. 
https://www.uni.gl/media/1434044/1112222011arctic-dialogue-
greenlandconferenceworkshop-summary.pdf  
29. See http://www.ft.dk/samling/20121/almdel/gru/bilag/16/1200391.pdf   
30. In: Greenland Oil and Minerals (2011). Greenland is NOT for sale. By Christian Schultz-
Lorentzen. 
31. On January 1, 2010, the Inatsisartut act no. 7 on mineral resources and related activities came into 
force. The Mineral resource Act replaced the Consolidation Act No. 368 of June 18, 1998. 
32. Map 1 includes all 15 explorative offshore drillings since 1975. 
33. By Act no. 6 of December 5, 2008 on Greenland’s Mineral Resource Fund the Greenland 
Parliament decided to establish a Fund (the Act has been updated and amended by 
Inatsisartut Act no. 25 of December 2015; Inatsisartut Act no. 31 of November 28, 2016 
and Inatsisartut Act no. 49 of November 23, 2017) of December 5. The Act is inspired by 
the Norwegian Oil Fund and the overall purpose of the Act is to secure long term 
Greenland societal interests through the investments and disposals of revenues from 
hydrocarbon and mineral activities.  
34. See http://naalakkersuisut.gl/da/Naalakkersuisut/Departementer/Erhverv-og-
Energi/Naalakkersuisuts-strategier 
35. See e.g. world crude oil price history: http://www.macrotrends.net/1369/crude-oil-
price-history-chart  
36. As an example an article in the magazine ’Greenland Oil and Minerals’ refers to a number 
of major oil companies such as Chevron in the Beaufort Sea, ConocoPhillips in the Arctic 
as a whole, and Statoil in Alaska (Lindquist 2015: 51). 
37. The survey: Greenland 2013: Attitudes towards natural resource development and the 
marine environment. Results of a national public opinion research study survey was 
conducted by HS Analysis (Nuuk) on behalf of Pew Charitable Trusts between September 
8, 2013 and October 14, 2013. A random sample (n=721) would be considered within a 
+/- 3.62 % statistical uncertainty. Unpublished.  
38. Coalition agreement (March 26, 2013) between Siumut, Atassut and Partii Inuit. 
http://naalakkersuisut.gl/~/media/Nanoq/Files/Attached%20Files/Naalakkersuisut/D
K/Koalitionsaftaler/Koalitionsaftale%202013-
2017%20endelig%20version%20dansk.pdf  
39. Apart from a recently founded party every party now represented in Inatsisartut, the 
Greenland parliament has at least once been part of a cabinet. 
40. See history of oil price for a more detailed overview 
http://www.macrotrends.net/1369/crude-oil-price-history-chart  
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41. See http://naalakkersuisut.gl/da/Naalakkersuisut/Departementer/Erhverv-og-
Energi/Naalakkersuisuts-strategier  
42. See 
https://www.govmin.gl/images/Documents/CurrentLicencesandActivities/ListofLicen
ces-19-06-2018.pdf 
43. See http://m.sermitsiaq.ag/olieeventyr-slut-sidste-olieselskab-ude-vestgroenland 
44. See 
https://www.govmin.gl/images/Documents/CurrentLicencesandActivities/ListofLicen
ces-19-06-2018.pdf 
45. See 
https://www.govmin.gl/images/Documents/Current_Licences_and_Activities/List_of_
Licences_17-09-2018.pdf  
46. See note 16 above. 
47. The block grant was a key part of the Home Rule arrangement from 1979 stating that 
neither the Greenland Home Rule nor the Danish state should benefit from transfer of 
responsibilities from Danish to Greenland authorities. Thus, an amount equal to the 
operating costs of an activity should ‘follow’ the activity. This principle was not included 
in the Act of Self-Governance for transfer of future responsibilities but the accumulated 
block grant from 1979-2009 was frozen at an inflation adjusted 2009 level.  
In the Act of Greenland Self-Governance it is stated that income form mineral – 
including hydrocarbon - activities beyond 75 million DKK (roughly € 10 million) shall be 
shared equally between the Government of Greenland and the Danish state (reducing 
the block grant) until the block grant is reduced to zero. Then negotiations between the 
Government of Greenland and the Danish state about future economic (and political) 
relations shall start. 
48. Whereas compensation followed every transfer of authority from the Danish state to the 
Greenland Home Rule Government from 1979 – 2009, the Greenland Self Government 
has to finance all activities transferred from Danish to Greenland authority since the Act 
on Self Governance came into effect in 2009. Furthermore, the, since 2009, frozen block 
grant is regulated by the Danish inflation rate which tends to be lower than the inflation 
rate in Greenland. 
49. An interview on the BBC program ‘Hard talk’ with Premier Kleist provided an opportunity 
to expand the preconditions (including earnings from new industries such as oil and 
minerals) and visions for an independent Greenland. 
50. The Deepwater Horizon blowout caused eleven dead, a number of injured and the largest 
marine oil spill ever, as more than four million barrels of crude oil leaked into the ocean. 
51. See https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/aug/31/greenland-greenpeace-
arctic-oil-rig  
52. Greenpeace based their argument on comparing conditions in the Gulf of Mexico that 
would appear more favourable compared to Arctic waters (shorter distances to search and 
rescue assistance, warmer weather, no ice bergs, etc.) to conduct emergency operations 
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and handling major disasters including oil spills. Despite these better conditions it lasted 
almost three months (87 days) from the explosion and until the well was capped. 
53. Conference of the Parties for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, COP21, December 2015. 
54. ILO C169: Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries (Entry into force: 05 Sep 1991) Adoption: Geneva, 76th ILC session (27 Jun 
1989) http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/indigenous-tribal/lang--en/index.htm  
55. The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) was 
adopted by the General Assembly on Thursday, 13 September 2007. 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf  
56. It should be noted that Greenland is ranked on par with OECD countries in relation to 
the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Climate agreement based on the GDP per capita 
measure. 
57. See the subsection on ‘Greenland economic dependency on the annual block grant from 
Denmark’. 
58. See http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/jan/28/independent-greenland-
could-not-afford-to-sign-up-to-paris-climate-deal  
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In this work the attention is focused on the necessity of mitigating risks and dangers in the Arctic zone of the Russian 
Federation, which are associated with extreme climate conditions, the focal character of economic development, remoteness from 
major industrial centers, and low stability of ecological systems, which is susceptible even to minor climatic and anthropogenic 
impacts. In warming conditions, one of the main ecological risks is changing climatic conditions affecting permafrost rocks and 
the potential growth of negative anthropogenic loads associated with the mineral resources mining and infrastructure development. 
This article deals with modern conditions and potential risks, related to possible further climatic warming in the Arctic zone 
and economic development of new regions. The main attention is paid to changing geocryological and geomorphological conditions, 
which lead to the activation of exogenous processes in the continental part of the Arctic zone. Possible changes in the ecology-
geomorphological situations of the Arctic zone regions were analyzed. Three groups of subjects with identical tendencies in 
climate changes were identified: I) regions in which less than 30% of the area was affected by dangerous processes; II) 30-50% 
of the area were affected by dangerous processes; III) over 50% of the area was affected by dangerous processes.  
 
 
Introduction 
The Russian overland Arctic zone extends from the western boundary in the Kola Peninsula up 
to the Dezhnev cape in the Chukotka Peninsula in the East of the country, and is represented by 
diverse natural conditions. The balanced economic development in the Arctic zone of Russia is 
impossible without due regard to risks of global changes in the natural environment and natural 
disasters, which cause considerable damage to the economy and mortality to the population (Figure 
1). 
This zone is characterized by extreme natural conditions: low annual average air temperatures, 
widespread permafrost rocks that occur at a depth of 0.3 to 2-3 meters, and low biological activity. 
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Permafrost rocks usually contain underground ice of different geneses (Geocryological, 2000). Ice 
content in rocks depends on their composition and genesis, and ranges from several to 50% and 
even to 80-90%. Since rocks are waterproof and seasonal thawing layer is highly humid, flat-land 
areas are covered by bogs and lakes, whereas many solifluction and thermo-erosion processes are 
observed on slopes. In this connection, even minor changes in the air temperature and 
precipitation causes negative influences on the natural environment.  
Economic development of new areas and technogenic transformations of the relief are 
accompanied by destruction in soil vegetation cover, and the arrival of warmth to the soil. 
Consequently, the depth of seasonal thawing increases by 2-3 times, and runoff conditions change, 
which often additionally moistens the soil and even leads to the appearance of water reservoirs. 
Changing geocryological and geomorphological conditions entail the activation of exogenous 
processes of relief formation. Among them: frost cracking, soil heaving, thermokarst, solifluction, 
erosion and thermoerosion, abrasion and thermoabrasion, and aeolian processes (Gerasimov, 
1996; Relief, 2002; Sukhodrovskii, 1979). 
Figure 1. Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (Morozova & Chesnokova, 2017) 
1 - Murmansk region, 2 – Republic of Karelia, 3 – Arkhangelsk  region, 4 – Nenets autonomous district, 5 
– Yamalo-Nenets autonomous district, 6 – Krasnoyarsk krai, 7 – Sakha republic (Yakutia), 8 – Chukotka 
autonomous district, 9 – Komi republic (Vorkuta city) 
The purpose of our research was to analyze the changes in the eco-geomorphological situation 
and the development of hazardous natural processes in the territory of the Arctic zone of Russia 
to justify sustainable development and to develop approaches to the introduction of measures 
aimed at reducing the possible economic and environmental damages from hazardous natural 
processes. 
Techniques and Materials 
It is considered that anthropogenically-conditioned processes in the area of widespread permafrost 
rocks might be irreversible. But this judgment is not always confirmed by factual data. Once active, 
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the processes become weaker over time, and the relief stabilizes even in the conditions of 
continuing anthropogenic influence. Irreversibility may be expressed in appearance of new relief 
forms, though their development is limited by self-regulation processes. Among 
anthropogenically-conditioned exogenous processes, which are rapidly evolving in developing 
northern territories, there are: frost cracking of soil, heaving, thermokarst, solifluction, erosion and 
thermoerosion, abrasion and thermoabrasion, and aeolian processes. These processes acting in 
different directions produce significant deformations in oil and gas pipes and related technical 
facilities. The existing research has shown that the greater the thickness of permafrost rocks, the 
more heat load they can absorb during economic development activities (Geocryological, 2000; 
Chigir, 1988). 
The data of ROSGIDROMET (Federal Service of Russia for Hydrometeorology and Monitoring 
of the Environment) monitoring suggest that during the last thirty years (1986-2015) the 
temperature in all regions of the Arctic zone rose (Figure 2). On the whole, in all regions of the 
Eurasian sector, the linear growth of average annual temperature was about 2.0°C for 39 years (or 
0.68°C/10 years). An acceleration of warming was observed in the West and East Siberian regions 
from the end of the 1990s (Review, 2016; Report, 2017). 
 
Figure 2. Average annual anomaly of the near-surface air temperature in the Russian territory, its European 
and Asian parts for 1936-2016. The anomalies were calculated as fluctuations from the average one for the 
base period of 1961-1990. Shown are also 11-year, average sliding, linear trends for 1976-2016 and 2007-
2016 with 95% confidential bands. 
Multi-year investigations on annual precipitation amounts for the period from 1936 to 2015 have 
demonstrated a statistically significant upward tendency with an average speed about 3mm/10 
years. Precipitation increase is predominantly noted in the cold season. The precipitation increase 
is mostly demonstrated in the southern part of the northern European region (15.3mm/10 years 
for precipitation of the cold period and 18.0mm/10 years for annual precipitation). A minor 
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downward tendency in precipitation is observed in the Chukotka region throughout the year. But 
on the whole, this tendency does not affect the natural environment of the region (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Annual precipitation anomaly in Russia regions for 1936-2016. Anomalies were calculated as 
fluctuations from the average for the base period from 1961 to 1990. 11-year sliding average, linear trends 
for 1976-2016 and for 2007-2016 was also shown with 95% confidence bands. 
The population of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation (RF) is over 2.5 million people. 
However that makes up below 2% of the population of the country. The social-economic area of 
the Arctic zone of the RF concentrates in urban settlements: more than 80% of the population 
live in cities and towns with a population of over 5,000 people. The main atmosphere pollution 
sources in populated localities are oil, gas, and mining enterprises, ferrous and non-ferrous 
metallurgy, the fuel and energy complex, chemical industry, woodworking, the pulp and paper 
industry, railway and sea transport. The results of the monitoring, carried out in 2015, suggest that 
ten cities of the Arctic zone of the RF are characterized by low pollution, two by elevated levels 
(Arkhangelsk and Nikel cities); and one, Norilsk, which is annually included in the list of Russian 
cities with the highest pollution levels, at very high (Review, 2016; Chernogaeva, 2017) (Figure 4, 
Table 1). 
The relative content of sulfate-ions from mineralization value amounts to: from 12 to 50% in 
sediments of the Kola Peninsula; from 11 to 68% in sediments of North Siberia and at the average 
15% and 30% in the North of the European part of Russia and in Far East North sediments 
relatively. Minimal content of bicarbonate-ions was observed in the sediments of Zarechensk 
locality (0.2 mg/l), in Padun (0.2 mg/l), Palatka (0.6 mg/l), and Deputatskii (1.6 mg/l). Bicarbonate 
ions prevail in the sediments of most stations of the European part of Russia, and North of Siberia, 
where the concentration of bicarbonate-ions in 2016 amounted to 30% from the sum of ions. 
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Figure 4. The content of sulfates, chlorides, nitrates, and bicarbonates in atmospheric precipitation in the 
Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, 2016 (Review, 2016). 
 
Table 1. Categories of the air quality in populated areas of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation in 
2012-2016 (Review, 2016). 
Locality 
Category of air quality 
201
2 
201
3 
201
4 
201
5 
201
6 
Anadyr, Chukotka Autonomous region ND ND ND ND ND 
Apatity, Murmansk region. L L L L L 
Arkhangelsk, Arkhangelsk.Region H H E E E 
Vorkuta, Komi Republic H H L L L 
Zapolyarny, Murmansk region L L L L     L 
Kandalaksha, Murmansk region L L L L L 
Kirovsk, Murmansk region. ND ND ND ND ND 
Kola, Murmansk region L L ND ND ND 
Monchegorsk, Murmansk region E E E L L 
Murmansk, Murmansk region. L L L L L 
Nikel, Murmansk region E E E E E 
Novodvinsk, Arkhangel’sk region. H H L L L 
Noril’sk,, MO, Krasnoyarsk krai VH VH VH VH VH 
Olenegorsk, Murmansk region L L L L L 
Pevek, Chukotka Autonomous Region ND ND ND ND ND 
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Locality 
Category of air quality 
201
2 
201
3 
201
4 
201
5 
201
6 
Salekhard,Yamalo-NenetsA,Region VH VH L L L 
Severodvinsk, Arkhangel’sk region. E E L L L 
Tiksi, Saha Republic (Yakutia) ND ND ND ND ND 
Pollution level of the atmospheric air: L – low, E – elevated, H – high, VH – very high, ND - not 
defined due to insufficient observation data or insufficient amount of measured substances. 
Results and Discussion 
Preservation of sustainable structures of human settlements, and maintenance of the efficiency of 
geotechnical systems (especially in the conditions of global climate changes) is an important state 
objective (Baburin, 2015; Tulupov, 2009). 
Based on the data obtained, possible changes in the ecological-geomorphological situations in 
regions of the Arctic zone of Russia were considered. Three groups of regions with analogous 
tendencies in climate changes were identified (Table 2): 
I. Regions 6-8 (Krasnoyarsk krai, Sakha Republic (Yakutia), Chukotka Autonomous region). Here 
an increase in temperature of frozen soil by at least 1º leads to a decline in its bearing capacity, an 
increase in the depth of seasonal thawing, and their irreversible warming and subsidence. All these 
processes are the cause of deformation of soils and foundations, piles dipping etc. Most dangerous 
are the consequences of the transformation of frozen soils into thawed ones. The natural results 
of such dangerous phenomena include both minor and large accidents in engineering structures. 
II. Regions 4, 5, 9 (Nenets autonomous region, Yamalo-Nenets autonomous region, Komi Republic 
(Vorkuta-city). Among the negative consequences of climate changes, most frequently mentioned 
are the worsening of the engineering-geological conditions in the period of sharpest change of 
geocryological situations. That may lead to the destruction of industrial and residential buildings, 
and various constructions. 
III. Regions 1-3 (Murmansk region, Karelia Republic, Arkhangelsk region). These are the most 
developed areas of the Arctic zone, and here with existing tendencies of climate changes, the 
ecologic-geomorphological situation might deteriorate. 
Table 2. Assessment of eco-geomorphological situations on the territory of the Arctic zone of Russia 
Subject numbers of 
the Arctic zone of 
RF 
Basic exodynamic processes and degree of 
economic damage (e.d.-economic damage) 
in points (on a five-point scale) 
Possible changes in eco-
geomorphological situations 
1 
 
Murmansk 
region 
On large area there is a complex of 
natural-anthropogenic processes (planar 
runoff, erosion, bogging); 
In permafrost zone less than 30% of the 
area are affected by dangerous 
processes, there is minor and medium 
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Subject numbers of 
the Arctic zone of 
RF 
Basic exodynamic processes and degree of 
economic damage (e.d.-economic damage) 
in points (on a five-point scale) 
Possible changes in eco-
geomorphological situations 
activation of technogenic processes along 
mines and pipelines; e.d.=2-3 
 
 
- “ - 
possibility of activation during warming 
up. There may be negative processes, 
associated with permafrost degradation, 
increase in bogging areas and 
stabilization of engineering-geological 
and ecological geomorphological 
conditions on the localities where 
permafrost is absent. Outside of the 
permafrost zone, climate conditions and 
the structure of the earth fund can be 
improved (favorable ecology-
geomorphological situations) 
2 Republic of 
Karelia 
 
 
- “ - 
3 
 
 
Arkhangelsk 
region 
 
- “ - 
4 Nenets 
autonomous 
region 
Complex of natural processes (bogging, 
gravitation), on urbanized areas, activation 
of exogenous processes: e.d.=2-4  
30-50% of the area is affected by 
dangerous and potentially dangerous 
permafrost processes; there is the 
possibility of extreme situations, 
medium and high, (predominantly 
activation of thermokarst, 
thermoerosion, heaving on the 
urbanized area) 
5 Yamalo-
Nenets 
autonomous 
region 
Complex of natural (exogenous and 
seismic) and anthropogenic processes in 
developed areas; e.d.=2-4. 
Over 50% of the area is affected by 
dangerous and potentially dangerous 
permafrost processes, high possibility of 
their activation during warming up: 
considerable degradation of permafrost 
rocks, their subsidence over large areas. 
In mountain areas a high possibility of 
activation of ice formation, solifluction, 
and other dynamic processes, related 
both to permafrost degradation, 
elevated relief instability and seismicity 
6 Krasnoyarsk 
region 
- “ - 
7 Saha 
Republic 
(Yakutia) 
Complex of natural (exogenous and 
seismic) processes with elevated danger: 
e.d. = 1-4 
 
8 
 
Chukotka 
autonomous 
region 
 
- “ - 
9 
 
 
Komi 
republic 
(Vorkuta-city) 
Technogenically activated cryogenic 
processes: degradation-aggradation of 
permafrost rocks, thermokarst sinking, 
cryogenic heaving of deposits 
Activation of thermokarst, 
thermoerosion, and heaving in 
urbanized territories 
 
* 1 –minor damage, 2 –negligible, 3 - medium, 4 - elevated, 5 – high 
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The given characteristics provide the general idea about the change of ecological-
geomorphological situations (Chesnokova, 2016). The full picture is much more complicated.  
It is difficult to properly evaluate the social-ecologic damage. Such damage is expressed in 
decreasing qualitative and quantitative indicators, first of all of human health, the state of natural 
systems, biota habitats, the state of the lithogenous basis of agricultural, forest, and water 
resources, and the state of monuments associated with nature, history, and culture. In the absence 
of damage cost evaluations, rank and semi quantitative estimates may be applied. 
In order to assess the damage from hazardous processes, it is possible to use the approaches that 
were proposed by us for estimating drills on the roads of the Leningrad Region. Thus, we provide 
an expert evaluation of the damage-forming effects of frost heave processes (Koff & Chesnokova, 
1998) in the territory of the Leningrad Region (Table 3). 
Table 3. Permafrost heaving process and its consequences on the territory of the Leningrad region 
Source of influence Demonstration areas Damage consequences  
Permanent structures 
Lightly loaded shallow (rural 
houses, barracks, transformer 
substations, purifying plants) 
 
Boxitogorsk, Tikhvin, 
Volkhov areas, Pikalevo-town 
and others 
 
Basement skewing, bulging, in- 
clination of the floor. 
The break in facing of buildings 
etc. 
 
 
Temporary structures 
Lightly loaded, shallow 
(construction cabins, canteens  
etc.) 
Volkhov, Boxitogorsk regions 
Smolenka r. embankment, 
Rzhevka-Porokhovye village 
Bridges Volkhov-town Skew and sagging of supports 
Power Line (6 кwatt) Tosno-town  
Vyborg-Medyanki region 
Skew and sagging of supports 
 
Telecommunication lines 
Shugozero region 
Villages: Dymi, Lisichki, 
Pul’nitsa, Plekhanovo, 
Volkhov and others 
 
Skew of supports 
Metro Leningrad-city and suburbs 
 
Deformation and sometimes 
crashes the capital buildings 
Roads Almost over all areas of the 
region 
Destruction of a roadway, the 
formation of abysses 
Landscape-park and other 
recreation territories 
Oranienbaum (Lomonosov) 
Petrodvorets 
Rupture of the canvas, the 
formation of cracks, holes, etc. 
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Long-term forecasts for the acceleration of warming are not encouraging either. According to 
some estimations, by 2050 the temperature of permafrost rocks may rise by 3-6°C, so causing 
considerable warming up of permafrost rocks, their subsidence over large areas, and their 
submergence below sea level (Map, 2005; Kruzhalin, 2001). In the Sakha Republic and Chukotka, 
the activation of geodynamic processes is determined not so much by climate changes as by the 
seismicity of the territory.  
In the third group of regions, ecological-geomorphological situations are most pronounced, 
including the Yamal Peninsula as a prospective hydrocarbon production area. Hydrocarbon 
resources in the Yamal peninsula at present are as follows: 44.5 trillion cubic meters of gas, 5 
million tons of oil, and 2 billion tons of condensate. 
The Yamal Peninsula is characterized by extreme natural conditions including low annual average 
air temperatures, widespread permafrost rocks, and low levels of biological activity. Precipitation 
is up to 300mm, increasing southwards up to 400mm; and eastwards, towards the Polar Urals, up 
to 450mm of precipitation, which mostly occurs in the warm season of the year (from April to 
October) in the form of rain. In January the average air temperature drops to -48°C in the North 
of the Peninsula and to -44°C in the South. The absolute temperature minimum is observed in the 
western coast of Yamal, in Mappe-Sale village, at -50°C. In July the average air temperature 
increases from North to South and ranges from +4.5°C to 6.0°C. In the northern forest-tundra, it 
ranges from +10°C to 13°C. Stable frosts persist from 200 days in the South to 220 days in the 
North. Snow cover stays from 220 to 240 days respectively.  
Recent exogenous relief-forming processes are widespread in the peninsula – river and gully 
erosion, the complex of cryogenic processes (thermokarst, heaving, thermoerosion, 
thermoabrasion, solifluction, frost cracking), and aeolian processes. 
The development of deposits is accompanied by large drilling activities, road construction for 
various purposes, engineering constructions and living settlements. A forty-year development of 
the territory was accompanied by active relief-forming processes and, first of all, cryogenic ones. 
This determined the ecological safety of various constructions. The growing degradation of natural 
landscapes creates serious problems for the protection of nature in this region. 
Permafrost rocks of various ages and thickness react differently to anthropogenic affects. It was 
established that permafrost rocks of the Holocene Age are more resistant to anthropogenic 
influence, as there are less icy and devoid of stratified and reveined ice. 
Anthropogenic influence on permafrost rocks brings about the activation of processes of heaving, 
thermokarst, solifluction, thermoerosion, and thermoabrasion. Heaving and thermokarst are 
typical of subhorizontal water-dividing areas; solifluction, thermoerosion, and thermoabrasion 
characterize slopes and steep coasts of rivers and water reservoirs. 
Heaving is a risk of accidents in linear constructions that determine both material and ecological 
damage – irreparable consequences for the environment (Essays, 2009; The Map, 2005). Cryogenic 
heaving is the main cause of deformations in underground pipelines, which cross bogging super 
humid localities. The parts of the pipelines extending on the floor of non-freezing thermokarst 
lakes are subjected to heaving due to seasonal freezing of underwater thawed grounds. Heaving is 
also dangerous for roads, buildings, and communication and power lines, where cracks and 
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deformations may appear. Seasonal thawing leads to subsidence accompanied by still stronger 
deformations. 
The systematization of exogenous relief-forming processes in the cryolitezone is a complex 
problem due to a diversity of conditions and an ambiguity of the role of certain factors in their 
development (Voskresenskii, 2001; Report, 2017). Many permafrost phenomena appear under the 
influence of some processes; as a rule, two processes (Table 4).  
Table 4. Potential damage-producing activity of permafrost and erosion processes 
Processes Activity in points* 
Thermoerosion (complex impact) 1 
River erosion 2 
Frost cracking 3 
Sliding (drifting) 3 
Planar runoff 3 
Solifluction 3 
Thermokarst 3 
Erosion by temporary water courses 4 
Deflation 4 
Gully erosion  5 
*maximum 5 points 
The Yamal Peninsula is already involved in urbanization process. However it should be 
remembered that Yamal is unique as a natural object and as a specific social ecosystem. It has no 
analogues either in Russia, or in the World. Therefore we should not apply to it the methods of 
economic development, even successfully used in other regions. Its uniqueness and all possible 
negative consequences should be remembered. 
Conclusions 
Regarding regions of the Arctic zone as territorial resources, it is necessary during their 
development to carry out complex geocryological, geomorphological and ecological investigations 
based on: 
• Monitoring of the temperature regime in strata of permafrost rocks in different zonal-
regional conditions; 
• Prognosis of the dynamics of permafrost rocks and geocryological processes under different 
scenarios of global and regional climate changes;  
• The assessment of changes in complicated engineering-geological conditions and the cost 
of investigations associated with consequences of the global climate changes;  
• Assessment of changes in the stability of foundations of existing and projected 
constructions, conditions of mineral deposits mining; and 
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• Quantitative assessment of possible economic damage in case of the realization of different 
scenarios of global climate changes (Geocryological, 2000; Report, 2017). 
In conclusion we should mention that regions of the Arctic zone more than other regions of the 
Russian Federation need protection and insurance (in preparation of protection measures) of the 
population from negative impacts of natural and natural- anthropogenic processes. 
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Sustainable Development of the Russian Arctic Zone: 
Challenges & Opportunities 
 
Daryana Maximova 
 
This paper attempts to consider a fundamental problem of ensuring sustainable development of the Arctic zone of the Russian 
Federation in the context of expanding economic activity. In August 2017, the new edition of the Russian state program on 
the Arctic’s socio-economic development was released. At present, this is the main document regarding the development of the 
Arctic territories of Russia. The main idea of this document and the future law “On the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation” 
is to create support zones, which will be complex projects of social and economic development of the Arctic territories where the 
Northern Sea Route will become the main navigable artery and the central project. According to the state program, one of the 
main tasks of the support zones is the use of best practices for creating favorable living conditions for the residents. This paper 
will examine the Russian Arctic’s challenges and opportunities regarding sustainable development, including an analysis of the 
recent Russian plans in relation to the territorial development.  
 
 
Introduction 
The 1992 Summit in Rio de Janeiro, following the Brundtland Commission, recognized the so-
called sustainable development “that meets the needs of the present, without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED, 1987). Since then, the concept of 
sustainable development has acquired global significance. It is a fundamental problem of our time. 
This concept is indeed applicable to such an essential region as the Arctic. Since its foundation in 
1996, the Arctic Council has aimed to integrate sustainable development to the main areas of its 
activities. The forum unites the efforts of the eight member states to solve the challenges of the 
Arctic region to improve the economic, social and environmental well-being of the ecosystems 
and peoples living in the area. Therefore, the sustainable development of the Arctic is a global 
objective and requires the establishment of international cooperation.  
Finland’s Chairmanship platform in the Arctic Council states that “the human dimension of the 
Arctic Council’s work covers such areas as health, water, energy, infrastructure, and Indigenous 
cultures and languages, and thus contributes to the implementation of the Sustainable 
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Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations 2030 Agenda. Finland proposes to explore 
how the SDGs can be further used in strengthening the economic and social progress and cultural 
self-expression of Arctic communities” (High North News, 2017). Meanwhile, the current global 
warming has economic consequences which could be beneficial for the Arctic states. A recent 
launch of industrial development in the Arctic shows the growing interest toward transport and 
energy opportunities in the region. Economic indicators are increasing, however the growth of 
industry could lead to a high degree of negative impacts on the environment and residents.  
The concept of the Russian Federation’s transition to sustainable development was released in 
1996. Since the 2000s, there has not been a single document approved by Russia in the title of 
which there was a reference to “sustainable development.” It is especially interesting because 
Russia has declared a new stage of Arctic development. The new edition of the state program of 
2014 “Socio-economic development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation for the period 
until 2025”1 (State Program) was published in August 2017. The updated State Program outlines 
the country’s major plans for the Arctic territories, and sets out complex projects for the social 
and economic development of the region. 
Economic Development of the Russian Arctic  
The Arctic has always been a reserve of natural resources for Russia. Since the 1930s, during the 
Second World War and then the Cold War, in connection with the international situation, the 
country’s economy began to need natural resources badly. So in the 1920’s and 1930’s in the USSR, 
a program of government events was organized to study and develop the so-called Far North. The 
Soviet Union was eager to discover the resources of the rich Arctic quickly. There were issued 
orders for the construction of mines, power plants and factories near the Arctic deposits. Soviet 
development of the Arctic was intensive, large-scaled and based on free labor. In 1931, the first 
oil field in the Russian Arctic, Chibyiskoye, was discovered in the Komi Republic. In 1932, the 
Main Directorate of the Northern Sea Route (Glavsevmorput) was created by the Council of 
People’s Commissars of the USSR. The new directorate was entrusted with the economic 
development of the Arctic and navigation on the Northern Sea Route (NSR), as well as the 
organization of geological work, and exploration of minerals in the Arctic. The first head of the 
Glavsevmorput, Otto Schmidt, was appointed a polar explorer, who in the same year made passage 
on the NSR on the icebreaker “Sibiryakov” for the first time in one navigation, of 65 days. In 1937 
the first flight over the North Pole was made, and the first drifting scientific station “North Pole” 
was settled. In total, 31 drifting stations were organized in the USSR, and they functioned until 
1991. The program relaunched in 2003. In the 1930s Arctic seaports (Igarka (1931), Tiksi (1933), 
Dixon (1934), Dudinka (1935)), cities and new settlements were constructed. The USSR used 
prisoners of the Gulag as free labor. Thus, the prisoners built such Arctic cities as Dudinka, 
Vorkuta, Inta, Pechora as well as such industrial enterprises as the Norilsk Mining and 
Metallurgical Combine in 1935 and the Kapitalnaya mine in Vorkuta in 1937 and so on. In the 
second half of the 20th century, the most abundant hydrocarbon deposits were found. In the 1960’s 
and 1970’s they were discovered on the coastal territory—Urengoy (1966), Yamburg (1969), 
Bovanenkovo (1971), etc., in the 1980s hydrocarbons were found on the Arctic shelf—
Shtokmanovskoe (1988), Prirazlomnoye (1989), etc. As a result, during the period from the 1920s 
to the 1980s, the Soviet Arctic has become a circumpolar region with the most significant number 
of cities in the world. 
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Today, the Arctic region is one of the priority directions of Russia’s internal policy, including social 
and economic development as well as international cooperation. However, the legal status of the 
Russian Arctic zone and its borders are not yet defined precisely. The framework law on the Arctic 
zone in the USSR and then in the Russian Federation was not released despite attempts to accept 
it. Today legal relations in the Russian Arctic are regulated by more than 500 documents 
(Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East, 2017, October 10). A draft law “On the 
Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation” has been in progress for five years, and its consideration 
is continuously postponed. However, it may be submitted to the government in 2018. 
Today, Russia’s Arctic strategy is determined by three documents: Fundamentals of the State 
Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the period up to 2020 and beyond (2008); The 
Strategy of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation development and national security system 
for the period till 2020 (2013); The new edition of 2017 of the state program of “Socio-economic 
Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation for the period till 2025” (2014).  
In Russia, the concept of “sustainable development” is interpreted differently. There is no 
comprehensive understanding of all aspects of sustainable development. For example, in the State 
Program on the Arctic, the word “sustainable” is used 16 times on 140 pages of text. Five times 
the phrase “sustainable development” is used in different contexts: “sustainable development of 
the nuclear weapons complex,” “sustainable development of indigenous peoples,” “sustainable 
development of related industries,” “sustainable development goals and human well-being,” 
“sustainable development of regional ecosystems.” Thus, the State Program on the Arctic does 
not define what is meant by the term “sustainable development.” The authors of the State Program 
either did not set the task of articulating the principles of “sustainable development” or there is 
no clear understanding of what “sustainable development” is. At the same time, the authors 
consider this term to be applicable in completely different contexts. However, in the Russian 
terminology the closest term to “sustainable development” is usually the term “socio-economic 
development.” 
The main idea of the State Program is a creation of so-called support zones – comprehensive social 
and economic development projects aimed at achieving strategic interests and ensuring national 
security. There are eight support zones identified based on the existing administrative-territorial 
division of the Russian Arctic zone (Government of the Russian Federation, 2017, August 31). It 
is interesting that Russian regions work out these support zones, not federal authorities. Articles 
of the State Program about the support zones will be included in the future law “On the Arctic 
zone of the Russian Federation.” As of now the State Program can be considered as the primary 
document reflecting Russian plans in the Arctic zone. 
Here are the different zones and possible economic development as planned by the State Program: 
Kola support zone: the mining industry (more than 60 large deposits of various types of mineral 
raw materials, including apatite, nepheline, kyanite ore, nickel, copper), fishing, tourism, the central 
logistics hub to supply the entire western part of the Russian Arctic (ports Murmansk, 
Kandalaksha, Vitino, railway), the Northern Fleet; 
Arkhangelsk support zone: timber industry, shipbuilding, fishing, diamond mining complex, 
natural resources (lead, zinc, silver), railway, it is planned to create a port complex in Bezymyannaya 
Bay; 
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Nenets support zone: hydrocarbon production (Timan-Pechora oil and gas province), 
construction of the Northern Latitudinal Railway, the Naryan-Mar-Usinsk road, railway transport 
corridors (Belkomur, Barentskomur, Sosnogorsk-Indiga), development of ports in Amderma and 
Indiga, reconstruction of Naryan-Mar airport; 
Vorkuta support zone (Komi Republic): coal mining industry, construction of the Vorkuta-
Ust-Kara railway, the Pechora-Vorkuta road which will connect the Komi Republic with the 
Nenets Autonomous District, construction of the Northern Latitudinal Railway, tourism; 
Yamal-Nenetsky support zone: formation of the oil and gas chemical cluster will provide more 
than one third of the country's gas production (the Yamal Peninsula and Gydan, the shelf areas of 
the Kara Sea, the Ob and Taz Bay), construction of the Obskaya-Bovanenkovo railway, the Yamal-
Ukhta-Europe gas main, a plant for the production of liquefied gas at the South-Tambeyskoye gas 
field; 
Taymyr-Turukhanskaya support zone (Krasnoyarsk region): Norilsk industrial region (nickel, 
copper, platinum, cobalt), Dudinka Port, in 10–20 years will be coal and hydrocarbons, a coal 
terminal in the port of Dixon, road construction, modernization of the port Dixon, construction 
of the Tanalau offshore oil terminal; 
Chukotka support zone: mining industry (gold, tin, tungsten, coal, copper, mercury, 
hydrocarbons), construction of the federal road Kolyma-Anadyr which will provide year-round 
communication with other regions of the Russian Far East; 
North-Yakutian support zone: It must be emphasized that the North-Yakutian support zone is 
chosen as a pilot project according to the State Program. So far, there is no information on the 
launch of the project, possibly due to the lack of a law “On the Arctic Zone of the Russian 
Federation.” The first project of the North-Yakutian support zone is the reconstruction of the 
seaport infrastructure of the NSR in the village of Tiksi, which will ensure the safe entry into the 
port of sea-going ships with a draft of up to 10 meters (now only 5 meters), to bring the volume 
of cargo processing to 300,000 tons per year (Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far 
East, 2017, December 7). Yakutia can be a “bridge” between Asia and the Arctic. One of the main 
tasks will be the development of the eastern sector of the NSR, including within the framework of 
the China-Yakutsk-Tiksi-Europe Transport Corridor Project. It will cut the way from Asia to 
Europe, reducing the risk of falling into a complicated ice situation, which often exists at the exit 
from the Bering Strait to the Arctic Ocean. Logistics, according to this transport corridor, are as 
follows: the goods are delivered by rail from Harbin to Yakutsk, then they stow a cargo to river 
vessels and go to the port of Tiksi, then they stow the cargo to sea vessels and deliver them to 
European ports. The second project is a construction of a high-tech Zhataisk Shipyard, which is 
estimated at 5.75 billion rubles, while 4.1 billion rubles will come from the federal budget as part 
of the State Program. There will be the modernization of the fleet and construction of ships in 
Yakutia which will provide cargo transportation by inland waterways. It will create about 1,300 
new jobs (ibid.). Also, the following projects are planned: infrastructure development projects – 
reconstruction of airports, construction of roads, modernization of diesel power stations; projects 
of industrial development of the deposits of gold, diamonds, tin, coal, antimony, tungsten, indium, 
etc. It is said about investment projects for the development of the Upper-Munsky ore field, the 
placer deposit of the river Tirekhtyakh, about the geological study and development of the Western 
Anabar section, the Tomtor deposit of rare earth metals. Besides, in Yakutia, there are 80% of the 
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world stock of mammoth tusks and the Popigaysky deposit of impact diamonds. The North-
Yakutian support zone’s strategy is not completed yet. It will still change. At least, the Yakutian 
government is planning such. 
Thus, industrial development is the cornerstone of Russia’s Arctic strategy. The primary task of 
creating the support zones is the exploitation of mineral resources. According to the State 
Program, “almost two thirds of all projects are directly related to the development of the mineral 
resource base” (Government of the Russian Federation, 2017, August 31). Mineral raw centers 
with their infrastructure will be developed within the support zones. The most significant projects 
are the seaport of Sabetta on the Kara Sea in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District, which 
already began operating in December 2017, and is expected to become the most significant 
logistics hub of the NSR. One of the essential parts of this hub must be the Northern Latitudinal 
Railway (707 km), which will connect for the first time the Trans-Siberian Railway with the 
Northern Sea Route. It should be noted that this is a project of Soviet designers of Stalin’s time. 
The completion of the railway construction launched in May 2018 is planned by 2022. The project 
also has a social significance: about 300,000 new jobs can be created in the Arctic and the Urals. 
Another important project in Sabetta is the Yamal liquefied natural gas (Yamal-LNG) plant which 
opened in December 2017. 
The Northern Sea Route will become the most significant project. It should unite all the subjects 
of the Russian Federation that participate in the development of the Arctic because “the formation 
and functioning of the support zones are planned to be carried out in close connection with the 
Northern Sea Route” (ibid). By 2021, Russia plans to build three new nuclear icebreakers of 
Project 22220. The main icebreaker “Arctic” will float out in 2019, “Siberia” in 2020, and “Ural” 
in 2021. Russia does not limit the passage of foreign ships on the NSR, but starting in 2017 the 
right to transport hydrocarbons remains exclusively for Russian vessels (Government of the 
Russian Federation, 2017, December 26). As Vladimir Putin said in the message from the President 
to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, by 2025 the cargo traffic on the Northern Sea 
Route should grow by ten times – up to 80 million tons per year (Ministry for the Development 
of the Russian Far East, 2018, March 1). In March 2017, the government was instructed to work 
out the issues of creating a separate institution who will be responsible for the integrated 
development of the Northern Sea Route and Arctic territories, including the development of 
infrastructure and all the services required. At the moment, there is no special ministry responsible 
for the Development of the North and the Arctic in Russia. The leadership over Arctic issues at 
different times has been exercised by the Ministry of Economic Development and the Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Environment. However, the creation of a new ministry would require much 
effort and money, therefore it is uncertain when this will happen. Last year, it was announced that 
a decision has been made to entrust the Arctic to the Rosatom Corporation, whose structure 
includes Atomflot with its icebreakers. Rosatom might soon gain control over the development of 
the NSR and the coastal areas of the Arctic. Moreover, a separate section of the State Program on 
the Arctic prescribes plans for the development of the Russian Far East, which includes two Arctic 
regions – Yakutia and Chukotka. This combination is not accidental. After the presidential 
elections in 2018, Yuri Trutnev was appointed as Deputy Prime Minister of Russia responsible for 
both regions development—the Russian Far East and the Arctic. He was previously responsible 
for the development only of the Far East. In September 2018, Trutnev also headed the State 
Arctic Yearbook 2018 
 Sustainable Development of the Russian Arctic Zone 
378 
Commission for Arctic Development. In connection with his appointment, we can assume that 
not only the Far East but also the Arctic will become a megaproject of Russia. 
The State Program emphasized that public-private partnership must be a relevant tool for 
implementing the social and economic development of the Russian Arctic zone. The mechanism 
of public-private partnership was used in such megaprojects as the APEC meeting 2012 in 
Vladivostok, the Olympic Games 2014 in Sochi, and the FIFA World Cup Russia 2018; now the 
same development tool is being introduced for the development of the Russian Far East with the 
Arctic. The Far East is a priority, and the Arctic has an applied significance. The Ministry of 
Economy of the Russian Federation does not single out the Arctic in a separate macro-region in 
the draft of the Strategy of Spatial Development of the Russian Federation for the period until 
2025. In this strategy, the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation is distributed among four 
macroregions - the North, North-West, West-Siberia and Far East. However, in the development 
of the Far East, the situation is unusual, because Russia is oriented towards foreign investors, 
primarily Asian ones. Russia’s “Turn to the East”2 (from 2013) as well as Western sanctions3 (since 
2014) predetermined the development of Russia’s international cooperation with the countries of 
Northeast Asia – China, Japan and South Korea. In turn, the interest of Asian countries in the 
NSR is enormous. Their main attention is paid to the development of the transit possibilities of 
the Arctic. In this case, the Far East can become an outpost of Russia’s Arctic strategy in relations 
with Northeast Asia. To develop the Far East, Russia should take in consideration the wishes of 
these countries. Western sanctions on Russia have become an obstacle to possible investment 
projects, including the Arctic. At the same time, a possibility of cooperation with Russia remains, 
in the case of interest from the Western partners. Strong examples of this can be the participation 
of the French Total in the Yamal-LNG project or gold mining in Chukotka by the Canadian 
company Kinross Gold. Russia is open to collaborating with any potential partner, but the problem 
lies in excessive bureaucracy and the lack of a unified mechanism. The idea for a “one-window” 
mechanism is proposed to solve these issues. 
Environmental Damage 
Of course, there is a constant alarm about the environment in connection with the socio-economic 
development of the Arctic. The State Program occasionally mentions environmental problems. 
The list of tasks of the State Program declares that it is necessary to strengthen the coordination 
of activities of state authorities to “preserve and protect the Arctic environment, eliminate the 
environmental consequences of economic activity; improve environmental monitoring of the 
Arctic zone of the Russian Federation” (Government of the Russian Federation, 2014: 34). The 
basic principles and mechanisms for the implementation of the State Program are based on 
“maximum environmental conservation (application of the environmental standards and 
technologies)” (ibid: 35). In 2021-2023 in the list of main activities of the State Program, the 
construction of an environmental fleet is planned to ensure federal-state environmental 
supervision in the seas and on the continental shelf in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation 
(ibid: 104). However, in the State Program, there are no precise methods for combating 
environmental risks. At the same time, references to the other state program of “Environmental 
Protection for 2012–2020” were made. This document includes two subprograms convenient to 
the Arctic zone: “Hydrometeorology and Environmental monitoring” and the project “Clean 
Country,” which provides measures to eliminate the accumulated environmental damage. Russia 
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has recognized an accumulated environmental damage (industrial waste, nuclear waste, etc.) as a 
main environmental problem of the Arctic.  
In the twentieth century, priorities of the Soviet policy on the Arctic were industrialization and 
development of the military-industrial complex. Consequences of the industrialization and the 
active use of the NSR have become detrimental to the environment. In the 1990s after the collapse 
of the USSR, the Arctic was hit by an economic crisis: the polar explorers began to leave the Arctic, 
leaving the infrastructure and waste behind (buildings, cars, unused fuel, spare parts, and building 
materials). Substantial multi-kilometer dumps originated around scientific stations, military units, 
settlements, ports. According to some estimates, in the coastal zone of the Arctic Ocean, there are 
up to 4 million tons of industrial and construction debris, as well as from 4 to 12 million steel 
barrels (Sokolov, 2013: 18). Also, the nuclear tests conducted at that time on the Novaya Zemlya 
Archipelago, and flooded nuclear submarines have had a negative impact on the ecology. 
The problem of assessing and eliminating the accumulated environmental damage is present in the 
Arctic Strategy of Russia. Since 2010, as a result of the ex-Prime Minister’s indication, a cleaning 
of the Russian Arctic territories was launched. That year Vladimir Putin became aware of a massive 
amount of debris from rusted steel barrels with fuel during his visit to Franz Josef Land 
Archipelago, and he said that it was necessary to organize a “general cleaning” in the Arctic 
(Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2010). The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of Russia 
together with the Council for the Study of Productive Forces has developed a draft program for 
eliminating sources of negative impacts on the contaminated areas of the islands for 2012–2020. 
According to the survey prepared by the Council for the Study of Productive Forces in 2011–
2012, the total clean-up of Franz Josef Land alone will require about 8.5 billion rubles. Practical 
work on garbage disposal began in 2012 and went on in the summertime each year on the polar 
islands of the Barents Sea and the Arctic territories. 
The Franz Josef Land is a pilot region of the “general cleaning” in the Russian Arctic – 44% of 
the accumulated damage has already been cleaned up (Lenta.ru, 2017). The Russian Geographical 
Society joined the cleaning of the Arctic in 2010. They have launched the “Arctic clean-up 
program” on the islands of the Franz Josef Land, Spitsbergen, Wrangel, and the Novosibirsk 
Islands. There is a national project “Clean Country,” which is reflected in the State Program on 
the Arctic. According to this project, the accumulated environmental damage will be eliminated in 
the Franz Josef Land Archipelago, oil pollution in the Kuznetsov water protection zone 
(Arkhangelsk region), and the tailing dumps of the Kular gold-extracting factory of the Ust-Yansky 
municipal district in Yakutia. In 2014, the military joined in cleaning up the Arctic. They exported 
collected garbage from the islands using the Northern and Pacific fleets, as well as other vessels 
that usually carry out deliveries of goods to the northern territories. Also, in Russia, there is a 
general federal target program in 2014–2025 “Elimination of accumulated environmental 
damage”; of 218.7 billion rubles in funding, 22 billion rubles are allocated to the Arctic 
(Government of the Russian Federation, 2014).  
However, this is not enough. It is impossible to cope with this large-scale task without the help of 
the international community. Russia is attracting volunteers and military personnel for cleaning up 
the Arctic because of a lack of funds for hiring workers. In addition to the financing problem, 
there are two more challenges related to the methods of cleaning. Many issues on the elimination 
of garbage are not legally regulated. In particular, the procedure for determining environmental 
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damage has not been established. Moreover, the vulnerable Arctic ecosystem is disturbed during 
the collecting of debris. Therefore, there is a need to act more gently in particularly sensitive places. 
Russia most fully addresses issues of environmental protection in the Arctic in its strategic 
documents (Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the period 
up to 2020 and Beyond; The Strategy of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation development 
and national security system for the period till 2020). Unfortunately, the Russian environmental 
legislation does not explicitly mention the Arctic zone. On one hand, mechanisms stipulated by 
the environmental legislation – federal laws “On Environmental Protection” (2002), “On 
Ecological Expertise” (1995), “On Specially Protected Natural Territories” (1995) – are potentially 
applicable to the protection of Arctic ecosystems. On the other hand, none of these documents 
takes into account the specifics of the natural and climatic conditions of the area and do not 
establish specific environmental requirements for economic activities in the Arctic zone. The same 
is in the federal laws “On the Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation” (1995) and “On 
Subsoil” (1992), where there is not a single norm devoted explicitly to the Arctic zone. 
Gaps in the legal regulation on the protection of the Arctic environment in Russian legislation are 
one of the main topics of discussion. There are two points of view. Some believe that fundamental 
federal law is needed, the subject of legal regulation of which would be the protection of the 
environment of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation (Gladun, 2015:  135). Others believe 
that the environmental protection mechanisms of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation do 
not require the adoption of a particular law, it is mostly necessary to amend the already existing 
legislation to ensure their implementation (TASS, 2018). 
One additional challenge is the lack of eco-friendly technologies or green technologies that are 
needed in the Arctic. The article 12 (6) in the Executive Order on the Russian Federation 
Economic Security Strategy until 2030 was released in 2017, and was almost unnoticed. This article 
states that the development of “green technologies” is one of the main challenges and poses threats 
to the economic security of the country (Government of the Russian Federation, 2017, May 13). 
So, Russia is not yet ready to use green technologies in the development of the territories. 
However, it contradicts Russia’s new guidelines, which were defined in the “May decrees” of 
Vladimir Putin in 2018. On May 7, 2018, a second “May decree” was published, defining a work 
plan for Putin’s fourth presidential term. The full title of the document is “On national goals and 
strategic development objectives of the Russian Federation for the period until 2024”. “May 
decrees” is the name of a series of decrees signed by Vladimir Putin. The first “May Decrees” were 
signed on May 7, 2012, on the day when the President of the Russian Federation assumed office, 
and contained 218 instructions in 11 decrees to the Government of the Russian Federation for 
implementation during 2012-2020. “May decrees” mostly repeat the theses of Putin’s election 
promises. And ecology is identified as one of the national projects in “May decrees” for a six-year 
period until 2024. Among the goals of this project are: efficient handling and disposal of waste, 
reducing the level of atmospheric air pollution in industrial centers, improving the quality of 
drinking water for residents, and conservation of biological diversity. It is also planned to create 
24 protected areas with an area of 5 million hectares (Government of the Russian Federation, 
2018, May 7). But it will be in the future. To this day the Code of Administrative Offenses of the 
Russian Federation and the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation do not include special rules 
on liability for environmental pollution by economic and other activities in the Arctic zone despite 
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the fact that the Russian Arctic Strategy stresses the need to increase the responsibility of 
enterprises that use natural resources in the Arctic. 
Residents of the Russian Arctic 
In connection with the plans for the development of the Arctic region, there is a need for 
specialized personnel to implement large-scale investment projects in the Russian Far North. 
Today, one of the most pressing challenges is the outflow of the Arctic population. The share of 
Russia’s population living in the Arctic zone is small - 1.6% (Fauzer, Lytkina & Smirnov, 2017: 
22). The structure of the population of Russian Arctic territories includes groups of Indigenous 
small-numbered peoples of the North, medium-sized peoples such as the Yakut and Komi, settlers 
of the period of Soviet industrial development (20–80s of the 20th century), the descendants of 
the discoverers, and old Russian settlers. Also, rotation workers, scientists on expeditions and 
military personnel live there on a temporary basis. The population of the Russian Arctic is 
continually decreasing. In 1989 there were 3.3 million people; in 2016 - 2.3 million people (ibid). 
Cities with a population of more than 100 thousand inhabitants in different years include: 
Arkhangelsk, Murmansk, Severodvinsk, Norilsk, NovyUrengoy, Noyabrsk, and Vorkuta. The 
most urbanized regions of the Russian Arctic are the Murmansk Region and the Yamal-Nenets 
Autonomous District. 
Small-numbered Indigenous peoples are native residents of the Russian Arctic. The peoples who 
have fewer than 50,000 individuals are named small-numbered Indigenous people in Russia. There 
are 40 such Indigenous peoples in Russia; according to the last census of 2010, they comprise only 
257,900 people (Census, 2010). In the Russian Arctic, there are 19 small-numbered Indigenous 
peoples (Nenets, Chukchi, Khanty, Eveny, Evenki, Selkup, Sami, Eskimos, Dolgans, Chuvans, 
Chum, Nganasans, Yukagirs, Ents, Mansi, Veps, Koryaks, Itelmen, Kereks). The number of them 
is 82,500 people (Tishkov, 2016: 9–10). 
In Russia, there are many Indigenous peoples’ issues, which challenge their traditional way of life. 
Among the main issues that can be noted: a low level and low quality of life; alcoholism; high 
mortality; unemployment and poverty; and a large number of Indigenous people who migrate to 
cities, and are assimilated. There are imperfections in legal and organizational mechanisms that 
would need to be addressed to ensure the development of self-government of Indigenous peoples. 
Some Indigenous communities are not legal entities. Therefore, they cannot count on financial 
and social support from the state. Since the 1990s, a new problem has been noticed: the reduction 
in the number of reindeer in personal and collective ownership. Reindeer herding is considered to 
be the main branch of the traditional economy of the Indigenous peoples of Russia’s Northern 
regions. The Northeast of Russia was the largest region of domestic reindeer breeding in the world. 
The most telling example is Chukotka because this region formed the basis of reindeer herding. 
For decades in the 20th century in the Chukotka Autonomous Region, the number of reindeer 
stably remained at the level of half a million heads, which could be considered “normal” for this 
region. Since 1991, the reduction of reindeer husbandry, caused by socio-economic reforms, 
began. The number of domestic reindeers in Chukotka decreased by five times so that in 2002, the 
total number of reindeer was 94,600 thousand heads. In many farms, reindeer herding was lost 
entirely. In 2015, the total number of reindeer was 185,000 heads. However, it continued to 
decrease again. In 2017, their number has decreased to 155,000 heads (EastRussia, 2017). There is 
a need to create conditions for the restoration of reindeer husbandry, livestock, and fisheries as 
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the basis for social and economic security of the population, and the development of a traditional 
way of life. 
Moreover, relations between reindeer-herding communities and extractive companies have 
become urgent. Sometimes the Indigenous communities have no place for their reindeer because 
of the lack of pasture which is occupied by the extraction of minerals in the traditional territories 
of nature use of the small-numbered Indigenous people. In this case, the procedure of ethnological 
expertise can be especially interesting. In 2010, the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) released a law “On 
Ethnological Expertise in Traditional Living and Traditional Economic Activities of the 
Indigenous Peoples of the North of the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia).” There is no such law in any 
of the subjects of the Russian Federation, but such practice exists in the Yamal-Nenets 
autonomous okrugs, Khanty-Mansiysk autonomous okrugs and the Sakhalin region. Ethnological 
expertise in Yakutia must be carried out without fail. However, despite this condition, extractive 
companies continue to ignore the law of the Sakha Republic, citing the absence of federal law. At 
present, the process of discussing a federal draft law on ethnological expertise is underway; in 
March 2018 the first readings were held. Indigenous peoples have the right to enjoy benefits 
throughout the whole territory of Russia not only on their own territories where they live. The 
number of inhabitants in the settlements of Indigenous peoples is small. Such settlements in Russia 
are called “compact places of residence”, and their maintenance is costly for the state budget. The 
discussion on keeping such settlements in the North is growing. There is even an offer to move 
people from one “compact place of residence” to another bigger one regional center to reduce the 
number of such small settlements and to consolidate into the bigger groups of population in the 
enlarge settlements in the Russian Arctic. 
Among the challenges, the lack of human resources (rotation workers or residents) and a low level 
of living conditions in the Russian Arctic can be noted. The advantage of the rotation workers is 
the possibility to assemble a professional team in a short time. Also, the rotation workers are 
cheaper than settling new residents in the Arctic who would require a broad infrastructure for 
living. However, in the Russian Arctic, it would be optimal to involve the residents and develop 
their human potential, taking advantage of the infrastructure that has remained since the time of 
Soviet development. Russia has some unique residents having the experience of living in the Far 
North. Also, it needs to be emphasized that the survival experience of middle-numbered native 
peoples, such as the Yakut and Komi, is of particular value for the sustainable development of the 
Arctic region. For hundreds of years, they have been living in harsh northern conditions, and their 
numbers are increasing. So, in Yakutia in 1917 the Yakut had 224,960 people, growing to 365,236 
people according to the 1989 census (Dyakonov, 1993), and up to 466,492 people in 2010 (Census, 
2010). 
Therefore, to involve the residents of the Arctic zone in the new socio-economic development, 
there needs to be tools to prepare them for such development and lead them to get the qualification 
for the professions that are in demand. Along with the labor resources for the development of 
natural resources (oil, gas, mineral resources), there is a need for professionals who can build 
buildings and roads in the Far North, work in energy, transport, health, education, and commerce. 
In 2017, the ex-Chairman of the State Commission for Arctic Development Dmitry Rogozin said 
that it was planned to develop a federal target program for training personnel to work in the Arctic. 
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Besides, the conditions for attracting labor resources to the Arctic will be proposed in the future 
law “On the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation.” 
However, the reality is that the residents often cannot find a job, and unemployment is growing. 
One of the most urgent is the problem of poverty in the northern settlements. For example, in 
Yakutia, where there will be implemented a pilot project of the North-Yakutian support zone, the 
unemployment rate in the Arctic regions exceeds the average republican figure, and in some areas, 
it reaches 37% (Kondratyeva, 2014: 24). It so happens that the northern residents are mainly 
engaged in the public sphere: health care, education, social services, state and municipal 
management. The sphere of business, where the northerners could find a job, is not developed. 
Therefore, in the absence of a sufficient number of vacancies in many northern settlements, a 
significant proportion of people of working age are unemployed. Also, there is a problem within 
the framework of the “center-periphery” model, which leads to an increase in hidden 
unemployment and the emergence of a class of “newly unemployed” in the cities (Gavrilyeva, 
2016: 26). In modern Russia, the concepts of “center” and “periphery” have become truly 
common. There are differences in the levels of the economic and social life of the population of 
large cities and citizens living in the rest of the country (more than 80% of all Russians) who often 
feel themselves to be on the outskirts of the “centers” of political, financial, cultural and other 
activities. Firstly, there is the difference of interests and political decisions of the “center” from 
the pressing problems of the “periphery”; secondly, there is the belief of the “periphery” that it is 
impossible to influence “central” interests and decisions. These phenomena are also manifested in 
the sphere of state administration, where the “center” means the federal bodies of legislative, 
executive and judicial power, and the “periphery” is the corresponding bodies of the subjects of 
the Russian Federation (Leksin, 2013: 60). An additional point to emphasize is that such a vertical 
executive power structure makes it difficult to attract foreign investment in the Russian Federation. 
Attracting new residents to the Arctic is one of the challenges of the State Program. Since Soviet 
times there have been special programs, for example, northern surcharges (incomes) in the salaries 
of residents, which are considered the primary tool for attracting the population. However, under 
the current legislation, the northern surcharges for newcomers is accumulated in full only after five 
years of professional experience in the Far North. There is an opinion that it is necessary to revise 
this rule and to give the northern surcharges entirely immediately after the person has moved to 
the Arctic.  
Besides, since the 1990s the northern surcharges are now not so high than they were under the 
USSR. Therefore, if in Soviet times the salary of a northerner was ten times higher than the national 
average: now it is impossible. Today the air tickets are more expensive. It was suggested that the 
Russian government revise the northern surcharges exclusively in the direction of increasing them. 
So, in 2018 it was announced that salaries would rise in the Arctic regions of the country. In 
addition, the attractiveness of work and living in the Arctic zone needs to increase. For example, 
the development of the Northern Sea Route is essential not only for industry, but for residents 
too. During the Soviet period, regular supplies of so-called northern deliveries made through the 
Northern Sea Route, are impossible to fill today. The old port system of the NSR does not allow 
the use of infrastructure for these purposes. Almost annually the deadlines for the importation of 
essential goods, fuel, and food are broken. However, in the light of the future social and economic 
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development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, there is hope for restoring the northern 
infrastructure and creating an attractive image of the region.  
Conclusion 
The primary challenge for both social and economic development of Russia’s Arctic zone is an 
outflow of residents since the 1990s. Russia has set the task of keeping and attracting residents to 
the Arctic. There are discussions on this topic. Scientific research on human capital and human 
potential are in progress. It is necessary to increase the attractiveness of the region despite its harsh 
climatic conditions. Tools of attraction are an improvement of the living standards of the residents 
(an increase of salaries, benefits, compensations, and so on), and the creation of a comfortable 
infrastructure for housing and communications, which is impossible without socio-economic 
development. Therefore, in the State Program, the first object is the improvement of the quality 
of human life. It appears that Russia figures the development of social infrastructure is closely 
linked to the creation of industrial facilities. Russia needs to pay attention to the social dimension 
of sustainable development of its Arctic zone because those northern residents are the guarantor 
of its national security. Their presence in the Arctic zone provides Russia with its ability to exercise 
control over these vast territories. Also, more than 2 million residents of the Russian Arctic have 
a unique experience of survival in a severe climate.  
At the same time, environmental security is a pressing issue. Russia recognizes the accumulated 
environmental damage as a critical problem. Since 2012, the “general cleaning” of the Arctic 
territories from the debris of the Soviet legacy has been taking place. The fact that Russia’s 
economy sank into a deep depression in the 1990s is one more reason behind the pollution, besides 
Soviet industrial development. The accumulated environmental damage in the Russian Arctic is 
not only a result of industrial activity, but also of human activity abandoned by residents after their 
massive outflow from the Arctic in 1990s. In recent years, the President and the government are 
monitoring that project. Russia continues to clean up the Arctic, but it is not enough. There is a 
lack of funds to do it rapidly. We can assume that Russia could associate with the international 
environmental community to find some solutions to this problem. 
Russia has an apparent imbalance preferring economic development, rather than sustainable 
development as yet. It is very unfortunate that the environmental dimension of sustainable 
development remains in the shadow of statements about socio-economic development. There are 
concerns about environmental security arising from a new stage in the socio-economic 
development of Russia’s Arctic zone. Fears arise in particular from the pre-existing experience of 
large-scale Soviet development of the Arctic. So, it is necessary to establish a special regime for 
nature management, environmental protection, and pollution monitoring in the Arctic zone of the 
Russian Federation. However, Russia has an opportunity to engage in the process of developing a 
concept of sustainable development for the Arctic through the Arctic Council. The Sustainable 
Development Working Group proposes to consider the Arctic zone as an indicator of 
environmental conditions which gives a signal to the rest of the world about the impact of global 
processes (Kharlampyeva, 2010: 214). Environmental aspects should be central to the sustainable 
development of the Arctic. Current environmental issues exist in all circumpolar countries. 
Therefore, it is necessary to establish deeper international environmental cooperation. Indeed 
creating an effective system of sustainable development is possible only with the participation of 
all eight Arctic states (Young, 1998; Dodin, 2005).  
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Meanwhile, the Northern Sea Route is the primary goal of the socio-economic development of 
the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation. First, the NSR will develop as a transport and logistics 
sector between Asia and Europe. Second, it will act as a service sector in the framework of major 
energy projects. Russia undertakes to restore its infrastructure on the NSR because it has the 
longest coastline in the Arctic Ocean. The melting of the Arctic ice cap opens opportunities for 
Russia regarding the development of the Northern Sea Route. Opening access to the Arctic sea 
routes may allow Russia to develop as a maritime power. Merchant ships can begin to navigate, 
accompanied by icebreakers, through the Arctic, including across the North Pole. However, it is 
necessary to develop international cooperation to build all the logistics, as well as provide 
opportunities for rapid emergency response, and support commercial activity. In particular, Russia 
cannot implement its politics in the Arctic region without cooperation with other member states 
of the Arctic Council. The Arctic challenges are the shared responsibility between the circumpolar 
states. On the one hand, Russia’s State Program notes the importance of international cooperation 
within the organizations which are mandated to address Arctic issues. On the other, it is already 
clear that a special place in Russia’s international cooperation in the Arctic region will be occupied 
by the countries of North-East Asia. In particular there are great hopes associated with China. But 
it’s clear that the Arctic is a region of international cooperation for Russia. 
 
Acknowledgments 
This work was supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, Grant No 17-02-00619, 
the research project “Comparative analysis of the sources of incomes and the problem of poverty 
in traditional communities of northern regions of Russia, the USA, and Canada.” 
  
Notes 
1. In the new edition of 2017, the term of implementation has changed from 2020 to 2025. 
2. Since 2013, the current state of Russia’s economic and foreign policy development has 
been characterized by a strategy called “Turn to the East.” The APEC summit held in 
Vladivostok in 2012 laid the basis of this strategy. Its goal is to expand Russia’s political 
and economic influence in the Asian-Pacific region. In 2013, Vladimir Putin in a message 
to the Federal Assembly announced the rise of Siberia and the Far East as “a national 
priority for the XXI century.” From then Russia has begun to strengthen its diplomatic 
cooperation with Northeast Asian countries. 
3. Western sanctions (anti-Russian sanctions) are restrictive measures taken by the EU, the 
United States, and their satellite countries against Russia due to the Ukrainian crisis of 
2014. The main types of sanctions are bans on entry for individuals and on the conduct of 
economic activities for companies. 
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Authoritarian Administration: 
An Environmental Paradox in the Russian Arctic 
 
Troy J. Bouffard 
 
 
Throughout the Cold War, the international community often feared the worst concerning environmental behavior in Russia. 
However, post-Soviet Russia continues to make significant progress in environmental stewardship in one specific region – its 
Arctic coastline and maritime region. The contrast between on- and offshore priorities remains notably disparate, especially in 
policies and behaviors. While previous examination remains lacking in this context, it is important to ask – how, and especially 
why, does Russia maintain a significantly different Arctic offshore emphasis concerning the environment? The argument 
supported in this article suggests that, while Russia maintains a discernible difference between Arctic land territory versus 
maritime behaviors, initial intuition behind “why” indicates that Russia might possibly be setting conditions in order to 
eventually leverage soft powers, and ultimately, jurisdiction of an expanded amount of maritime surface territory in the Arctic. 
In support of the examination, the use of authoritarian environmentalism provides the framework in which to view the evidence 
and perspectives. Two case studies provide methodology, including aspects: 1) involving notable environmental problems within 
Russian Arctic land territory located around Norilsk mining as well as the Usinsk oil pipeline, and 2) focusing on Russian 
efforts toward offshore environmental remediation, prevention, and protection efforts. The actual differences in policies and 
behavior seem clear as a result, and perhaps helps establish the start of a discussion concerning the “why” in order to start 
investigating the potential greater reasoning behind such environmental behaviors, and maybe even what to anticipate. 
  
 
Introduction 
Throughout the Cold War the international community often feared the worst concerning 
environmental behavior in Russia. Several factors contributed to the decline in environmental 
quality under the Communist system, including disincentives toward conservationism as well as 
the nation’s enormous size and natural resource wealth supporting a sense of complacency (Henry 
& Douhovnikoff, 2008: 438-439). The global community’s suspicions of the USSR’s transgressions 
ranged from onshore oil and mining issues to severe air pollution through nuclear-related 
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contamination (Bronder et al., 2010: 56). However, since the fall of the Soviet Union, and especially 
during the last decade, Russia has made significant progress in environmental stewardship of its 
Arctic coastline and maritime region. The northern coast and waters continue to benefit from 
strong Russian governmental support, investments, and promotion of environmental issue 
remediation, prevention, and protection. Conversely, the same focus and magnitude of concern 
for land territories does not exist. The contrast between on- and offshore priorities remains notably 
disparate, especially with regard to policies and behaviors. Comparative literature remains lacking 
on this topic and offers an opportunity to explore the differences in terrestrial and Arctic maritime 
environmental stewardship policy characteristics of the Russian Federation.  
What explains how, and especially why, Russia has such a notable and stewardly emphasis 
concerning the Arctic offshore environment? The argument supported in this article suggests that 
Russia not only enables deliberately different behaviors, but could also be setting conditions 
through its Arctic maritime environmental priorities in order to eventually leverage soft power for 
the purposes of contesting established international rules. The Russian regime continues to 
suppress transparency of issues to its civil society, supported largely by state-controlled mass media 
which helps to ensure how state actors critically shape and narrate legitimate concerns 
(Poberezhskaya, 2015: 106; Smyth & Oates, 2015; Sundstrom & Henry, 2016). Therefore, to 
support the hypothesis, authoritarian environmentalism helps provide the theoretical framework 
from which to view perspectives and evidence – an application not yet applied to Russia based on 
the available literature. The methodology follows themes based on two post-Soviet case studies. 
The first involves significant environmental issues within Russian Arctic land territory (figure 1). 
In particular, this case examines the notable environmental problems associated with Norilsk 
mining in the central Siberian region (Shiklomanov & Laruelle, 2017: 254) as well as the Usinsk oil 
field problems in the west (Wilson & Society, 2016: 77-79). The second case focuses on Russian 
Arctic coastal and offshore environmental remediation, prevention, and protection efforts. Of 
note, the secondary part of the argument concerning “why” – although necessary to provide a 
fuller contribution – should be considered and understood only as an initial plausibility probe. This 
means that the findings hopefully provide an emerging opportunity to begin consideration, 
however speculative at first, into one of any vast number of possible consequences; perhaps even 
drawing further interest and perspectives.    
Background 
Authoritarianism 
Progress throughout the 90s to improve Russia’s public- and private-sector environmental aspects 
as well as expanded actor access and influence suffered repressive marginalization. It is important 
to remember Putin’s presidential election victory donned the guise of emerging democratic values, 
such as greater public access and influence concerning environmental issues, only to begin 
reversing democratic progress and Western envy after securing the win (Tysiachniouk et al., 2018). 
This means, in part that, countering Russian desires of the West became necessary to not only 
undo jealously of Euro-Atlantic progress, but also citizen expectations of government and 
governance – both wildly different from Putin’s vision to establish a superior Eurasian civilization. 
During the transition, Putin tried to soften the shift by offering an authoritarianism model with 
personal freedoms, possibly as a way to facilitate incrementalism domestically and appease the 
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range of generations (Lukin, 2009: 71). This shift ultimately signaled that Russia would not 
continue to pursue and support the environmental reforms of the 90s, but rather develop into a 
“vanguard of right-wing authoritarianism” (Feifer, 2018). 
Authoritarianism refers to the relationship and dynamics involving both authoritarian leaders and 
authoritarian followers (Altemeyer, 1996). The ‘right-wing’ component represents authoritarian 
followers that willingly submit to authoritarian leaders perceived as legitimate powers, and who adopt 
social norms while acting hostile toward those that do not (Altemeyer, 1981). In the context 
offered by this article, if environment health needs to be risked or sacrificed for natural resource 
development in accordance with Kremlin directives, then a supportive constituency would not 
only be expected to accept such conditions, but also to aggressively counter non-supportive 
perspectives and activities, such as protests and grassroots initiatives. 
Prevention 
Preventing environmental disasters and issues usually requires governmental mandates and 
industrial compliance. Policy is not just the written word or implemented documents; it is also the 
speech and conduct of the public-sector elites. Profit-maximizing firms tend to disregard the full 
economic and social costs of their activities, such as increased risk of accident from petroleum 
extraction, on other stakeholders and on the ecosystem in general (Cole, Izmalkov, & Sjöberg, 
2014: 10). Negative externalities remain one of the primary justifications for government 
intervention through policy and regulation developed to resolve issues. Such externalities, or 
un/intended consequences of economic enterprise, generally require governmental regulation to 
mitigate harms to society and the environment. To that end, policy helps to bind and constrain 
what is known as discretionary authority. 
Prevention-related policies normally take form through regulations, embedded throughout various 
mandates and requirements where preventive intent can be little more than implied directives. 
With regard to Russia, the later section involving the case studies illustrates the differences in how 
onshore and offshore regulatory behavior remains significantly unbalanced in reality. Russian 
legislation provides expectations for both on- and offshore environmental management, yet only 
the maritime Arctic continues to benefit from meaningful implementation and enforcement. 
Remediation 
Understanding remediation is not without its difficulties. Contrary to popular belief, remediation 
involves far more than just simple cleanup of a contaminated site. Numerous aspects illustrate 
some of the legal ambiguities that add to the complexity of remediation, including - but not limited 
to - 1) defining contaminated land, 2) scopes of efficacy in remediation, 3) defining the utility of 
the scientific foundation supporting remediation, 4) specifying differences between short- and 
long-term risk reduction, 5) determining contamination worthy of remediation, 6) establishing the 
degree of cleanup that will be judged as satisfactory, 7) developing the role of technology, and 8) 
overcoming effective methods of remediation management (involving interdisciplinary 
communication problems, dealing with uncertainty, and policy issues) (Hrudey & Pollard, 1993: 
56, 64, 66). In addition to the categories of remediation (isolation, mobilization, destruction), 
efforts can be considered in categories including containment -  namely in situ, and ex situ (Table 
1) (Mulligan, Yong, & Gibbs, 2001: 205). As expected, onshore remediation often differs from 
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offshore. For example, oil-spill cleanup techniques fall under three categories depending on 
location, including 1) mechanical, 2) chemical, and 3) in situ burning (Modeling of potential oil spill 
behavior when operating Prirazlomnaya OIFP (offshore ice-resistant fixed platform). Assessment of Possible Oil-
spill Emergency Response, 2012: 81). Lastly, costs can range from tens to hundreds of dollars per ton 
of remediated land (Mulligan et al., 2001: 205). 
 
Table 1. Traditional remediation categories and techniques 
Category Techniques 
Containment/Isolation 
Mechanical separation 
Capping 
Low permeability cutoff walls 
Solidification/stabilization 
Vitrification 
Mobilization 
Pump and treat 
Permeable treatment wall 
Soil vapor extraction 
Soil heating 
Soil washing 
Pyro Separation 
Electrokinetics 
Phyto remediation 
Destruction 
Incineration 
Bioremediation 
Sources: Content for this table partially developed from Hrudey and Pollard (Hrudey & Pollard, 1993: 64-65; 
Mulligan et al., 2001: 197-204).  
 
Administration and Regulations 
The scope of onshore oil and mining activity remains overseen primarily by the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation. Key federal executive bodies include the 
Federal Supervisory Natural Resource Management Service and the Federal Service for 
Environmental, Technological, and Nuclear Oversight. Federal Law No. 2395-1 of February 21, 
1992 represents the lead legislation regulating terrestrial oil and mining activity. The early post-
Soviet law increasingly fell short of effective though. By the turn of the century, significant 
shortcomings with the law surfaced and the Putin administration accepted responsibility in pursuit 
of major reform, which underwent delays and ultimately failed (Adachi, 2009). Instead, the Subsoil 
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Law of 1992 was amended, to include provisions to strengthen environmental protection. 
However, federal environmental law, as a potential backstop to natural resource legislation 
shortcomings, has eroded for over a decade now with decreased jurisdiction limited to projects 
associated with the continental shelf or conservation areas (Pettersson et al., 2015: 250). Although 
pronounced, Russian environmental law lacks the resulting substantive rules and enforcement 
commitment in support of environmental management as maximizing resource exploitation 
maintains dominance over systems (ibid: 252). Far more administration and regulation pertain to 
oil and mining activities than can be covered in this study. However, this brief introduction should 
provide the basic context for what will later be discussed concerning institutional path dependency. 
Theoretical Framework 
Theory 
The origins of the concept of authoritarian environmentalism, the antithesis of democratic 
environmentalism, can be traced to the 1970s to Heilbroner (1974), who proposed a wide 
consideration of governance and global stresses caused by population growth and resource 
scarcity. Under such conditions the emerging theoretical development became defined as “a non-
participatory approach to public policy making and implementation in the face of severe 
environmental challenges” (Gilley, 2012: 287). Furthermore, a dimension of authoritarian 
environmentalism states that it is “a policy process dominated by a relatively autonomous central 
state, affording little or no role for social actors and their representatives” (ibid: 288). Reasons that 
states invoke authoritarian environmentalism processes include non-state actor difficulties with 
issue complexity, value conflicts, expert information deficits, and policy legitimacy disagreements 
as well as state-actor interests involving dominating traditions and structure, leadership choices, 
and agency (ibid: 292-293). Gilley further explains that authoritarian environmentalism often 
emerges in discussion as either a prescriptive model or descriptive model with regard to 
environmental issue response. The prescriptive model helps to clarify authoritarian aspects of 
environmental policy given the highly directive nature of the government toward policy, versus a 
performance-based approach which allows for roles involving non-state actors, especially with 
regard to prevention policies and industry innovation.  
Authoritarian environmentalism should not necessarily be only thought of as anti-democratically 
ineffective. Much like the idea of the “benevolent dictator,” this non-democratic form of 
environmental governance earned positive perspectives touting its effectiveness. Possibly the most 
noteworthy example is the effectiveness of China’s application (as the leading proponent)  of 
authoritarian environmentalism via the 1970s one-child policy, which is credited with alleviating 
global population growth and the impacts to the environment by avoiding what is estimated to be 
an additional 400 million Chinese (Beeson, 2010: 289). A significant amount of the literature 
demonstrates the success of authoritarian environmentalism, especially when it comes to resolving 
substantial environmental problems that democratic environmentalism struggles to address. This 
association coincides with the conventionally defined understanding of authoritarian 
environmentalism, which is stated as a public policy model that concentrates authority in a few 
executive agencies manned by capable and uncorrupt elites seeking to improve environmental 
outcomes (Gilley, 2012: 288). The application of the theory for this article focuses not only on 
how the Russian Federation handles environmental issues through prevention and remediation 
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efforts, but also why the state may leverage authoritarian environmentalism in order to facilitate 
economic goals (required to support higher-level strategic objectives). In this sense, perhaps a new 
version of this theory could be established that accounts for the less appealing aspects of 
authoritarian rule; possibly “counter-benevolent authoritarian environmentalism” or “anti-
democratic environmentalism.” All models of environmental public policy involve a degree of 
both authoritarian and democratic environmentalism, but on a continuum, models will tend to 
lean toward the dominating governing principles and values of the state. 
Additionally, the role and sphere of the general public access and influence within an authoritarian 
regime should be acknowledged. Authoritarian solutions toward environmental issues often comes 
across as ineffective as understood by narrow instrumentalism of rationalistic management and 
approaches based on anarchist prescriptions (Torgerson, 1999: xi). Public participation is limited 
to a confined cadre of scientific and technocratic elites while others are expected to participate in 
state-led mobilization for the purposes of implementation (Ahlers & Shen, 2018: 300). However, 
authoritarianism does not automatically mean “no public access or influence,” aside from the 
previously mentioned expectations. Clearly, authoritarian aspects of environmentalism likely 
restrict unscripted public participation. For example, on the extreme side, in both Burma and Iran, 
no public space exists where opposition can be legitimately or openly pursued without, in Burma 
‘inviting severe retribution from the military regime,’ or, in Iran, inviting a visit by the state’s 
guardians of Islamic law (Doyle & Simpson, 2006: 752). Less harsh circumstances may exist in 
China, where citizens now experience a relative decrease in the risk of protesting as sociopolitical 
activism and popular contention becomes more widespread and tolerated (Steinhardt & Wu, 2016). 
At the same time, liberal democracy is not simply the opposite of authoritarianism. Time and again 
the conventional liberal democratic model practices little more than voting in elections, largely 
devoid of enhanced deliberations and meaningful discourse in the public sphere (Torgerson, 1999). 
Nonetheless, defining and comparing effectiveness of environmental governance is beyond the 
scope of this article. 
Although authoritarian environmentalism has successfully resolved significant issues in the past, 
often by deliberately bypassing civil inclusion, this study hopes that a novel application of the 
theoretical framework normally reserved for China has applied meaning when developing 
explanatory power concerning the Russian Federation. Authoritarian environmentalism continues 
to gain expanded application, including approaches that consider, 1) how Korea leveraged it as a 
democratic state, (Han, 2015) and 2) how Singapore used it as a developing state (Han, 2017). 
Again, both circumstances view perspectives through a relatively uncorrupt governance lens. 
This study offers yet another application of the theory from a view through an ethically 
questionable governance lens of a developed, semi-democratic (managed democracy) authoritarian 
state. Nevertheless, the use of authoritarian environmentalism for this study presents limitations. 
Thorough application toward Russian Federation environmentalism has yet to be established. 
Although this article considers the premise of the relationship between economic growth and 
environmental stress, the developed linkages differ from those that follow ecological 
modernization frameworks (Mol, Spaargaren, & Sonnenfeld, 2014; Tokunaga, 2010). The process-
tracing quality of ecological modernization can present a cleaner description of how, but the why 
question for this study might ultimately fall short of convincingly effective when discussing the 
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data. Ecological modernization helps to explain meaningful environmental reform, but for this 
study it cannot answer how the reverse occurs. 
Methodology and Selection Criteria 
Case study is a form of qualitative research that can advise evidence-informed decision making in 
the policy realm. It is one of the basic methods – the others being experimental, statistical, and 
comparative – of establishing general empirical proposition (Lijphart, 1971: 682). Case study is the 
detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test explanations that may 
be generalized to other events (George & Bennett, 2005: 5). It is important to note that the 
emphasis is on the well-defined aspect of the incident, event or crisis, rather than the historical 
event itself. Case study is an empirical inquiry that focuses on contemporary phenomena within a 
real-life context in which the boundaries between the phenomena and the context are not evident 
(Yin, 2013). Whereas other research methodologies often use strategies meant to reduce data for 
empirical clarity, case studies can focus on one case while accounting for context encompassing 
many variables (Johansson, 2003: 4-5).  
Moscow and St. Petersburg are not representative of the whole of Russia as they are subject to 
greater forces of economic and social transformation than other areas of Russia, especially with 
regards to comparative environmental issues (Crotty & Hall, 2013: 7), and as such are deliberately 
excluded from the case studies. Moreover, this study focuses on northern Russia – those areas 
designated within the “Arctic Zone (figure 1),” (Glinskiy, Serga, & Zaykov, 2017: 312) especially 
onshore (currently), that experience a significantly higher level of industrial activity and economic 
circumstances (Poland, Riddle, & Zeeb, 2003: 380). For this article, the onshore case study 
emphasizes two globally notable environmental tragedies as examples representative of the state’s 
overall attitude and behavior toward enduring legacy issues while the offshore case, including the 
Northern Sea Route (figure 2) study presents a far different picture concerning state focus on 
offshore areas of emerging opportunity. 
Case Studies 
Onshore - Usinsk 
A prime example of an onshore disaster involves an oil spill that occurred just outside of Usinsk, 
Russia. A pipeline just south of the Arctic Circle had been leaking since February 1994, with the 
oil contained in a dike constructed for that purpose. However, diurnal temperature differences, 
snow and rain caused the dike to collapse in October of that year and millions of gallons of oil 
flowed onto the Siberian tundra. With frozen conditions, the pollution did not soak into the 
ground at first, so initial efforts focused on containment with hasty snow and earth berms. 
However, heavy rains in the spring caused these structures to fail and the oil flowed west, reaching 
the Pechora River and eventually into the Barents Sea ("The Russian Arctic Oil Spill," 1997). The 
volume of the spill is unknown, but authoritative estimates put the amount between eighteen and 
ninety million gallons (the Exxon Valdez oil spill was eleven million gallons by comparison) 
(Goldberg, 1994). Another estimate puts the amount spilled between ~600k and 2m barrels, 
(nearly half of Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico), while the oil that did not first end up 
in the Arctic Ocean-bound Kolva, Usa, and Pechora rivers, spread over 186 square kilometers of 
marshland and tundra (Bachman, 2010). 
Arctic Yearbook 2018 
Bouffard 
395 
 
Figure 1. Land Territory of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation 
 
Note: .pdf embedded image, zoom enabled for higher resolution and readability 
 
Greenpeace helped provide global awareness of the incident once oils reached the Arctic Ocean. 
As a result, the Russian government requested and received a $99 million loan from the World 
Bank to pay for additional cleanup (Jernelöv, 2010: 359). Efforts toward further remediation fell 
far short of effective. When the snow that covered over a couple hundred square kilometers of 
oil-soaked soils melted, the now darkened ground surface layer was able to rapidly thaw the active 
layer of soil above the permafrost to depths much deeper than normal. Previous observations 
illustrate the same effect in interior Alaska, where crude oil changed thaw depths to 70cm from 
the previous average of 57cm in non-impacted areas (Collins, Racine, & Walsh, 1994: 164). The 
overall effect resulted in the oil creating its own carrier waters which repeated until it reached the 
Pechora River, flowing north into the Barents Sea. The incident is considered among the top five 
worst oil spills in history (Jernelöv, 2010). 
The Russian company Komineft is responsible for this spill as well as several other incidents in the 
Komi region. The company blamed the West for exposing the incident and went on to deliberately 
constrain standard procedures used in clean up, as was being overseen by Alaskan companies that 
had then recent experience with the Exxon Valdez incident (Shapiro, 1995). Initial estimates and 
other figures underwent significant (increased) revisions within weeks once an international team 
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observed the reality (Russian Federation Oil Spill Oct 1994 UN DHA Information Reports 1-6, 1994). 
 
Figure 2. The (actual) Northern Sea Route 
Note: .pdf embedded image, zoom enabled for higher resolution and readability 
Beyond the single catastrophic event, it is believed that the majority of the Usinsk oil pipeline 
infrastructure is deteriorating, resulting in thousands of pollution-causing incidents each year 
[emphasis added] that add up to more oil spilled than during the Deepwater Horizon disaster 
(Luhn, 2016). Although Western Siberian oil reserves are steadily depleting through continued 
production (and spills), operations continue at full capacity with relatively unknown changes to 
policies. 
Onshore - Norilsk 
Norilsk is home to the world’s largest nickel producing mine as well as significant reserves of 
platinum, cobalt, and palladium. The highly industrialized Arctic city provides an example of the 
order of magnitude effects on the environment associated with large-scale operations. For decades 
Norilsk has often been the worst air polluter in Russia (figure 3), the Boreal Biome, and the world, 
in the form of emissions involving large quantities of sulfur dioxide – a main component of acid 
rain (Karnachuk et al., 2005; Kotov & Nikitina, 1996). Urban development on permafrost has 
suffered different kinds of failures as well. Pollution from factories help produce acidic 
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precipitation which in turn affects the active layer of permafrost as a result of an increase in thermal 
conductivity of soils (Grebenets, Streletskiy, & Shiklomanov, 2012: 112). 
 
Figure 3. Satellite image of the MMC Norilsk factory area. 
 
Source: Google Maps screenshot (satellite view), captured on 01 April 2018 
https://www.google.com/maps/@69.2841327,87.8964149,15593m/data=!3m1!1e3  
 
Changes in building bearing capacity worsened with changes in permafrost as measured by safety 
coefficients, often associated with event-driven structural incidents. However, comparisons 
acknowledge that civil-engineering standards of the past could not have anticipated or factored in 
current understanding of climate change impacts to the environment (Grebenets et al., 2012: 114). 
Road and railways in and around Norilsk continuously suffer significant failures as a result of 
changing permafrost. In a temporal analysis of environmental information disclosure of the ten 
largest mining projects, CVRD and MMC Norilsk placed last in offering stand-alone reports and 
assessments regarding company policies (Jenkins & Yakovleva, 2006). The study indicates that 
Norilsk consistently failed to voluntarily provide environmental information regarding ethics, 
indigenous peoples, sustainability and corporate social responsibility in accordance with 
international guidelines which includes the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) (Jenkins & 
Yakovleva, 2006: 280-281). 
Ecologically, the circumpolar treeline represents an important area to study the relationship 
between climate change and ecosystem response where vegetation responds steeply to factors such 
as temperature and precipitation (Timoney et al., 1992). Laing et al. (1999) studied the effects of 
anthropogenic activity of Norilsk in waters along the associated treeline and found that air 
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pollution from the factories impacted microalgae significantly different from similar industrial 
activity in Canada and Scandinavia. Today, Norilsk continues to operate under the same policies 
and continues to draw attention as the world’s most depressing city – a place where even the local 
river recurrently runs deep red from pollution (Gigova, 2016). 
Offshore – The Russian Northern Coast and Maritime Environment 
Building on the progress of groups such as the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation 
(AMEC), Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP), and the Global Partnership 
Program (GPP), Russia welcomed a significant contribution of over $130m in June 2003 from the 
international community to assist with nuclear cleanup in the Kola Region (Digges, 2003). At the 
time of the funding support announcement at the G-8 summit in France, there were 115 
decommissioned nuclear subs and 258 nuclear reactor associated with the Arctic region (Digges, 
2003). 
Under a government program in 2010, the Russian Geographical Society (RGS) accepted 
obligations for a full-scale cleaning of the Arctic ("Arctic Cleanup Program," 2013). In 2011, the 
organization developed environmental pollution estimates, and over the next couple years 
remediated several affected areas of pollutants, including 1) 52,000 barrels, 2) 2,500 tons of 
combustible and lubricating material, 3) 5,000 tons of scrap metal, 4) 1,800 tons of solid waste, 
and 5) 50 hectares of reclaimed land ("Arctic Cleanup Program," 2013). 
In 2010, then Prime Minister Putin ordered that a million abandoned barrels be removed from the 
Franz Joseph Land Archipelago because they were polluting the environment (Bryanski, 2010). As 
with other Arctic locations, the outlying islands served as Cold War support, where Putin stated 
caused “a pollution level that is six times higher than normal…with a need to organize a sweeping 
cleanup of the Arctic” (Bryanski, 2010). 
On World Environment Day in June 2014, President Putin reiterated the 2010 Arctic coastal and 
offshore cleanup program as a “massive spring cleaning effort on our Arctic territories” as 
“necessary for clearing the consequences of our past attitudes to the Arctic” (President of Russia, 
2014). In the same speech, Putin continues to state that “we should not only fix the damage done 
to the [Arctic] environment…we should also make sure we never repeat these mistakes in the 
future.”   
In March 2017, Russia’s Federal Medical and Biological Agency together with the Norwegian 
Radiation Protection Authority began planning a joint project to withdraw all nuclear waste from 
Adreeva Bay, located on Kola Peninsula near the Russian-Norwegian northern border (“Russia 
and Norway team up to clean Arctic of nuclear waste”, 2017). The facility has a long history of 
radioactive pollution issues, including a significant accident in 1982 when a serious leak in the 
spent fuel storage pool in building 5 released highly radioactive water as a result of cracked steel 
walls because of ice – increasing until the situation was resolved many months later (“Storage of 
spent nuclear fuel in Andreeva Bay — history”, 2003). Over the last two decades Norway has 
contributed millions in aid toward cleanup. Current estimates project that approximately 3,100 
container shipments will be required to empty the three storage tanks of spent fuel assemblies 
(Nilsen, 2017). 
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In September 2017, the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation declared that it was 
adding a special Arctic department and increasing legislation and oversight of  violations involving 
activities that contribute to pollution, as well as imposed remediation requirements for violators 
(Staalensen, 2017). Justification for the development comes from various issues, including 
numerous violations of environmental laws in the Arctic, neglected industrial waste management, 
economic activities being conducted without required approvals, and use of illegal components 
and substances (Staalensen, 2017). 
Also in September 2017, The Russian Federation’s Northern Fleet, the largest and most powerful 
of its four (including the Pacific, Black Sea, and Baltic fleets), continued a new season of a cleanup 
project on Kotelny Island to remove six hundred tons of scrap metal (“Northern Fleet begins 
evacuating scrap metal from Arctic island”, 2017). The project compliments previous efforts for 
the last two years when the Russian Navy removed fifteen thousand empty oil barrels (two hundred 
liter) as well as two hundred thousand tons of scrap metal. The island is part of the Novosibirsk 
Archipelago and previously served as a major port supporting Navy operations. As part of these 
remediation efforts, the Russian government announced that over 90 percent of the project met 
the 2017 environmental cleanup plan  (“Northern Fleet’s Platoon Continues Cleaning on Arctic 
Island”, 2018; “Russian Defense Ministry completes over 90 percent of its 2017 environmental 
cleanup plan”, 2017). 
The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation announced in 
October 2017 that it would spend over $3 billion rubles in an environmental protection fleet largely 
focused in the North (“Russia plans to build an environmental protection fleet worth 3.1 billion 
rubles after 2021”, 2017). Minister Donskoi stated that starting in 2021 the fleet would provide 
environmental inspections in the sea, and that the program will upgrade the safety level of sea 
activities and substantially minimize any possible environmental risk to the sea ecosystems (“Russia 
plans to build an environmental protection fleet worth 3.1 billion rubles after 2021”, 2017). 
Results and Discussion 
Throughout the case studies, a pattern of Russian Arctic environmental behavior is not difficult 
to discern. Emphasis on the offshore Arctic maritime environment, including coastlines and 
peninsulas, remains convincingly distinct from the lack of same focus for Arctic terrestrial 
environmental issues. Onshore, the desire to address environmental issues through prevention and 
remediation efforts seems stagnantly ineffective and ostensibly deliberate. Efforts to affect 
industrial activity through policy – the primary means with which to constrain and bind the 
discretion and behaviors of actors – remains lacking, and often unknown. Some may reasonably 
attribute onshore environmental issues as entrenched legacy behaviors from Soviet policies and 
too overwhelming to overturn. 
Russian News Agency TASS interviewed the deputy chief of the Ministry of Natural Resources in 
March 2017, (the Year of Ecology in Russia), citing 40,000 tons of waste cleaned in the Arctic 
Zone (Керимов, 2017). As discussed, during that same year, Russia launched “Чистая Страна” 
(Clean Country), with remediation goals set for 2025. Throughout the interview, the deputy 
acknowledged the sensitivity of the Arctic ecosystems and overall need to protect the environment 
of the Arctic Zone of Russia. Deputy Kerimov also stated that the majority of pollution occurred 
from the 30s to the 80s, during a period of “intensive industrialization and natural resource 
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extraction” (Керимов, 2017). Such a statement implies that the problems and responsibilities 
originated from previous generations during the Soviet era and should not reflect the efforts of 
this century so far. 
The Usinsk area residents and environment seem relegated to living with constant oil pollution as 
a result of accidents and rapidly worsening infrastructure. A simple search on Google maps 
(satellite view) of the Usinsk region and north of the main city reveals an extensive pipeline 
network and what appears to be numerous large spots of barren earth, spur lines and access roads 
as well as significant surface oil and scarring. When trying to understand the seemingly blatant 
disregard for the environment, one thought may be that the government does not want to provide 
funding for legacy pollution and deferred maintenance issues when there is far more interest in 
getting new projects online, especially in the offshore Arctic, knowing that the onshore reserves 
will eventually be depleted. 
The Norilsk region provides a strong illustration of the way environmental air quality issues are 
directly associated earth surface problems caused by industrial activity. Air quality studies provide 
scientific explanation of both short and long term impacts to the regional ecosystems. On the 
ground, readily visible evidence shows gross reminders of unmitigated effects to local hydrology 
(Figure 1). The sulfur content in the precipitation of the Polar Division of Norilsk (MMC) remains 
the highest not only in Siberia, but all of Russia, while less than 10 percent of the wastewater from 
all sources go through purification (Bronder et al., 2010: 19-21). 
Path Dependency 
Partly enabled by Russian censorship, the Komi Republic oil pollution (Usinsk) represents what 
can happen when resource extraction projects lack proper oversight and suitable technology 
(Rosen & Thuringer, 2017: 60). Path dependency can further help to explain the onshore problems 
with regard to insufficient incentives established with the operating firms in Norilsk and Usinsk. 
Greener (2005) explains that path dependency involves future policy experiencing constraints 
because institutions and policies tend to succumb to inertia. Considerable evidence exists linking 
significant availability of commodity resources to marginalization of institutional integrity and 
vitality, to include the ability to increase profits under weaker institutes (Diversifying Russia: 
Harnessing Regional Diversity, 2012: 14). Revenues generated from the projects in Usinsk and Norilsk, 
especially during the post-Soviet recession years, clearly and increasingly became more important 
than reinjecting monies into maintenance and measures to protect the environment, to include the 
flora, fauna and populace. Another indicator of dependence involves local jurisdiction. Although 
municipalities cannot own projects, local authorities can ensure compliance with laws and 
regulations as well as suspend operations as a result of violations (Gjertsen et al., 2018: 44). How 
and why Usinsk and Norilsk seem to avoid exercising such authorities would likely be valuable 
studies. To make matters worse, further institutional weakness exists in the form of inherent 
conflict between the separate federal agencies that manage permits and licenses versus 
environmental protection (ibid: 45). 
The urgency and resolve to address offshore environmental matters significantly differ from the 
terrestrial policies and behaviors. Russia’s concern for remediating Cold War and post-Soviet 
pollution issues and preventing future violations remains increasingly disparate in comparison to 
its existing and ongoing onshore environmental issues. Investment in and public-sector advocacy 
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for coastal- and offshore-focused efforts continues to indicate that inconsistent environmental 
priorities remain acceptable under the authoritarian regimes that best support state interests. 
As previously mentioned, part of the purpose for this article requires an examination of what may 
explain why a difference in environmental behavior exists. Of course, it is possible that Russia 
chose to ignore terrestrial issues as a result of cost-benefit analysis and path dependency while 
leveraging the opportunity to establish a highly managed Arctic maritime environment. Yet, as 
Russia’s geo-economic goals for the Arctic offshore seem clear, the geo-strategic and geo-political 
objectives remain a mystery for the long term. As a result, asking why Russia behaves in certain 
ways becomes necessary in order to carefully explore potential resolve. Specifically, within the 
context of contemporary Russian neo/realist defined conduct, what should the international 
community eventually expect as the end state for the Russian Arctic maritime domain? Intuition 
tells us something is going on…that Russia has a plan which goes beyond just a clean and well 
managed northern maritime environment. 
Discussion is possible, but without significantly more evidence, it is not possible to demonstrate 
clear correlation, nor is one being suggested. Instead, this article hopes to provide the beginning 
of an appropriately engaging idea – that a possible Russian objective toward long-term strategy 
could rely upon jurisdiction of an expanded amount of maritime territory in the Arctic. In 
particular, the soft-power approach would seem to support a future opportunity for Russia to 
depart from international norms, and even hard law, by leveraging environmental efforts as 
justification for expanded control of surface and water columns beyond current international 
norms. According to legal experts, international law, including and especially Article 234 of 
UNCLOS, would seem to have room to argue increased control (Williams, 2017). Whatever the 
assertion, it’s time to start the discussion. 
Conclusion 
October 1st, 1987, President Gorbachev conducted a speech in Murmansk during an awards 
ceremony, stating the Arctic needs to be a “Zone of Peace” and went on to describe his vision for 
the Northern Sea Route and economic opportunity as well as security throughout Russia’s 
maritime Arctic – with almost prophetic vision (“General Secretary Gorbachev’s Speech in 
Murmansk, October 1987”, 2014). Little did the West know that Putin’s regime would aggressively 
pursue these objectives even beyond Gorbachev’s imagination. Under Putin, exploitation of 
natural resources expanded. Production often means some degree of environmental sacrifice 
though. One astute question posed in Stephen Brain’s (2016) contribution to the Oxford Research 
Encyclopedia asks to what extent has the Russian historical tendency toward authoritarianism 
facilitated predatory policies that have degraded the environment? 
The research question for this study required an examination of the differences in on- and offshore 
environmental issue prevention and remediation in the Arctic Zone of Russia, and why. The 
theoretical use for this article focuses on how public-sector governance of the environment can 
be exploited for industrial and national security purposes. The case studies illustrate the significant 
differences and suggest that Russia’s behavior concerning the Arctic offshore might be facilitating 
conditions that it can leverage as soft power in order to deviate from international norms in the 
future. One way to view potential outcomes might be to think of Russia’s current policies and 
behaviors in its maritime Arctic as necessary and with sufficient conditions (for the Russian 
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Federation) to eventually claim customary law in order to supersede instruments such as 
UNCLOS. Such an assertion could greatly expand the amount of maritime surface (and water 
columns) territory under ‘Russian Federation jurisdiction’ – a term heavily used in Russia’s two 
primary national Arctic strategies (Presidential Decree, 2008, 2013). Assuming this study provides 
legitimate perspectives, further research could address the limitations of this article and expand on 
similar topics. Principles such as “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities” (CBDR) and 
“Sustainability” both characterize defining methods for environmental management. Yet, even 
though both principles could be invoked to satisfy international commitments, how they will be 
achieved at the domestic level depends greatly upon the environmentalism approach – either 
democratic or authoritarian.1 
 
Notes 
1. The author wishes to acknowledge Russian language review contributions from Olga 
Jarrell, who also provided an important source involving an interview with Kerimov 
(Керимов). 
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Complex Efficiency Assessment of Development of 
Arctic Oil and Gas Resources in Russia 
 
Mansur H. Gazeev, Natalia A. Volynskaya & Anatoly B. Rybak   
 
The specific nature of the conditions for the implementation of investment projects in the Arctic zone, in particular, the 
development of hydrocarbon resources (HCR), requires a national economic approach in assessing economic efficiency. This is 
due to the high capital intensity, the use and creation of special (innovative) materials, machinery and technologies, the lack of 
production infrastructure in most of the territories, the increased sensitivity of the natural environment of the Arctic zone to 
man-caused stresses.  
An assessment of economic efficiency based on the indicators of commercial efficiency is insufficient and erroneous. The rationale 
for investment decisions should be based on comprehensive national economic assessments. In terms of content, such an assessment 
characterizes the expected magnitude of the full national economic effect of the project and possible environmental damage. 
An indicator of the combined economic effect ("#) of the development of the hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic zone is proposed. 
 
 
Introduction 
The high potential of hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic zone of Russia can have a significant 
impact on the socio-economic development of both the Arctic territories and the country as a 
whole. The specific character of economic activities in the Arctic areas as well as natural and 
technological peculiarities of hydrocarbon developments determine their multisectoral and 
innovative pattern, and simultaneously, an increased level of risks. Implementing Arctic zone 
resource development programs suggests an active involvement of the state. This requires 
adequacy of criteria used for the projections and evaluation of economic efficiency. This paper 
maintains that classical revenue-based methods are insufficient for assessing hydrocarbon 
development project efficiency in underdeveloped territories, to which the Russian Arctic zone 
belongs, including oil and gas resources of the Arctic offshore areas. A methodological approach 
to the formation of an integral criterion of efficiency is proposed. To implement this task in 
practical terms, the authors developed tools that were used in the calculation of economic 
efficiency in developing mineral resources on the continental shelf of the Russian Federation’s 
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Arctic seas. The results of the calculations show that under the proposed criterion the expected 
efficiency in hydrocarbon developments differs markedly from the same results obtained by 
traditional methods. These differences are due to effects induced in related sectors of the economy 
and potential environmental damage. The proposed criterion allows one to explicitly assess the 
impact of imports substitution on effects in related industries and, consequently, on the total 
national efficiency of developing hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic zone of Russia. 
The subsoil of the Arctic zone of Russia along with other mineral resources has an exceptionally 
high potential for hydrocarbon resources, which are in the initial stage of their development and 
geological study. According to various sources, for example (Shpurov, 2017), hydrocarbon 
resources of the Russian Arctic sector are estimated at 316 billion barrels of oil equivalent (boe), 
or about 60% of the total potential Arctic hydrocarbon resources, of which 235 billion boe are 
situated offshore and 81 billion boe onshore. In the process of exploration this value can increase 
significantly. This means that the state policy in the field of exploration and development of the 
Arctic hydrocarbon system is an essential factor of Russian socio-economic and scientific-
technological development. Over the last years, the state’s attention to the Arctic zone as a 
strategically important territory of the country has increased, in particular a new version of the 
state program for its development until 2025 has been adopted. In this regard the relevancy of the 
investment projects economic efficiency predictive assessment grows with a possibly more 
complete account of the regional specifics conditions and system macroeconomic consequences, 
which is necessary for determining the strategic development priorities. 
Specific Aspects of Operations in Russian Arctic Zone 
Currently a significant part of scientific practical research and methodological developments 
concerning some project economical efficiency assessment suggests the use of traditional 
investment analysis tools applying, as a rule, income methods based on the modeling of cash flows 
taking into account inflation, risk and the minimum rate of return. However in substantiating long-
term management decisions on such projects as the development of hydrocarbon resources of the 
Arctic territories of Russia, it is not enough to handle only the estimates of direct commercial 
effects of their implementation. The specific conditions of such investment projects, as already 
mentioned, require a broader national economic approach.  
The authors assume that the specific aspects of hydrocarbon development in the Arctic zone 
affecting the efficiency and approaches used to measure it are characterized by the following: 
• harsh natural and climatic environments of the Arctic zone cause the increased risks of any 
economic activity, especially hydrocarbon resource development which is a complex high-
tech process further complicated by high geological risks; 
• specific requirements to the technologies/materials used in the Arctic zone and operations’ 
seasonal character lead to higher costs of investment projects; 
• low density and patchy character of the Arctic zone’s economic development increase 
significantly the cost and time required to fulfill transport, energy, production and social 
infrastructure projects. For example, population density (Rosstat, 2017) of the Arctic 
territories of the North-West (0.2 person/km2) and Ural (0.7 person/ km2) administrative 
districts is drastically less than the relevant average numbers for these districts (2.7 person 
and 9.9 person per km2, respectively). Development of hydrocarbons in the Yamal-Nenets 
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Autonomous Okrug has required the construction of the 525 km long railway line 
Obskaya-Bovanenkovo, with plans for a massive railway development of Yamal (see 
https://regnum.ru/news/2466759.html);   
• relatively poor degree of geological study of the Arctic zone subsoil, which reduces the 
reliability of existing estimates of the resource base and increases timing, costs and risks of 
project implementation (Shpurov I.V., 2017); 
• increased sensitivity of the Arctic zone natural environment to man-caused stresses, which 
leads to stronger environmental restrictions and higher cost components of projects, 
increases the duration of and makes it more technically difficult to carry out 
emergency/salvage measures and eliminate the consequences in cases of emergency 
situations;  
• a large share (more than 70%) of the Arctic zone hydrocarbon resource potential is located 
in the offshore areas (Shpurov I.V., 2017). Developing such resources to a considerable 
degree is of innovative nature and in many cases requires designing special technologies, 
equipment and materials. The problem is complicated by the lack of accumulated 
experience in the development of hydrocarbons in the Arctic shelf; 
• high scientific content as well as significant percentage of the infrastructure component in 
the future costs determines the necessity for direct/indirect participation of the 
government in the Arctic projects. “Scientific content” shall mean – as the authors 
understand this term – a share of innovations attached or organic to various techniques 
and methods of hydrocarbon exploration and production, this requiring not only better 
related industries but also fundamental research and development; 
• uncertainty of economic and legal conditions for the realization of investment projects in 
the Arctic, this precluding any discussion of the cost and revenue allocation between 
potential project participants. 
Obviously, under these conditions, the economic efficiency estimate based on commercial 
efficiency does not meet the strategic goals that have been set. The justification for investment 
decisions and priorities should be based on integral national economic assessments. In meaningful 
terms, such an assessment must characterize the expected scale of the full national economic effect 
of the project implementation and cover the risks of possible environmental damage. 
Comprehensive Criterion for Estimating Project Efficiency 
By now, there are no international or Russian techniques for the complex assessment of such 
projects that would take into account economic, innovative and environmental parameters within 
a single (financial) space. The innovation aspect acquires special significance for the Russian 
economy. In this regard, when estimating the effectiveness of innovative projects, a 
macroeconomic assessment is needed that characterizes the impact of projects on the national and 
regional economies. The consideration of environmental consequences (damages) in the 
development of the Arctic seas shelf is hindered by the lack of sufficient operational experience in 
such areas of the subsoil, which in particular creates problems of insurance for these risks. And, 
finally, a low level of geological study of the subsoil areas of the regions mentioned above raises 
the need for solving the problems of methodological and instrumental supply for accounting for 
the uncertainty in the economic estimate of hydrocarbon reserves and resources. 
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In general, the expected complex economic effect ("#	) from the subsoil areas development, as it 
was shown in Gazeev, Rybak and Volynskaya, 2015, should be formed by three components 
characterizing various aspects of such development’s impact on the social and economic system: 
• direct aggregated economic effect occurring in the course of the project implementation, 
which is quantitatively estimated by the sum of the project’ cash flow value before taxes 
(%&'(), taking into account risks; 
• economic effect occurring in the related industries ("*+) in the process of project 
implementation; and 
• cost estimation of the possible ecological damage (,-). 
According to Gazeev M.H., Rybak A.B. and Volynskaya N.A. (2015), the value of complex 
economic effects can be represented by the formula (1) 
"# = %&'( + "*+ − ,-.         (1) 
Let us consider in more detail how each of the components of the proposed criterion (1) is shaped. 
Direct Aggregate Economic Effect 
The first component of the complex criterion – direct aggregate economic effect - is measured by 
the discounted cash flow value (%&'() before taxation. At the stage of predictive assessment and 
strategic priorities identification there is no information on the economic-legal (including tax) 
regime, sources of financing and forms of state participation in the project implementation. 
Consequently, the subject of evaluation at this stage is only the amount of potential of the expected 
cash flow. The evaluation of commercial efficiency indicators is premature and not provided with 
the necessary information.  
As already mentioned above, the value of project cash flow before taxes (%&'(), should be 
calculated taking into account risks. The quantitative risk assessment based on statistical methods 
is hindered due to poor geological study and economic development degree, as a result of which 
there is a lack of sufficient technical and economic information array. In light of the exceptional 
variety of risks of different kinds that arise when investing, for example, in geological exploration 
and operation in the Arctic conditions, the use of simulation methods is often simply impossible. 
Therefore, the application of expert estimates based on the results of geological exploration and 
operational works and investment activities in the oil and gas sector seems to be justified. For this 
purpose, it is proposed to use the so-called “method of adjusting the discount rates”.  
Despite the fact that this method does not provide any information on the degree of risk (the value 
of possible deviations from the design results), it makes it possible to significantly improve the 
comparison accuracy of the economic efficiency of objects located in different natural-climatic 
zones and at the different stages of geological study. Such comparative assessments are an 
indispensable element in the formation of development strategies and ranking of hydrocarbon 
assets.  
Table 1 sets out the values of the indicative risk adjustments to the basic discount rates. Two types 
of risks are considered: geological and natural-geographic. The premiums are provided for each 
type of risk. 
Arctic Yearbook 2018 
 
Development of Arctic Oil & Gas Resources in Russia 
411 
Table 1 – The proposed risk premiums to the base discount rate (10%) depending on the exploration 
degree and economic/geographic location of oil and gas fields. Data on water areas are given according to 
(Nazarov & Kalist, 2006). 
Risk 
measure 
Region 
characteristics 
Location Explora-
tion 
degree 
Risk premium, % Total 
discount 
rate Water area Onshore geological 
natural and 
geographical 
Medium 
New region with 
poorly developed 
infrastructure, 
bordering on 
developed regions 
- 
Murmansk and 
Arkhangelsk 
regions, North 
of Komi, 
Nenets AO, 
islands in the 
Arctic Ocean 
Reserves 
A+B+C1 
0 – 1 
1-2 
11-13 
Reserves 
C2 
2 – 3 13-15 
Resources 
C3 
4 – 5 15-17 
Resources 
D 
6 - 8 17-20 
High 
New region with 
no infrastructure 
and/or  
complicated ice 
situation 
Bering, 
Pechora, 
Barents, 
Kara  
Seas 
North of the 
Republic of 
Sakha, 
Taimyr AO, 
Kamchatka 
Region, 
Chukotka AO, 
Yamalo-Nenets 
AO 
Reserves 
A+B+C1 
0 – 1 
3-4 
13-15 
Reserves 
C2 
2 – 3 15-17 
Resources 
C3 
4 – 5 17-19 
Resources 
D 
6 - 8 19-22 
Very high 
Unexplored region 
with no shore 
infrastructure, with 
severe ice 
conditions, 
requiring special 
technical solutions 
to develop 
hydrocarbons  
Seas of the 
Eastern 
Arctic 
- 
Reserves 
A+B+C1 
0 – 1 
5-7 
15-18 
Reserves 
C2 
2 – 3 17-20 
Resources 
C3 
4 – 5 19-22 
Resources 
D 
6 - 8 21-25 
 
Arctic regions are divided into three groups: with medium, high and very high risk measure. In the 
Arctic conditions the regions with a low risk level are absent. The premiums for geological risk are 
determined depending on the degree of exploration of deposits and the reliability of their reserves. 
For example, for commercial A+B+C1 category reserves the minimum premium value is accepted:  
0% - 1%, for C2 category reserves the premium is in the range of 2% - 3%. The maximum value 
of the premium for geological risk is established for the predicted and prospective D category 
resources and makes 6% - 8%. The premium for natural and geographical risk is 1% - 2% for 
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regions with medium risk, 3% - 4% for regions with high risk and 5% - 7% for regions with a very 
high development risk. 
In general, the total risk premium can vary from 1% to 15%, and the final discount rate – from 
11% to 25%. The given values of discount rates can be used in calculating the income received or 
lost. 
Economic Effect in Related Industries 
The hydrocarbon resources development of the regions under consideration along with direct 
sectoral effects is accompanied by a set of systemic effects, in particular: socio-economic, 
innovation-technological, ecological, regional and geopolitical. Note that the last of listed effects 
defy the formalized cost valuation, therefore, the procedure for coordinating investment decisions 
on this criterion, as a rule, is carried out using expert assessment methods.  
As a quantitative measuring instrument of systemic effects, it is proposed to use the predicted 
value of GDP additional growth, caused by the implementation of the relevant project (multiplier 
effect), which is formed due to the additional development of related industries and manufactures, 
the corresponding development of infrastructure and social sphere ("*+). The application of the 
multipliers theory is based on the results of calculating the promising inter-industry balance. 
The multiplier in macroeconomics is a numerical coefficient that shows how many times the final 
indicators of economic development will change with the growth of investment or production in 
the analyzed branch of activity. Since in our case, the added value is estimated, the multipliers for 
added value (GDP growth) are used, which arise in related sectors of the economy per unit of 
investment in the evaluated projects. The magnitude of the multiplier effect depends on the share 
of imported products, technologies and services used. A decrease in the share of imports increases 
the values of the multipliers. With a view to current sanction restrictions on Russia and the 
maximum import substitution policy pursued by the government, below we give the multiplier 
values which would reflect a total abandonment of imports. In other words, the following values 
and results calculated on their basis correspond to the maximum estimate of the multiplicative 
effect. The multiplier values in the main sectors of the economy are given in Table 2 and are 
discussed in detail in (Shirov & Yantovskii, 2011). 
Table 2 – Estimation of operational multipliers in the most important sectors of economy with no account 
of imports 
Activity type Multipliers (operational) 
Crude oil production 1.35 
Natural gas production 1.31 
Oil refining 1.88 
Ferrous metallurgy 1.65 
Machinery and equipment manufacture 1.87 
Sea vessels and equipment manufacture 2.20 
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Railway transport manufacture 2.57 
Construction 2.05 
Transportation and storage 1.75 
 
The high capital intensity of hydrocarbon resources development in the Arctic territories, and in 
particular in the shelf areas of the Arctic seas, suggests that the effect in related industries should 
be evaluated not only at the development stage using the production multiplier but also at the 
investment stage with an estimation and use of the investment multiplier according to Gazeev 
M.H., Rybak A.B. and Volynskaya N.A. (2015) by the formula: 
	"*+ = (2+3 × 56 +27) × ∆,,        (2) 
where:  
 2+3 – investment multiplier;  
 27 – production multiplier; 
 ,	– average annual discounted gross revenue from hydrocarbon production;  
 9 – total discounted capital investments;  
 ∆,	 – growth in the annual discounted gross revenue, which is equal to , for new investment 
projects. 
The value of the investment multiplier is calculated by the formula: 
2+3 = 	∑ ;< ×7= 	2< ,          (3) 
where: 
>  - number of identified related industries or industrial complexes, > = 1,…, &; 
& – number of industrial areas identified within the project’s capital costs; 
;< – the share of funds spent on the products of the i-th industry in the structure of project’s total 
capital costs,  ∑ ;<7< = 1; 
2< – operational multiplier of the i-th industry. 
Due to the fact that the structure of capital costs can vary significantly from one project to another 
depending on geological, natural and other factors, as well as on the technology for developing the 
resources of a particular subsoil block, the value of the investment multiplier (2+3) should be 
determined for each project (block) individually. 
Potential Environmental Damage 
Let us turn to the issue of quantitative accounting of environmental risks. Securing a zero discharge 
system during hydrocarbon resource development in the Arctic territories (especially the Arctic 
shelf) requires the implementation of environmental protection measures in its entirety, including 
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insurance payments. The expenses in all these mentioned areas are included in the total project 
investment and costs. Nevertheless, there remains the risk of a major accident, which in its 
consequences can be attributed as an environmental disaster. 
It is especially important to take into account the probability and damages of such an accident in 
the course of development of the shelf resources, since there is not yet any technology which can 
preclude catastrophic accidents on oil and gas platforms operating in the severe natural conditions 
of the Arctic shelf. Of course, the probability of an accident like the one that occurred in the Gulf 
of Mexico is not high, but it cannot be ruled out. Depending on the degree of exploration and 
economic and geographic location of the oil and gas fields of the continental shelf, it is suggested, 
by analogy with Table 1, to classify the objects of the hydrocarbon resources development in 
different water areas according to the degree of ecological risk.  
On the basis of the risk assessment presented in the Declaration of Industrial Safety of the 
Offshore Ice-Resistant Fixed Platform “Prirazlomnaya” coordinated with the Ministry of 
Emergency Situations of the Russian Federation on 24.08.2009 № F-03/03-203 and 
Rostechnadzor (Federal Environmental, Industrial and Nuclear Supervision Service) on 
25.09.2009 № 07-07/3146, and a number of other sources, the authors carried out an expert 
assessment of the probability of an environmental disaster occurrence during the development 
period for different regions. The results of the analysis are shown in Table 3. 
For the Arctic territories, the ecological component is a necessary attribute of valuation of any 
investment project (Strategy for Development of Russian Federation’s Arctic Zone and Provision 
of National Security up to 2020 approved by President of Russia; Federal Law ‘On Environmental 
Protection’ of 10.01.2002 № 7-FZ). The damage caused by environmental pollution is taken into 
account when making management decisions on any level, especially in view of the commitment 
by the oil companies to compensate for all the costs incurred in neutralizing the spill consequences 
which can be enormous in case of the territories under consideration. It is enough to quote the 
figures in connection with the explosion on the BP oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico in April 
2010. The company only managed to stop the oil spill on August 4, 2010. The accident resulted in 
about 5 million barrels of crude oil spilled over. According to Neft I Kapital (Oil and Capital) e-
edition (2013-1) and (2013-2), BP agreed to pay out compensation for the damage caused by the 
accident in the amount of 42 billion USD, while the total losses exceed 90 billion USD together 
with additional claims from several states. 
Despite the high damage estimates from the accident described above, ecological damage will be 
much higher in the Arctic shelf environment. First of all, it is technically extremely difficult to 
ensure a sufficiently complete oil spillage recovery in ice conditions, besides the natural 
mechanisms of oil residues decomposition do not work in the Arctic latitudes. 
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Table 3 – Ecological risks classification in relation to economic and geographical location of oil and gas 
fields 
Risk degree 
Region 
characteristics 
Location Probability of 
major accident, 
% 
Duration of 
accident, 
days Water area Onshore 
Medium 
New region with 
poorly developed 
infrastructure, 
bordering on 
developed regions 
- 
Murmansk and 
Arkhangelsk regions, 
North of Komi, 
Nenets AO, 
islands in the Arctic 
Ocean 
2 – 3 20 - 60 
High 
New region with 
no infrastructure 
and/or 
complicated ice 
situation 
Bering, Pechora, 
Barents, Kara  
Seas 
North of the 
Republic of Sakha, 
Taimyr AO, 
Kamchatka Region, 
Chukotka AO, 
Yamal-Nenets AO 
4 – 7 60 – 150 
Very high 
Unexplored region 
with no shore 
infrastructure,  
severe ice 
conditions, 
requiring special 
technical solutions 
to develop 
hydrocarbon 
resources 
Seas of the Eastern 
Arctic 
- 8 – 10 150 – 180 
 
In the first approximation the value of ecological damage (,-) can be estimated from the formula: 
,- = @- × AB × C,          (4) 
where: 
@- – damage (penalty) from a spill of 1 ton of oil, 
kE =@D	 × ED   
@D	– unit economic damage from the spill of 1 ton of oil; 
ED – probability of a major accident (oil spill); 
AB – daily oil spill, t/day, 
C – duration of the accident, days. 
The value of the specific ecological damage from the spill of 1 ton of oil (@D), taking into account 
the available actual data, is estimated by us at 60,000 USD per 1 ton of spilled oil in case of an 
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accident on the continental shelf and 6,000 USD in case of an accident onshore. The remaining 
parameters are random values. A quantitative assessment of the probable ecological damage 
resulting from a major accident for each project can be obtained using simulation methods, in 
particular the Monte Carlo method. It should be noted that depending on the location of the 
subsoil area, the probability of a major accident can vary from 2-3% for regions with a medium 
development risk, up to 8-10% for regions with low exploration level and severe ice conditions 
(very high development risk). Accordingly, the duration of the accident can vary from 20 days to 
six months. Note that the category of medium development risk does not include any of the Arctic 
water areas. 
Conclusions 
Based on the accumulated technical and economic information on subsoil blocks containing 
hydrocarbon resources and located in different water areas of the Russian Federation Arctic shelf, 
the authors carried out a large amount of experimental calculations to determine the values of 
traditional (income-based) and proposed (complex) efficiency criteria of their development. The 
results of these calculations presented in Table 4 showed an exceptionally high influence of the 
conjugate effects on the estimates obtained. In addition, not only the values of the efficiency 
indicator change, but so do the preferences for specific subsoil areas of development. Moreover, 
taking into account the conjugate effects in a number of cases changes the economic priority of 
development of the water areas as a whole. Note that for the comparability of obtained results, for 
each water area average estimates are given for hydrocarbon resources of same groups of 
exploration level. 
It is necessary to stress once again that the estimates presented in Table 4 are obtained from the 
hypothesis that all imports have been substituted in full in related industries, thus maximizing the 
value of multipliers, effects in related industries, and consequently, integral economic effect. More 
imports of technology, equipment, materials, etc. will reduce the multiplier effect. Respectively, 
the share of possible environmental damage will become higher in the structure of an integrated 
criterion. 
 
Table 4 – Results of calculating economic efficiency of developing the Arctic seas continental shelf 
prospective structures  
Water areas 
Direct aggregate 
effect (NPV0) 
(traditional 
criterion) 
Multiplicative effect in 
related industries 
Probable 
ecological damage 
Complex 
economic effect 
USD/bbl 
Pechora Sea 42.1 28.8 2.1 68.7 
Laptev Sea 0.3 40.0 7.1 33.2 
Bering Sea -1.7 41.6 16.1 23.8 
Kara Sea 3.1 22.6 3.5 22.2 
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Barents Sea 
(north) 
10.0 6.7 4.2 12.5 
Barents Sea 
(south-west) 
10.9 5.9 6.3 10.4 
 
The calculations were carried out under the following assumptions: 
• price of crude oil 70 USD per barrel; 
• exchange rate 60 RUB / USD; 
• average values of the discount rate from Table 1 were used for the relevant water area and  
exploration-degree; 
• ecological damage was estimated using the data contained in Table 3. 
From the analysis of the data in Table 4, it follows that with regard to the criterion of direct 
economic efficiency (%&'() the development of the Arctic offshore areas in the Laptev Sea, 
Bering Sea and Kara Sea is least effective. Furthermore, the development of hydrocarbon resources 
of the Bering Sea shelf is wholly uneconomic, since the specific economic efficiency of their 
development is negative. However, the development of oil and gas resources of these territories 
may give a powerful impetus to the development of related sectors (science and industry), thereby 
increasing the potential of public economic efficiency and the priority of their development. 
Therefore, the formation of an assessment criterion taking into account the strategic goals of the 
state (maximizing GDP and environmental security) can significantly change the outlook on the 
economic efficiency of Arctic hydrocarbon resources development and its predictive estimate. 
This means there is a high relevance for the use of such approaches in creating programs for 
economic development in the Arctic zone of Russian territories. Along with that, the use of 
domestic technologies and equipment has a great impact on the efficiency. In light of this, the 
priority of development of the resources should be determined in accordance with the level of 
readiness of related industries. 
 
References 
Gazeev M.H., Rybak A.B, Volynskaya N.A. (2015). Methodical aspects of estimation of oil and 
gas resources of the continental shelf and Far East. News from higher educational institutions. 
Sociology. Economics. Politics. Tyumen, TSOGU, 1 (44): 45 – 48. 
Nazarov V.I., Kalist L.V. (2006). Ekonomicheskaya otsenka neftegazovogo potentsiala 
arkticheskogo shel’fa Rossii [Economic Assessment of Oil and Gas Potential of the Arctic 
Shelf of Russia]. Neft'GazPromyshlennost' [OilGasIndustry], St. Petersburg, 6(26): 22 – 24. 
Regional and local US authorities require 34 billion USD from BP. (2013-1). Oil and Capital.  
oilcapital.ru/company/195904.html.  
Required BP expenses caused by the Gulf of Mexico disaster. (2013-2). Oil and Capital. 
oilcapital.ru/company/195940.html. 
Arctic Yearbook 2018   
Gazeev, Volynskaya & Rybak   
418 
Shirov A.A, Yantovskii A.A. (2011). Otsenka mul'tiplikativnykh effektov v ekonomike. 
Vozmozhnosti i ogranicheniya [The estimation of multiplicative effects in the economy. 
Capabilities and limitations]. ECO Journal, Novosibirsk, The editorial board of ECO, 2: 40 
– 58. https://ecfor.ru/publication/otsenka-multiplikativnyh-effektov-v-ekonomike. 
Shpurov I.V. (2017). Syr’yevaya baza uglevodorodnogo syr’ya rossiyskoy Arktiki i kontinental’nogo 
shel’fa. Perspektivy osvoyeniya. [Raw materials base of hydrocarbon raw materials of the 
Russian Arctic and continental shelf. Prospects for development.] rao-
offshore.ru/netcat/RAO-2017/1/Shpurov_GKZ.pdf. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section VII:  
The Polar Silk Road & Arctic 
Maritime Development 
 
Kong Soon Lim is a pupil advocate and solicitor at Messrs. Dorairaj, Low & Teh, Kuala Lumpur.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
China’s Arctic Policy & the Polar Silk Road Vision  
 
Kong Soon Lim 
 
 
On 26 January 2018, China released the much-anticipated White Paper that sets out its policies and position on the Arctic. 
China understands the economic opportunities and the territorial challenges in the region as it seeks a greater role in Arctic 
development. The White Paper outlines China’s ambitious plan to develop a Polar Silk Road across the Arctic. It also 
summaries China’s policy goals and the principles guiding its conduct. As a non-Arctic state with no territorial sovereignty in 
the region, China’s ambition would be dependent on its cooperation and the alignment of its interest with Arctic states. In 
considering China’s Arctic policy, this paper considers three pertinent questions: (1) what are China’s key interests in the 
Arctic, (2) what are the aims and basis of China’s Arctic policy as outlined in the White Paper and (3) how does China’s 
Arctic policy complement with its Polar Silk Road vision as an extension of its Belt and Road Initiative.    
 
 
Introduction 
Global warming is accelerating the transition of the Arctic from an ice-covered region to an ice-
free ocean at an unprecedented rate. Estimates suggest a nearly ice-free summer Arctic by 2030 as 
the region continues to warm at approximately twice as fast as the global average (e.g., Wang & 
Overland, 2012). The thawing ice has overwhelmingly altered and threatened the region’s 
ecosystem while unlocking its economic potential that was previously inaccessible due to the dense 
ice. Unsurprisingly, this has led to renewed interests on Arctic governance and attracted the 
attention of external actors, including China. China’s engagement in the Arctic flows from the 
Arctic’s geographical location that provides a range of long-term economic opportunities and a 
platform for scientific research – in summary the Arctic provides China a shorter and reliable 
shipping route, access to natural resources and insight on climate change (e.g., Chen, 2012: 361).
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The admission of China as an observer in the Arctic Council in May 2013 marks the pinnacle of 
China’s Arctic diplomacy. China together with five other states (India, Italy, Japan, Singapore and 
South Korea) were granted observer status during the Arctic Council’s Kiruna Ministerial Meeting, 
in which the admission of these states was a political decision whose time had come. The exclusion 
of China would only risk further drawbacks and possibly undermine the Arctic Council credibility 
and legitimacy, considering China's active involvement in Arctic affairs and its contribution in 
Arctic research that far exceeds the contribution of Arctic States themselves (Ingimundarson, 
2014: 191). The admission of China and the other observer states in the Kiruna Ministerial Meeting 
was timely to strengthen the Arctic Council position and to discourage the emergence of other 
regimes or bilateral relations as alternative avenues for interested parties to express their interest 
in the Arctic (ibid.: 191-194). Nonetheless, politics and diplomacy on the Arctic is now 
unpredictable and it is more crowded than before with the presence of China and other new 
observer states (Lanteigne, 2014: 11).  
As an external actor outside the region, China’s participation as an observer remains an ideal and 
perhaps the only pathway that allows China to gain formal access to the Arctic’s governance and 
the decision-making process (Graczyk & Koivurova, 2014: 225). Whilst observers are generally 
perceived as weak actors in the absence of voting rights in the Arctic Council’s decision-making 
process (Chater, 2016: 173), China’s observer status would enable Beijing to assert greater 
influence in the Arctic Council in setting future agendas on Arctic development.    
China recognises the Arctic Council as the key policy forum in addressing Arctic-related issues. In 
acceding to the Arctic Council, China had undertaken a ‘laborious process’ over the past decade 
in vying for an approved observer status (Amatulli, 2017: 104). China’s admission in the Arctic 
Council was not immediate. Its application for an observer status in three previous occasions, in 
2006, 2009 and 2011 were denied before succeeding in its fourth attempt in 2013, though it was 
granted an ad-hoc observer status since 2007 whilst its application was being reconsidered. The 
application for an observer status is assessed against a set of non-exhaustive criteria and it requires 
a unanimous approval from all Arctic states. Annex 2 to the Arctic Council Rules of Procedure 
outlines the admission procedure and criteria. Amongst the key criteria imposed are: firstly, the 
applicant accepts and supports the objective of the Arctic Council, secondly, the applicant 
recognises the sovereignty and jurisdiction of Arctic states in the region and thirdly, the applicant 
accepts the framework of the United Nations Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) to govern the Arctic. 
Despite these criteria, the consideration on the application for observer status discussed during 
the Kiruna Ministerial Meeting was characterised as ‘old-fashioned intergovernmental deal-
making’ (Ingimundarson, 2014: 190).    
Salient issues concerning China’s interest in the Arctic have emerged in recent years. The 
discourses in literature have also attempted to provide a comparative approach on China’s Arctic 
ambitions alongside with the interest of Arctic states (e.g., Lackenbauer et al., 2018; Koivurova et 
al., 2017). The existing literature has been divided on China’s Arctic ambitions. The idealist views 
China as a cooperative and collaborative partner because it is in its best interest to do so (e.g., 
Alexeeva & Lasserre, 2012; Liu, 2017). On the contrary, the pragmatist argues that China’s position 
in the Arctic are merely expressed by ‘unctuous and circumlocutory diplomatic language’ that are 
inconsistent with its practices (Wright, 2011: 2). Although it is unlikely that the release of the White 
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Paper would alter these views, the long-awaited policy document is a starting point to understand 
China’s Arctic policy.   
The aim of this paper is to examine China’s Arctic policy as outlined in the White Paper and its 
vision for a Polar Silk Road. This paper proceeds in the following three parts. The first section 
considers China’s key interests in the Arctic. The second section examines the White Paper to 
provide a better understanding on the aims and basis of China’s Arctic policy. The third section 
considers China’s vision of the Polar Silk Road as part of its grand strategy under the Belt and 
Road Initiative. Whilst the release of the White Paper is much welcome as it has shed light on 
China’s Arctic policy, the penumbra of doubt remains visible.  
China’s Interests in the Arctic  
The White Paper describes China as an ‘important stakeholder’ in the Arctic and a ‘near-Arctic 
State’.1 China describes itself as ‘one of the continental States that are closest to the Arctic Circle’ 
(State Council Information Office of the PRC, 2018) despite the absence of any Chinese territory 
above the Arctic Circle or an Arctic border. By extension of this self-defined and self-descriptive 
identity, China views itself as a global power with a stewardship role in Arctic governance. It is 
also an Arctic stakeholder through its vested interest in the region.  
In a press briefing on the release of the White Paper, Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Kong Xuanyou emphasised two positions that China will adopt in its role as an Arctic stakeholder 
– firstly, China will not be overstepping and secondly, China will not be absent (Kong, 2018). He 
emphasised that by ‘not overstepping’ (bu yuewei ), China acknowledges it is a non-Arctic 
State and will not intervene in the affairs between Arctic States and within the region. Thus, the 
conduct of Chinese entities and individuals in the Arctic will be based on international law and the 
respective domestic laws of Arctic States (ibid). In ‘not being absent’ (bu quewei ),2 China will 
participate constructively in cross-regional and global issues concerning the Arctic (ibid). The first 
position reflects China’s assurance on its non-interference on the affairs between Arctic states 
whilst the second position reflects China’s commitment to promote cooperation in Arctic 
governance. Based on these positions, it can be inferred that despite the growing Chinese presence 
in Arctic governance, China will retain its neutral approach on contentious matters between Arctic 
states, especially in relation to the sovereignty claims and disputes concerning Arctic boundaries.  
China’s admission as an observer certainly does not reflect an absolute recognition by the Arctic 
Council on its ‘stake holding’ or interests in the Arctic. Like other observer states in the Arctic 
Council, China’s interests can be summarised into two broad aims: firstly, to contribute to the 
governance of environmental issues that are of global concern and secondly, to benefit from the 
economic potential of the Arctic region (Chater, 2016: 173-174). Both aims are summarised in the 
following paragraph of the White Paper:  
The natural conditions of the Arctic and their changes have a direct impact on China’s climate 
system and ecological environment, and, in turn, on its economic interests in agriculture, forestry, 
fishery, marine industry and other sectors. China is closely involved in the trans-regional and 
global issues in the Arctic, especially in such areas as climate change, environment, scientific research, 
utlisation of shipping routes, resources exploration and exploitation, security and global governance. These 
issues are vital to the existence and development of all countries and humanity, and directly 
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affect the interests of non-Arctic States including China (State Council Information Office 
of the PRC, 2018). 
In analysing the first limb of China’s broad interest on the governance of the Arctic environment, 
China understands the need to respond to climate change in the Arctic. Chinese researchers have 
emphasised that the effects of climate change in the Arctic correlate with the changes in China’s 
environment and ecology (e.g., Li & Leung, 2013; Ma et. al., 2014; Chen et. al., 2013). The thinning 
of the Arctic’s sea ice has also contributed to the abrupt climate shift in China due to alternations 
in atmospheric circulation at high altitudes. For instance, the severe snowstorms that hit central 
and southern China in 2007 to 2008 are attributed to the warming of the Arctic (Liu et. al., 2012). 
Likewise, the extreme haze pollution in the East China plains in 2013 was due to poor ventilation 
conditions caused by the loss of Arctic sea ice in the preceding Autumn and boreal snowfall in the 
earlier Winter (Zou et. al., 2017).  
As the largest developing state in the northern hemisphere, China has experienced the effects of 
these climate changes that have in turn affected its industrial and agricultural production (Chinese 
Government Portal, 2010). Whilst the implications of climate change may have an adverse effect 
on China’s economic growth, such effects may alter the political stability of the Chinese 
Communist Party that relies on strong economic growth as the foundation of its stability (Jakobson 
& Lee, 2013: 4). Although the anecdotal suggestion may appear far-fetched, the plausibility of 
social unrest caused by climate change are further amplified by the vast population and landscape 
of China.  
On the second limb of China’s broad interest to harness the economic potential of the Arctic 
region, the Arctic’s strategic location boast abundance in energy resources and it is likely to be an 
important transportation route for international trade. As the world’s largest energy consumer, 
China requires a constant supply of energy resources to sustain its economic growth. The Arctic’s 
untapped supply of natural gas and oil would meet China’s demand for energy resources and the 
need to diversify its energy supply (Gavrilov & Kripakova, 2017: 74). China also seeks to reduce 
its carbon footprint and address climate change by optimising its energy usage through the 
reduction of its coal-dominated energy consumption (NDRC, 2017: 10-12). In a joint document 
released by the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission and the Chinese National 
Energy Administration, Beijing set out its aim to shift China’s energy consumption towards natural 
gas by 15% by 2030 (NDRC & NEA, 2016: 8). Estimates suggest that China’s demand for natural 
gas will grow by over three percent annually until 2030 (Xinhua, 2017). Beijing has also announced 
plans to expand the country’s pipeline for the supply of crude, refined oil and natural gas to ensure 
the steady supply of imported energy resources to its inland cities (NDRC & NEA, 2017). Hence, 
the Arctic’s supply of natural gas and oil is crucial in improving China’s energy supply.  
Additionally, China foresees the economic prospects of the Arctic as the ‘golden route’ in shipping 
(Brady, 2017: 63). China favors the opening of the Northern Sea Route that is the shortest shipping 
route linking East Asia to Europe and North America. The Northern Sea Route would provide 
China a safe and reliable shipping route, which is crucial in importing the supply of resources and 
exporting Chinese product. It is estimated that Arctic shipping through the Northern Sea Route 
would shorten shipping trips between northern Chinese ports and northern Europe as well as the 
east coast of America by at least 40% as compared to conventional routes via the Suez Canal or 
Panama Canal (Chen, 2012: 361). As China’s foreign trade currently passes through the saturated 
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and unreliable Straits of Malacca and the Suez Canal, where traffic capacity is at its peak and piracy 
is rampant, the Northern Sea Route provides China an alternative shipping route and would 
enhance the economic development of the coastal areas in the northeast region of China (Gavrilov 
& Kripakova, 2017: 74). Considering the ongoing trade war between China and the United States, 
the Arctic and the Northern Sea Route would also provide China an assured shipping passage that 
is not in the control of the United States Navy (ibid.).     
China’s Arctic Policy 
China’s Arctic interests as described in the above section demonstrates the proliferation of its 
global interest beyond its geographical borders as it emerges as a global power. China’s White 
Paper on its Arctic policy was published in early 2018 amidst concerns and debates on China’s role 
as an observer in the Arctic Council. The release of the White Paper may have come as a surprised 
to those who were unexpecting it (e.g., Jakobson & Lee, 2013: 11),3 but for others the much-
anticipated publication that was expected to clarify China’s Arctic policy is long due (e.g., 
Lanteigne, 2016: 2; Sun, 2013: 6).    
Nonetheless, the White Paper should not be viewed as a new revelation on China’s Arctic policy 
but rather an affirmation of its existing policies. The contents of the White Paper have been 
articulated by Chinese officials in recent years. The policy goals and basic principles of its Arctic 
participation as stated in the White Paper have been raised by Chinese officials on a few previous 
occasions. Accordingly, the White Paper reflects Beijing’s commitment to the Arctic and growing 
confidence as it attempts to reduce its Arctic’s strategy in writing as an official policy document.  
All Arctic states and a few observer states have released their respective policy papers on their 
Arctic strategy. The culmination of China’s Arctic policy is relatively recent compared to other 
Arctic states and it remains a work in progress (Lanteigne, 2016: 2). Beijing is hesitant to outline 
its policies in writing unless it is necessary, or it is in its best interest to do so. Unlike its Western 
counterparts, Beijing has only published official and translated White Papers on pressing and key 
policy issues over the past decade. Hence, the release of the White Paper demonstrates the 
significance of the Arctic region among its policymakers. The delay in its release can only be 
sensibly attributed to Beijing’s hesitance to outline its Arctic policy officially as it may restrict its 
ability to adapt with diplomatic and political changes in the rapidly transforming region.   
The White Paper begins with an overview of the current Arctic situation before elaborating on 
China’s goals, basic principles, policies and position on the Arctic governance. The foreword of 
the document states that the intention of the White Paper is: 
‘… to expound its basic positions on Arctic affairs, to elaborate on its policy goals, basic 
principles and major polices and positions regarding its engagement in Arctic affairs, to 
guide relevant Chinese government departments and institutions in Arctic-related activities 
and cooperation, to encourage relevant parties to get better involved in Arctic governance, 
and to work with the international community to safeguard and promote peace and 
stability in, and the sustainable development of, the Arctic (State Council Information 
Office of the PRC, 2018).’   
Based on the foreword, the White Paper is not only intended to dispel the negative perception 
among the international community on China’s Arctic interest, but it is also intended as a guidance 
document for coordination among governmental agencies and institutions. As China does not 
have a specialised governmental authority in managing its Arctic affairs, the competency of 
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different issues may fall within several governmental agencies and it would require proper 
coordination to overcome bureaucracy and to achieve a common goal. It is estimated that there 
are at least seventeen agencies involved in China’s Arctic affairs demonstrating the broad and 
complex nature of China’s policymaking and execution process (Brady, 2017: 114). For instance, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs manages its diplomatic agenda and foreign policy in the Arctic. 
Matters of national maritime interests are reviewed by the State Oceanic Administration while the 
Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration organises, coordinates and manages Chinese polar 
exploration. The interactions between these governmental agencies with other scientific 
institutions and research universities are facilitated by the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the 
Chinese Academy of Social Science (Gavrilov & Kripakova, 2017: 76). Hence, the White Paper 
would be a reference point in its internal coordination as it encapsulates the common policy that 
China intends to push forward in its’ Arctic agenda.  
The White Paper elaborates on the history of China’s participation in the Arctic with the aim to 
highlight and legitimise its interest in the region. China’s earliest participation in Arctic affairs is 
dated back to 1925 when it ratified the Svalbard Treaty (initially referred to as the Spitsbergen 
Treaty) that confers it and other contracting States the right to carry out commercial activities and 
scientific research over the archipelago of Spitsbergen. There were few and insignificant Chinese 
activities in the Arctic until the late 1990s when China begun to focus its Arctic interest on 
scientific research. Over the past two decades, China has conducted numerous Arctic expeditions 
using its icebreaker ship and research vessel Xue Long. It has also built the Arctic Yellow River 
Station in 2004 as a research base. Chinese commentators have emphasised that China’s research 
objectives focus on climate change in the polar region, which has direct impact on China’s weather 
that in turn affects China’s ecological environment, agricultural and economic activities (e.g., 
Tianbao & Miaomiao, 2017: 24; Guoqiang, 2013: 29).  
China’s policy goals in the Arctic are four-fold: ‘to understand’, ‘to protect’, ‘to develop’ the Arctic 
and ‘to participate’ in the Arctic’s governance (State Council Information Office of the PRC, 2018, 
Jan 26). The White Paper describes that these goals are necessary to ‘safeguard the common 
interests of all’ and to ‘promote sustainable development’ (ibid). These goals are correlated and are 
integral to each other as China needs a deeper understanding of the Arctic to enable the protection 
of the Arctic’s environment, social and economic development as well as its participation in the 
Arctic governance (Kong, 2018).   
In realising China’s commitment, the White Paper outlines four basic principles guiding its 
participation in Arctic affairs: ‘respect’, ‘cooperation’, ‘win-win result’ and ‘sustainability’ (State 
Council Information Office of the PRC, 2018). The first two principles of ‘respect’ and 
‘cooperation’ are reciprocal values that China seeks to push forward while the latter two principles 
of ‘win-win result’ and ‘sustainability’ refer to the nature of the outcome that it intends to achieve 
through its participation. In acknowledging the values of ‘respect’ and ‘cooperation’, China 
understands that Arctic affairs are multi-faceted and complex involving multiple stakeholders.  The 
outcome of a ‘win-win result’ and ‘sustainability’ can be achieved if stakeholders pursue common 
aims through coordinated development. Hence, these principles demonstrate a utopian view that 
no stakeholder or the Arctic environment should suffer loss at the expense of development. The 
White Paper addresses five key policies area that are summarised succinctly as follows (ibid.):  
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1. Firstly, concerning China’s scientific exploration and understanding of the Arctic, China 
seeks to promote scientific expedition and research in the Arctic.   
2. Secondly, in relation to the protection of the Arctic’s environment, ecosystem and climate 
change, China reiterates its commitment to tackle global environmental challenges.  
3. Thirdly, on the utilisation of Arctic’s shipping routes and the exploitation of its natural 
resources, China advocates for the protection and rational use of the abundance Arctic 
resources through cooperation.  
4. Fourthly, on China’s participation in the Arctic governance, the White Paper emphasises 
China’s commitment to improve and complement the existing Arctic governance regime. 
China intends to actively engage at global and regional level and promote cooperation in 
all fields.  
5. Lastly, China believes that the promotion of peace and stability in the Arctic is necessary 
to serve the fundamental interest of all states.  
In all of the above policies, the White Paper emphasises on China’s reliance on the framework of 
international law treaties and general international law. For instance, in relation to scientific 
research in the Arctic, China expresses its respect of the exclusive jurisdiction of Arctic states and 
the freedom of scientific exploration by all states in the high seas of the Arctic must be respected 
(ibid). Similarly, it maintains that the development of Arctic shipping routes must be in accordance 
to UNCLOS, general international law and the freedom of navigation (ibid).  
The four basic principles and five key policies elucidated in the White Paper are nothing new. The 
first three basic principles outlined in the White Paper have been raised briefly by the Chinese 
Foreign Minister, Wang Yi at the Third Arctic Circle Assembly in October 2015. The brief outline 
was followed by a keynote speech delivered by Chinese Vice Foreign Minister, Zhang Ming who 
presented six specific points that have close resemblance with the current policies presented in the 
White Paper. The six points summarised from his speech are as follows:  
Six Specific Policies on China’s Arctic Affairs 
1) ‘further explore and understand the Arctic’ 
2) ‘protect and rationally use the Arctic’ 
3) ‘respect the inherent rights of Arctic countries and the Indigenous people’ 
4) ‘respect the rights of non-Arctic countries and the overall interests of the 
international community’ 
5) ‘build a multi-tiered Arctic cooperation framework for win-win results’ 
6) ‘uphold the Arctic governance system based on existing international law’ 
(Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). 
The nearly identical content of the White Paper with the speech delivered by the Chinese minister 
in 2015 suggests that the White Paper was drafted by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
Whilst the relevant provisions of UNCLOS are not cited in the White Paper, the repeated reference 
to UNCLOS demonstrates China’s reliance on its rights and freedoms of the high seas of the 
Arctic Ocean to further its interest in the Arctic.4 Despite citing the intention to safeguard 
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‘common interests’ as one of its goals, the White Paper did not draw any references to the term 
‘global commons’. Although the Arctic boundaries are deeply contested among Arctic states, no 
state has sovereignty over the high seas of the Central Arctic Ocean – the terra nullius area. Hence, 
China’s rights and freedoms in the high seas of the Arctic Ocean are legally justified. As 
controversially described by Admiral Yin Zhuo of the People’s Liberation Army in 2010, ‘the 
North Pole and the sea area around the North Pole belong to the ‘commonwealth of the people 
of the world’ and as China has one-fifth of the world’s population, its role in the Arctic is ‘very 
much not being absent’ (bu ke quewei ) (Chinanews, 2010).  
The White Paper describes a similar position in a softer tone drawing a clear distinction between 
areas of the Arctic that belong to the sovereignty of Arctic states and those that belong to the 
global commons.  
The continental and insular land territories in the Arctic cover an area of about 8 million square kilometers, 
with sovereignty over them belonging to Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and 
the United States respectively. The Arctic Ocean covers an area of more than 12 million square 
kilometers, in which coastal States and other States share maritime rights and interests in 
accordance with international law. These coastal States have within their jurisdiction internal 
waters, territorial seas, contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones, and continental shelves 
in the Arctic Ocean. Certain areas of the Arctic Ocean form part of the high seas and the Area (State 
Council Information Office of the PRC, 2018).   
Tellingly, the area of high seas or international waters of the Central Arctic Ocean that is of interest 
to China spans over 2.8 million km2, nearly the size of the Mediterranean Sea. Like any other state, 
China may exercise its non-exhaustive freedoms over this area.5  
China’s reliance on UNCLOS as the basis of Arctic governance is tactical. The reliance on 
UNCLOS is best described as and it is ‘the path of least resistance’ considering its near universal 
adoption (Jarashow et al., 2006: 1587). Likewise, international law provides an efficient mechanism 
for Arctic governance as it is a common ground for cooperation and multilateralism. Koivurova 
sums it rightly in describing China’s Arctic policy as an approach that ‘banked so heavily on 
international law’ (Koivurova, 2018). The White Paper cites China’s commitment on international 
agreements such as the UN Charter, rules of the International Maritime Organisation and 
international agreements on environmental protection including the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement (State Council Information 
Office of the PRC, 2018). From the perspective of governance, Koivurova elaborates that China 
relies on the framework of international law because it is merely an outsider State of the Arctic 
region. By relying on the various international regimes and treaties that it is a party, China has 
effectively placed itself in the driver seat being one of the key players in Arctic governance (2018). 
The White Paper must be viewed against the backdrop of Beijing’s foreign policy that has evolved 
over the past few decades. The release of the White Paper is a significant departure and 
abandonment of the often-cited Deng Xiaoping maxim of ‘concealing one’s capability from its 
outward display’ (tao guang yang hui 
). China no longer intends to keep a low-profile 
diplomacy; slowly but gradually it seeks to challenge existing regimes and norms of international 
law. The departure should not be viewed with surprise as China has been advocating for greater 
status in international diplomacy while being mindful of existing rules and norms (Lanteigne, 2014: 
5). As China rises to become a global power, it seeks to possess greater influence in international 
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affairs as it shapes its own foreign policy identity, instead of responding or following the footsteps 
of other great powers (ibid).   
Under the administration of Hu Jintao, Beijing propagated the foreign policy concept of ‘peaceful 
rise’ (heping jueqi ), which refers to China’s aim to achieve peaceful economic development 
without destabilising the existing international order (Glaser & Medeiros, 2007: 293-296). The 
concept does not challenge or replace the structure of the international community, but it seeks to 
foster equality in China’s rise with other great powers without tilting the global balance of power 
or hegemony (ibid.). Following from uneasiness provoked by the term ‘peaceful rise’ outside 
China, the term was rephrased as ‘peaceful development’ in Chinese official speeches and 
documents, despite no changes in the thrust of the concept (ibid: 301). A new phase of China’s 
foreign policy is manifested under Xi Jinping to realise the ‘Chinese dream’ (zhongguo meng ) 
of a successful and modernised China. Whilst the principle of ‘peaceful development’ remains as 
an interest in Beijing’s foreign policy, its core national interests are now of equal or greater 
importance than ever before to realise the ‘Chinese dream’ (Zhang, 2015: 9). In protecting the 
‘Chinese dream’, Beijing has expressed that its legitimate national interest would not be sacrificed 
at the expense of maintaining peace (ibid.).  
To a large extent, Beijing’s stance is no different from the default foreign policy of other states 
that generally seeks to safeguard their individual national interest before the pursuit of other 
international matters. However, the reinterpretation of Beijing’s ‘peaceful development’ in light of 
realising the ‘Chinese dream’ has proven difficult. In reconciling both concepts, the notion of 
‘peaceful development’ in achieving the ‘Chinese dream’ does not refer to the absence of any 
conflict (ibid). Accordingly, if necessary Beijing may choose to adopt a more confident and tough 
stance to advance its national interest, including in its role in Arctic governance.     
As China’s actions in the Arctic are now intensely scrutinised by others, the White Paper 
demonstrates its proactive diplomacy to ease concerns on its interest in the Arctic. Overall, the 
White Paper represents a cumulation of China’s policies on its various engagement in the Arctic 
and its strong emphasis on international law in the Arctic governance. China is indeed an 
enthusiastic participant in the Arctic but its role and presence in the region represents new 
challenges and opportunities. 
The Polar Silk Road Vision  
China envisions the Arctic Ocean route to be part of its grand strategy in establishing the Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI is an ambitious plan under Xi Jinping to realise the great 
rejuvenation of China through enhanced connectivity and trade flow between across the three 
major continents of Asia, Europe and Africa (Xinhua, 2015). The grandiose action plan of the BRI 
unveiled in 2015 aims to establish the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime 
Silk Road (ibid). In June 2017, the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission and 
the State Oceanic Administration jointly issued a document entitled Vision for Maritime 
Cooperation under the BRI that outlines China’s vision to synchronise development plans and 
joint actions for maritime cooperation in propelling the BRI (NDRC & SOA, 2017). The 
document declared the maritime passageway of the Arctic Ocean as amongst the Chinese ‘blue 
economic passage’ that extends China’s economic corridor with Central Asia, the Balkans, Russia, 
Europe and North America (ibid.).        
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The White Paper is the first official policy document to set out China’s vision of the Polar Silk 
Road in relation to the development of Arctic shipping routes. Despite two brief mentions of the 
term in the White Paper, Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kong Xuanyou in a press 
briefing elaborated that the Polar Silk Road is also an alignment with the Russian-led Eurasian 
Economic Union and potentially other Arctic states (Kong, 2018).6 As a non-Arctic state, China 
understands the challenges in achieving its vision in the absence of cooperation from Arctic state. 
In this regard, China’s admission as an observer in the Arctic Council would enable Beijing to 
increase its political and economic influence in the region to ensure its interests are equally 
considered and respected.  
China’s Arctic diplomacy with individual Arctic states represents the ‘species’ of the highly focused 
bilateral relations, in which the Polar Silk Road is the ‘genus’ with characteristics of the overarching 
grand strategy of the BRI. The diplomatic jargons used by Chinese officials in describing the 
principles of the BRI (i.e., ‘mutual respect’, ‘consensus-building’, ‘common development’, 
‘common prosperity’, ‘win-win cooperation’ and ‘sustainable achievements’) are also echoed and 
encapsulated in the four basic principles of China’s Arctic policy as discussed in the above section.   
The BRI and the Polar Silk Road vision are the product of globalisation to facilitate global trade 
and economic integration. The Polar Silk Road would enable China to diversify its maritime routes 
whilst reducing journey length and fuel cost. China understands the importance in the opening of 
Arctic shipping routes to boost its export-driven economy. In lobbying for its Arctic shipping 
agenda, Chinese state-owned shipping company, China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) has 
sent vessels transiting along the Northern Sea Route and expressed interest to increase its 
engagement in the region (Staalesen, 2016).  
Prior to the release of the White Paper, China’s vision of the Polar Silk Road has gained grounds 
in various cooperation with Arctic states. The Chinese and Russians have embarked jointly on the 
Yamal Peninsula liquefied natural gas (LNG) project. As Russia is among the world’s largest energy 
exporters and China is the largest energy importer, the gas from the Yamal Peninsula is expected 
to be exported for Asia. The Arctic plant that has three production lines with a fourth planned, 
has a capacity of 16.5 million tonnes of LNG per year (Mazneva, 2017; Foy, 2017). China through 
its state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation and the Chinese Silk Road Fund 
collectively have close to a 30% stake in the project (ibid). China has also pledged to financially 
support the second phase of the Russian LNG project at the Gydan Peninsula (Foy, 2017). These 
projects have led to other projects in the pipeline such as the construction of the seaport of Sabetta 
and the Kotelny Cape offshore oil terminal both located on the Yamal Peninsula to facilitate the 
transportation of the LNG by sea to Asia (Sørensen & Klimenko, 2017: 18). In Murmansk, Chinese 
state-owned China Oilfield Services Limited in partnership with Russian state-owned Gazprom 
have also embarked on mapping out and drilling the Leningradskoye field, located west of the 
Yamal Peninsula to discover the extent of hydrocarbon reserves in the area (Staalesen, 2018). It is 
estimated that the Leningradskoye field holds over 1.9 trillion cubic meters of natural gas (ibid.).  
In leveraging on the potential shipping traffic along the North Sea, Finland and Norway have 
unveiled blueprints for an Arctic Corridor, extending the Finnish and Norwegian railway system 
to the Arctic and an underground tunnel connecting Helsinki and Tallinn (Xinhua, 2018). The 
planned route will link Rovaniemi, a Finnish town located on the Arctic Circle to Kirkenes in 
Norway, allowing connectivity from Europe to the ports of the Arctic Ocean and the Northern 
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Sea Route (ibid). It is estimated that the railway extension project would cost 3 billion EUR while 
the tunnel project would cost close to 15 billion EUR, with potential investment from China 
(Breum, 2018). The journey along the Northern Sea Route coupled with the railway will be the 
shortest route for transporting goods from Asia to Europe and would potentially increase Sino-
European economic trade and cooperation.7 Finland has also commenced preliminary works to 
implement the Arctic Connect project that aims to lay nearly 10,500km of optical fibre cable 
through the Arctic to bridge connectivity between Europe and Asia (Lipponen & Svento, 2016). 
Once completed, the trans-Arctic cable through Finland will be the new landing area for 
international data traffic (ibid.), strengthening Finland’s position as a hub for technology and data 
operations on the Polar Silk Road.  
In the United States, the Alaska Gasline Development Corporation has entered into a joint 
development agreement with China’s leading oil company, China Petrochemical Corporation 
(Sinopec), the Bank of China and China Investment Cooperation on the Alaska natural gas project 
(Feng & Saha, 2018). Whilst a definitive agreement has yet to be finalised, the project is estimated 
to cost 43 billion USD and is expected to receive 75% of its funding from the Bank of China. In 
exchange for the Chinese financing, Sinopec will retain 75% of the total capacity of the project 
that is destined to be exported to China (ibid). China stepped into the project after it was side-
lined by American oil companies due to its lack of competitiveness with lower cost shale projects 
(ibid). 
The above examples demonstrate Beijing’s efforts in intensifying its relations and investments in 
Arctic states, reflecting its strategic priority in the region. However, Chinese investment in 
infrastructure projects along the Polar Silk Road have raised concerns over the future of Arctic 
security. The interest of Chinese construction companies in expanding the three airports in 
Greenland have received strong opposition from Danish officials (Matzen & Daly, 2018). Similarly, 
the Chinese had to pull out and abandon their investment plans for the deep-water port in Lysekil, 
Sweden after concerns were raised about the environmental impact and national security concerns 
of the project (Suokas, 2018). Chinese investments in Arctic states are also criticised due to the 
lack of transparency and disclosure, as these investments are generally funded through subsidiaries 
to hide the identity of the corporate or state-funded investment project (Rosen & Thuringer, 2017: 
53).8 The nature of these investments is blurred with misrepresentations, distortions and 
differences in value reported to foreign media, arguably with the intention to avoid competition 
and to enable China to manoeuvre its investment geopolitically (ibid.).  
Concerns have also been raised in relation to China’s funding on the BRI projects, in which China 
has fuelled the indebtedness of developing States through large infrastructure investments before 
seeking to gain control of strategic assets when debtors failed to pay their Chinese state-owned 
creditors (Hurley et. al., 2018: 19-20).9 Whilst there has been no reported incident on the default 
of the Chinese investment in the Arctic region and the indebtedness of developing states are far 
from comparison with the economic stability of Arctic states, China’s risk-taking approach in 
investing in mega Arctic projects that were previously deemed unrealistic, raises questions on the 
sustainability and vulnerability of its investments. Although the White Paper may ease concerns 
on China’s interest in the Arctic, China would have to increase its transparency in its Arctic 
investments to facilitate an open and constructive dialogue with Arctic states.   
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Concluding Remarks 
The White Paper has certainly provided a general overview of China’s Arctic policy that guides its 
Arctic discourse. Looking ahead, China’s presence in the Arctic and ambition of a Polar Silk Road 
bring new opportunities and challenges for Arctic states – as expressed in the Chinese proverb 
‘good fortune follows upon challenges, challenges lurks within good fortune’ (huo xi fu zhi suo yi, fu 
xi huo zhi suo fu, 		).10  
The success of China’s Arctic policy as a non-Arctic state would be dependent on its Arctic 
diplomacy and ability to strengthen cooperation in the region. Yet, much remains uncertain on 
aspects of China’s key interests that are not addressed in the White Paper, in particular on the role 
of the Arctic in its national security and defence strategy (Brady, 2017: 117). The release of the 
White Paper may have cleared some misconceptions about China’s Arctic interest, but it lacks 
concrete steps or measures that China intends to implement in its Arctic policy. Considering 
China’s growing investment and presence in the Arctic, it remains a matter of time before China 
seeks greater influence or a leadership role in the Arctic beyond its current observer status to 
safeguard its economic interests. As for now, China has maintained that it respects the political 
status quo in the Arctic.  
 
Notes 
1. The first reference in which China has referred itself as a ‘near-Arctic State’ was in January 
2013, in a speech by Chinese Ambassador Zhao Jun at the 7th Arctic Frontiers Conference, 
Tromsø, Norway. In his speech the Ambassador emphasised that China's northeast is close 
to 50 degrees north latitude (Zhao, 2013).   
2. The notion of ‘not being absent’ was previously raised by Admiral Yin Zhuo of the 
People’s Liberation Army in 2010. He noted that China’s position in the Arctic is ‘very 
much not being absent’ (being present) (bu ke quewei ) (Chinanews, 2010, March 
5). The phrase is often misconstrued and mistranslated as ‘indispensable’ (e.g., Jakobson 
& Peng, 2012: 15).     
3. Jakobson and Lee opined that the Arctic was 'simply not sufficiently high on the agenda 
of [Chinese] senior officials’ that necessitate the publication of an Arctic strategy (Jakobson 
& Lee, 2013: 11). The publication of the White Paper has proven the contrary.  
4. Article 87(1) of the UNCLOS outlines a list of non-exhaustive freedoms available to all 
States, comprising inter alia, the freedom of navigation, freedom of overflight, freedom to 
lay submarine cables and pipelines, freedom to construct artificial islands and other 
installations, freedom of fishing and freedom of scientific research.  
5. China has the freedom to exercise any of its right in the Arctic High Seas, except on the 
right to conduct commercial fishing as China is party to the Agreement to Prevent 
Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean 2017. Parties to the 
Agreement are Canada, China, Denmark (in respect of Greenland and the Faroe Islands), 
the European Union, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Norway, Russia and the United States. The 
Agreement is scheduled to last for 16 years after which it will be automatically renewed for 
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every five years unless a contracting State objects or a scientific based fishing quota and 
rules are established. 
6. Beijing initially used the term ‘Ice Silk Road’ to refer to the framework cooperation 
between China and Russia on the development of Arctic shipping routes.     
7. Risto Murto, the Deputy Director General of the Networks Department of the Finnish 
Ministry of Transport and Communications in commenting on the Arctic Corridor noted 
that, ‘When we think of the new corridors to China, we are in the middle between Europa 
and Asia. Finland is not an island anymore. We look at our geopolitical position in a whole 
new way’ (Breum, 2018). 
8. It estimated that China has invested over 1.4 trillion USD in the economies of the Arctic 
Five (plus Finland and Sweden) from 2012 to 2017, in which nearly 89.2 billion USD are 
investment in infrastructure, cooperative agreements and financing for projects located 
within the Arctic Circle (Rosen & Thuringer, 2017). There are no official data from Beijing 
or respective Arctic States to verify these estimates. 
9. For instance, when Sri Lanka was unable to service its 8 billion USD loan for the 
construction of the Hambantota Port, parties entered into a debt-for-equity swap, which 
provides China a 99-year lease in managing the port. 23 out of 68 States that have received 
BRI-related financing were reported to have unsustainable level of debt, in which eight of 
them are categorised as high risk of debt distress. Russia is the only Arctic State included 
in the study and was categorised as low risk of debt distress (Hurley et. al., 2018). 
10. Chinese Ambassador Zhao Jun in his speech at the 7th Arctic Frontiers Conference, 
Tromsø, Norway used a simplified English translation of the above Chinese proverb. He 
emphasised on the saying ‘luck and misfortune come in turn’ in describing the 
opportunities and challenges that are present in the Arctic (Zhao, 2013).   
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The Polar Silk Road & the West Nordic Region 
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In June 2017, China’s National Development and Reform Commission officially announced that the Arctic Ocean would be 
added to the list of “blue economic corridors” comprising a major part of China’s emerging “Belt and Road” trade and 
infrastructure initiatives. In January 2018, this policy was further codified in China’s first governmental White Paper on the 
Arctic. In May 2017, The Nordic Council of Ministers and China formally agreed to strengthen collaboration between China 
and the Nordic region on five key areas. At the same time, the West Nordic Region (Greenland, Iceland, the Faroe Islands, 
and coastal Norway) is increasingly being framed as a distinct part of the Nordic region with its Arctic location, maritime and 
blue bio-economy focus, yet these countries have no joint Arctic strategy or approach to the emerging Polar Silk Road. On the 
one hand, China’s enhanced Arctic engagement and strategic collaboration with the Nordic region, which includes the Arctic, 
maritime economy, and bio-economy, seem very promising for West Nordic development, on the other hand, geo-political unease 
about Chinese investments in the Arctic raise questions about what happens when the large-scale geopolitics meet the micro-
scale geopolitics of the West Nordic Region. There is a significant gap in both the academic and policy literature on these 
matters, and as such, this article targets both academia and practitioners seeking to better understand and act according to 
developments in this region. Theoretically, we frame the article within the English School in International Relations. 
 
Introduction 
How can we understand China’s Polar Silk Road initiative from a West Nordic perspective? This 
question is relevant for several reasons. First, Beijing is increasing its engagement in the Arctic 
primarily through scientific activities, but also through economic collaboration and infrastructure 
investments as part of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) under President Xi Jinping (&
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) since 2013. Second, China and the Nordic countries, represented within the Nordic Council 
of Ministers, are increasing their strategic collaboration via a so-called “5+1” dialogue. Third, the 
West Nordic Region is being increasingly framed as a distinct political, economic, social, and 
environmental region both within and outside the region. Fourth, the West Nordic Region covers 
the ocean area between the Arctic and Europe, making the West Nordic countries, governments, 
ports, and other relevant actors, central stakeholders in any Polar Silk Road plans and 
developments whether or not these actors recognize this. Fifth, there is some (geo-)political unease 
from the U.S. in relation to Chinese investments in Greenland further complicating internal 
Kingdom of Denmark relations (DR, 2018). As argued by Eythórsson and Hovgaard (2013: 140), 
the communities of the West Nordic space now find themselves in the middle of a new melting pot, 
and therefore it is a pressing question whether and how the West Nordic region can address itself to 
this new agenda.  
Despite the above reasons and calls for addressing the new agenda, there is a significant gap in 
both the academic and policy literature on these matters, and as such, this article targets both 
academia and practitioners seeking to better understand and act according to developments in this 
region.   
Theoretically, it can be argued that the Arctic resembles an International Society, based on 
institutions and norms of cooperation as defined by the English School in International Relations 
(Buzan, 2001). The Arctic is predominantly understood today by its many actors as a milieu of 
cooperation and knowledge sharing, where the military and economic differences between Arctic 
states are downplayed and non-state actors, like Indigenous Peoples’ organisations, participate in 
dialogue on equal footing with states, e.g. in the Arctic Council established in 1996 (Young, 2005). 
The Arctic, not just thawing itself, actually contributed to Cold War thawing via the 1986 Reykjavík 
Summit and East-West breakthrough (Berkman, 2014). The English School also applies two other 
key concepts to understand International Relations: an International System based on traditional 
Realist notions of anarchy and power politics amongst states, and a World Society based on 
Kantian notions of human emancipation and transcendence of the state system as centre of 
International Relations (Buzan, 2001: 475-6).  
Thus, the main point is that “[i]n the English School perspective, all three of these elements are in 
continuous coexistence and interplay, the question being how strong they are in relation to each 
other.” (Buzan, 2001: 476). During the Second World War and the Cold War, the Arctic was 
predominantly understood as a region under the dynamics of an International System and power 
politics of the United States/NATO on one side and Russia/USSR on the other (Dittmer et al, 
2011; Young, 2005). We understand the increasing regionalisation and practices of the West 
Nordic Region to be an integral part of an Arctic International Society. Further, by exploring new 
dynamics of China’s Polar Silk Road from a West Nordic perspective in an English School 
framework, we gain a better understanding of the interplay between International System, 
International Society, and World Society in the Arctic.  
In line with the English School’s methodological pluralism and historicist approach, to answer the 
initial research question, we depart from existing academic and policy literature on China’s BRI to 
first describe and analyse the current state of affairs of Beijing’s BRI and Polar Silk Road and also 
current frames of the West Nordic Region. We then continue with analyses of individual West 
Nordic cases of Chinese engagement in Norway, Iceland, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands. These 
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case studies are based on text analyses, observations, and interviews. As part of this project, we 
organised a plenary session on Beijing’s BRI and the West Nordic Region at the Arctic Circle 
Forum which took place in Tórshavn, Faroe Islands, on 8-9 May 2018. The plenary session was 
opened by China’s Special Representative for the Arctic, Mr. Gao Feng, who presented on Beijing’s 
understanding of BRI in relation to the Arctic and the West Nordic Region. We presented the 
project and preliminary findings from Norway, Iceland, and Greenland, after which the CEO of 
Faroese Telecom, Mr. Jan Ziskasen, outlined the strategic collaboration between his company and 
the Chinese communications firm Huawei. These presentations, and feedback from the session, 
also inform this article. Based on these descriptions and analyses, we summarise our findings and 
conclude with a few recommendations for further research and policy analysis. 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the Polar Silk Road 
When the first blueprints of China’s Belt and Road (yidai yilu %) Initiative (BRI) were 
unveiled by President Xi Jinping in 2013, the policy’s focus was well south of the Arctic region, 
with a concentration on developing trade links with Africa, Europe, Eurasia and Russia via land 
links as well as through the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. To date, more than sixty 
countries have since signed on to the BRI, which is emerging as less of a concentrated policy and 
more as a series of components working together under a wide aegis. The “Belt” within the 
configuration is composed of overland trade routes stretching from China to Europe via Russia 
and Central Asia, with a primary focus on energy, goods trade, and transportation infrastructure. 
The grouping of Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) has also developed as a major 
link of the Belt resulting from the creation of the “16+1” dialogues between Beijing and the CEEC 
which began in 2012 and focus on deepened economic cooperation and mass transportation 
projects (Poggetti, 2017; Zhang, 2015). The “Road” within the BRI is more specifically known as 
the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” and until recently has been centred on the Indian Ocean 
(Blanchard, 2017; Garlick, 2018).  
As the BRI began to grow, the question arose of whether the Arctic would eventually be 
incorporated into the initiative, given Beijing’s growing interest in the economic possibilities of the 
far north in areas of energy, raw materials and shipping. There was a notable focus on the Northern 
Sea Route (NSR), an emerging Arctic sea route north of Siberia, as a potential conduit for Chinese 
trade with European markets and beyond. Initial discussion of the “third road” in the Arctic was 
tempered, however, by geographic and political realities (Hansen et al., 2016; Lanteigne, 2015). 
First and foremost, the NSR can only be used during summer months, and then still under difficult 
navigational conditions. In 2016, nineteen vessels were registered using the NSR, with the number 
increasing slightly to twenty-four ships by the end of 2017. It remains unclear as to when the route 
will be suitable for higher volumes of traffic, but China has expressed great interest in developing 
it for increased shipping to Europe (Feng, Woodhouse and Milne, 2018; Zhang, 2018). 
Second, developing a northern branch of the BRI would require strengthened political and 
economic relations with key Arctic states, beginning with Russia. Relations between Beijing and 
Moscow remain warm, and there has been much enthusiasm about the joint creation of an “Ice 
Silk Road” (bingshang sichou zhilu %) in Siberia and the Russian Far East (RFE) since 
2017. However, there is still some unease in Russia about long-term Chinese interests in both the 
Arctic and the RFE. The diplomatic fallout from the post-2014 Crimea/Ukraine crisis further 
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highlighted questions as to whether Sino-Russian cooperation remains a “marriage of 
convenience” as opposed to be burgeoning alliance, especially in light of growing bilateral military 
cooperation and mutual concerns about the United States (Jia, 2017; Lo, 2017, Lukin, 2018). 
Another geopolitical complication for Beijing’s Arctic interests had been the diplomatic freeze 
between China and Norway over the Nobel Prize incident in 2010. Although low-level 
communication between the two countries continued, including in the area of polar affairs, 
government-to-government contacts were cut until an agreement was reached in December 2016 
which restored full relations and paved the way for greater bilateral cooperation, including in the 
Arctic (Sverdrup-Thygeson & Lanteigne, 2016; Xinhua, 2018). 
Third, China is a relative newcomer in the Arctic, and thus has attempted to tread carefully in 
matters relating to its economic interests in the region to avoid being perceived as trying to act as 
a spoiler.1 This message was repeated by Chinese Arctic Ambassador Gao Feng at the May 2018 
Tórshavn conference.2 Although China lacks an Arctic border or an Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) in the Arctic Ocean, the term “near-Arctic state” (jin beiji guojia &	) has regularly 
appeared in Chinese policy papers over the past five years. This created some concerns in the 
United States and other Arctic actors that Beijing was indeed seeking to construct a revisionist 
policy in the region (Lundestad & Tunsjø, 2015). However, since becoming a formal Observer in 
the Arctic Council in 2013, China under Xi continued to stress its interests in science diplomacy, 
regional partnerships, and support for Arctic legal structures while expressing some interest in 
investment and other economic activities. In short, China was trying to walk a fine line between 
being considered as pushing its way into the region to stake a claim on Arctic resources, and being 
too passive in its Arctic policy and running into a potential “blueberry pie problem”, meaning the 
risk of the region being divided like a pie among Arctic states with those countries outside having 
limited access. Thus, Beijing has been seeking to stress the idea that some areas of Arctic 
governance, including economic development, are of international concern in addition to regional 
(Lanteigne, 2017 and 2018a). Beijing, therefore, was wary of linking the Arctic and the BRI too 
quickly out of concerns about a further backlash.  
Nevertheless, in the months leading up to Beijing publishing its first official governmental policy 
paper on the Arctic in January 2018, signs of a more comprehensive approach to the region were 
appearing from different quarters. For example, in a September 2016 speech on China and global 
governance, President Xi called for greater Chinese participation in creating new rules in the Polar 
Regions as well as cyberspace, outer space and the oceans (Hua, 2016). In October 2015, speaking 
at the annual Arctic Circle conference in Iceland, then-Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Zhang Ming 
outlined a six-point approach to China’s Arctic policy. These included economic development, the 
rights of Arctic and non-Arctic states, and the need for a ‘multi-tiered’ cooperation framework in 
the region, further underscoring Beijing’s interests in participating in the development of future 
Arctic governance. In 2016, China’s Central Television (CCTV) showcased a documentary, “Arctic! 
Arctic!” (Beiji, Beiji 	! 	!), to introduce the region to the Chinese public as well as to indicate 
the roles the country could possibly play in the region’s future (Lanteigne & Shi, 2018). 
By 2017, China’s Arctic policies had developed to the point where there began to be more direct 
talk of linking the far north to Beijing’s deepening BRI policies. For example, one prominent 
Beijing-based academic noted that the time had come to add a “Circle” to the Belt and Road 
structure (Huang, 2017). In June of that year, official government confirmation that the Arctic 
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would be formally linked to the BRI arrived in the form of a nondescript paper co-published by 
China’s then-State Oceanic Administration (SOA)3 and the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC). Entitled “Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road 
Initiative”,4 it identified three specific “blue economic passages” (lanse jingji tongdao ! ') 
crucial for enhanced maritime trade under the auspices of the BRI. The first was the Indian Ocean-
Mediterranean route which remains the centrepiece for the Maritime Silk Road and the second an 
emerging southern tier, a “China-Oceania-South Pacific” route which may extend all the way to 
Latin America, including new BRI participants Argentina and Chile (Cambero, 2018; PwC, 2018). 
The third involves the Arctic Ocean, connecting Chinese trade with Northern Europe.  
The final confirmation that the Arctic would be an integral part of the Belt and Road Initiative 
came in the form of the long-awaited governmental White Paper on the Arctic. The document, 
entitled “China’s Arctic Policy” (Zhongguo de beiji zhengce 	) brought together the 
country’s previously announced economic, political and scientific interests in the region.5 In 
addition to re-affirming China’s status as a “near-Arctic state”, the paper stressed the need to 
“advance Arctic-related cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative,” while clarifying China’s 
position in the issue of overall regional engagement: 
States from outside the Arctic region do not have territorial sovereignty in the Arctic, but they do 
have rights in respect of scientific research, navigation, overflight, fishing, laying of submarine cables 
and pipelines in the high seas and other relevant sea areas in the Arctic Ocean, and rights to resource 
exploration and exploitation in the Area, pursuant to treaties such as UNCLOS and general 
international law. 
Specific economic areas which were outlined in the paper included shipping, energy and raw 
material exploitation, fishing and tourism, with an emphasis on the requirement for China “to 
understand, protect, develop and participate in the governance of the Arctic”. The question now 
is the direction in which China’s Arctic policies within the BRI framework will take from this stage.  
Currently, Russia remains the main area of interest for China’s Arctic trade and joint investment, 
especially given the fossil fuel and commodity potential of Siberia and the RFE as well as Russia 
being seen by Beijing as holding many keys to access the greater Arctic. Among current Sino-
Russian Arctic development projects is the Yamal Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) enterprise in 
Siberia, co-financed by the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) (Ufimtseva & Prior, 
2017). The project, worth an estimated US$27 billion, came online in December 2017, and reached 
the two million tons mark in LNG exports in May 2018 (Bergman, 2017; Foy, 2017). The Yamal 
project is expected to be a model for future examples of Sino-Russian energy cooperation in the 
Arctic. With the NSR continuing to open up to greater shipping for longer periods each year, there 
is also the potential for enhanced bilateral cooperation to develop the waterway, especially with 
the Vladimir Putin government continuing to depend on China for economic cooperation in the 
wake of still-frozen Western relations.  
Beyond Russia, China has a number of other economic projects in various stages of development 
with other major Arctic states, which could be incorporated into the Belt and Road Initiative in 
the near future. In the Nordic region, there have been discussions about future Chinese investment 
in port facilities in Iceland as well as Kirkenes in Norway, which could potentially service a growing 
number of vessels using Arctic sea routes (Kynge, 2017). Arkhangelsk is also the potential site of 
a Chinese-based initiative, which may include a deep-water port and the Belkomur rail link, which 
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would connect the city with the Ural Mountain town of Solikamsk. China and Russia are also 
consulting on the enhancement of the Zarubino Port and adjacent Binhai transport corridors in 
the Russian Far East, which could also assist with future Arctic sea transportation from both 
countries (Breum, 2018; Guan and Zhang 2017; Luo, 2017; Staalesen, 2018). These projects have 
the potential to become part of a larger land-based transportation network, which could not only 
improve cross-regional trade but also increase economic opportunities along the Russian and 
Nordic-Arctic coast. In addition to land and sea links, China may also become a major backer of 
a fibre-optic cable line, envisioned as connecting East Asia and Europe via Siberia (Buchanan, 
2018; Shi, 2017). As the Polar Silk Road continues to evolve, it is apparent that China is more 
comfortable accentuating the economic dimensions of its expanding Arctic policy and wishes to 
be universally viewed as a serious Arctic player.  
As for Beijing’s understanding of the Nordic region in relation to the BRI and Polar Silk Road, 
Chinese diplomats and policy experts attending the China Nordic Arctic Research Centre 
(CNARC) Symposium in Tromsø, Norway, on 23-25 May 2018, explained that China does not 
differentiate between Nordic, East Nordic and the West Nordic regions. China works with either 
the individual countries or the Nordic region as a whole. China takes a more pragmatic approach 
to projects in the Polar Silk Road, sometimes called the “all in one basket” approach, where existing 
and new projects with some sort of infrastructure and trade perspective are included even though 
these projects are not strictly Polar (Interviews, 23-25 May 2018). At the Tórshavn conference, 
Gao Feng presented the official line, further noting that what China expects from the different 
potential partners in a Polar Silk Road is that partners first meet amongst themselves and develop 
ideas and positions, and only then meets with China for negotiations. Gao also stressed in an 
interview that Beijing does not want to push specific policies, but rather wants the Nordic partners 
to develop their own ideas, interests, and positions and engage with China in dialogue to develop 
jointly the Polar Silk Road as a “win-win” (shuangying
$) collaboration (Interview, 9 May 2018). 
The question therefore is how the Nordic region, the West Nordic region, or the individual Nordic 
countries can best engage China in the Arctic as the northern branch of the BRI begins to take 
shape. 
Analysis of West Nordic Cases 
Following the end of the Cold War and the Arctic dominated by International Society dynamics, 
the West Nordic Region is increasingly being framed as a distinct part of the Nordic Region and 
the Arctic,6 although it is still ambiguous what exactly characterises the “West Nordic” beyond its 
geography, and how functional it is as a region (Eythórsson and Hovgaard, 2013). However, certain 
features stand out. Politically, the West Nordic region consists of Iceland, a sovereign country, 
Greenland and the Faroe Islands, two self-governing, but not fully sovereign, countries within the 
Kingdom of Denmark,7 and sometimes Norway or only coastal Norwegian municipalities are 
included. In the West Nordic Council (WNC),8 established in 1985, Norway is not included, but 
in the North Atlantic Cooperation (NORA),9 coastal Norway is (OECD, 2011). Compared to the 
“East Nordic” countries, the four West Nordic countries are not members of the European Union, 
but are members of NATO.10 However, Norway and Iceland are members of the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) and the European Economic Area (EEA), the Faroe Islands and the 
European Union (EU) have a Free Trade Agreement, and Greenland, which left the EU’s 
precursor, the European Economic Community, in 1982, is associated with the EU under the 
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Overseas Association Decision protocols. Economically, the West Nordic countries are based 
much more on fishing, aquaculture, shipping, and maritime services, etc. and with small and 
dependent economies are much more at risk from external shocks. The West Nordic countries 
have small populations, totalling 2,750,000 people, compared to the East Nordic total population 
of 24,200,000 people (NORA, 2017: 20-21).  
Despite growing awareness and framing of a West Nordic Region, no joint West Nordic Arctic 
strategy or approach to the Polar Silk Road exists. The West Nordic Council does recognise 
China’s geopolitical interest in the region, but has not developed any analysis or recommendations 
in relation to China. The Nordic Council of Ministers has developed a joint strategic partnership 
with China.11 In recent years, however, Greenland and the Faroe Islands have not always felt 
represented within the Nordic Council of Ministers, e.g. when the five Nordic Prime Ministers 
from Finland, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, and Denmark meet, they cannot participate, but are 
represented by Denmark’s Prime Minister. In matters of foreign and security policy, Copenhagen 
represents the Kingdom of Denmark including Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Each West 
Nordic country has some degree of foreign relations with China, which will be elaborated below. 
According to our observations, the different West Nordic countries and their approaches to the 
Arctic are best understood through what can be termed “micro-scale geopolitics”, where local and 
personal history and interests are more important than large-scale developments and long-term 
strategies. In the Arctic dominated by International Society dynamics, this gives room for further 
regionalisation and participation by diverse actors. The “West Nordic-ness” is further motivated 
by intra-Nordic and intra-Kingdom of Denmark political and economic interests of independence 
and self-determination. 
Norway 
After six years of frozen relations between Beijing and Oslo as a result of the Nobel Prize incident 
in 2010, Norway was anxious to make up for lost time in re-engaging the Chinese economy, 
especially in the energy and shipping sectors (Chan, 2016). During the period immediately after 
the diplomatic freeze, high-level bilateral relations between Beijing and Oslo were suspended. 
Instead, most official contacts took place either in multilateral fora such as the World Trade 
Organisation and the Group of Twenty/G20 meetings, or via Track II conferences12 including 
those such as Arctic Frontiers in Tromsø, the CNARC based in Shanghai, or through the networks 
and projects of the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS) (own observations). Although there 
were some economic effects to the diplomatic freeze, including periodic stoppages of Norwegian 
salmon, the overall economic relationship continued to grow and there were few negative effects 
seen in many sectors, including Chinese tourism in Norway (Lanteigne & Sverdrup-Thygeson, 
2016). Norway was also allowed into the Beijing-founded Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB) in April 2015 with no political interference from Beijing (China Daily, 17 April 2015). 
Diplomatic relations were fully restored in December 2016 after a joint statement was signed, 
which included a promise by Oslo to “do its best to avoid any future damage to bilateral relations” 
(Government of Norway, 2016).   
In light of the restored diplomatic situation, China restarted FTA negotiations with Norway in 
April 2017 after diplomatic ties were restored, with the eleventh and most recent round of 
negotiations completed in Oslo in May 2018 (Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of 
China, 2018). Should the Sino-Norwegian FTA be successfully completed in the short term, this 
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would mean that Beijing will have free trade pacts with each of the four EFTA economies.13 Beijing 
is also interested in further engaging with Norway in Arctic-related projects, and China has 
maintained an Arctic research station at Ny-Ålesund in Svalbard since 2003.  
As China’s Belt and Road continues to develop in the Arctic, there is the possibility of a Beijing-
backed port project in Kirkenes as well as Chinese assistance with developing a section of a polar 
railroad, which would link northern Norway to China via Finland and Russia. It was also 
announced in June 2018 that an existing China-Finland rail rink for cargo shipping was planned to 
be extended to Narvik in northern Norway, a move that could further strengthen Arctic overland 
shipping (Kynge, 2017; Staalesen, 2018; Suokas 2018). Several Norwegian businesses, including in 
the energy, seafood and shipping sectors, are hoping to expand their partnerships with China as 
the BRI continues to develop in the Arctic (Xinhua, 7 April 2017, Foreign Ministry of China, 
2017b).  
Iceland 
Relations between Beijing and Reykjavík have remained close, and Iceland became the first 
European state to complete a free trade agreement with China. Beijing completed these FTA talks 
with Iceland in 2013, after a delay in 2009 caused by the island country’s banking crisis (Lanteigne, 
2010; Joy, 2013). Since that time, Iceland has been interested in developing an identity as a primary 
gateway to the Arctic for non-Arctic states, including in East Asia, with China as a major partner. 
There had been a fossil fuel partnership between the China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC) and Iceland’s Eykon since 2013, to explore for oil and gas in the Dreki region of the 
North Atlantic, but disappointing initial findings prompted the Chinese firm to withdraw from the 
arrangement in January 2018 (RÚV, 22 January 2018). However, there are other areas of joint 
energy cooperation which are also looking promising, including cooperation in thermal power 
projects in China (Kottasová, 2018), given Icelandic expertise in that area. There is also the growing 
possibility of Sino-Icelandic cooperation in Icelandic data storage facilities as well as other green 
initiatives (Turner, 2018; Whitlock, 2018).  
In 2012, Iceland and China signed agreements promising to collaborate on other areas of Arctic 
and maritime scientific affairs and related areas (Foreign Ministry of China, 2012). In the same year 
leading up to the scientific agreement, RANNÍS (The Icelandic Centre for Research) and Arctic 
Portal from Akureyri in northern Iceland facilitated the visit of China’s polar research vessel, Snow 
Dragon (Xuelong*+) to Reykjavík and Akureyri. These events lead to the first annual China Nordic 
Arctic Research Symposium, and CNARC was established in 2013 (Arctic Portal, 2016). Chinese 
policymakers and researchers have since 2013 been active within the Arctic Circle conference, one 
of the largest Track II meetings in the region and which is hosted annually in Reykjavík. A major 
scientific collaboration in the works is the joint Sino-Icelandic aurora research centre at Kárhóll in 
northern Iceland, which is expected to be fully open by the end of 2018. The main partners and 
initiators of the aurora research centre are RANNÍS, Arctic Portal, and the Shanghai-based Polar 
Research Institute of China (PRIC), again with strong ties to CNARC and with PRIC funding a 
large part of the centre. The aurora centre combines many activities, including research, education, 
tourism, technology, and intercultural exchange (conversation with Arctic Portal, 24 May 2018).  
In September 2018, Mr Guðlaugur Þór Þórðarson, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iceland, paid a 
diplomatic visit to Beijing in order to further develop the relationship between the two states in 
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the areas of trade, tourism, geothermal energy, and climate change. The visit also conveyed a 
message of Reykjavík’s welcoming attitude towards Beijing’s BRI strategy (Foreign Ministry of 
China, 2018). Iceland will be assuming the chair of the Arctic Council in 2019, and given the 
smooth Sino-Icelandic relationship thus far, it is reasonable to assume that China will wish to 
expand its presence in Iceland, seeing the country as a window to the greater Arctic region.  
Greenland 
Beijing has developed various interests in Greenland, including in areas of scientific research, but 
also wishes to develop partnerships with Greenlandic economic interests, including in the area of 
natural resources along with other related sectors. Greenland, as the largest island in the world, 
with most of its land covered by ice and glaciers, provides a potential site for a Chinese research 
station. At the Arctic Circle conference in Reykjavík, Iceland in 2017, Yong Yu, the Vice-Director 
of the Shanghai-based Polar Research Institute of China (PRIC) first confirmed China’s ambition 
to establish a research station in Greenland (Breum, 2017). Even though the exact location of the 
station has yet to be announced, there is reportedly interest in establishing the facility in north-
eastern Greenland.  
Chinese firms have also been active in Greenland, including in the island’s emerging mining sector. 
Three such projects include a potential rare earth elements (REE), uranium and zinc mine in 
Kvanefjeld, overseen by Greenland Minerals of Australia in cooperation with China’s Shenghe 
Resources (Shenghe ziyuan #) which owns a 12.5% stake in the project (Birney, 2018). The 
Kvanefjeld project is a prime example of China’s pursuit of rare earth elements, which are essential 
in many high-technology sectors, as well as green technology. Kvanefjeld, located in southern 
Greenland, is one of the biggest potential REE sites in the world. According to a completed 
Kvanefjeld feasibility study published by the Greenland Minerals in 2015, the Kvanefjeld project 
represents a current net value, after taxes, of US$1.4 billion, and supports an initial mine life of 
thirty-seven years (Greenland Minerals, 2015). There is also a zinc mine planned at Citronen Fjord, 
in Greenland’s far north being overseen by Perth-based Ironbark, in cooperation with China 
Nonferrous Metals. Third, General Nice, a Hong Kong-based company, has held the rights since 
2015 to a potential iron mine at Isua in western Greenland (Fouche, 2016; Shi & Lanteigne, 2018).  
In March 2018, a Chinese firm, China Communications Construction (Zhongguo jiaotong jianshe 
'"), was placed on the shortlist for a contract connected to the expansion of three major 
Greenlandic airports, despite misgivings expressed by members of the Danish government. 
However, in June 2018, the governments of Denmark and Greenland announced that there would 
be negotiations about possible financial support for the airports from Copenhagen, a move seen 
as forestalling the Chinese bid (Berlingske, 2018; Reuters, 2018). The matter moved closer to a 
settlement in September 2018, when an agreement was struck in Nuuk by the Prime Minister of 
Greenland, Kim Kielsen, and visiting Prime Minister of Denmark Lars Løkke Rasmussen, which 
included a promise by Copenhagen to provide 450 million DKK (70 million USD) in funds for 
the project as well as access to supplemental loans.  
This deal came at a steep political cost, however, as one of the parties within Greenland’s governing 
coalition, Partii Naleraq, withdrew out of protest of what it saw was an unacceptable policy 
overreach on Denmark’s part, forcing the Kielsen government into a potentially unstable minority 
position (Al-Jazeera, 2018; Jensen, 2018; Lanteigne, 2018b). Even if the airport agreement does go 
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forward, it is unlikely that this will be the end of the story in regards to Chinese interests in 
Greenland beyond mining. Adding to the complexity of this issue was an announcement later that 
month that the United States government was also interested in “strategic investment” in 
Greenlandic airports for potential “dual use” purposes, further underscoring the emerging 
geopolitical importance of Greenland, as well as concerns about Chinese interests there (US DoD, 
2018). 
The question of Chinese investment in Greenland lies right in the middle of the debate about the 
possibility of independence as Greenland’s economic interests have expanded from seafood to 
natural resources and potentially tourism. A self-rule agreement between Greenland and Denmark 
has been in force since 2009 (Lyall, 2009), which gives Nuuk greater space to expand its diplomatic 
relationships with other states. However, Denmark still assumes authority over Greenland’s 
security and foreign policy. Therefore, China’s approaches to Greenland have been viewed warily 
by Denmark, (and its main security partner, the US). In 2012, Hu Jintao ()), the then-
President of China, paid a visit to Denmark, the first time that a Chinese leader had ever visited 
that country since bilateral ties were established in 1950 (Acher, 2012). The visit was widely seen 
as a sign of Chinese interests in strengthening its relationship with Denmark, partially with a view 
to securing greater economic access to Greenland. In October 2017, Prime Minister Kielsen paid 
a visit to Beijing, and his government has been open to the possibility of more investment from 
China in Greenland (Foreign Ministry of China, 2017a). 
There remain questions and considerations about China’s future involvement in Greenland, both 
from the domestic politics and external actors, including Denmark and the greater European 
Union. A (then-)four-party coalition government was established after Greenlandic parliamentary 
elections in April 2018 (Government of Greenland, 2018), an administration which is seen as both 
pro-foreign investment and open to the possibility of eventual independence. Danish officials have 
conveyed their apprehension towards potential Greenland separatism and China’s economic 
participation and investments in Greenland, especially given the possible airport expansion 
projects cooperating with a Chinese company. A December 2017 report by the Danish Defence 
Intelligence Service (DDIS) included concerns about Chinese investment having a detrimental 
effect on Greenland given the island’s small economic base (DDIS, 2017; Finne, 2018). The airport 
debate further underscored the political sensitivities both within Greenland and between 
Copenhagen and Nuuk over to what degree Chinese investment might be a security challenge for 
Greenland. As Greenland continues to debate the possibility of greater autonomy, or even 
independence, from Denmark, China will likely be a major factor in its expanding foreign policy 
and trade interests. 
The Faroe Islands 
In 2013, the Faroese Prime Minister’s Office published an assessment of the country’s strategic 
interests in the Arctic. The six areas of interest are “Arctic cooperation”, “Northern Sea Route”, 
“Fisheries in the Arctic Ocean”, “Research and Education”, “Environment”, and “Maritime Safety 
and Emergency Response” (Prime Minister’s Office, 2013).14 The assessment recommended that 
in relation to the Arctic, the Faroe Islands and Greenland be given a more independent voice, and 
that a “joint West Nordic approach to Arctic cooperation, together with Iceland, Greenland and 
Northern Norway, should be promoted and enhanced,” (ibid: 13). It does not include any 
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recommendations specifically mentioning China, although it recognises China’s strategic interests 
and plans related to economic activities in the Arctic connected with opening up of the Northern 
Sea Route. The following recommendations are of relevance to possible collaboration with China 
in the Arctic in general and in the Polar Silk Road specifically. It is recommended that 
“[c]onnections to other relevant places should also be developed, for instance through business 
trips” (ibid: 19); that research projects with external international co-funding are supported more 
strategically (ibid: 26); and that Faroese maritime governance be strengthened, e.g. through the 
establishment of a Faroese EEZ,15 and participation in relevant maritime agreements (ibid: 31 and 
35). 
Trade relations between the Faroe Islands and China has increased in recent years, and in 2017, 
China ranks seventh on the list of biggest trade partners after Denmark, Russia, Germany, Norway, 
Britain, and the United States. Exports to China, a little bigger in value than imports and almost 
entirely represented by farmed salmon, has grown from 359 million DKK (5%) in 2015 to all-time 
high of 569 million DKK in 2016 (7%), dropping to less than 500 million DKK in 2017 (Hagstova 
Føroya, 2017 and 2018). When a Chinese state delegation visited the Faroe Islands in 2012, it was 
to learn more about food safety and regulations and to increase China’s import of Faroese fish 
products (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2012). In October 2016, the Faroese Minister for 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, Poul Michelsen, led a trade delegation to China with a range of Faroese 
companies visiting Chinese health authorities and China Fisheries and Sea Food Expo, but also 
Danish shipping giant Mærsk and the Confederation of Danish Industry in China as well as 
telecom giant Huawei (House of Industry, 2016). Cultural relations have also increased with more 
people exchanges, although in small numbers, and in 2017, a Faroese-Chinese friendship society 
was established in the Faroe Islands (KVF, 2017). 
Faroese collaboration with Huawei is especially relevant in relation to the Polar Silk Road. The 
story begins in Denmark in 2013, when Huawei replaced the Swedish firm Ericsson to run and 
develop the Danish mobile phone infrastructure from 2014. At the same time, the Faroese telecom 
infrastructure needed a full and expensive modernisation, and in 2015, after an international tender 
in competition with other American, European, and Chinese companies, Huawei was chosen as 
the new strategic partner to develop Faroese telecom infrastructure to 4G-/LTE. The choice of 
Huawei in the Faroe Islands was not met by security concerns, as there had already been a debate 
about cyber-security and espionage in Denmark in relation to Huawei. The Danish Defence 
Intelligence Service had analysed and approved Huawei, and Huawei Denmark even employed the 
Head of IT Security from the Danish National Police (Berlingske Business, 2015; Kildebogaard, 
2015).  
As explained by the CEO of Faroese Telecom (FT), Jan Ziskasen, at the Tórshavn conference, the 
strategic partnership with Huawei has not only delivered one of the world’s best telecom 
infrastructures and mobile coverage, it has developed into an equal partnership, where the huge 
size difference between the countries and companies is not understood as a problem. The 
developed solutions tested and implemented in the Faroe Islands have since been implemented in 
Huawei’s own system in China, and in 2016 a new strategic partnership was signed. Today, FT and 
Huawei are implementing 4.5G technology in the Faroe Islands working towards 5G, also 
participating in a 5G pilot project in the Scottish Isles funded by the British Government, and the 
plan is to have all businesses and homes connected with fibre-optic cables by 2022. Jan Ziskasen 
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also mentioned that the first year of collaboration was marked by cultural differences and 
misunderstandings which have since been addressed. FT and Huawei have held a series of 
intercultural workshops which significantly improved collaboration and communication focusing 
on treating each other as equal partners and common themes such as being hardworking, 
dedicated, but also enjoying recreational and social activities.  
Conclusion 
This article has explored and analysed how China’s Polar Silk Road initiative can be understood 
via a West Nordic perspective, and within an English School framework. The work first described 
and analysed Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative and its northern and Arctic part, the Polar Silk 
Road. This analysis has demonstrated that Beijing is trying to walk a fine line between being seen 
as a “spoiler” in the Arctic and being seen as an outsider, instead concentrating on being widely 
viewed as a partner. Theoretically, China seeks to adhere to the existing International Society 
dynamics of the Arctic, and downplays the huge differences, including in size and economic power, 
between China and West Nordic actors. China approaches the Polar Silk Road with a focus on 
partnerships and, as Chinese officials have commonly phrased it, “win-win” outcomes between 
China and Arctic actors. For example, Beijing seeks to play down the idea of big country-small 
country relations, with a preference for negotiations between “partners” with mutual interests, 
expecting the Nordic partners to first develop own ideas and positions before negotiations on 
specific Polar Silk Road projects can commence. This was also confirmed in the case studies of 
Iceland and the Faroe Islands. On the other hand, China does not really distinguish between the 
East and West Nordic, but approaches the region as one Nordic region and through individual 
partnerships in a pragmatic “all in one basket” perspective. 
The article found that there is no joint West Nordic strategy or approach to China and the Polar 
Silk Road, although there is recognition of China’s interests in the Nordic Arctic. From the Norway 
and Iceland case studies, it can be determined that science diplomacy and networks like CNARC 
play an important role in developing relations with Beijing. It is also evident that there are both 
positive and negative examples, and perceptions, of China’s engagement in and with West Nordic 
countries. Especially in relation to Chinese investments in Greenland, there have been some 
tensions including American warnings to Denmark of security issues tied to China. In other words, 
the United States is closely watching China’s engagements, and interferes at least in Greenland, 
but has not done so in relation to Huawei’s strategic partnership and telecom projects in the Faroe 
Islands (and in Denmark). The Icelandic example of the new aurora research centre, and FT’s 
collaboration with Huawei show that positive collaboration is possible to develop in relatively 
short time, through mutual respect and a focus on intercultural communication and understanding. 
Across the case studies, the West Nordic countries are framing this region more within an intra-
Nordic and intra-Kingdom of Denmark context than in relation to the Arctic and other actors like 
China. The West Nordics are not very coordinated as such, and still mostly driven by economic 
interests.  
However, as the Arctic and the West Nordic Region further develops and opens up for economic 
opportunities for China, from an English School perspective, International System dynamics begin 
to play a larger role. We argue that stressing and practicing cooperation, dialogue, and knowledge 
sharing – characteristics of International Society – is in the interest of China and the West Nordic 
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countries alike. It is thus recommended that further research attention is given to the role of 
science diplomacy in the Nordic Arctic, and that especially Greenland, the Faroe Islands, and the 
West Nordic Council undertake such analyses of the potential of science diplomacy and more 
strategic participation in conferences like the Arctic Circle and Arctic Frontiers. China, in turn, is 
showing signs of taking a more varied approach to European engagement, maintaining strong 
relations on the EU level but also recognising the emerging roles of key individual players, such as 
Germany, as well as sub-regions such as the CEEC (Sverdrup & Lanteigne, 2018). A window is 
therefore opening for the West Nordic region to create its own distinct identity in the midst of 
deepened Chinese diplomatic and economic engagement in Europe. Finally, the West Nordic 
countries should seek to move beyond the small-scale geopolitics of intra-Nordic and intra-
Kingdom of Denmark relations and seek a more coordinated understanding and distinctly Nordic 
approach to China and the Polar Silk Road. This should obviously be done under the 2017 
agreement between the Nordic Council of Ministers and China. At the same time, China is advised 
to pay more attention to the “West Nordicness” of certain partners in Nordic Arctic. 
 
Notes 
1. In a predominantly International Society setting, China has to act accordingly. Any 
perception of power play will spoil the sense of cooperation based on dialogue and 
institutions. 
2. Own observations, Arctic Circle Forum, Faroe Islands, 8-9 May 2018. 
3. In March 2018, it was announced that the SOA would be absorbed into China’s newly 
created Ministry of Ecology and Environment (Shengtai huanjing bu (). 
http://www.mep.gov.cn. 
4. Full Text: ‘Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative,’ Xinhua, 
20 June 2017,  http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-06/20/c_136380414.htm.  
5. Full Text: ‘China’s Arctic Policy,’ Xinhua, 26 January 2018, 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-01/26/c_136926498_4.htm.  
6. For a discussion of regionalism in the Arctic including West Nordic cases see Huppert & 
Chuffart (2017). 
7. Whereas Denmark is not part of the West Nordic Region. 
8. The official website of The West Nordic Council (n.d.) is www.vestnordisk.is/english/.  
9. The official website of NORA (North Atlantic Cooperation, n.d.) is www.nora.fo. 
10. Greenland and the Faroe Islands as part of the Kingdom of Denmark. 
11. The agreement as stated in the joint press release from Foreign Ministry of China and the 
Nordic Council of Ministers (2017) can be accessed here 
http://www.norden.org/en/nordic-council-of-ministers/international-co-
operation/international-co-operation-documents/strengthening-sino-nordic-
cooperation. 
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12. Track II diplomacy refers to diplomatic activities by non-state actors (see also Homans, 
2011). 
13. Liechtenstein is de facto covered, under free trade in goods, as part of the Sino-Swiss free 
trade agreement completed in 2013, as Switzerland and Liechtenstein have maintained a 
customs union since 1923 (FDFA Switzerland, 2018). 
14. In September 2015, the Foreign Service was moved from the Prime Minister’s Office to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 
15. Currently, the Faroe Islands has a FFZ (Faroese Fisheries Zone) under its jurisdiction with 
less rights than an EEZ, whereas Greenland has its own EEZ. 
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Arctic Blue Economic Corridor: China’s Role in the 
Development of a New Connectivity Paradigm in the 
North 
 
Vasilii Erokhin, Gao Tianming & Zhang Xiuhua 
 
During recent years, growing exploration of natural resources and development of transport routes have reemerged in the Arctic 
as a scene for political and economic collaboration between Nordic and non-regional states. Being a non-Arctic country, China 
nevertheless has played an active role in the elaboration of international regulations and the establishment of governance 
mechanisms in the Arctic. The country has recently released a White Paper on the Arctic Policy and thus prioritized scientific 
research, underscored the importance of environmental protection, rational utilization, law-based governance, and international 
cooperation, and committed itself to maintaining a peaceful, secure and stable Arctic order. Diversified transportation routes 
and economic corridors are of paramount importance to such global trading nations as China. However, an extension of the 
economic corridors to the Arctic is viable only in the case of development of satellite trade, production, and research opportunities 
along the potential transport routes. In this study, the authors discuss the critical points in the implementation of China’s 
paradigm of collaboration and connectivity in the Arctic, as well as focus on the promotion of bilateral win-to-win investment 
and trade projects with the countries along the potential Arctic Blue Economic Corridor (ABEC). The authors conclude that 
the ABEC may be efficiently incorporated into China’s Belt and Road network, but emphasize that specific technological and 
economic challenges have to be considered and met before a sustainable connectivity between the markets of Asia and Europe 
is established in the Arctic. 
 
 
Introduction 
International collaboration in the Arctic and the challenges of Arctic connectivity for economic 
development and trade have been attracting increased attention by many scholars worldwide. One 
of the most comprehensive comparative studies of Arctic strategies and policies of different 
countries has been made by Heininen (2012), who summarized the priorities, priority areas, and 
objectives of major actors in the Arctic. Involvement of non-Arctic states into the Arctic 
governance and growing roles of China, Japan, Republic of Korea, and other non-regional actors 
in the Arctic issues has been studied by Ivanov (2016), Coates and Holroyd (2017), Lanteigne 
(2014), Leifer (2013), Peng and Wegge (2015), Streltsov (2017), and others. Most of the 
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publications include contemporary issues of international cooperation in the Arctic in the formats 
of the Arctic Council and the Nordic Council. However, it is important to consider the roles of 
various trans-Arctic interactions between Nordic and non-Arctic countries, particularly, China, to 
address the specific implementations of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China-Nordic 
diplomatic model for achieving sustainable development in the region. 
The themes of China’s involvement in the Arctic governance and growing role of the country in 
the Arctic issues have been addressed by both Chinese and international scholars. Lanteigne (2014) 
studied the evolution of China’s Arctic strategies in terms of their distinct paths, institutions, and 
political and economic dimensions. Joelsen (2016) focused on the study of China’s engagement 
with the Arctic Council, particularly, strategic goals of China’s observer status in that organization, 
principal interests of the country in the Arctic, and peculiarities of contemporary China’s 
diplomacy with the Arctic countries. Lanteigne (2017), Stokke (2013), and Gavrilov and Kripakova 
(2017) determined the prerequisites for the formation, analysis of the current state and of the 
future development of the Arctic policy of China and the countries of Northeast Asia and provided 
a description of current opportunities for China to participate in the institutional and rule-making 
mechanisms of the Arctic governance.  
Bennett (2014), Stephenson et al. (2013) paid special attention to the ports linking resources in the 
North Pacific and wider Arctic region to destinations in Northeast Asia, particularly, the effects of 
the development of the shipping lanes in the Arctic Ocean for the increase of commercial ties 
between Asia and Nordic countries. Special attention has been given to the investigation of 
transport corridors in the Arctic. Meng et al. (2017) focused on navigation conditions and 
commercial features and reviewed the existing studies that had examined the necessary conditions 
and requirements for transarctic shipping routes to be viable. Guy and Lasserre (2016) studied 
perspectives, challenges, and regulations of commercial shipping in the Arctic. Jorgensen-Dahl 
(2010) investigated the perspectives of economic development and shipping in the Arctic along 
the Northwest, Northeast, and Transpolar passages. Farre et al. (2014) focused on the perspectives 
and challenges of commercial Arctic shipping through the Northeast Passage, including Russia’s 
part of the Northern Sea Route (NSR). Ruksha et al. (2013), Xu et al. (2011), and Verny and 
Grigentin (2009) studied the perspectives and challenges of development and exploration of the 
NSR for bulk and container shipments between China, Russia, and Europe. Dunlap (2002) studied 
the possibilities of transit transportation along the NSR by Russian and foreign vessels. Kikkas 
(2015) and Zalyvsky (2015) discussed the potential of the NSR and other transport corridors in 
the Arctic and conducted an analysis of major factors affecting the performance of transport and 
economic projects in the High North. Fisenko (2013, 2014) and Zelentsov (2012) focused on the 
political, economic, and transport aspects of the development of the NSR in terms of competition 
for resources in the Arctic and search of new ways of shipping.  
China has recently published its Arctic policy and incorporated the Arctic shipping lanes into the 
BRI transport network. Contemporary approaches of the country to the development of the region 
and exploration of its resource and transport potential require thorough study in the light of the 
collaboration with Nordic countries. However, as to the involvement of the Nordic countries in 
the implementation of the announced Arctic Blue Economic Corridor (ABEC) initiative, there 
have not been any comprehensive studies of the issue so far. Perspectives on the development and 
commercial use of transport and trade routes in the Arctic, polar logistics, and development of 
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infrastructure in the High North are among the hot topics to investigate. This paper attempts to 
bridge the gap and assesses the challenges and perspectives of turning the ABEC into an economic 
and transport corridor between China and Europe. This study discusses the major challenges 
China faces in exploring new maritime ways in the Arctic and collaborating with Nordic countries 
and Russia in the development of the ABEC. 
China’s Arctic Aspirations 
In recent decades, international northern cooperation between the Nordic and non-Arctic states 
has become more institutionalized and dynamic. Various formats are used – from the multilateral 
international cooperation within the Arctic Council to the cooperation with and between 
international organizations and forums, in addition to bilateral inter-state relations (Heininen, 
2012). Non-Arctic states are keen to strengthen their role in the Arctic. They assert that their 
participation in international cooperation in that region is as useful as it is warranted and legitimate 
(Bartenstein, 2015). One of the most active players in the Arctic region is China. Being a non-
Arctic country, China though is closely involved in the trans-regional and global issues in the 
Arctic, especially in such areas as climate change, environment, scientific research, utilization of 
shipping routes, resource exploration and exploitation, security, and global governance. The role 
of the country in the Arctic grows as China explores the possibilities of opening the Arctic passages 
as alternative routes for its BRI and investigates the social, economic and political implications of 
this engagement in the Arctic. 
China’s engagement with the Arctic has been driven by multiple concerns, particularly, strategic 
interests and trade interests (Peng & Wegge, 2015). Under the presidency of Xi Jinping, there has 
been a significant shift in Chinese cross-regional diplomacy towards subregional approaches 
(Lanteigne, 2014), particularly, a “5+1” dialog between China and the five Nordic states. The 
“5+1” dialogues cover various issues including economic cooperation, security concerns, and 
regional cooperation. China is paying increasing attention to the Arctic. The country pursues 
economic interests in the oil-and-gas sector and the exploration of resources of the Arctic 
territories of Russia and Northern Europe, as well as pays special attention to the development of 
Arctic shipping (Schulze, 2017). 
China is also concerned about the effects of climate change and ice melting happening in Arctic 
waters. By 2050, climate fluctuations may dramatically change the conditions of navigation in the 
polar waters (Ratnikov, 2016). According to Mokhov and Khon (2015), by 2025, with less than 
15% of water area covered by ice during Summer, the average duration of navigation period may 
increase up to 3-4 months, by 2050 – to 4-5 months, and by 2100 – to 5.5 months. Due to such a 
radical change of climate and ice situation, there may happen the changes of wind and cyclonic 
regimes in the atmosphere along the shipping route, as well as sea waves and iceberg dislocation 
in the seas of the Arctic Ocean (Khon et al., 2010). Mao et al. (2011), Zhang et al. (2006), and Liu 
et al. (2016) studied the effects of climate change in the Arctic and discovered the association 
between the sea ice concentration and ice melting in the Arctic Ocean and weather conditions in 
the northern parts of China. Kelmelis (2011) and Hong (2012) investigated the impacts of climate 
change in the Arctic on the exploration of transport routes in the Arctic Ocean, particularly, on 
China’s maritime transport. 
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However, despite the economic, trade, investment, and research interests in the Arctic and its 
observer status in the Arctic Council, China was reluctant to officially incorporate the Arctic into 
the BRI. Arctic did not play a role in the initial structure of the BRI which involved creating 
maritime corridors through the Indian and Pacific Oceans (Erokhin, 2017). The BRI is a 
development initiative which focuses on the improvement of connectivity and collaboration 
among the countries of Eurasia through the increase of China’s role in global affairs. The pursuit 
of strategic interests in the Arctic exactly conforms China’s multifaceted, multilevel, and 
multidimensional diplomatic concept of development. With the release of the Vision for Maritime 
Cooperation under the BRI, China incorporated the Arctic shipping lanes into the BRI transport 
network. The document considerably altered the initial vision of the BRI’s transportation 
infrastructure across the Eurasian landmass (Silk Road Economic Belt, or SREB) and the Indian 
Ocean (Maritime Silk Road, or MSR) by adding the Arctic passages (State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China, 2018). Particularly, China outlined its interest in working with Nordic countries 
and Russia to improve sea transit conditions and survey for new resources. Concrete steps within 
the new vision of the policy include China’s efforts on the development a blue economic passage 
linking China and Northern Europe via the Arctic Ocean. China has actually formalized its 
involvement in the development of the Arctic Blue Economic Corridor (ABEC) as one of the 
three passages within the BRI (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. ABEC in the BRI network of corridors 
 
 
Source: Authors’ development. 
 
Arctic Yearbook 2018   
Erokhin, Gao & Zhang  
460 
The initiative of the extension of the BRI to the Arctic and participation of China in the 
development of the ABEC means that China is open to working with both Arctic and non-Arctic 
countries to build the ABEC through developing the Arctic shipping routes. Within the ABEC 
initiative, China expects its involvement in the infrastructure construction for the ABEC routes in 
the Nordic countries and Russia and conduction of commercial trial voyages in the polar waters 
to pave the way for Chinese commercial, exploration, transport, and logistics operations. China 
also attaches great importance to navigation security along the prospect routes of the ABEC, 
particularly, in the seas of the Arctic Ocean controlled by Russia. As economic activity in the Arctic 
region grows, there is a potential for 5+1 dialogue on promoting collaboration between China and 
Nordic states in the areas of polar transportation, logistics, investments, as well as the development 
of infrastructure along the Arctic sea routes and connectivity in the region. China is willing to work 
with all parties in conducting scientific surveys of navigational routes, setting up land-based 
monitoring stations, carrying out research on climatic and environmental changes in the Arctic, as 
well as providing navigational forecasting services (Erokhin & Gao, 2018). 
The approaches to the development of the ABEC are supposed to be based on three main pillars 
of China’s Arctic policy, which are respect, cooperation, and “win-win” solutions.  
China respects the rights of the Arctic countries and Indigenous people as enshrined in 
international law and supports the peaceful settlement of disputes over territory and maritime 
rights and interests in line with such treaties as the UN Charter, the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and international law (State Council of the People’s Republic 
of China, 2018). The position of China is that the management of Arctic shipping routes should 
be conducted in accordance with international law and that the freedom of navigation enjoyed by 
all countries in accordance with the law and their rights to use the Arctic shipping routes should 
be ensured.  
Within the second pillar, China wants to be involved in collaboration for Arctic development. 
Being committed to the existing framework of international law and rules, China aims at the 
maintenance of a reasonable and well-organized Arctic governance system and steadily advancing 
international cooperation on the Arctic. The priorities of such cooperation under the BRI are 
policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and closer 
people-to-people ties. In the Arctic, China wants to coordinate development strategies with Nordic 
countries and encourage joint efforts to build the ABEC linking China, Russia, and Europe via the 
Arctic Ocean and Russia’s NSR (State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2018). 
As to the “win-win” type of collaboration in the Arctic, China has the funding, technology, and 
the market to be of interest to Nordic countries. Chinese enterprises are encouraged to participate 
in joint investment projects in the Arctic, in the extraction of hydrocarbons and minerals, in 
infrastructure development for the ABEC, as well as to conduct commercial trial voyages along 
the transport corridors in the Arctic Ocean. China wishes to participate in the development of oil, 
gas, mineral resources and other non-fossil energies, fishing and tourism in the region, and 
scientific collaboration, jointly with Nordic states, while respecting the tradition and culture of 
Arctic residents, including indigenous peoples, and conserving the natural environment (State 
Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2018). 
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Sea Routes in the Arctic Relevant for ABEC 
Climate change and ice melting open up new opportunities for navigation in the Arctic Ocean 
through the three major passages which have been existed so far, i.e. Northwest Passage, 
Transpolar Passage, and the NSR, a part of the Northeast Passage (Ostreng, 2013). 
The Northwest Passage is a network of various possible ways between 19,000 islands of the 
Canadian Arctic Archipelago. Legal status of the Northwest Passage has not been formalized by 
any international agreement. However, because the route passes within the territorial waters of 
Canada, the sovereign regulations of Canada are applied. The Northwest Passage is relatively deep 
to accept supertankers and container carriers which draft is too big to pass through Panama Canal. 
In the light of the establishing ABEC, Northwest Passage cuts both the distance and time for 
Chinese vessels compared to other transport corridors. Thus, the distance between Shanghai and 
New York via Panama Canal is 10,500 nautical miles and only 8,600 nautical miles via Northwest 
Passage (savings of almost 2000 nautical miles and 7 days). However, in terms of its 
commercialization in the near future, the passage is of no interest due to the extreme 
unpredictability of climate conditions of Canada Arctic Archipelago. Other factors against the 
immediate commercialization of the Northwest Passage and building any economic corridor in 
that part of the Arctic are underdeveloped infrastructure and passing of the route along the 
underpopulated and unexplored territories in terms of extraction of mineral resources and any 
other kinds of economic activities (in contrast to the NSR) (Jorgensen-Dahl, 2010). Thus, the 
passage may be used only for transit between dispatch and destination points without an additional 
load in transshipment points.  
The Transpolar Passage (TP) is the shortest way from Europe to Northeast Asia through the 
North Pole. Sailing along this route requests passing heavy and perennial sea ice. However, as of 
Smith and Stephenson (2013), ice conditions may become easier, and optimal transport routes 
between Asia, Europe, and North America may move to the central parts of the Arctic Ocean. 
Apart from a substantial cut of a path length, the advantage of this route for Chinese vessels is 
that they do not have to enter territorial waters of Russia or Canada. In the near future, commercial 
shipping along the TP will require not only icebreaker assistance but also the usage of ice-
strengthened cargo vessels. Apart from the technical complexity of sailing along the TP, there are 
certain legal issues to be solved. It is highly likely that any country willing to establish a navigation 
in the central part of the Arctic Ocean will have to negotiate with Russia and all the Nordic states. 
Delays are quite possible. It may happen that no vessel can avoid entering the territorial waters of 
Russia and all the Nordic states because of heavy and changing ice conditions and other 
emergencies. 
Compared with the Northwest and TP, the NSR has the best potential in terms of the development 
of commercial shipping, extraction of mineral resources, production, and other kinds of economic 
activities. In terms of the establishment of the ABEC, the opportunities include transit shipping 
(cargo transportation between non-Arctic ports of Europe and Asia through the NSR) and special-
purpose shipping (activities that start and/or end in the Arctic). Availability of energy (oil, gas, and 
coal) and mineral (iron, non-ferrous and rare-earth metals, and phosphates) resources has made 
special-purpose shipping focused on the transportation of resources from the Arctic to Asia and 
Europe the most economically attractive kind of commercial activity along the NSR and, 
potentially, the ABEC. 
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As regards the climate conditions for navigation, the NSR may be divided into three climatic zones 
(ABS, 2016) (Figure 2): 
Figure 2. Climatic zones along the NSR 
 
 
Source: Authors’ development 
 
The Atlantic zone includes the Barents Sea, the western part of the Kara Sea, and part of the Arctic 
Ocean to the North. There are frequent storms in Winter and cloudy weather with frequents fogs 
and rain in Summer. In the Barents Sea, the average temperature is +7°C in Summer and -20°C in 
Winter. Wave height up to 7 m. In the Kara Sea, the average temperature is +6°C in Summer and 
-28°C in Winter. 
The Siberian zone includes the eastern part of the Kara Sea, the Laptev Sea, and the western part 
of the East Siberian Sea. Winter temperatures are lower compared to Atlantic and Pacific zones, 
while Summer ones are usually higher (in the southern coastal part of the zone). In the northern 
part of the zone (Arctic Ocean) Summer is cold (+1°C in the northern part of the Laptev Sea in 
Summer and down to -34°C in Winter). 
The Pacific zone includes the eastern part of the East Siberian Sea, the Chukchi Sea. The Pacific 
Ocean influences the climate of the zone in Winter, consequently, air temperature is higher, winds 
are stronger, and precipitation is heavier compared to Atlantic and Siberian zones. In the East 
Siberian Sea, the average temperature is +7°C in Summer and down to -33°C in Winter. There are 
frequent storms, air temperature fluctuations, and heavy fogs in Summer. 
ABEC, NSR and Russia 
Until recently, the NSR had been used exclusively for internal Russia’s transportation, i.e., 
provision of Russia’s regions of High North and commercial cargo shipments by Russian oil-and-
gas and mining companies. Arctic zone of Russia accounts for over 10% of Russia’s GDP and 
20% of export revenue (Heininen et al., 2014). With over 200 oil and gas continental and offshore 
deposits, Arctic territories of Russia hold most of the Arctic's hydrocarbon reserves. The region is 
the most prolific producer of Russian gas (95%) and oil (about 70%), primary and placer diamond 
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(99% of total Russian production), platinum-group elements (98%), nickel and cobalt (over 80%), 
chromium and manganese (90%), copper (60%), antimony, tin, tungsten, and rare metals (from 50 
to 90%), and gold (about 40%) (Sergunin & Konyshev, 2016). 
With the development of exploitation of natural resources and construction of new production 
facilities along the potential ABEC route, Russia is very keen to increase the contribution of Arctic 
territories to the domestic product. Over the last few years, the total cargo turnover of the NSR 
(domestic Russia’s transportations plus Europe-Asia transits) has increased substantially from 2.0 
million tons in 2011 to almost 7.3 million tons in 2016 (Administration of the Northern Sea Route, 
2018). The growth has been contributed by the launch of big projects on infrastructure 
construction (Sabetta seaport) and resource extraction projects (Yamal-LNG plant for production 
of liquefied natural gas) by Russian oil-and-gas companies and international consortiums. 
However, international transit shipments have been decreasing. In 2016, the entire route from 
Europe to Asia or back was passed by 19 vessels with 214,500 tons of cargo (compared to 2013, 
when the transit cargo turnover almost reached 1.2 million tons carried by 73 foreign-flag vessels) 
(Administration of the Northern Sea Route, 2018). The major cargo was coal (155,000 tons, or 
70% of the total transit turnover in 2016).  
There are several reasons for such a decrease in transit shipping. On the one hand, during the 
period of growth of transit shipping in 2011-2013, Russia almost failed to develop the 
infrastructure of the NSR apart from the continuous construction of new seaports and marine 
surveys (Bai & Voronenko, 2016). On the other hand, due to the drop in oil prices, the economic 
conditions of usage of the NSR have changed dramatically (Erokhin, 2018). Cheaper fuel has 
erased the cost advantage of a shorter distance compared to the traditional southern routes via the 
Suez Canal, especially since sailing through ice fields assumes increased fuel consumption. The oil 
price gap between European and Asian markets has also narrowed thus decreasing the profitability 
of intercontinental transportation of hydrocarbons. 
ABEC and the Nordic Countries 
Despite the short-term deterioration of the economic environment, China expects to redirect up 
to 1% of its foreign trade to the northern routes by 2020 (Erokhin, 2018). China looks forward to 
developing the ABEC as a link between Chinese and European markets and therefore expects the 
involvement of the EU countries, particularly, Nordic ones, to the development of this initiative. 
EU member states combined have the world’s largest merchant fleet that is why the EU’s policies 
in the Arctic are focused on transportation (Ostreng, 2010). Extending from Europe to Asia, the 
ABEC could shorten the time taken by cargo vessels to travel between the Pacific and the Atlantic 
by about one third which may save energy, reduce emissions, promote trade, and diminish the 
pressure on main trans-continental navigation channels. In the sphere of Arctic shipping, the EU 
wants to maintain its competitive lead in developing the technology required for Arctic conditions, 
i.e. specially designed icebreakers and cargo vessels. Nordic countries, however, have different 
interests and expertise to bring to the table in the China-Nordic cooperation (Table 1). 
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Table 1. Priority areas and expertise of the Nordic countries in the China-Nordic cooperation 
 
Country Priority areas Expertise 
Denmark 
Self-sustaining 
growth and 
development 
Exploitation of mineral resources 
Exploitation of renewable energy potential 
Knowledge-based growth and development 
Development with 
respect to climate, 
environment, and 
nature 
Vigorous and ambitious knowledge building on climate change in the 
Arctic and its consequences in order to foster global and local 
adaptation to far-reaching change 
Environment and nature management based on the best possible 
scientific knowledge and standards for protection 
Finland 
Construction and 
infrastructure 
Offshore and maritime industries 
Shipbuilding and shipping 
Generation and distribution of electricity 
Energy saving and energy efficiency 
Knowledge  
Internationally-recognized expert in the Arctic 
Knowledge-based service provider 
services and new business models for the Arctic 
Iceland 
Information 
society, human 
resources, and new 
opportunities 
Access to a cost-effective telecommunications system with sufficient 
carrying capacity for the residents of the Arctic region 
A hub for Nordic and Chinese institutions, companies, and research 
facilities 
Trade Free Trade Agreements 
Energy Development of renewable energy 
Norway 
Industry 
Exploration and exploitation of oil and gas offshore fields 
Fishing 
Business 
development 
Economically, socially and environmentally sustainable business 
development  
Value creation based on the region’s resources 
Infrastructure 
Reliable, efficient and environmentally sound transport system 
Secure and efficient power supply 
Broad access to good digital infrastructure 
Reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and local pollution, reduction 
of negative environmental impacts of infrastructure development 
Sweden 
Science and 
technology 
A supporting country by providing services, scientific research, and 
public information 
Human development 
Research in the sphere of climate change and its effects on transport 
routes, industries, and people 
Economy Promotion of free trade and industrial development in the Arctic 
Source: Authors’ development. 
 
Denmark’s priorities in the region are formalized by the Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the 
Arctic 2011-2020. They include self-sustaining growth and development; development with 
respect for the Arctic’s vulnerable climate, environment, and nature; and close cooperation with 
international partners (Government of Denmark, Government of the Faroes, & Government of 
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Greenland, 2011). Being one of the leading shipbuilding and shipping states in the world, Denmark 
devotes much attention to the development of Arctic transport corridors. Many Denmark’s 
territories, especially Greenland, are favorably located in relation to both the EU and the US. 
Therefore, the country may consider its involvement in the development of the ABEC and 
expansion of trade with Asian markets. Greenland is interesting for China for its natural resources 
and as a hub on the ABEC route (Seaman et al., 2017). Mortensen et al. (2016) and Tetu and 
Lasserre (2017) report that China plays an important role in mining development and is often 
considered one of the most important partners for Greenland in mining its abundant natural 
resources, primarily, rare earth elements, uranium, and zinc. According to Shi and Lanteigne 
(2018), China’s interests in Greenland have not only included emerging mining opportunities, but 
also the areas of infrastructure planning, tourism, and scientific cooperation. 
One of the core priorities of Finland in the region is an achievement of a statue of an 
internationally-recognized expert in the Arctic. Though Finland does not have a direct access to 
the seas of the Arctic Ocean, the country pays much attention to the development of the transport 
corridor from Europe to Asia and North America through Lappeenranta, Russian cities of Saint 
Petersburg and Moscow, Sweden, and Norwegian seaports. As of Schulze (2017), the country 
seeks a role as a knowledge-based service provider and invests in research and development of 
technologies, services and new business models for the Arctic. In the light of Finland’s 
participation in the ABEC, major areas may include offshore and maritime industries, shipbuilding 
and shipping, construction and infrastructure, mining and minerals, generation and distribution of 
electricity, energy saving and energy efficiency, and others. Consequently, economic interests of 
Finland in the ABEC are focused on shipbuilding (particularly, icebreakers), mining, and 
construction of the related industrial, transport and distribution infrastructure (Telegina & 
Morgunova, 2012). 
Similar to Finland, Sweden has no direct access to the Arctic Ocean. Therefore, in the ABEC 
format, Sweden should establish itself as a supporting country by providing services, scientific 
research, and public information. Chinese investment in Sweden is partly directed towards 
production, but technology and innovation stand out as the main driving factors in attracting 
investment (Seaman et al., 2017). Sweden’s priorities in the Arctic include climate, biodiversity, and 
environmental protection; economic development and promotion of free trade and industrial 
development in the Arctic; human development, health issues, and influences of climate change 
and hazardous substances on the population, indigenous cultures, and industries. 
The prospects of Iceland’s participation in the ABEC are logically suited to its position as a small 
state in a sensitive and geographically central setting (Bailes et al., 2014). Iceland is located by the 
Arctic Circle and within the Arctic more than other countries rely on the fragile resources of the 
Arctic region (fishing, tourism, and renewable energy). Iceland’s Arctic strategy is embedded to 
the context of the general European approaches to polar activities. Iceland may contribute to the 
ABEC by promoting trade relations in the Arctic, including in the format of free trade agreement 
with China, and developing itself into a hub for Nordic and Chinese institutions, companies, and 
research facilities. Guschin (2015) expects that commercial shipping offers a broad perspective on 
the cooperation between Chinese COSCO and Icelandic Nesskip in the segment of container 
carriage, implementation of energy saving solutions, and reduction of CO2 emissions.  
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For Norway, the overarching goals in the Arctic are peace, stability, and predictability; integrated, 
ecosystem-based management; international cooperation and international legal order; and 
stronger basis for employment, value creation, and welfare (Norwegian Ministries, 2017). In terms 
of Norway-China collaboration on the economic development of the Arctic, the major areas are 
the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas offshore fields, fishing, and tourism. Among the 
five priorities which have been identified as crucial for Norway in the Arctic (Norwegian 
Ministries, 2017), at least two (business development and infrastructure) correspond with ABEC’s 
areas. Particularly, Norway should develop a reliable, efficient, and environmentally sound 
transport system in the Arctic; ensure that the transport system is able to meet the business sector’s 
international transport needs; ensure a secure and efficient power supply and broad access to good 
digital infrastructure; promote economically, socially and environmentally sustainable business 
development; increase value creation based on the region’s resources.  
Major Challenges of the ABEC 
There are many specific technological and economic challenges to be considered and met before 
the ABEC may become any viable alternatives to southern maritime routes used by China. High 
insurance expenses, low speeds, stringent security regulations, high environmental risks, 
unpredictable ice, wave, and wind conditions, varying routes, lack of qualified and experienced 
staff to facilitate safe sailing in polar waters are just a few challenges to the intensification of China’s 
shipping and economic activities in the Arctic (Fisenko, 2014). In terms of its economic viability, 
major downsides the ABEC project are its unsuitability for containerized cargo shipping (Farre et 
al., 2014), underdeveloped infrastructure, and seasonality of transportation.  
While the NSR may provide a viable alternative for liquid and bulk cargo shipping (e.g., oil, coal, 
and ore) in the near future, it may be of limited value for container shipping. Container carriers 
need schedule adherence along with predictable climate conditions and unified operations on cargo 
loading and discharging at the port terminals (Lasserre, 2014). So far, the MSR has been the more 
sustainable route for China’s container vessels even in the light of long distance and possible delays 
due to the heavy traffic in the Malacca Strait and Suez Canal. As against the MSR, navigation 
conditions in the polar waters are far less predictable because of seasonal fluctuations of ice cover 
and diurnal variations of wind and wave regime. Any change in the weather may either break the 
delivery schedule (delay, extra operational costs, and risk of penalty payments) or request 
icebreaker assistance (an increase of freight cost, additional expenses due to icebreaker support). 
Consequently, despite the bright long-term perspectives of the ABEC development, in the 
foreseeable future China’s cargo container flows will continue moving southward – not only 
because of easier navigation conditions but also due to the proximity of southern transport 
corridors to the emerging markets of India, Pakistan, Middle East, and East Africa (Fisenko, 2013). 
Economics of the ABEC requires massive cargo flows by many carriers. Current sporadic 
shipments with the involvement of only several dozens of vessels (taking into account the 
decreasing number of transits since 2014) are economically unviable. In terms of economic 
benefits, for China, the ABEC project is attractive in case of high oil prices, when saving time by 
shipping a shorter route may cause essential saving of fuel and, consequently, money. Only, in this 
case, the costs associated with sailing by the NSR may be recuperated by shorter distance and time. 
To take a ship from a logistic chain and forward it through the NSR, Chinese shipping companies 
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need massive investments to the development of the Arctic fleet, the year-round availability of the 
route, and the possibility to deliver cargo without delays. 
One of the keystone ideas of the ABEC, at least in the first instance, is that cargo flow is created 
by means of export of hydrocarbons and other natural resources produced in the Arctic. However, 
sectoral sanctions against Russia forced most of the Western companies to quit from the projects 
in the Arctic, primarily, from oil and gas extraction. Being under the Western sanctions, Russia has 
neither financial resources nor technological solutions for effective exploitation of natural deposits 
in the Arctic, particularly, in the shelf areas (Gao & Erokhin, 2017). Russia would like China to 
invest in an exploration of Russia’s Arctic shelf. Particularly, Russia expects China to participate in 
the investigation of shelf areas in Barents and Pechora seas (with Rosneft), to exploit Shtokman 
gas field and Prirazlomnoe offshore oilfield (Smirnova et al., 2016). Russian Government provides 
favorable treatment regime for Chinese investors, including tax holidays. Nornickel is interested 
in China’s involvement in the exploitation of the deposits of rare-earth metals, vanadium, 
molybdenum, and wolframite in the Kola Peninsula, Taimyr Peninsula, and northern parts of the 
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) (Ivanov, 2016). 
One of the critical challenges to the commercial viability of the ABEC is the necessity of icebreaker 
assistance to pass along the NSR. The high cost of assistance provided by Russia nearly evens the 
distance and time advantages of using the NSR instead of the southern routes of the MSR. Without 
high-capacity icebreakers, navigation along the maritime routes of the ABEC is unsustainable. Ice 
is not the only challenge for Chinese cargo vessels to face in the Arctic. Low predictability of 
weather conditions, heavy storms, extreme temperature, drifting icebergs, and the fields of thin 
first-year may either disrupt deck machinery and navigation equipment or even damage the vessel. 
Observed climate change and ice melting are not quite simplistic. Many experts warn that shrinkage 
of ice cover in the Arctic Ocean may drive uncontrollable changes of weather and thus make 
navigation even less predictable than it is today. Major risks are strong winds, extreme waves, 
detachment of icebergs, erosion of the coastline, and damage of inland port and transport 
infrastructure (Overeem et al., 2011; Ogorodov et al., 2016). In view of all those problems and 
challenges, implementation of the ABEC initiative requires substantial investment to the 
construction and renovation of the infrastructure for production and extraction of resources, cargo 
shipping, icebreaking assistance, and safer navigation and rescue.  
Solutions 
To ensure stable and on-schedule navigation along the ABEC maritime routes, construction of 
modern icebreakers is required. Russian nuclear-powered fleet is outdated and predominantly not 
suitable for piloting large-capacity vessels. China needs construction of nuclear-powered 
icebreakers able to pilot large-capacity tankers, bulkers, and container carriers through thick ice. 
The major challenge of the ABEC in terms of the commercialization of the polar shipping and 
decrease of icebreaker assistance costs is how to ensure the maximum available load of the route 
by cargo vessels during the four-month navigation window.  
Most of the territories along the prospective ABEC, primarily, along the Russian part of the NSR, 
have inadequate infrastructure to support shipping. This includes such infrastructure components 
as the availability of ports and port facilities needed for different types of vessels operating in 
Arctic waters, the accuracy and availability of information needed for safe navigation and 
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availability of search and rescue assets. Berthing facilities need overhaul renovation and 
reconstruction. Seaports need dredging to be able to receive modern large-capacity vessels. In most 
of the ports, there should be constructed and developed facilities for reception and utilization of 
shipboard wastes. It is necessary to develop infrastructure for berthing, loading, and discharging 
of vessels at various points of the ABEC throughout the year. Communication systems are 
generally adequate for the lower parts of the Arctic, but data transmission becomes problematic 
when the vessels have to move to higher areas of the NSR because of the ice situation. 
Taking into account the integrated and comprehensive nature of the ABEC initiative, activities in 
this field has to become increasingly international. The principal areas for collaboration between 
China and Nordic countries and Russia are: 
• Geography (the study of the continental shelf of Nordic countries and Russia potentially 
involved in the ABEC, delineation, and amendment of maritime boundaries). 
• Geology (geological surveying of hydrocarbons and mineral resources, evaluation of 
potential deposits for their exploration). 
• Ecology (analysis of climate change and environmental problems with emphasis on the 
negative environmental effects of resource exploration, shipping, and other kinds of 
economic activities in the Arctic). 
• Economy (economic evaluation of discovered deposits of hydrocarbons, mineral, 
biological, and other resources of the Arctic; perspective directions of the development of 
commercial shipping in polar waters). 
• Sustainability (elaboration of effective solutions on the convergence of economic benefits 
from exploring the Arctic with the urgent need for sustainable development a fragile Arctic 
environment, conservation of resources, biodiversity, and food security). 
• Security (development of the mechanisms for collaboration between the Nordic countries, 
Russia, and major non-Arctic actors for peaceful and secure development of the region). 
Specific interests of China in the region include surveying of the mineral resource potential of the 
territories along the future ABEC routes. Mineral resources have not yet been extensively explored 
and developed. China’s long-term goals is to focus on maintaining a high level of exploration 
activity for oil and gas in Norway to increase the possibility of making commercial discoveries. 
With regard to minerals in Greenland, China aims to maintain the development of mineral 
exploration and increase the level of knowledge regarding attractive geological areas in Greenland. 
Mining is not the only area on which the ABEC may be built. A number of other areas include 
energy-intensive industries based on potentially available hydro and thermal power (Greenland 
and Iceland), infrastructure and related industries (Finland and Russia), commercialization of 
maritime transport routes (Russia), research and development (Sweden and Iceland), tourism 
(Nordic countries and Russia), and the fishing industry (Iceland and Norway).  
Contemporary policies of principal actors in the region should be focused on the following major 
areas: 
• protection of fragile Arctic environment, reduction of greenhouse gases, preservation of 
biodiversity, and protection the Arctic Ocean from pollution; 
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• establishment of scientific networks, international cooperation, and expansion of research 
funding with a focus on interdisciplinary polar research on the climatic changes and 
sociocultural developments in the Arctic; 
• provision of an access of the local population to education, e.g. through modern 
communication technologies and distance learning; building-up training and study 
programs and the establishment of Arctic education programs in schools and universities 
(in non-Arctic countries too); 
• exploration and exploitation of oil and gas in the Arctic, mining of mineral resources, in 
particular, rare earth elements, iron ore, precious metals, and diamonds, expansion of the 
required off- and onshore infrastructure in a sustainable and ecologically responsible way; 
• expansion of transport routes to link the region to major markets of the world (Europe, 
Asia, North America); development of new shipping routes and the intensification of 
maritime traffic on the transport corridors on the Arctic Ocean (NSR and Northwest and 
Transpolar passages); 
• development of marine technology and the expansion of the maritime infrastructure 
(ports, access roads, and container terminals); 
• expansion of the technical infrastructure such as energy supply and communication; 
• exploration and exploitation of existing and new fishing grounds for marine resources; 
• expansion of tourist facilities, accommodation and targeted marketing for Arctic 
destinations. 
Arctic region is now changing at an unprecedented pace, in the ways that fundamentally affect 
ecosystems, people, biodiversity, and sustainability. Such changes are driven primarily by external 
factors: climate and environmental change, rapid social and economic developments, and 
industrialization. Increasingly frequently, business interests (extraction of mineral resources, cargo 
shipping, extensive fishing, tourism, etc.) interfere with the sustainable development goals. Arctic 
social and environmental systems are deeply intertwined with both the environmental systems and 
economic development of other regions of the world, so rapid changes in this sensitive region are 
likely to be felt elsewhere. That is why the cooperation for sustainable development has to be put 
at the top of the China-Nordic ABEC agenda. 
Conclusion 
The initiative of the establishment of an economic corridor in the Arctic is an integral element of 
the long-term vision of the region by China. Despite the strategic orientation of the BRI to the 
southern transport corridors, China is rather dependent on the situation in Malacca and Suez (Sun, 
2014; Lanteigne, 2013). The ABEC initiative is as an attempt to diversify maritime transport routes 
and ensure long-term security trading for China. The resource-rich Arctic offers new possibilities 
in China’s global search for energy and strategic engagement in the region. However, the 
prospective vision of the ABEC is not only about securing trade routes. The overarching goal is 
to facilitate connectivity between China and Nordic countries, to ensure sustainable economic and 
social development of the Arctic, and to bridge the gap between traditional industries in the Arctic 
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and China’s market. Chinese shipping in polar waters in the coming years will form the backbone 
of the BRI process in the Arctic, which will require collaboration with Nordic countries and Russia, 
on the co-development of transport infrastructure and cargo-generating facilities along the Arctic 
routes. 
For the Nordic countries, Russia, and other stakeholders involved, there are certain geopolitical 
and commercial advantages of the ABEC initiative, as well as risks. Nordic countries and Russia 
look forward to attracting investment to the mining and infrastructure projects in the Arctic, 
increase export of hydrocarbons and minerals, and benefit from serving transit navigation along 
the opening maritime routes. China would like to ensure its presence in the Arctic projects, get 
access to economic resources and shipping routes in the region, and incorporate the entire region 
into the BRI network. However, there are many specific technological and economic challenges 
to be considered and met before the ABEC may become a viable alternative to the MSR. 
Development of the ABEC requires extensive construction and reconstruction of the 
infrastructure along the entire route from Russian Chukotka in the east to Iceland and Greenland 
in the West: deep-water seaports with modern logistics and service, transport hubs, support and 
rescue points for safe and stable transarctic shipping, and refueling points for transit vessels passing 
the route from China to Europe and back.  
The success of the ABEC is only possible with the attraction of foreign investments. In such a 
situation, future development of the ABEC and China’s position in the initiative depend on the 
willingness of Nordic countries and Russia to attract China’s investment. The economies along the 
potential ABEC have a wide range of assets and features that Chinese investors seek, i.e. 
hydrocarbons and maritime transport in Norway and Russia, shipbuilding in Finland, research and 
development in Sweden, mining in Denmark (Greenland), renewable energy and rare-earth metals 
in Iceland, among others. However, the magnitude and certain patterns of China’s activities in the 
region have also raised concerns as Chinese companies have begun to buy what some consider 
critical infrastructure (Seaman et al., 2017). To overcome challenges of strategic mistrust, China 
should further engage Nordic countries and other stakeholders to reassure them of its intentions 
(Liu, 2018). China should not solely rely on its economic largesse to win the support of its potential 
ABEC partner nations. Over the long term, China will need to highlight the less visible benefits 
of the ABEC, such as sharing of development experience and expertise, the promotion of regional 
cooperation, and the delivery of more global public goods.  
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The Polar Silk Road in the Popular Press:  
Global Media Framing of China’s 2018 Arctic Policy 
White Paper  
 
Derek Moscato 
 
 
China’s issuance of its 2018 Arctic Policy white paper, calling for a “Polar Silk Road,” provides a unique lens into how 
narratives about China are fostered in global news outlets. The white paper, garnering headlines from international media 
outlets, provided the kind of foreign policy milestone that allowed journalists to develop a narrative about the country’s 
interest and actions in the polar sphere. Drawing from media framing theory, this study seeks to establish how three 
prominent media outlets from North America, Europe, and Asia covered China’s high-profile Arctic publication. Using news 
stories and a qualitative analysis, this paper’s analysis offers a glimpse into the dynamic interplay of global media and policy 
at a time when China’s interests converge with the Arctic’s increasingly prominent place in international affairs. China’s self-
identification as a “Near-Arctic State” has created an inevitable focal point for the press and subsequent dialogue highlighting 
the convergence of Chinese and Arctic affairs. 
 
 
Introduction 
China’s ascent as a global political and economic power has been accompanied by much scrutiny 
from the West about its developing agenda in the Arctic. The country’s interest in the polar region 
is buoyed by a combination of environmental concern and economic opportunity (Lanteigne & 
Ping, 2015). On January 26, 2018, China’s State Council Information Office published the 
country’s first Arctic white paper. The document formalized a series of oral statements from 
Chinese officials about the country’s policy positions and aspirations in the decade previous (i.e. 
SIPRI, 2012; Rylander, 2015; Liu, 2016). Entitled China’s Arctic Policy, it called for, among other 
things, greater international cooperation over shipping and infrastructure in the Arctic—a so-called 
“Polar Silk Road” (Xinhua, 2018). International media headlines from publications such as 
Newsweek, the Financial Times, AND THE South China Morning Post were quick to latch onto 
the moniker in covering the development and providing assertions of what this meant for the 
region and the world.  
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China’s white paper highlights how the country envisions its future in the Arctic— not as a remote 
or separate site of ecology and geopolitics, but rather a strategic location for the country’s future 
interests in logistics, resources extraction, scientific exploration, and climate policy. As a result, the 
Arctic Policy white paper emerges as an important media artifact in understanding China’s 
motivations and aspirations in the polar sphere, and serves as a subsequent story angle for 
journalists or what is known as a “news peg.” For example, China’s September 2018 launch of the 
Xuelong 2 polar research vessel, also known as Snow Dragon II, set off a number of articles in the 
international press about China’s Arctic ambitions. These articles continued a polar narrative about 
China already highlighted in previous stories about the earlier-launched Snow Dragon icebreaker. 
Media coverage about China’s Arctic white paper, then, is the inevitable outcome of a journalistic 
process that ties larger stories to events, incidents, or publicity announcements and missives that 
editors considers newsworthy. 
White papers exist as a hybrid of organizational expertise, journalistic-styled communication, and 
institutional advocacy (Perez, 2011). However, while white papers and like-minded policy 
documents are well-read by scholars, technicians, specialists, politicians, and journalists, they are 
not necessarily created for mass consumption. The job of relaying the messaging from a white 
paper beyond a first-level audience to a larger public often falls to news reporters, whose audiences 
can number in the thousands or even millions. In the case of China’s Arctic Policy, as with similar 
scenarios, a majority of those made aware of the document’s assertions did not read the publication 
itself, but rather interpretations of it from intermediaries, including the popular press. Thus, media 
take on a heightened role in disseminating information between nations and publics. Because of 
their mass reach and influence on both audiences and policymakers, national and global news 
outlets can serve or undermine nation-state interests.  
At the same time, China’s arrival in existing Arctic discourses has provided an opportunity for 
circumpolar nations such as Canada to press for greater international cooperation in the region 
and provide the Arctic with more prominence on the national political agenda (Lasserre, 2010). In 
other words, because of its national heft China brings an inevitably larger spotlight to the entire 
polar sphere. This study seeks to establish how three prominent media outlets in North America, 
Europe, and Asia covered China’s publication of its Arctic Policy white paper. Drawing from news 
stories, and using a qualitative framing analysis to assess how the white paper was conveyed to 
global audiences, this paper offers a glimpse into the dynamic interplay of global media and policy, 
at a time when China’s interests converge with the Arctic’s increasingly prominent place in 
international affairs. China’s self-identification as a “Near-Arctic State” has created an inevitable 
media focal point and subsequent dialogue highlighting the convergence of Chinese and Arctic 
affairs. Yet the media’s central role in constructing a narrative about a polar China deserves further 
scrutiny. 
Literature Review 
China and the Arctic 
The emergence of China as a country of interest in scholarship about the Arctic has coincided with 
the region’s growing significance in the global consciousness—particularly in the realms of 
ecological and economic affairs. Significant milestones have also led to more scholarly and media 
interest. In 2013, following years of negotiation, China was admitted to the Arctic Council as an 
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observer nation, along with other Asian states, including Japan, Singapore, India, and South Korea. 
While a global perspective has been present in public dialogue about the Arctic over the past 
decade, especially in relation to environmental issues and social/economic development, China’s 
2013 inclusion emphasized further the confluence of the Arctic with globalization (Rainwater, 
2013), marking a new era for international Arctic politics.   
One polar view that has emerged from within China is that the Arctic is a region for all of 
humankind. However, according to Wright (2011), such a perspective contradicts the country’s 
emphasis on sovereign state rights as a basis for international relations. Related to this is the belief 
that China would be less inclined to pursue an exploration strategy characterized by aggression or 
confrontation, in great part because such an approach might harm China’s standing related to 
disputes in the South China Sea (Alexeeva & Lasserre, 2012).   
More often, China’s Arctic aspirations are understood through an economic lens, including 
transportation and logistical concerns such as shipping routes. China stands to benefit from lower 
regulatory costs as a result of shorter trips through the less-congested waters of the Northeast 
Passage—this in spite of the potential for technical challenges and the country’s relatively limited 
experience in polar navigation (Campbell, 2012). A policy of collaboration and cooperation is 
therefore the most optimal path forward for China in the region because it benefits the country’s 
economic and strategic positions (Alexeeva & Lasserre, 2012).  
A corresponding yet distinct perspective sees China’s interest in the Arctic as a direct extension of 
its overarching focus on science and innovation. The country’s interest and involvement in Arctic 
science—which can be categorized by the disciplines of oceanography, biology, glaciology, and 
atmospheric science—is predicated on developing the kind of scientific policy and leadership that 
matches its global political and economic aspirations (Lasserre, 2018). Thus, China’s Arctic 
engagement to date, and its policy moving forward, represents a much longer-term investment 
comprising economic and scientific innovation. Tonami (2014) situates the country’s interests, 
along with other Asian powers such as Japan, as being aligned closer to economic security and 
development rather than traditional security concerns.   
However, a much wider range of views about China’s aspirations continue to circulate in 
international discourses. Diverging perspectives between China and the West have given way to 
an emerging “clash of identities” narrative, one that is sometimes based on earlier myths and 
misconceptions (Lanteigne & Ping, 2015). Such a constructivist perspective puts the spotlight on 
a key global conduit of information and ideas: The news media.  
Coverage by the U.S. and Global Press 
Since the 1980s—a time of growing international influence, diplomatic engagement, and economic 
ties for the country—China has seen an accompanying upswing in international media exposure. 
Even as China emerged as an inevitable economic rival to the United States at the turn of the 
millennium, the country’s reputation cultivated by the media largely rested on the whims of 
American news outlets (Peng, 2004). Some scholars have suggested that the rise of interest in 
China has aligned with the need to make the country the inevitable enemy of the United States—
with attention switching to China in the 1990s after the demise of the USSR (Stone & Xiao, 2007). 
Regardless of the motive, the growth of coverage about China in the U.S. media was not 
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insignificant, as it came during a time when international coverage from the press was trending 
downwards on the whole (Peng, 2004). 
Such extensive media treatments of China are not necessarily extended to the rest of Asia. A 
content analysis of media coverage of the SARS outbreaks connected to China and Vietnam in 
international newspapers (the Washington Post, the Times of London, the Sydney Morning Herald, the 
Globe and Mail, the Straits Times, and Newsweek) found that Western news coverage emphasized 
China as the negative other, a media treatment not extended to Vietnam (Leung & Huang, 2007). 
Meanwhile, country of origin difference was found in media coverage of SARS between Chinese 
and U.S. newspapers (Luther & Zhou, 2005).  
International media coverage critical of the Chinese government is a sharp contrast from the pro-
government coverage in the country’s domestic, state-owned publications. A comparison of news 
coverage of HIV/AIDS in China by the Associated Press and Xinhua News Agency found the latter to 
be sympathetic to the government’s efforts—suggesting that news is a socially constructed 
phenomenon that reflects national values or agendas (Wu, 2007). A similar study, this time 
comparing media depictions of the Chinese gold medal-winning swimmer Ye Shiwen during the 
2012 Summer Olympics in both the U.S. and Chinese media, highlighted an “us versus them” 
dichotomy that is strongly influenced by national ideology (Bie & Billings, 2013).  
Visual media such as photojournalism also drives coverage of global events like the Olympics. 
Huang and Fahmy (2011), looking at the anti-China protests at the 2008 Beijing Summer Games, 
showed that the U.S. media focused on images of Chinese government suppression, as well as pro-
Tibet demonstrations. However, online news sites from six countries, including China and the 
U.S., ultimately showed neither overt nationalism nor sporting bias during coverage of the 
subsequent London Summer Olympics (Eagleman, Burch & Vooris, 2014). The aforementioned 
studies underscore one reality of contemporary global media: The variety of such outlets creates a 
much more complex journalistic ecosystem than the one that existed even a decade previous. 
Yet China garners a particular kind of media treatment because of its institutions, economic heft, 
and foreign engagement. So-called “elite media” play an especially critical role in shaping coverage 
of China from abroad. The New York Times’ coverage of China’s ascent as the world’s second 
largest economy was embedded with three themes highlighting an interplay of Orientalism and 
neoliberalism, according to Ban, Sastry, and Dutta (2013): consumption as national duty, personal 
hyper-consumerism and luxury goods shopping, and China as a place that operates with disregard 
to international law.  
Similarly, the New York Times’ discourses about Chinese government policy between 1990 and 2000 
have featured three “ideological packages” within its stories: globalization, engagement, and 
containment (Lee, 2010). The notion of China as international threat emerges in other studies, 
including those connecting media coverage to individual level cognition and beliefs. One survey 
of American views on China based on U.S. media coverage found that the country was viewed as 
an economic and social threat, even as Chinese nationals individually were viewed as hardworking 
and intelligent (Zhang, 2015). The analysis points to another broader theme within media studies: 
while news stories and television programs may not accurately reflect the on-the-ground reality of 
world events, they shape a perceived reality for those who consume such media.  
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The tone and content of international media stories about China carries over into the polar sphere. 
Such stories reflect negativity or suspicion of Chinese activities. In turn, Chinese scholars argue 
that a media rhetoric of threat and suspicion have served to slow down China’s active engagement 
in the Arctic (Bradie, 2017). Within geopolitics, an “imagined geography” can be both produced 
and reinforced by news media and other popular culture offerings. Mass media representations of 
Arctic geopolitics are often imbued with a “polar orientalism” that simultaneously emphasizes 
Eurocentric worldviews while obscuring key geographic and historiographic facts (Dodds & 
Nuttall, 2016). As some East Asian states, including China, reorient themselves toward the Arctic, 
they are vulnerable to news coverage that points to their polar interest as unconventional or 
suspicious.  
Media coverage of China, like other topics in the global public sphere, is therefore subject not only 
to an emphasis or de-emphasis of certain themes, narratives, issues, and viewpoints. It is also 
rendered by journalistic values and practices embedded within the newsroom cultures of different 
nations, which in turn dictate the role of story variables such as conflict, responsibility, leadership, 
economy, and human-interest (Luther & Zhou, 2005). To this end, media framing endures as an 
appropriate lens for understanding how nations such as China, or their national events, are covered 
by journalists domestically or abroad.  
Media Framing and the Interpretation of News 
A well-established approach to analyzing global political discourses in the press is framing. Media 
framing helps audiences interpret the world around them in new or different ways, and involves 
the selection of information to provide different perspectives of reality. Entman (1993) highlights 
four functions within this framework: defining problems, diagnosing causes, making moral 
judgments, and suggesting remedies. Within broader public discourses, media framing draws from 
symbolic acts as well as cognitive processes—which in turn help audiences form positions on 
social or policy issues (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). Specific devices—namely metaphors, 
catchphrases, exemplars, depictions, and visual images—enable the producers of discourse and 
media content to imbue content with meaning, which in turn can shift public opinion (Gamson & 
Modigliani, 1989). 
Thus, the variables involved in the construction of frames help establish their salience. A framing 
analysis of the 1999 Seattle WTO Conference and subsequent “Battle in Seattle” showed that the 
Australian media highlighting of official sources and specific dramatic characteristics of public 
protest helped to demonize anti-WTO protesters (McFarlane & Hay, 2003). However, media 
framing can be a fluid entity—even within single events. Protesters at the G-20 Summit in 
Pittsburgh successfully generated their own frames through the media such as “First 
Amendment/right to protest” and “nonviolence” even as some news commentators and city 
officials characterized their activity as “violence” and “anarchy.” Different framings, and therefore 
different meanings, can be generated by the same global media event.  
Aligning with the view that information by itself doesn’t translate into newsworthiness, Cox (2012) 
suggests an outsized role for emotional appeals, tropes, narrations, and argumentation in 
environmental media controversies. A public media event (which can also be construed as a public 
relations or public diplomacy event), such as the publication of a national white paper, therefore 
exists as an interpretive construction fostered by audience and journalist perceptions.  
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Newsworthiness can thus be socially constructed—contingent upon features, meanings, and 
consequences of a story or topic (Lester, 1980). Breaking through to the audiences served by 
national and international media outlets with the right kind of news coverage becomes paramount 
for nations—which risk public disinterest/alienation or international opposition with the wrong 
kinds of coverage. Media framing of China has toggled between a developing and threatening 
China, as well as the ‘Red’ China and the authoritarian, Tiananmen Square China (Peng, 2004). 
Therefore, China comes in for both favorable and unfavorable treatment by outside news outlets. 
Because media coverage tends to pivot around major global events and issues, this study seeks to 
understand what media frames emerged during coverage of the country’s Artic Policy white paper.   
Method 
To address the research question, the study employed a qualitative content analysis design. In the 
context of journalism and media studies, qualitative data can be used to assess the appeals, 
narratives, and themes of textual documents or other mediation, while connecting such artifacts 
to overarching conceptual or thematic frameworks (Meyers & Abrams, 2010). Furthermore, 
Altheide (1996) situates qualitative research as a means to understanding the traits and significance 
of documents, including their meaning in a larger social arena. To this end, and because this study 
is concerned with the construction of news messaging about China’s Arctic engagement for a 
global audience, the author sought out widely-consumed news media artifacts that were distributed 
and consumed outside of China. Using a combination of Lexis-Nexis and Google News, the 
researcher used the search terms “China,” “Arctic,” and “White Paper” to locate relevant articles. 
The coverage timeframe was January 26, 2018 to February 14, 2018—representing the first three 
weeks after the publication of the white paper. While further coverage of the white paper was 
produced in the months following, the researcher felt the first three weeks captured a critical mass 
of voices that were focused on the document in isolation from other events; whereas subsequent 
coverage has placed the white paper alongside larger events and policies, thus diluting coverage of 
the white paper itself.  
The Lexis-Nexis database located over 200 articles about the white paper’s release during this 
period. However, many of these stories were simply reproductions of existing wire service stories 
or press releases. Most of these media pieces were produced by official communication arms of 
the Chinese government, including the Xinhua News Agency. The author further narrowed the 
search criteria to newspapers only, which produced 51 articles. This number overstates actual 
coverage of the Arctic white paper in international media, however: A majority of stories were 
published in the Africa, European, and U.S. editions of China Daily. While this coverage is 
noteworthy, China Daily’s “state-owned” status in China (Smith, 2013, para.1) means these stories 
served aims of public diplomacy and public information more than as, ostensibly, independent or 
third-party journalism.  
Given some of these distortions in global media coverage, the author chose to focus on corporate 
(non-government) news stories emanating from three of the world’s prominent centers for media 
and capital markets activity: New York, London, and Hong Kong. As global media centers, these 
jurisdictions are home to journalistic production that is consumed by audiences beyond their 
immediate metropolitan regions. Furthermore, as centers for commercial activity and trade, their 
media are inherently interested in geopolitical and global economic activity. Related to this, the 
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author looks to assessments of the growing literature devoted to China’s Arctic interests, which 
see the country through lenses of geopolitics but also political economy (Lackenbauer, Lajeunesse, 
Manicom & Lasserre, 2018). Similarly, media have focused not only as China the political entity, 
but the transformative economic and financial story as well. Thus, publications with an emphasis 
on geopolitics, international relations, and global business/economics are a key and influential part 
of the international China dialogue.  
From the initial search on Lexis-Nexis and a subsequent search on Google News, three online 
publications were identified. Part of the so-called popular press, including newspaper and 
television media, they are New York area-based CNBC, the London-based Financial Times, and the 
Hong Kong daily South China Morning Post. CNBC is an American basic cable channel focused on 
economic, financial, and political affairs. It is part of the New York City-headquartered NBC 
Universal News Group, which is owned by Comcast. The Financial Times, which also focuses on 
economic and business affairs, is owned by Nikkei Inc. The South China Morning Post, Hong Kong’s 
English-language daily, is owned by Alibaba, which purchased the publication in 2015. The new 
ownership group sees the newspaper as an international source for Chinese affairs (Hoffman 
Agency, 2018). Unlike China Daily and other official Chinese media outlets, the South China Morning 
Post offers a view of China from Hong Kong, simultaneously independent yet existing within 
China’s borders.  
Noteworthy here is the relatively minimal attention paid to the white paper publication from other 
leading media in the U.S., in particular the New York Times and the Washington Post (the former’s 
coverage was lumped in with coverage of the World Economic Forum and China’s broader Belt 
and Road Initiative, while the Post did not provide any coverage at the time). 
A total of four stories were retrieved from South China Morning Post; while two each were collected 
from CNBC and the Financial Times. These were exclusively news and feature stories. Letters to 
the editor and social media messages (such as tweets or blog posts) were not included. The author 
coded each article for the dominant frames used to explain China’s engagement with the Arctic, 
as well as variables and devices (such as expressions, clichés, and numbers) within the content.  
Results 
Collectively, the articles collected developed a discourse about international interests in the Arctic, 
and specifically created frames about China and its Arctic engagement. The frames that emerged 
for the highlighted publications will be briefly described.  
Resources, Partnerships, and Passages  
A key emergent frame, one that featured prominently in media coverage, focused on the economic 
drivers and outcomes of China’s Arctic interests. This frame corresponds closely with China’s 
original white paper. References to the “Polar Silk Road,” an expression that originally appeared 
in the white paper itself, emphasized China’s desire to tap into the region’s hydrocarbon and 
mineral natural resources, including natural gas reserves. “Polar partnerships”—with Russia, 
Iceland, Finland, and Norway—were observed. The Financial Times highlighted China’s interest 
specifically in Greenland, including its interest in “rare earth metals and possible rights to Arctic 
ports” according to an expert. The South China Morning Post described China’s ambition to exploit 
shipping routes to Europe, and its interest in not only natural resources, including fishing, but also 
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developing Arctic tourism. CNBC tied China’s Arctic engagement to the Belt and Road Initiative, 
the country’s attempt to “construct a massive, multi-national zone of economic and political 
influence that has Beijing at its core.”  
Some references to economic aspirations in the region painted China in a decidedly more positive 
light. CNBC explained that capital and joint venture opportunities would benefit China’s national 
partners that lacked necessary funding for such activities on their own.   
Territorial History and Ambitions 
In this frame, China was situated as a nation intent on growing its geographic footprint. This 
coverage reflected existing tensions between China and its Asian neighbors, such as Japan-China 
disagreement over the Senkaku archipelago. The South China Morning Post, for example, emphasized 
how geopolitical tensions with Japan would be exacerbated if it were to deploy warships 
northward—through the Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima straits—to the region. It also quoted an 
editorial from Japan’s Yomiuri newspaper arguing for the world to be wary of China’s Arctic 
advances, because the country’s Belt and Road Initiative is “aimed at securing military footholds.”  
China’s history with previous territorial disputes was asserted, including disputes in the South 
China Sea. CNBC’s coverage spoke to “red flags” about potential boundary disputes and Chinese 
aggression, noting that in the South China Sea, “China has ignored maritime law and a legally 
binding tribunal by building islands there.” Noted also was how the country’s Arctic ambitions fit 
in with the Belt and Road initiative, and that China wished to connect itself to Europe, the Middle 
East, and beyond via massive infrastructure projects across dozens of countries. At the same time, 
the global leadership ambitions of President Xi Jinping were also highlighted. One example of this 
was the emphasis on the development of shipping lanes opened up by global warming. The 
encouragement of companies and governments to build infrastructure and even conduct trial 
voyages—“paving the way for… routes that would form a ‘Polar Silk Road’”—can be framed 
simultaneously as territorial ambition or national innovation.   
China the Global Innovator 
In this third frame, China’s engagement with the Arctic emerges as the inevitable outcome of a 
nation transformed as a result of its growing political, economic, and scientific clout. Highlighting 
the white paper’s assertion that the Arctic represents “a shared future for mankind,” CNBC 
explained China’s concern over climate change and its implications for the region and the planet. 
Other publications, however, positioned China’s interest in climate change exclusively in terms of 
the melting of sea ice opening up new passages for shipping as well as previously inaccessible, 
resource-rich areas.  
The South China Morning Post relayed China’s interest in emergent areas of innovation and science—
polar, oceanic, space, and digital/technology—that had advanced alongside China’s global 
influence and clout. Also noted was China’s ability to potentially play the role of peacemaker in 
the region. The Financial Times, for example, noted that China had set up a joint research center in 
Shanghai with institutes from five of the Arctic nations with sometimes overlapping claims and 
interests. The Financial Times, while describing the “slow-motion race for the control of the region”, 
highlighted the first transit of the Northwest Passage by a Chinese research ship in 2017, thus 
speeding up travel time by seven days (even as it also noted tensions with Canada over this). To 
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this end, China is held up as a global power using its political and economic strength to develop 
solutions to existing international challenges—even as geopolitical tensions sometimes arise over 
them.   
Analysis and Conclusion 
News coverage of China’s Arctic Policy white paper demonstrates how media can collectively 
construct a perceived reality of the nation-state in different contexts. This is true even of a tightly-
controlled communication document such as the international white paper. Even as it is produced 
within China’s controlled media environment, the white paper is subjected to the whims of the 
relatively uncontrolled global media ecosystem. Media can frame, and reframe, ideas through the 
inclusion of symbolic devices (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989), rhetorical variables, or editorial 
approaches such as emphasis or repetition. 
At the same time, through frames this media process helps weave a narrative about the arrival of 
the world’s arguably most robust economy to the Arctic. Frames that emerged from the news 
about this key geopolitical milestone developed some of the same themes that are seen in coverage 
of China outside of the Arctic. For example, the frame of resources, partnerships, and passages 
picked up on a narrative about China that has been well told over the past two decades: China’s 
economic engine continues to drive the country’s growth, aspirations, actions, and relationships.  
At the same time, negative portrayals of China as the “other”—this time in the context of the 
Arctic—are also seen. The “clash of identities” narrative described by Lanteigne & Ping (2015) is 
seen when China’s Arctic strategy is juxtaposed against China’s track record in the South China 
Sea, situating the country in potential opposition to established Arctic nations, to its Asian rivals 
such as Japan, and to international law. Indeed, the inclusion of China’s territorial disputes in the 
South China Sea allowed media stories to preview one potential (and aggressive) pathway for China 
in the Arctic. This theme in particular was espoused by the South China Morning Post: While different 
international media might uniformly frame an initiative such as the white paper as “suspicious”, 
the construction of such a threat can be different based on regional or contextual factors. What 
one country identifies as aggression might be perceived as less menacing in another. 
Nonetheless, a concurrent theme emerging from China’s Arctic interest is that of the global 
innovator, although a media dialectic of nautical, geographic, and environmental advances toggles 
between enthusiasm and fear. However, global media coverage ultimately highlighted China’s 
desired or established partnerships with multiple countries as a basis for economic but also political 
cooperation. Such reporting echoes the view of Alexeeva and Lasserre (2012) that a policy of 
collaboration and cooperation is the best strategic path forward for China.  
Climate change, unsurprisingly, factored extensively into the news coverage. However, while some 
reporting did focus on China’s global role in reducing carbon emissions, this environmental 
framing variable was linked extensively to China’s economic ambitions—specifically by explaining 
how melting ice would give way to enhanced transportation corridors. This shows one of the key 
challenges for China as it increasingly tries to influence the media narrative about its political rise: 
Even when it takes a leadership role in globally pressing areas such as climate change, such actions 
are subject to interpretation by some media as a pathway to political or economic advantage.  
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While this study did not analyze all stories about China’s Arctic Policy white paper, it did provide 
a snapshot of how some media coverage from outside of China coalesced to provide distinct 
narratives about China’s Arctic Strategy white paper and its polar engagement. Such articles are 
not produced in isolation, and broader contextual factors need to be considered when one analyzes 
such coverage. For example, at the time of the announcement, China’s economy had enjoyed 
strong growth over the past 12 months. At the same time, the country was the focus of aggressive 
trade banter from U.S. President Donald Trump; and the country continued to reaffirm its 
commitment to the Paris climate accord, from which the United States had recently departed. 
While these factors might not have directly influenced how stories about the country’s Arctic 
engagement were written, they did help to inform a much larger discourse about China’s 
international relations and global aspirations. At the same time, as noted in the methodology, China 
itself produced much of the global public discourse through its official communication arms, 
including its China Daily international editions. A future study might compare and contrast 
commercially-owned media’s framing of China’s Arctic milestones with the state-controlled 
coverage produced within China’s borders, including its official news channels and government 
communication agencies.  
Lastly, it is worth noting that China’s publication of a white paper served to both broadcast policy 
and promote the country’s national interests in the polar sphere. As a public document, it invited 
mass consumption through media coverage—as national white papers exist as informational and 
publicity conduits between policy and publics. Thus, China would have expected media coverage 
to inevitably follow its Arctic Policy publication. This sequence of media events hints at a China 
that is actively aware of how global media can influence and shape narratives abroad, and how 
China’s interests in the Arctic are ultimately better served by more favorable news treatment and 
audience sentiment. The framing of international policy in the media is more than just discursive 
phenomena in the global public sphere; it represents a strategic communication pathway and 
opportunity for nations intent on reclaiming media narrative, public opinion, and policy outcomes.  
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Commentary 
China’s Polar Ships and Future Operations 
 
Lawson W. Brigham 
 
 
 
China significantly upgraded its polar marine operations capacity with the launch of a second polar 
research ship, the Xuelong 2, on 10 September 2018.  Construction began on the new ship in 
December 2016 at the Jiangnan Shipyard in Shanghai and this vessel is China’s first domestically-
built polar research icebreaker; the ship is scheduled to come into service during 2019. The 
propulsion is diesel-electric and provides the ship with 15 megawatts of power (20,115 
horsepower) to two Azipod propulsion units, or rotating, steerable pods.  Xuelong 2 is a Polar Class 
(PC) 3 ship (the highest class in the international classification system is PC1 and the lowest is 
PC7) and is designed to break 1.5-metre thick ice moving at continuous speeds of two to three 
knots (with icebreaking capability both moving ahead and astern). Owned by the Polar Research 
Institute of China, the new ship can operate comfortably in both polar regions as a logistics-supply 
vessel and a research ship conducting a full range of oceanographic and surveying operations. The 
total complement is 90 researchers and crew. 
One of the keys to the design of Xuelong 2 is the role of Finnish marine technology.  China’s Polar 
Institute awarded a contract to Aker Arctic in Finland for concept and basic design phases in 2012. 
Most would agree that Aker Arctic is among the world’s leading icebreaker design firms and China 
has opted for the latest technological advances in polar ship design. Ice and open water model 
tests were conducted in Aker Arctic’s Helsinki ice tank and laboratory. Due to the requirements 
for long, open water transits of modern polar research vessels, especially on voyages to the 
Southern Ocean, good seakeeping characteristics are essential for Xuelong 2. The ship is designed 
to carry two helicopters, has extensive wet and dry laboratories, multiple cranes, large cargo spaces, 
and spacious working decks for scientific operations. One special feature is a ‘moon pool’ ~ an 
opening through the ship’s hull where scientific instruments can be lowered during operations 
with difficult ice conditions surrounding the ship. One icebreaking feature, unique to a number of 
Aker Arctic designs, is the ability of the ship to break ice effectively in both ahead and astern 
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directions, dubbed by Aker Arctic a ‘dual-acting icebreaker.’ Xuelong 2 is smaller in tonnage and 
physical size than Xuelong 1, but is more capable as an icebreaker due to higher propulsion power 
and a more efficient, icebreaking hull form. 
Xuelong 1 (Snow Dragon) has been the principal polar research vessel for Chinese Arctic and 
Antarctic research expeditions since being acquired by China’s government in 1993. Xuelong I was 
completed in March 1993 by the Kherson Shipyard in Ukraine as an icebreaking supply and cargo 
ship for the Russian maritime Arctic. Shanghai’s Hudong-Zhonghua Shipbuilding firm converted 
the ship from a cargo vessel to polar research support ship by 1994. Extensive rebuilds of the ship 
were conducted in 2007 (with a new superstructure and pilothouse) and in 2013 (with new main 
engines). Xuelong 1 is a physically large polar ship (21,025 tons displacement and 167 meters in 
length) and can accommodate 128 scientists and crew. However, the key limitation of this ship is 
that it is relatively under-powered (13.2 megawatts or 17,700 horsepower for propulsion) for the 
large size of the ship, and if it would be considered a fully capable icebreaker. Its original design as 
an ice class cargo ship with a single shaft and controllable pitch propeller limits its icebreaking 
capability. However, the ship has crossed the Arctic Ocean in summer on several research cruises 
and operated successfully in the Antarctic on numerous expeditions. Xuelong 1 has been an 
impressive, Chinese national presence in both polar regions, and has been operated safely and 
effectively by highly competent polar mariners. 
It is important to keep these ship developments in Chinese polar research in context. These two 
polar research ships, both government-owned and operated, provide China’s research and 
sovereign presence at both ends of the world. They are excellent polar ships, and appropriate for 
the tasks at hand, but are far from being high end, large polar icebreakers with high propulsion 
and icebreaking capabilities.  Xuelong 1 & 2 are not naval vessels, nor do they have apparent security 
or law enforcement roles (as U.S. Coast Guard icebreakers have); both ships do have the endurance 
and capability to effectively carry Chinese officials on Antarctic Treaty inspections around the 
Continent.  Neither ship has an envisioned role in the ice escort of commercial ships such as occurs 
along Russia’s Northern Sea Route. They are purpose built and operated in support of China’s 
expanding research efforts in Arctic and Antarctic waters. They have no commercial or escort 
function related to China’s Polar Silk Road proposed in its January 2018 Arctic policy white paper. 
The only obvious link to a Polar Silk Road is the conduct of Arctic Ocean research to expand our 
knowledge of the profound changes underway in the region, and to support applied research 
related to potential Arctic marine transport routes. Tables in the media equating China’s polar 
research ships to the large polar icebreakers of Russia, the United States and Canada, for example, 
are misleading and overstate China’s current, national icebreaking capability. 
The potential building of a Chinese nuclear icebreaker would be an intriguing game changer and 
wildcard factor from several strategic perspectives. The Chinese press in June 2018 reported that 
the China National Nuclear Corporation was welcoming bids from domestic shipyards to build a 
nuclear-powered icebreaker and comprehensive polar support ship. Such a nuclear icebreaker 
would provide China with an extraordinary maritime capacity with unlimited endurance, mobility 
and self-sufficiency to: potentially escort ships on Arctic waterways; conduct polar scientific 
operations in remote regions for extended periods; and, perform a broad range of complex logistics 
support in both polar regions, possibly in all seasons. Such a nuclear ship could conceivably 
provide support to naval operations. But a number of technologies would have to be harnessed 
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and meshed to construct a Chinese civilian, nuclear-powered ship. Russia operates the world’s only 
nuclear icebreakers and they have pioneered their use since 1959, the year of completion and early 
operation of the icebreaker Lenin (the world’s first nuclear-powered surface ship in service 1959-
89). The Russian nuclear ships employ a steam turbine-electric power plant: the nuclear reactors 
produce hot water and steam which in turn drive turbine generators; the electricity produced by 
the generators power electric motors which rotate the ship’s shafts and propellers. Rosatomflot, 
Russia’s nuclear icebreaker operator, could provide China with a wealth of experience and Russian 
shipyards could export nuclear marine technology and expertise. Is it plausible the renewed era of 
Russia-China cooperation might extend to a collaboration in the design and construction of a 
Chinese nuclear icebreaker? 
The potential construction and operation of a (civilian) nuclear icebreaker would provide a useful 
test platform for China’s future development of nuclear-powered naval ships (such as an aircraft 
carrier and other surface warships), and possibly for future commercial cargo ships. However, 
construction, manning and operation of such a nuclear ship would require a lengthy and complex 
project requiring close cooperation among several industries and government agencies. The entire 
project would be a costly enterprise. Importantly, a nuclear icebreaker is realistically not required in 
the Antarctic for research or logistics. A Chinese nuclear icebreaker would be built for Arctic 
operations and roles supporting commercial ships that are unclear. China’s ambition and call to 
build and operate a nuclear icebreaker leave many unanswered questions, including an abundance 
of strategic implications for the Arctic states and polar community. 
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Briefing Note 
 
The Need to Better Unpack the Transaction Costs 
Associated with Northern Research in Canada 
 
Ashlee-Ann E. Pigford, Samantha Darling & Gordon M. Hickey 
 
 
Introduction  
Governments in Canada have been steadily increasing their investments in scientific research to 
help support evidence-based decision-making for sustainable northern development (Carr, 
Natcher et al., 2013; ITK, 2018). Prominent examples include financial support for: ArcticNet 
(2003-2018; 113.2 million CAD), the Canada program for the International Polar Year (2006-2011; 
150 million CAD), the Polar Continental Shelf Program (2006-2011; 88.9 million CAD), the Arctic 
Research Infrastructure Fund (2009; 85 million CAD), Sentinelle Nord (2015-2023; 98 million 
CAD), Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada’s (NSERC) Northern 
Chairs Program (2000-2017; 11 million CAD), the Canadian High Arctic Research Station (250 
million CAD for construction; 2018 onwards 26.5 million CAD /year) and the Institut nordique 
du Québec (2018; 83.5 million CAD for construction).1 Along with these investments, various 
knowledge co-production frameworks have been proposed and some have been adopted to help 
foster the production of scientific knowledge that is considered relevant to academia, communities 
and governments (e.g. participatory, community-based and action research) (Gearhead and Shirley, 
2007; Burn, 2008; Pearce, Ford et al., 2009). While collaborative approaches to scientific research 
have seen some success in informing public policy directions (Armitage, Berkes et al., 2011), 
northern advocates have continued to call attention to gaps between scientific pursuits, community 
needs and northern policy outcomes (Burn, 2008; Ogden, Schmidt et al., 2016; ITK, 2018). Reports 
such as Research Excellence in the Northwest Territories: Holistic, Relevant and Ethical Research in the Social 
Sciences, Humanities and Health Sciences (ACUNS, 2018), Research Excellence in Yukon: Increasing Capacity 
and Benefits to Yukoners in the Social Sciences, Humanities and Health Sciences (ACUNS, 2017), and A new 
Shared Arctic Leadership Model (Simon, 2017) also suggest that equitable collaboration and 
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participation in northern research processes has yet to be fully realized (see also Korsmo & 
Graham, 2002; Caine, Salomons et al., 2007; Gearhead & Shirley, 2007; Brunet, Hickey et al., 2014; 
Brunet, Hickey et al., 2017). Interestingly, despite the identification of these gaps, there has been 
relatively little systematic analysis of the northern research governance system that guide 
collaborative engagement, consultation practices, and overall co-productive capacity in Canada. In 
this Briefing Note, we consider how such an analysis might be approached by drawing on a 
transaction costs approach to help inform more strategic and integrated research policy 
frameworks across scale.  
Transaction Costs in Research 
Through the lens of social network theory, a transaction costs approach has the potential to 
provide insight into how existing institutions2 either support or impede effective collaborative 
research endeavors (Landry & Amara, 1998). According to Landry and Amara (1998), a transaction 
costs approach predicts that when the perceived monetary and non-monetary costs (e.g. time and 
opportunity) of participating in formal collaborative research arrangements are relatively high, 
actors will tend to seek alternatives. Robust public research governance is inherently relational and 
often accrues costs associated with engaging in processes to exchange information, coordinate 
diverse actors and enforce reporting and monitoring requirements (Landry & Amara, 1998; Ruiter, 
2005). The types of transactions that are associated with relational activities tend to be continuous 
and occur over an extended period of time, moving away from market transactions that aim to be 
both costless and instantaneous (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). It is often assumed that governance 
structures that lower transaction costs and control for the dimensions of transactions (e.g. 
uncertainty, frequency, specificity) will perform better than those that do not (i.e. those with higher 
transaction costs) (Croisier, 1998; Jobin, 2008). Therefore, ‘organizing transactions in order to 
economize on transaction costs’ is often considered a core aspect of effective public governance 
(Ruiter, 2005). 
Research governance is often approached with the intent to minimize administrative requirements 
(e.g. reporting, managing collaborative research relationships) and maximize available resources 
for research efforts (i.e. minimizing transaction costs) (Landry & Amara, 1998; Boardman and 
Bozeman, 2006). However, Clark (2010) has suggested that despite government polices that aim 
to foster academic collaboration, institutional requirements at other levels of governance (e.g. 
university contract requirements) may unintentionally increase transaction costs (see also Kim & 
Bak, 2017; Widmark & Sandstrom, 2012). Therefore, an improved understanding of governance 
attributes (i.e. the distribution of resources and responsibility) and capacity is often needed in order 
to support arrangements for sustainable long-term collaborative research relationships (Sinnewe, 
Charles et al., 2016). In the Canadian context, Landry and Amara (1998) have examined how 
university researchers initiate, negotiate and coordinate inter-organizational collaborative research 
arrangements with other research partners (e.g. industry, governments, and special interest groups) 
in response to transaction costs. Their results suggest the need for more systematic and holistic 
approaches to research policy. That study and others have also shown that high transaction costs 
associated with collaborative research may offset the benefits of collaboration and contribute to 
suboptimal collective research and policy outcomes (Croisier, 1998; Landry & Amara, 1998; 
Boardman & Bozeman, 2006; Jobin, 2008; Clark, 2010; Sinnewe, Charles et al., 2016; Kim & Bak, 
2017).  
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Transaction Costs in Northern Collaborative Research  
A range of direct and indirect transaction costs have already been reported in association with 
northern collaborative research processes (see Table 1). For example, the financial costs associated 
with collaborative Arctic science can be more than eight times higher than similar research 
conducted in southern Canada, prompting northern researchers to ask, “Why conduct research in the 
Arctic, when you can do more work for less money in the South?” (Mallory, Gilchrist et al., 2018), a question 
that has been echoed elsewhere (e.g. Brook, 2009). Northern researchers have also expressed 
concern over the need to negotiate conflicting demands between dominant academic reward 
systems (e.g. the ‘publish or perish’ phenomenon) and calls for more community-engaged research 
(e.g. participatory methods, outreach, training) (Korsmo & Graham, 2002; Gearhead & Shirley, 
2007; Tondu, Balasubramaniam et al., 2014). While formal requirements for community 
engagement can require up to one quarter of a research budget (Mallory, Gilchrist et al., 2018) they 
also place significant demands on northern communities which often face challenges associated 
with limited research capacity. For example, local communities are often required to commit 
resources for participation in pre-project consultations, data collection, managing community-
researcher interactions, and assessing scientific licenses, projects and reports (Gearhead & Shirley, 
2007; Ogden, Schmidt et al., 2016; ITK, 2018). These challenges can be confounded by 
organizational and regional variation among formal approval processes (e.g. licencing and ethical 
approvals) (George, 2011), often leading to redundancies and barriers for implementation when 
projects span multiple regions, years or institutions. 
To date, existing research into the transaction costs associated with northern science has largely 
focused on project-level outcomes, providing a ‘snapshot’ of the types of transaction costs that 
can be incurred by researchers and communities. However, this approach misses the inherent 
complexity of northern innovation systems and the related impacts of scale, feedback and memory. 
Recognizing that northern scientific research operates within dynamic and multi-layered 
governance contexts, there is a need for research-related policies, organizations and actors to pay 
closer attention to the broader research system in order to help co-deliver public value (Pigford, 
Hickey et al., 2017). This is particularly pressing for northern governance actors in the context of 
sustainable northern development, as existing institutional arrangements appear to produce a range 
of direct and indirect effects that cumulatively impact overall outcomes (Burn, 2008; Ogden, 
Schmidt et al., 2016; ITK, 2018).  
Table 1. Project-level collaborative activities associated with transaction costs in the Canadian North 
Activity Associated Transactions References 
Relationship 
Building  
Time & Opportunity 
- Extended physical presence and “idle time” in the community to 
identify appropriate authorities for community representation and 
facilitate the development of local networks and friendships (i.e. 
build trust) 
- Dedicated time for pre-project consultation with the community (or 
research team)  
- Communication in multiple formats (plain language, policy briefs) 
Financial & Opportunity 
- Travel for pre-project consultation 
- Provision of food & refreshments at meetings 
(Korsmo & Graham, 
2002; Carr, Natcher et 
al., 2013; Brunet, 
Hickey et al., 2014; 
Tondu, 
Balasubramaniam et al., 
2014; Carr, 2017; 
Mallory, Gilchrist et al., 
2018) 
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Location-
specific 
Investments 
Time & Opportunity 
- Involving communities in research design, including the time for 
necessary training  
- Involving community members in dissemination activities   
- Writing proposals to acquire extra resources for outreach 
Financial & Opportunity  
- Provide local training and employment 
- Provide honoraria for knowledge holders  
- The pursuit of collaborative funding 
(Gearhead & Shirley, 
2007; Pearce, Ford et 
al., 2009; Carr, Natcher 
et al., 2013; Tondu, 
Balasubramaniam et al., 
2014; Carr, 2017; 
Mallory, Gilchrist et al., 
2018) 
Licencing & 
Ethics 
Time, Financial & Opportunity 
- Community review of ethical and license documentation 
- Navigating the differences between formal informed consent and 
community practices  
- Obtaining consent at multiple levels (e.g. community, region, 
territory) 
(Davison, Brown et al., 
2006; Davidson-Hunt 
& Michael O’Flaherty, 
2007; George, 2011) 
Reporting, 
Outreach, and 
Knowledge 
Sharing 
Time & Opportunity 
- Communication in multiple formats (plain language, policy briefs, 
academic outputs) 
- Disseminating research to the community first 
Financial & Opportunity 
- Outreach workshops (e.g. half of annual budget- see Mallory et 
al., 2018) 
(Pearce, Ford et al., 
2009; Tondu, 
Balasubramaniam et al., 
2014; Mallory, Gilchrist 
et al., 2018) 
Academic 
Expectations 
Time & Opportunity 
- Navigating partner interests that may not align with academic 
science designed to serve a greater society 
- The need to publish findings for personal (tenure and promotion) 
and scientific reasons 
- Participating in interdisciplinary and international approaches to 
address complex issues 
(Korsmo & Graham, 
2002; Kraft Sloan & 
Hik, 2007; Gearhead & 
Shirley, 2007; Tondu, 
Balasubramaniam et al., 
2014; Mallory, Gilchrist 
et al., 2018) 
 
Future Directions  
Ultimately, there is a need for the actors involved in Canada’s northern research governance system 
(e.g. academics, northern communities, funding agencies, government departments, licencing 
bodies, universities and northern research institutes) to design ‘path-breaking’ policies that 
facilitate coordination and communication across the system to help minimize associated 
transaction costs. Attempts to better manage the impacts of research-related transaction costs in 
non-northern contexts have so far focused on the importance of knowledge brokers and boundary 
organizations, which could be further explored in northern contexts (Kowalski & Jenkins, 2015). 
A more systematic and coordinated approach to northern research governance could build on 
existing Canadian bridging efforts, such as the territorial “pan-northern” approach to science 
policy (Government of Yukon, 2016), the ArcticNet Network of Centres of Excellence (ArcticNet, 
2017), Polar Knowledge Canada (Government of Canada, 2017), and Canada’s participation in the 
Arctic Council. Future studies could, for example, examine how the policies that shape the science-
policy-community interface in northern Canada might become more integrated, complementary 
and effective in achieving desired collective outcomes. An improved understanding of the nature 
of transactions (e.g. uncertainty, frequency, specificity) (Croisier, 1998) as well as the formal and 
informal dimensions of transaction costs (Landry & Amara, 1998) is also needed to more fully 
understand the diverse transaction costs associated with northern research. Building on previous 
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studies on research-related transaction costs conducted in non-northern collaborative 
environments, we can identify a number of themes and associated propositions that may act as 
useful starting points for further policy reflection, examination and experimentation in the 
northern research policy context, summarized below.  
• Theme 1: Opportunism:  
o Proposition: In larger institutional arrangements, research actors will be more likely 
to engage in opportunistic behaviour (i.e. secure more resources for themselves) 
(Landry & Amara, 1998);  
• Theme 2: Acquaintance:  
o Proposition: Transactions where actors are amicably acquainted (i.e. have higher 
levels of trust) will diminish the probability of opportunism and reduce the need 
for monitoring (Putnam, 1993; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Boardman & 
Bozeman, 2006); 
• Theme 3: Incentives:  
o Proposition: Extrinsic institutional reward structures designed to incentivize 
collaboration (e.g. resource sharing, co-learning) will be confounded by intrinsic 
individual reward incentives (e.g. personal motivations) (Boardman & Bozeman, 
2006); 
o Proposition: In more formal institutional arrangements, research actors will be less 
likely to fully engage in collaboration due to the potential for reduced returns or 
‘shrinking costs’ (Sinnewe, Charles et al., 2016); 
• Theme 4: Research Stage:  
o Proposition: Collaborative transactions that occur earlier in the research process are 
more likely to foster equitable participation (versus sub-contacting) (Croisier, 
1998);  
o Proposition: The adaptive capacity of an institutional arrangement will become more 
valuable, the longer the duration of the collaboration because of increasing 
probability that research actors will need to renegotiate their arrangements 
(Croisier, 1998); 
•  Theme 5: Collaborators:  
o Proposition: The greater the heterogeneity among research actors, the more likely 
that institutional arrangements will be formal and hierarchical (Boardman & 
Bozeman, 2006);  
o Proposition: The larger the number of partners, the more difficult it will be for 
research actors to distribute tasks and control efforts (Croisier, 1998; Boardman 
& Bozeman, 2006); 
• Theme 6: Geography:  
o Proposition: The larger the geographical scope of transactions, the more difficult it 
will be for research actors to coordinate tasks and control efforts (Boardman & 
Bozeman, 2006); 
• Theme 7: Governance & Change: 
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o Proposition: When the distribution of transaction costs become too expensive 
and/or unbearable research governance will make adjustments (Croisier, 1998; 
Landry & Amara, 1998; Widmark & Sandstrom, 2012); and 
o Proposition: A better understanding of the different transaction costs incurred by 
research actors will improve the ability to predict and promote effective long-term 
research relationships (Sinnewe, Charles et al., 2016). 
These themes and propositions provide a variety of potential research paths that may inform the 
development of revised institutional arrangements capable of more strategically managing 
transaction costs in the northern research system. A more deliberate, multi-dimensional and shared 
understanding of the various transaction costs associated with northern scientific research and the 
implications of these costs for collective research policy outcomes is needed. Such an 
understanding has the potential to usefully inform efforts of different actors to disrupt the status 
quo of northern research governance while also helping to realise more effective, systemic and 
reflexive northern research policy. 
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Notes 
1. Sources for financial estimates: 
ArcticNet: http://www.nce-rce.gc.ca/_docs/reports/NCEReport-2015-
RaportRCE_eng.pdf 
 
Arctic Research Infrastructure Fund: http://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100037415/1100100037416 
 
Canadian High Arctic Research Station: 
https://www.canada.ca/content/canadasite/en/polar-knowledge/CHARScampus.html 
Institut nordique du Québec: https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/the-
governments-of-canada-and-quebec-support-the-sustainable-and-ethical-development-
of-the-north-691110821.html 
 
International Polar Year: http://www.api-ipy.gc.ca/pg_IPYAPI_008-
eng.html#q1.1http://www.api-ipy.gc.ca/pg_IPYAPI_008-eng.html#q1.1 
 
Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC) Awards 
Database: http://www.nserc-crsng.gc.ca/ase-oro/index_eng.asp 
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Polar Continental Shelf Program: 
http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/evaluation/reports/2012/796 
Sentinelle Nord: https://www.ulaval.ca/fileadmin/ulaval_ca/Documents/sentinelle-
nord/Sentinel_North_-_21_research_sub-projects.pdf 
2. Institutions are the ‘rules of game’ and can include formal or informal customs, norms, 
standards, policies and laws. 
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Briefing Note 
 
On the Link between Climate Change and Forced 
Migration: The Impact of Climate Change in the 
Arctic and Global South 
An Analysis in the Context of Bangladesh 
 
Afroja Khanam 
 
Introduction 
Finland is now the Chair of the Arctic Council for the 2017–2019 period and aiming to highlight 
the Paris Agreement within Arctic cooperation on climate change and the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). During its chairmanship, Finland takes up a broad range of issue 
areas encompassing climate change mitigation and adaptation as well as sustainable development. 
There are certain priority areas of concentration: environmental protection, meteorological 
cooperation, connectivity and education (Finland MFA, 2017). In short, climate change stands out 
as the main focus –  it is a global phenomenon and its impacts are visible everywhere, including 
the Arctic and also in the Global South. According to many researchers, climate change brings a 
lot of challenges in the Arctic, with various environmental impacts and implications to people’s 
livelihoods and economic activities such as forestry, fishing and reindeer herding (AACA, 2017). 
At the same time, climate change also has its adverse effect on the Global South. Most of the low-
lying countries are vulnerable due to the impacts of climate change. Bangladesh, as a country that 
is already vulnerable to and affected every year by many different types of environmental disasters, 
is particularly exposed to climate change and accompanying societal security threats. According to 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2012 report, Bangladesh is among the 
countries estimated to lose the largest amount of cultivated land due to environmental and climate 
changes (IPCC, 2012). Another data shows that 30 million people are expected to be displaced 
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due to Bangladesh losing 17% of its land if global sea levels rise by one metre. While the Arctic 
has some connections with South Asia and South-East Asia, as China, India and Singapore have 
become Observer states in the Arctic Council, Bangladesh is not among the Observer states 
although it is one of the most vulnerable countries with regards to global warming. 
I have lived in Rovaniemi for a few years now, observing discussions on Arctic governance and in 
particular on climate change in the Arctic. What strikes me as an outside observer is that these 
debates are often disconnected from the broader global context. While there is increasingly more 
emphasis on the “global Arctic”, the Arctic remains to a great extent discursively isolated in terms 
of governance, politics and pondering about its future. My aim in this commentary is to highlight 
the global context that, I believe, may prove crucial for the long term trajectories of human 
development in the Circumpolar North. I use Bangladesh as an example as this is the context that 
I am the most familiar with. Against this backdrop, this Briefing Note analyses, firstly, how climate 
change is affecting the Global South; here exemplified with the case of Bangladesh. Secondly, it 
analyses how climate change is contributing to increasing levels of forced migration. Discussing in 
greater detail the predicament of climate migrants in Bangladesh will also serve to highlight the 
critical human dimension to the discussion in this briefing note. Thirdly, it explains why and how 
more integrated and combined policy/action is required in order to combat these problems along 
with the existing policies. 
The Context of Bangladesh 
Geographically, Bangladesh is one of the  
environmental-disaster-prone countries in South 
Asia. Currently, its total population is almost 186 
million (World Population Review, 2017). The 
coastal divisions, such as Barisal, Khulna and 
Chittagong,  are the most vulnerable parts of the 
country with regard to cyclonic flood and storm 
surge due to its location (Karim & Mimura, 2008). 
The coastal areas, which are less protected low-
lying lands, are highly populated. Every year, 
Bangladesh experiences several tropical cyclones, 
storm surges, coastal erosion, floods and droughts 
which cause loss of thousands of lives and 
significant damage to property. Due to its 
geographical location, most of the climatic events 
that the country faces, such as cyclones and 
storms, originate from the South; from the Bay of 
Bengal and the adjacent North Indian Ocean (A. 
Ali, 2004). All environmental disasters in 
Bangladesh are complicated due to its large 
population and high density of people living in the 
affected areas. The country suffers from many 
serious problems, such as shortage of land to 
Figure 1: Map of Bangladesh (Rangpur and Sylhet 
divisions are not indicated in this map). Source: The 
United Nations, 2004 
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accommodate its population, shortage of food, lack of clean drinking water, high level of illiteracy, 
and so on (A. Ali, 2004; Karim & Mimura, 2008). On top of that, Bangladesh is now predicted as 
one of the most vulnerable countries due to climate change and its impacts (Asaduzzaman, 2016; 
IPCC, 2012). As the country is facing more storm surges than ever before, the number of deaths 
resulting  from natural disasters is continuously growing (A. Ali, 1999;  A. Ali, 2004; Asaduzzaman, 
2016). According to data which is modified from A. Ali (1999), approximately 31,279 people died 
in 1965 (11 May and 31 May);  500,000 people in 1970; 11,069 people in 1985; 5,708 people in 
1988; and 138,000 people in 1991 due to natural disasters in Bangladesh. These high numbers of 
causalities, reaching hundreds of thousands during major cyclones and storms over the last 50 
years, paint a clear picture of intensity and severity of these events. Therefore, these numbers 
provide a clear picture of the intensity and severity of cyclones and storms. They also result in 
enormous economic impacts through infrastructural damage that affects livelihoods (MoEF, 
2008). Therefore, many places in Bangladesh face large scale population displacement, which can 
be defined as environmentally forced migration (Siddiqui, 2003; Siddiqui, 2012). 
Figure 2: The Coastal Part of Bangladesh 
 
Source: beahrselp.berkeley.edu 
 
As already mentioned, due to the global warming the Arctic would be contributing significantly to 
sea-level rise. According to the AMAP assessment (2017), if the greenhouse gas emissions continue 
at current rates, the sea-level would rise by 25 centimetres between 2006 and 2100, which means 
that many low lying countries would become submerged. The increased emissions of greenhouse 
gases are extensively contributing to changes to the Arctic’s sensitive climate. Moreover, the yearly 
updated data shows that it becomes evidently clear that the Arctic environment, familiar for 
previous generations, is being replaced by a warmer, wetter, and more inconstant environment. All 
these transformations have extremely serious impacts on people, resources and ecosystems 
globally (AMAP, 2017). It is adversely affecting also the Global South including Bangladesh as one 
of the low-lying countries.  
As an impact of these catastrophes, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) has 
increased dramatically during the past two decades in many South Asian Countries. Consequently, 
these countries have witnessed a rapid growth in the number of slums and shanty towns. These 
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developments concern also Bangladesh, where a growing number of people are becoming 
displaced due to climate change related triggers and causes, such as floods, storm surges, riverbank 
erosion, sea level rise, high temperatures, lack of drinkable water, increasing salinity of land, and 
changes in cultivation patterns (Goodbred et al., 2012; International Organization for Migration 
(IOM), 2010). According to a study conducted by Refugee and Migratory Movements Research 
Unit (RMMRU) and the Sussex Centre for Migration Research, over 16 million people in 
Bangladesh will become internally displaced due to climate change induced natural catastrophes 
by the year 2050 (Siddiqui & Mahmood, 2015). 
In Bangladesh, millions of people have moved to the capital city Dhaka from other parts of the 
country due to various reasons, such as displacement caused by river erosion, natural disasters and 
development projects, poverty and loss of livelihoods – or a combination of these and other 
factors. Dhaka, a megacity with over 16 million residents, continues to expand rapidly. According 
to the World Bank, already half of the population of Dhaka lives in slums. Between 1996 and 2005, 
the number of slum dwellers more than doubled from 1.5 to 3.4 million (Islam, 2006). 
Many of these people can be considered either climate migrants or climate refugees (Goodbred et 
al., 2012; Walsham, 2010), and their situation remains dire and requiring urgent response at national 
and international levels. Currently, most climate refugees migrate internally within their home 
countries, but it has been estimated that in the future millions of Bangladeshi people affected by 
climate change will migrate also abroad (Siddiqui & Mahmood, 2015). As climate change induced 
displacement will also lead to international impacts beyond Bangladesh, including Europe and the 
Arctic region, it is necessary to address it as a phenomenon on a global level. To be able to address 
and tackle various social, political, economic and environmental problems from a broader and 
collective perspective, a holistic and nuanced understanding of climate change related displacement 
must be developed. Where the aim is to create common strategies, integrated policies and practical 
solutions for combatting climate change-related complex challenges, it is of utmost importance to 
combine knowledge and expertise from the countries of the Global South, such as Bangladesh, 
and the countries of the Arctic region. It is necessary to place our climate change actions at national 
and regional levels within a global and trans-regional context, rather than narrow down policy 
deliberations to one region and its specific challenges, excluding the grave developments taking 
place elsewhere. 
At the same time, addressing serious social problems and injustices caused by climate change 
induced displacement locally in the Global South becomes also more important. Several studies 
have shown that despite the United Nation’s Guiding Principles on internal displacement, when 
marginalized and poor people are displaced, they are not usually offered compensation or 
resettlement. In shanty towns, displaced people confront serious problems, such as lack of food, 
water, shelter, healthcare and education, as well as unemployment and police repression. Many 
studies have shown that women are more vulnerable to climate changes and its impact on their 
health, psychology and security (Bunce, Ford, Harper, Edge, & IHACC Research Team, 2016; 
Hossain & Punam, 2016; Sultana, 2014). In camps and resettlement colonies, women also often 
face gender-based violence and sexual abuse, and are in high risk of being trafficked (Basu, 2011; 
Ghimire, 2011). In this way, their human rights are being constantly violated (Hossain & Punam, 
2016). Moreover, many IDPs living in slums are under the constant threat of being displaced again 
as slums are often evicted due to the continuously rising value of land in metropolitan cities (Jha, 
Arctic Yearbook 2018 
Khanam 
504 
2011). The effects are far greater than material impacts: displacement always represents “a wider 
loss of cultural autonomy, knowledge and power” (Baviskar, 2004; Chatterjee, 2004). 
Besides the everyday struggles described above, internally displaced people and  migrants are often 
exposed to political violence and dependence on a given political party (Suykens & Islam, 2013; 
Suykens, 2015; Suykens & Islam, 2015). A recent research shows that the level of political violence 
in Bangladesh has increased drastically from 2002 to 2013 in Bangladesh. In 2002, the total number 
of events including political violence was 668, whereas it was 14,187 in 2013 (Suykens & Islam, 
2015). 
The Global Arctic, the Global South and Climate Change 
There is no immediate solution to climate change. As climate change and its impacts have taken a 
long time to become more visible, the processes of combatting them will also require time. For 
this to happen, a trans-regional approach is required to take action effectively. The time has now 
come to combine actions taken in the Arctic and in the Global South. In order to combat climate 
change and prevent forced migration at least the following steps can be taken: 
• There should be a common working ground at the trans-regional or inter-regional level. Also, 
policies and approaches should be adapted trans-regionally or inter-regionally. The pattern 
should be multidisciplinary and multi-level. If the regions can take into account the situation 
in the other parts of the world then it would be more effective and timely.  
• Traditional knowledge could be useful in this regard. It must include Indigenous knowledge 
including traditional knowledge from the Arctic region and Indigenous knowledge from the 
Global South.  
• Access to updated knowledge is a must for this purpose. There is a huge gap of information 
between the Arctic and the South. Informing and updating the present state of climate change 
and its possible impacts would make others aware of the situation. When people from the 
Global South and Global North would have better understanding regarding the situation, they 
would realize the urgency of the issue. Thus, it will be helpful to generate new ideas for the 
purpose of mitigation. 
• Adaptation would be helpful to reduce the impact. Adaptation strategies should be developed 
and implemented both individually and jointly. Vulnerability assessments should be conducted 
from different viewpoints and by building on knowledge and perspectives from multiple 
disciplines. This requires an integrated approach.  From the perspective of climate justice it 
can be considered unfair while Bangladesh is a minimal contributor to the greenhouse gas 
emissions which result in global climate change, it is among the countries that suffer the most 
from the effects of climate change (see Ali, 2004). When compared to the Arctic Countries, 
the difference is that while they also suffer from effects of climate change, they are, at the same 
time, among the biggest emitters. 
Finally, the Arctic Council or other Arctic regional forums should develop enhanced governance 
systems and mechanisms. They should be rather inclusive and comprehensive and bring also the 
concerns of non-Arctic regions to the discussions taking place in the Arctic forums. Currently, 
Arctic regions are closely connected between themselves through various platforms. From the 
perspective of the Global South the problem is that the existing platforms such as the Arctic 
Council are very focused on the region itself, and not enough attention is paid to policies that 
Arctic Yearbook 2018 
 
 
The Impact of Climate Change in the Arctic and Global South 
505 
would take into account other parts of the world. Broadening the scope is crucial but may prove 
to be challenging as it seems to be difficult to adopt even a coherent Arctic policy, as the ongoing 
debates demonstrate.  
The same is true of the Arctic policies of such polities as the European Union. According to some 
research, there is no coherent policy for the Arctic region itself; including in the economic and 
political sectors (Stepien, 2014; Stepien & Raspotnik, 2015). This shows that it is very difficult to 
adopt and implement an integrated policy. Nevertheless, there should be some platforms or 
organizations that would address these issues also from the perspective of the Global South and 
link them with the Arctic region. The aim should be to develop an overarching policy that 
comprehensively addresses the whole spectrum of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 
links both regions together, which would help to combat and mitigate the adverse effects of climate 
change collectively. This is a complex question and it requires political will. However, without 
collaboration between the Arctic region and countries of the Global South, it will be impossible 
to address challenges related to climate change and its impacts more effectively, including the 
ongoing and rapidly increasing phenomenon of climate change-induced forced migration. 
Conclusion 
This Briefing Note addresses climate change in general with climate refugees from the Global 
South; more specifically from Bangladesh. Due to the ongoing ‘refugee crisis’; forced migration 
has become an object of wide attention and public debate in Europe. At the same time, there 
seems to be a certain blindness to forced migration that takes place outside the borders of Europe. 
In Bangladesh, for example, millions of people are forced to migrate from rural areas to urban 
slums. While increasingly many of these ‘climate refugees’ migrate abroad, the country receives 
also a growing number of refugees itself. For example, during the last few years, over 300,000 
Rohingyas have escaped ethnic cleansing in Myanmar and crossed the border to Bangladesh. It is 
high time for the Arctic region and Arctic governance related institutions, along with the EU, to 
develop a strong and common framework. If climate change is not tackled now comprehensively 
and collectively, the number of people migrating from Bangladesh and other countries will 
continue to grow substantially. Then, the question is, whether the Arctic countries are ready to 
accept more climate refugees in the future? 
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Bridging Policy, Research and Lived 
Experience  
 
Malgorzata (Gosia) Smieszek, Tahnee Prior & Olivia Matthews 
  
 
The Idea  
On September 6th and 7th, 2018 the University of Helsinki hosted Women of the Arctic: Bridging Policy, 
Research and Lived Experience, a side event of the UArctic Congress 2018. Building on ongoing efforts 
to better understand gender in the Arctic, Women of the Arctic sought to bring conversations about 
women’s and gender issues outside of research circles and to carve out a non-academic space for 
women and girls who work on or live in the Arctic. More specifically, its aim was to explore the 
roles and contributions of women to northern policy-making, research, exploration, art, activism, 
and daily life in a form of dialogue between invited guests and with active involvement of the 
audience. 
The idea behind Women of the Arctic grew out of a conversation between Tahnee Prior, a Pierre 
Elliott Trudeau Foundation Scholar and PhD candidate at the University of Waterloo and 
Malgorzata (Gosia) Smieszek, a researcher at the Arctic Centre, University of Lapland, and their 
realization that, amidst a steadily growing number of Arctic venues, initiatives focusing specifically 
on Arctic women – the successes they achieve and the challenges they face – remain few and far 
between. Moreover, the equal representation of women on Arctic conference panels is still far 
from standard with women’s perspectives often missing from debates, despite women’s critical 
role in their communities, their societal and political engagement, and their high levels of expertise 
and credentials. Women of the Arctic sought to address this issue, fill this critical gap and reach beyond 
the academic sphere to illuminate the stories and perspectives of a broad range of women from 
Arctic and non-Arctic countries, both of Indigenous and non-Indigenous origin. Ultimately, the 
Arctic Yearbook 2018   
Women of the Arctic 
509 
objective was and is to create an awareness of, and promote a continued focus on, issues relating 
to northern women and non-Arctic women who engage with polar realities. 
The Event  
The event opened on September 6th at the evening reception of the UArctic Congress with the 
performance of a play, Whale Song. With a keen desire to bring together art and science as a part of 
a large-scale academic event, like the UArctic Congress, Women of the Arctic partnered with the 
Arctic Cycle, a New York-based arts organization that uses theatre to foster dialogue about global 
climate crisis, to create an empowering vision of the future, and to encourage people to take action. 
Whale Song, a one-woman 15-minute play written by Chantal Bilodeau, the Arctic Cycle’s program 
director, tells the story of women’s suffering and strength when faced with the adverse effects of 
climate change and gender-based violence; both issues are still rarely brought to the forefront of 
debates about the Arctic. 
On September 7th, Women of the Arctic was opened with a speech by Finland’s State Secretary and 
forthcoming Secretary General of the Nordic Council of Ministers, Paula Lehtomäki, followed by 
a series of panels focusing on three major topics: northern women in leadership roles; women in 
Arctic science and exploration; and the role of arts in healing from systemic and gender-based 
violence in northern communities. 
The first panel, “Northern Women at the Table: From Community to Business Leaders” drew on 
the experiences of women politicians, entrepreneurs, and civil society leaders to better understand 
their roles and examine how to prepare the next generation of women leaders. Among the speakers 
were Finland’s former Minister of Gender and Ombudsperson for Minorities, Eva Biaudet, the 
speaker of the Sami Parliament of the Kola Peninsula and director of the Kola Saami Radio, 
Valentina Sovkina, and Kjersti Busch, a co-founder and CEO of SALT, a knowledge-based 
company from Lofoten, joined by Secretary Lehtomäki. Together, they discussed issues pertaining 
to gender inequality where even the Nordic countries, which often rank among the top in the 
world in this regard, did not reach yet equal representation in public offices. The speakers also 
explored the reasons behind the significantly low number of women entrepreneurs and investors, 
as well as disparities when it comes to raising and conditioning boys and girls in a manner that 
ultimately influences the life trajectories they choose. In addition to focusing on education and the 
responsibility of raising the next generation to take on equal work and caregiving roles, panelists 
spoke about the challenges of advancing work-life balance when caregiving and domestic duties 
often default to women – a commonality spanning from the northernmost communities to the 
highest-level political offices in the capitals. All panelists agreed that women bring distinct qualities 
to leadership, which is oftentimes more focused on communal benefits and shared advantages, 
rather than personal career advancement and development. In words of Kjersti Busch, being a 
leader is a privilege and as Valentina Sovkina noted women’s softness is their strength, which 
should be cherished and valued.  
Building on this momentum, the second panel on “Women in Arctic Science and Exploration” 
focused on traditional and Indigenous knowledge, as well as Western science, to explore how 
policy, education, international collaboration and mentoring can support women’s scientific 
careers and promote greater diversity in polar science. The speakers on the panel represented a 
great diversity of backgrounds and roles in Arctic science and education. Among them were Susan 
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R. Eaton, the founder of Sedna Epic Expeditions which brings all-female snorkeling crews to the 
Arctic to document the effects of climate change, empower local and Indigenous communities, 
young girls and women in particular, and engage youth in experiential learning; Renuka Badhe, the 
Executive Secretary of the European Polar Board; Karen Barnes; the President and Vice-
Chancellor of Yukon College, Canada; Gunn-Britt Retter, the head of the Arctic & Environment 
Unit of the Sami Council and the long-term representative of the Sami Council at the Arctic 
Council; Marina Kalinina, the Rector’s Advisor for International Collaboration at the Northern 
Arctic Federal University (NArFU) in Russia; and Ylva Sjöberg, a permafrost researcher at the 
University of Stockholm and member of the Association of Polar Early Career Scientists (APECS). 
Together they spoke of the role and position of women in Arctic science and research and how 
there has been a visible shift in the management structures of many polar organizations over the 
last 20 years, with more women hired in these positions. However, this change is not pervasive; in 
many Arctic countries, a low number of colleges and universities are run by women who have 
advanced little in their roles over the past decades. Panelists also gave significant attention to the 
broader role of diversity in science and exploration, beyond gender equality.  They stressed that 
diversity should be taken on as a full package beyond the gender binary to include the race, age, 
and sexual orientation of Arctic researchers, educators, and managers. “Women explore the planet 
differently than men,” said Susan R. Eaton, “…the sense of place, where they are. Women seek to 
understand the place they are exploring through the people that live in that place.” Yet, in order 
to become scientists and explorers, women must often face the expectations placed on them by 
others, like traditional roles, and by themselves, such as high or unrealistic expectations which can 
impede their development and cast doubt over their own potential. “It’s very important to create 
opportunity for youth so they can make a choice. It is the opportunities they have that give them 
better choice,” noted Marina Kalinina. The speakers agreed that collaboration among women 
fosters a sense of solidarity and common purpose which often prevails over competition. What is 
more, women role models and mentors can be immensely powerful for future generations. “We 
need to keep up with the younger ones. Rather than be protective, [we need to] guide them, be 
role models and help them get further than we ever got”, concluded Gunn-Britt Retter. 
The third and final panel on “Grappling with ‘Uncomfortable’ Conversations: From Past Traumas 
to Future Generations” examined some of the causes of, and solutions to, systemic and gender-
based violence in northern communities and industries which disproportionately impact the lives 
of northern women and children. A special focus was given to the role that art can play in 
unpacking and healing individual and collective trauma. The speakers included Michelle Demmert, 
the Law and Policy Consultant of the Alaska Native Women’s Resource Center and Chief Justice 
of the Central Council Tlingit and Haida Indian Tribes of Alaska; Sighthrudur Gudmundsdottir, 
Director of Kvennaathvarf, Iceland’s first and only women’s shelter; Liisa Holmberg, the Rector 
of the Sami Education Institute and Director of the International Sami Film Institute; and 
Katarzyna Pastuszak, the Artistic Director of Amareya Theatre who collaborated with Louise 
Fontain on “Nomadic Woman”, which tells the story of her deportation as a child from Greenland 
to Denmark. Instead of solely breaking down the statistics on violence in Arctic communities, 
panelists shared tangible stories, real challenges and successes from their experiences. Over the 
course of their panel, speakers were able to create a safe space for often-silenced conversations, 
sharing their experiences of intergenerational trauma in northern communities, at the hands of the 
state and local communities alike. Woven throughout their insights was a focus on art - film, 
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theatre, and other forms of storytelling – as it is used in their daily work. “I can do nothing with 
what they did with us as children [referencing deportation and abuse],” Louise Fontain reflected, 
“but I can tell my story – my whole story – not about the shame, or about the loss of language. I 
can tell the whole story of who I am.” Katarzyna Pastuszak, Fontain’s collaborator, added, “when 
we [performed our theatre piece, “Nomadic Woman”, in] Greenland, the place where Louise was 
born...she spoke about her story…and most of the young generation knew nothing about this...that 
it took place for many years. [When we performed in Nuuk], we had a group of elderly women 
who sat with us after the performance and telling their stories of deportation. Which means that, 
depending on what audience or witness you get for this storytelling, (…) the tool brings different 
results.” Both Sightrudur Gudmundsdottir and Michelle Demmert reflected on how their work in 
service provision and the law engages with the arts to teach children to identify violence and to 
inspire legal change, respectively. Despite a focus on pain and shame, the panelists ultimately drew 
attention to the strength that comes from understanding. As Michelle Demmert poignantly noted, 
“It is so powerful for people to realize they are not the only one and that there is hope.”  
The event came to an end with the closing session of the UArctic Congress, where former 
President of Finland, Tarja Halonen, an active spokesperson on issues of gender and girls’ and 
women’s rights, spoke about the essential role of gender equality in achieving the Sustainable 
Development Goals. “Women are critical agents of change in their communities. Without women 
and girls, we can’t be successful.” 
Moving Forward 
To maintain a long-term focus on women in the Arctic, organizers partnered with creative 
communications collective What Took You So Long to document the event, as well as to interview 
some speakers and participants about their professional and personal stories. Collected materials 
will be hosted on a digital storytelling platform, at www.genderisnotplanb.com. The organizers are 
now exploring the possibility of hosting future events in various Arctic and non-Arctic locations, 
in collaboration with existing groups and networks interested in issues relating to women and 
gender in the Arctic.  
The event was funded by NordForsk and supported by the University of the Arctic and the 
University of Helsinki. 
For more information about “Women of the Arctic” please visit www.genderisnotplanb.com and 
follow along on Twitter and Instagram at @PlanArctic. 
Join Us 
Do you live in, work on, or engage with the Arctic? Help us give a fuller picture of the 
#WomenoftheArctic! Send us your photo at info@genderisnotplanb.com and we will add it to the 
mosaic of Women of the Arctic on our website. Please feel free to share it with your Arctic colleagues 
and collaborators.   
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Briefing Note 
 
Less EU in the Arctic Region After 2020 
 
Stefan Brocza & Andreas Brocza 
 
 
 
With three EU Member States (Denmark, Sweden, Finland) and an additional two European 
Economic Area members (Norway and Iceland) being Arctic states, the EU has a strategic interest 
in the Arctic remaining a low-tension area, with ongoing cooperation ensured by the Arctic 
Council, a well-functioning legal framework, and solid political and security cooperation. 
Therefore the EU tends to contribute to this through enhanced work on climate action and 
environmental research, sustainable development, telecommunications, and search and rescue, as 
well as concrete cooperation with Arctic states, institutions, Indigenous peoples and local 
communities. 
For quite a long period, the EU provided a significant amount of funding through various 
initiatives to Indigenous peoples and local populations in the Arctic region. Funding programmes 
during the 2007-2013 co-financing period amounted to 1.14 billion EUR, or 1.98 billion EUR 
including the co-financing of EU Member States. Over 1 billion EUR from the European 
Structural and Investment Funds will be invested in the area over the current 2014-2020 financing 
period in strategic fields such as research and innovation, support to small businesses and clean 
energy. 
Serious Change After 2020 
However, this will change seriously with the next EU financial period starting in 2021. From 2021 
on, the EU will have to reduce and focus its financial engagements in external relations for a variety 
of reasons: 
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Brexit 
Following the decision of the United Kingdom to withdraw from the EU, its contribution to the 
EU budget – currently around 15 percent of the total budget – will end. Since there is no realistic 
scenario that the remaining Member States could take over this amount, the total available budget 
for the EU will be remarkably reduced from 2021 on. Even when the current proposal from the 
EU Commission increases the EU budget for the period 2021-2027, at the end the final amount 
has to be agreed between all (at this time) 27 Member States and the European Parliament. Already 
now several Member States indicated that they are not willing to pay more into the EU budget. 
With a view to the current Brexit negotiations, there could be another budget relevant irritation: 
If the British withdraw from the EU ends in a “hard Brexit” (e.g. without an agreement before 29 
March 2019), the envisaged financial remunerations and paybacks from the United Kingdom in 
the EU budget – for the moment discussions over an amount of 60 billion EUR are ongoing – 
would not be done. 
Greenland 
For the moment Greenland is one of the EU Overseas Territories and Countries (OCT) and 
therefore eligible for funding from the EU’s general budget through the EU-Greenland 
Partnership. For the current financial period 2014-2020 an overall amount of 217.8 million EUR 
is foreseen for the cooperation with Greenland. Education, vocational training and post-
elementary school systems have been chosen as the concentration sectors for cooperation between 
the EU and Greenland for the period 2014-2020. In addition, in 2015 an ‘umbrella’ framework 
document for the post-2013 EU-Greenland relations, a Joint Declaration on relations between the 
European Union, on the one hand, and the Government of Greenland and the Government of 
Denmark, on the other, has been signed. By this legally and financially non-binding document the 
EU confirms its long lasting links between with Greenland and reiterates the geostrategic 
importance of Greenland for the EU.  
The new proposal for an EU Council Decision on the Association of the Overseas Countries and 
Territories with the European Union including relations between the European Union on the one 
hand, and Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark on the other (so called “Overseas Association 
Decision”) comes in the context of the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework proposal 
from the EU Commission. It focuses on consistency with existing policy provisions in the policy 
area.  
The mid-term review report (December 2017) on 10 EU external financing instruments, including 
the Greenland Decision and the 11th European Development Fund (EDF), which includes 
programming for the other OCTs, concluded that the external financing instruments were ‘fit for 
purpose’. However, both the report and the consultations conducted highlighted the need for 
increased flexibility, simplification, coherence and performance. This has led to a proposal for a 
future Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument, which will draw 
on lessons learned to help streamline the Union’s external action architecture. 
The Overseas Association Decision and the Greenland Decision cannot be included in the new 
Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument or in any other legal act 
subject to ordinary legislative procedure. This is because they both have a specific adoption 
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procedure: an EU Council Decision by unanimity, following consultation of the European 
Parliament.  
However, to streamline the number of programmes it is proposed that both Decisions be merged 
into a single Decision regrouping all OCTs, including Greenland. 
When Greenland decides to become totally independent from Denmark, the current privileged 
status as an OCT ends automatically. An independent Greenland would mean that Denmark is no 
longer a member of the Arctic Council. The EU would lose one of its members in the Arctic 
Council and the only EU member in the group of the Arctic Five. 
Iceland 
Iceland applied for EU membership in July 2009. The EU Commission issued a favourable opinion 
in February 2010, and the EU Council decided in June 2010 that accession negotiations would be 
opened. After a new government took over in May 2013, Iceland put the accession negotiations 
on hold. At the time of this decision 27 of the negotiating chapters had been opened, of which 11 
were provisionally closed. In March 2015 Iceland’s government requested that “Iceland should 
not be regarded as a candidate country for EU membership”. 
However, Iceland is highly integrated with the EU through membership in the European 
Economic Area (EEA), the Schengen Area and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). It 
is also a signatory of the Dublin regulation on asylum policy and a partner in the EU’s Northern 
Dimension policy to promote cooperation in Northern Europe. 
Through the EEA Iceland participates in the single market and contributes financially towards 
social and economic cohesion in Europe. A significant proportion of the EU’s laws are applied in 
Iceland today. Iceland also participates, albeit with no voting rights, in a number of EU agencies 
and programmes, covering areas including enterprise, environment, education and research. 
Iceland has a bilateral Free Trade Agreement with the EEC since 1972. Two thirds of Iceland’s 
foreign trade is with EU Member States. 
With a view to the Arctic engagement of the EU, the withdrawial of Iceland’s request for EU 
accession weakens the EU position. Iceland becoming an EU Member would have increased the 
number of EU states in the Arctic Council. 
New External Priorities 
Finally, the EU is currently reorganizing its external priorities. A strong focus will be laid to the so 
called “close neighbourhood” in Eastern Europe and northern Africa. The growing security 
interest of the EU in these areas will call for additional funding. 
The current proposal for the EU Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027 sets the main 
priorities and overall budgetary framework for EU external action programmes under the heading 
‘Neighbourhood and the World’, including the establishment of the so-called Neighbourhood, 
Development and International Cooperation Instrument. The objective of the Neighbourhood, 
Development and International Cooperation Instrument is to uphold and promote the Union’s 
values and interests worldwide in order to pursue the objectives and principles of its external 
action. The proposal provides for a date of application as of 1 January 2021 and is presented for a 
Union of 27 Member States, in line with the notification by the United Kingdom of its intention 
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to withdraw from the European Union and Euratom based on Article 50 of the Treaty on 
European Union received by the European Council on 29 March 2017. 
Each regional envelope under the new instrument will be adapted to the needs and priorities of 
the regions in question, which reflect the EU’s strategic priorities, notably in the EU’s 
neighbourhood and Africa. Within the 75 page document the Arctic is only mentioned once: in 
footnote 17 as an inter alia example for “other policy documents”. Already this indicates that the 
Arctic region will not be high ranked within the new external priorities of the EU in the period 
2021-2027. 
Conclusion 
For the moment it is unclear how the envisaged new external priorities will be framed and to what 
extent they are going to change the EU financial framework of the post-2020 EU budgets. Already, 
the Arctic topic is unlikely to be anywhere close to the top of the agenda for the EU in the coming 
years. In summary, from 2021 onwards it is expected that the EU will have less financial funding 
available and will strengthen its external engagements in regions of the world other than the Arctic. 
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Briefing Note 
Travelling with the Calotte Academy, June 2018 
 
Peter Kujawinski 
 
 
In Summer, the Rovaniemi airport feels empty, as if off-season is in full effect. To me this seemed 
strange because after all, Summer is historically considered the best time to visit Lapland. The 
temperature is comfortable, it is light almost all the time, and the forests and fields are in bloom.  
But now that Rovaniemi is the “official hometown of Santa Claus,” I guess it shouldn’t be 
surprising that the area seems so empty during the most pleasant time of the year.  It underscores 
how the Arctic works in rhythms that are often counterintuitive. 
I was in Rovaniemi to join the Calotte Academy, a traveling symposium of academic researchers 
that takes a bus ride through northern Europe to discover the Arctic in all of its complexity.  My 
own journey to Rovaniemi began in the Canadian Arctic, where I had worked both as an American 
diplomat and later as a freelance journalist. In North America, the Arctic is sparsely populated and 
remote. This makes it difficult to get to, and the challenges people face while living up there are 
similar to the challenges anyone would face in areas that are difficult to access. The cost of living 
is very high and getting anywhere is a challenge. Therefore the Canadian and US Arctic have a high 
profile mainly because of the myths of living in a place so far north – not because of any lived 
reality.   
My time with the Calotte Academy demonstrated that the European experience of the Arctic is 
quite different. First, of course, is the fact that the European Arctic isn’t as cold as the North 
American Arctic. As we drove through the beautiful forests of Lapland, I noticed a mix of 
hardwood, deciduous trees and pines.  It could’ve been the forests of the north-central United 
States – of Minnesota, Wisconsin and Michigan.  For example, here is a snapshot of late evening 
near Inari, where we stayed on the grounds of a wonderful conference center.  
As we drove through northern Finland, the topography remained similar, though those of us from 
North America were constantly surprised at how developed the infrastructure was in these 
northern latitudes. Cell phones networks, roads, even bike lanes were ubiquitous. 
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To me, the work done in the European Far North to build infrastructure and professional links 
crystallized in the Norwegian town of Kirkenes. The history of the town was fascinating in its own 
right – a common Norwegian/Russian district until 1826 (and Sami before colonization), occupied 
by Nazi Germany and then taken over by the Russian army towards the end of World War II.  
And then of course there’s the geographical aspect – it’s further east than even Istanbul or St. 
Petersburg.  It occupies a unique place in the northern European context. 
 
In the picture above, you can see the coastal waters leading to the Barents Sea, taken from the Kirkenes 
heights. 
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Today, Kirkenes styles itself as an epicenter of the Barents region, which encompasses the 
northernmost parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia. When these Russian parts are 
included, the Barents region could easily be considered the most populated part of the Arctic.  
Here it is possible to perceive the sometimes conflicting currents of European integration, EU-
Russian military concerns, environmental issues, and through it all, the desire to continue 
cooperation and trade. 
While in the town of Kirkenes, I was pulled between two contradictory thoughts. First, Kirkenes 
was indeed very far away, on the margins of Europe, at the every edge of Norway. The town itself, 
though tidy and well built, is small – with a population of 3500 people.   
On the other hand, Kirkenes is the center of the Barents region, an area that always seems to be 
on the cusp of attracting the world’s attention, whether for natural resource extraction, military 
maneuvres, or something else.  The town is only 20 minutes from Russia and 40 minutes from 
Finland. I could well imagine that this town buzzed with expectation a few years ago, when 
European relations with Russia were at a higher level than currently.  Now, the atmosphere seemed 
to be one of waiting. Or, to be more diplomatic, anticipation. 
After our time in Finland and Norway, we visited Russia for several days. For an American like 
myself, the European Arctic is accessible, but the Russian Arctic feels different. Of course, a big 
reason is the recent downturn in relations between Russia and the West, as well as the palpable 
weight of the government. Checkpoints were many, and it was unclear what or why they were 
checking papers so often. 
 
 
A picture of the factory city of Nikel, near the Norwegian/Russian border 
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We spent many hours in the bus, driving through areas that wouldn’t seem out of place in Norway 
or Finland – swift-flowing rivers and thousands of square miles of forest. Other areas, like the 
massive factories and smelters on the road to Murmansk had clearly ruined the vegetation of the 
surrounding area. 
After a few days in Russia, we returned to the nearly empty town of Rovaniemi. The only work 
going on was in the Christmas village, as workers prepared to expand even more. It seems the 
interest in the Arctic – especially in the Winter – never stops. 
 
 
Sunset near the Arctic Russian town of Kirovsk 
 
As a non-academic, I wasn’t sure how much I could contribute to the Calotte Academy, but I’m 
so thrilled to have participated. Not only did I learn about a wide variety of issues I wouldn’t ever 
have understood before, but there is a certain rhythm of traveling together on a bus that stands 
the test of time. It was the perfect introduction to the European and Russian Arctic. I was left with 
an impression of a region of great possibility – and great uncertainty.  Because of the many changes 
going on in the Arctic, it’s unclear whether the Barents region will become central in the way it 
had been in recent history, or whether it will recede and become even more of a backwater. Given 
the amount of attention, and the patient, deliberate building of relationships that I witnessed, my 
bet is this area will grow in importance in the decades to come.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Check out the Arctic Yearbook 2018 Special 
Section on China & the Arctic at: 
 
https://arcticyearbook.com/arctic-
yearbook/2018/china-the-arctic  

